Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[crazy canuck]

Who can tell Jacob what he really meant, CC or Grumbler? Stay tuned!

Jacob told us what he really meant.  Why is that so hard to understand?

[Jacob]

Jacob told us what he really meant.  Why is that so hard to understand?

That got a genuine laugh from me

[grumbler]

I suppose there is a language barrier because if you read Jacob's explanation of what he meant he said the information available to him. 

Now we could go down the rabbit who of what information available to him but it seems pretty clear in most English speaking countries it means the information he has seen.

The problem of course goes beyond there semantics you have raised.  Rather the statements he makes about the accuracy of anything becomes meaningless because it is based on an entirely subjective view of what might be accurate.

Make a claim that something is consistent with the evidence has got to have some objective standard or it is entirely meaningless.  It simply  becomes a statement that this is what the person believes to be true based on who knows what information or misinformation they have seen.

Jacob is certainly arguing that he is basing his evaluation of the expertise of Puck Nielson at least in part on the fact that PN is quoted in Scandi papers as an expert, as a response to your sneer that Jake should only pay attention to what appears in newspapers and not online.

Nowhere do I see any trace of a Jake claim to possess unique information.  Your assertion that he is claiming to have information no one else has must be due to some language difficulty, as you are a smart guy and clearly cannot believe that Jake has some way of collecting information that no one else has (required for his information to be unique).

[grumbler]

Who can tell Jacob what he really meant, CC or Grumbler? Stay tuned!

   I see that we have another person with poor reading comprehension skills.

I am questioning what CC is saying, not trying to interpret what Jake is saying (which seems straightforward to me).

Maybe you and CC can get a discount if you sign up for a reading comprehension class together.

[The Minsky Moment]

The US has both the equipment and doctrine to employ low-yield nuclear weapons (the B61 has a selectable yield, one setting being 0.3KT, lower than that of any Russian nuclear weapon).  I would agree that the US doctrine favors, wherever possible, prompt precise conventional counterforce attacks to destroy enemy launchers and weapons, rather then relying solely on a nuclear response.  However, a low-yield US nuclear response is also part of that doctrine and is exercised (by NATO as well as the US).  The NATO nations just don't use nuclear training as an element of foreign policy.

My recollection when the new B61 program was announced last year was that there was commentary to the effect that the existing arsenal was sparse and was not in a sufficient state of readiness to be deployed on short notice. The point of the new program was to fill a perceived gap.

Since these weapons are based in NATO bases in Europe, would host country permission be needed to release for use?  I don't know the protocol on that.

[Zanza]

The nuclear weapons are under US control until they are armed and installed on the partner nation's aircraft which delivers them. So both partners are needed to use the weapon.

[The Minsky Moment]

On the broader question, this is a long war of endurance. Tactical performance matters, and tactical flexibility in employment of weapons systems matters, but it has to be seen in context. The key to victory is not whether a temporary advantage can be exploited on a particular front at a particular instant, but how well Ukraine's military and society can stand up to the strains of war. Germany in WW2 put a great deal of faith in particular superior weapons systems, but whatever advantages they obtained were far from decisive.  During the Cold War, both the US and the Soviets found that bringing superior weapons and tech to a battlefield against people fighting for perceived national survival was not always decisive.  This war will not be won or lost based on the precise identity of the airframes flown by the Ukrainian Airforce.  It may be won or lost in the legislatures of the United States and Europe.

[Jacob]

On the broader question, this is a long war of endurance. Tactical performance matters, and tactical flexibility in employment of weapons systems matters, but it has to be seen in context. The key to victory is not whether a temporary advantage can be exploited on a particular front at a particular instant, but how well Ukraine's military and society can stand up to the strains of war. Germany in WW2 put a great deal of faith in particular superior weapons systems, but whatever advantages they obtained were far from decisive.  During the Cold War, both the US and the Soviets found that bringing superior weapons and tech to a battlefield against people fighting for perceived national survival was not always decisive.  This war will not be won or lost based on the precise identity of the airframes flown by the Ukrainian Airforce.  It may be won or lost in the legislatures of the United States and Europe.

Agreed, but with the addition that it also depends on how well Russia's military and society can stand up to the strains of war.

[grumbler]

My recollection when the new B61 program was announced last year was that there was commentary to the effect that the existing arsenal was sparse and was not in a sufficient state of readiness to be deployed on short notice. The point of the new program was to fill a perceived gap.

The US has maintained a ready stockpile of 100 B61 warheads in Europe, with another several hundred (exact numbers classified) in the US reserve or undergoing maintenance and upgrade.

The US was confident that several hundred warheads would be enough in the event of a limited nuclear war, since that was greater than the number needed in an exchange so limited as to not trigger a wider war.  I believe that the replacement/modernization program just begun was a response to warhead lifespan issues more than it was to some belief that the US and Russia or China would be able to employ more than a few hundreds of nuclear weapons without any escalation.  US weapons need to be enough to convince an opponent that the opponent cannot escalate to nuclear warfare without facing nuclear weapons themselves.  They don't need to be numerous enough to "win" such a war nor to match Russian inventories.

Since these weapons are based in NATO bases in Europe, would host country permission be needed to release for use?  I don't know the protocol on that.

The forward-deployed nukes are NATO assets and require permission of both the host and the US.

[The Minsky Moment]

According to news reports about half the B61s are at Incirlik; Russia will likely assume those would not be released unless Turkey itself was threatened.

[grumbler]

According to news reports about half the B61s are at Incirlik; Russia will likely assume those would not be released unless Turkey itself was threatened.

B61s are transportable.  I don't think the Russians are basing their gamble on melting the planet on the present location of a handful of B61s.

[Tamas]

BTW in terms of Russia's strength and chances: what I feel like analysts ignore is that it is Russia constantly threatening nuclear escalation, not the various Western countries. If things are going so well for you, why would you constantly threaten M.A.D.?

[The Minsky Moment]

B61s are transportable.  I don't think the Russians are basing their gamble on melting the planet on the present location of a handful of B61s.

That's true. It's also true that finding a new host country willing to take 50+ B61s for immediate use against a nuclear armed opponent that already crossed the nuclear threshold may be more complicated than just arranging the transport.

[grumbler]

That's true. It's also true that finding a new host country willing to take 50+ B61s for immediate use against a nuclear armed opponent that already crossed the nuclear threshold may be more complicated than just arranging the transport.

Again, the issue as you raised it was "Russia will likely assume those would not be released unless Turkey itself was threatened."  The question is not what would happen; the question is what Russia will have to assume. If they are calculating their chances to be successful in nuclear weapon use without melting the world, they are going to plan based on NATO capabilities, not their assumptions about NATO intentions.

[Tamas]

Who can tell Jacob what he really meant, CC or Grumbler? Stay tuned!

   I see that we have another person with poor reading comprehension skills.

I am questioning what CC is saying, not trying to interpret what Jake is saying (which seems straightforward to me).

Maybe you and CC can get a discount if you sign up for a reading comprehension class together.

Yes but my comment was funnier this way.