Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Valmy]

I mean Donald Trump's toxic influence alone co-existed with the Soviet Union for over a decade. Putin didn't invent him...unless it was a KGB op or something.

[Josquius]

Pretty cool.
Yak propeller plane vs drone.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/06/10/another-world-war-i-style-dogfight-raged-over-ukraine-as-a-ukrainian-yak-52-with-a-rear-gunner-engaged-a-russian-drone/

[frunk]

I mean Donald Trump's toxic influence alone co-existed with the Soviet Union for over a decade. Putin didn't invent him...unless it was a KGB op or something.

I broadly agree that we can't blame domestic political issues entirely on Russia, but Trump is a bad example.  He has ties to shady Russian interests going back to the mid 80s.

[Valmy]

I mean Donald Trump's toxic influence alone co-existed with the Soviet Union for over a decade. Putin didn't invent him...unless it was a KGB op or something.

I broadly agree that we can't blame domestic political issues entirely on Russia, but Trump is a bad example.  He has ties to shady Russian interests going back to the mid 80s.

Damn maybe he was the result of a KGB op 

[DGuller]

Saying Trump was a KGB op is displaying ignorance of how KGB works, because it mock assumes that KGB can see into the future.  Of course KGB couldn't predict that Trump would be at this level of politics decades later.  However, they don't have to.  It's a numbers games, you start dossiers on thousands of stupid Americans who gave up kompromat on themselves, and just wait and see if an opportunity arises.  There are lots of places where a person compromised by KGB can be of use to them, if they make it there many years later.

[grumbler]

Pretty cool.
Yak propeller plane vs drone.

https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/06/10/another-world-war-i-style-dogfight-raged-over-ukraine-as-a-ukrainian-yak-52-with-a-rear-gunner-engaged-a-russian-drone/

That tactic makes perfect sense when you have the full scoop, but it sounds unreal when first discovered.  Thanks for sharing.

[The Minsky Moment]

Yeah.

The advantage of the theory is that it is coherent and fits the available evidence reasonably well. It doesn't mean it's correct, however.

Every confrontation involving nuclear armed powers since WW2 necessarily involves escalation management. The notion that escalation management is distinct from and even contradictory of other strategic considerations is not right; escalation management is necessarily integrated into strategic planning.  This is not a privileging of US against Ukrainian interests; it is obviously not in Ukraine's interest to become a target of "tactical" nuclear strikes.

The theory that the swings in the Russia-Ukraine war can be explained by reference to US escalation management policy is not supported by the facts and overstates the importance of the US to events on the ground.  US policy had little effect either on the initial Russian incursions nor the successful Ukraine counters in the early stages of the war, as these had to be fought primarily with pre-existing resources. The fortunes of war have ebbed and flowed because that is the nature of war generally and because of the specific dynamics of the contending forces, the environment and terrain, and the current technological regime. US supply and aid has been a significant factor, but one among several. And the principal determinant of the flow of US aid has been political dynamics in Congress, not US strategic doctrine.

[Threviel]

Yes, but limitations on weapons by Ukraine is decided solely by the White house, no?

So it is a complex "game" with many players and my thinking is that the Biden administration overthinks the risks of escalation. But of course, when it comes to global thermonuclear war it's perhaps fitting to overthink.

[crazy canuck]

Re: understanding Biden's policy decisions, here's another analysis of what his administration could be thinking:

There is no evidence to support his claim the Americans have been carefully managing the flow of weaponry.  You would have to believe that the DEMS and GOP were working together to delay the arms shipment.

This is the third video I have now seen from this guy which you have posted in which he makes dubious claims completely unsupported by evidence.

[Sheilbh]

Every confrontation involving nuclear armed powers since WW2 necessarily involves escalation management. The notion that escalation management is distinct from and even contradictory of other strategic considerations is not right; escalation management is necessarily integrated into strategic planning.  This is not a privileging of US against Ukrainian interests; it is obviously not in Ukraine's interest to become a target of "tactical" nuclear strikes.

Yeah, my understanding is that Russia has a published nuclear doctrine which is clear and that the West understands/interprets in a consistent way. In addition again from my understanding Russian nukes are disassembled, stored in separate locations which reinforces the escalatory ladder that they have in their nuclear doctrine because it would be visible to any power with a satellite if Russia was staring to move the parts for assembly.

There was recently a security event at St Petersburg where they had a host who was more mad and enthusiastic than violence interviewing Putin and was proposing stuff around nukes. Putin's response was basically saying no, pointing to Russia's clear and well-communicated nuclear doctrine but noting that it is a "living document". So perhaps there could be some introduction of tactical nukes. Obviously the benefit of a more inflamatory host is allowing Putin to be the reasonable one but also, perhaps, a bit of pitch rolling for updating Russia's doctrine.

I'd also add the other player in this is China. From my understanding in the early days of the war when Putin was throwing around a lot of nuclear talk (which he's stopped doing) China made it very clear that was unacceptable to them and it was reined in. This was around the same time that Poland announced they'd be providing Ukraine with planes - from what I've read there were very high level communications from Beijing to Washington that this was unacceptable/was a red line for China and the US didn't get Poland to walk it back but did stop the planes going.

Although, I'm not sure why it's more of a concern now than when Russia was verbally far more threatening about nukes.

Having said that I think you're right on escalations but I'm not sure the immediate risks is nukes. As you say that's a threat that's been with us since WW2 of navigating each other's nuclear posture. But I think Russia's view is that any attack made in Russia (of which there have been many including sabotage) is only happening because of the West and Western support - I don't think diminishing Ukrainian agency is just spin, I think the Russian state genuinely sees everything Ukraine does as an action of the West because Ukraine doesn't have agency.

We've already seen a few sabotage attacks in Europe (UK and Spain definitely) linked to Russia. Either Russian sympathisers or just hiring some thugs. I think that's probably where their escalation would focus in the short term. Relatively deniable (like the West using Ukraine) attacks on Western infrastructure particularly related to supporting Ukraine: logistics, manufacturing sites etc. That would be an escalation - it also strikes me as perhaps a particular risk in the US.

I think they could also increase their attacks on civilian infrastructure in Ukraine which has been bad but probably not all of what Russia could do (again this was an area Putin was pushed on in St Petersburg). That type of attack though I suspect carries the implicit message that they've given up on "winning".

[Jacob]

Every confrontation involving nuclear armed powers since WW2 necessarily involves escalation management. The notion that escalation management is distinct from and even contradictory of other strategic considerations is not right; escalation management is necessarily integrated into strategic planning.  This is not a privileging of US against Ukrainian interests; it is obviously not in Ukraine's interest to become a target of "tactical" nuclear strikes.

The theory that the swings in the Russia-Ukraine war can be explained by reference to US escalation management policy is not supported by the facts and overstates the importance of the US to events on the ground.  US policy had little effect either on the initial Russian incursions nor the successful Ukraine counters in the early stages of the war, as these had to be fought primarily with pre-existing resources. The fortunes of war have ebbed and flowed because that is the nature of war generally and because of the specific dynamics of the contending forces, the environment and terrain, and the current technological regime. US supply and aid has been a significant factor, but one among several. And the principal determinant of the flow of US aid has been political dynamics in Congress, not US strategic doctrine.

My understanding is that things like allowing allies to transfer specific armaments and relevant training (like the F16) and putting restrictions on targets by location is fully within the discretion of the administration.

Do you reckon the pace of how permissions have been rolled out is/was determined by the political dynamics in Congress (i.e. Biden made commitments to Congress in this area to secure their support)?

[Jacob]

This is the third video I have now seen from this guy which you have posted in which he makes dubious claims completely unsupported by evidence.

I don't remember what the first one was, as it's a while ago. The second video had the advantage of making predictions which can be evaluated against how things actually transpired.

At the time the video was made, the Russians had been making gains, there was a bit of a media panic, and some folks were bandying about scenarios like "Ukrainian collapse".

Puck Nielsen made the observation that Russian gains were tactical in scale. While not documented specifically in the video, that's easy enough to fact check and turns out to be true.

Secondly, he made the prediction that the Russian offensive was going to stall without further gains and that momentum would slowly swing towards the Ukrainians over the coming months as newly announced Western materiel made its way to the frontlines. In other words, the Russian offensive was about to culminate without having a major impact and there was no need to panic.

So far events have developed pretty much as Puck Nielsen predicted. The folks who were fretting about a Ukrainian collapse and worried about major Russian offensives and gains can relax as those scenarios did not materialize.

I watch all his videos. Typically when he's talked about how the conflict is likely developing in the next few months he's been pretty much right on the money. So I tend to hold his analysis in high regard.

This most recent video I shared is a bit outside of the "events on the ground" analysis, and therefore I'm more inclined to question it. Nonetheless, again it has the advantage that we can see how future events conforms to the hypothesis - will the support from the Biden administration (and Western allies, or at least those who take their cues from the Biden administration) surge and provide a hard stop when Ukraine is on its back foot? And will it continue to keep restrictions in place that prevent Ukraine from delivering its objectives of regaining all its lost territory and hurting Russia enough that it gives up its imperial ambitions in Ukraine?

Time will tell.

[The Minsky Moment]

My understanding is that things like allowing allies to transfer specific armaments and relevant training (like the F16) and putting restrictions on targets by location is fully within the discretion of the administration.

Do you reckon the pace of how permissions have been rolled out is/was determined by the political dynamics in Congress (i.e. Biden made commitments to Congress in this area to secure their support)?

I think political dynamics may play some role - i.e. the administration may not want certain news reports to come out while key bills are negotiated - but the bigger point is that whatever restrictions may or may not be imposed on certain weapons systems or their use are relatively minor considerations in the outcome of the war.  It's not surprising that a lot of attention is paid to those factors, because certain marquee weapons systems are cool and fun to talk about, and because it truly is an area where the President enjoys significant discretion and thus it is an area of policy that could be debated and changed.  But a far more significant contributor to Ukraine's success is the overall flow of money and critically needed supplies.

[Jacob]

I think political dynamics may play some role - i.e. the administration may not want certain news reports to come out while key bills are negotiated - but the bigger point is that whatever restrictions may or may not be imposed on certain weapons systems or their use are relatively minor considerations in the outcome of the war.  It's not surprising that a lot of attention is paid to those factors, because certain marquee weapons systems are cool and fun to talk about, and because it truly is an area where the President enjoys significant discretion and thus it is an area of policy that could be debated and changed.  But a far more significant contributor to Ukraine's success is the overall flow of money and critically needed supplies.

I think things like targeting restrictions have played a non-trivial role; being able to hit the sites in Russia that have launched serious attacks on various fronts and civilian targets would - I expect - at the very least have had a tactical impact. I don't know, though.

I'm unsure about the marquee systems, as I don't have enough of a grasp of their actual impact on shaping the battlefield to really have a strong opinion. I can definitely see how they're overvalued in the public discourse - as you say, they're fun to talk about it - but what's the likely actual impact when they come online? How much of hype is over hype? I don't know.

[The Minsky Moment]

Yeah, my understanding is that Russia has a published nuclear doctrine which is clear and that the West understands/interprets in a consistent way.

Let's be concrete. Unlike the US, Russian doctrine calls for direct battlefield use of lower yield nuclear weapons in certain situations and the Russian arsenal includes significant quantities and types of such weapons.  The doctrine since the late 90s authorizes their use "in response to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation." The doctrine incorporates the idea of "escalation to de-escalate" - i.e. the idea of using nuclear weapons to salvage a poor conventional situation and shock the adversary into negotiation, rather than escalate further.  It exploits the reality that the US lacks both the equipment and doctrine for proportional response to low yield battlefield nuclear weapons, and thus would face a difficult choice of either escalating further up the nuclear ladder or adopting some non-nuclear response.

To take one hypothetical but conceivable example, if h Russian conventional forces in the south collapsed and began retreating in disorder to Crimea and beyond, the doctrine would be implicated.