Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[grumbler]

Who can tell Jacob what he really meant, CC or Grumbler? Stay tuned!

   I see that we have another person with poor reading comprehension skills.

I am questioning what CC is saying, not trying to interpret what Jake is saying (which seems straightforward to me).

Maybe you and CC can get a discount if you sign up for a reading comprehension class together.

Yes but my comment was funnier this way.

So was mine.

[Legbiter]

BTW in terms of Russia's strength and chances: what I feel like analysts ignore is that it is Russia constantly threatening nuclear escalation, not the various Western countries. If things are going so well for you, why would you constantly threaten M.A.D.?

Because it works on Germany, Austria, Hungary and semi-effectively the US (Jake Sullivan apparently read Red Storm Rising and never mentally recovered)...

It makes the following nations dust off their own nuclear weapons plans; Poland, Finland, Estonia, Sweden.

[Legbiter]

BTW in terms of Russia's strength and chances: what I feel like analysts ignore is that it is Russia constantly threatening nuclear escalation, not the various Western countries. If things are going so well for you, why would you constantly threaten M.A.D.?

Ok no black humor, so long as the NATO alliance can keep the Ukrainians in the fight throughout this summer in matérial and ammo then the industrial might of the West will seriously begin to tell late next year.

[Jacob]

Ok no black humor, so long as the NATO alliance can keep the Ukrainians in the fight throughout this summer in matérial and ammo then the industrial might of the West will seriously begin to tell late next year.

... as long as Putinist fellow travelers in the West don't derail the support by then.

If we get Trump in the White House and the AdF become load-bearing for a new coalition in Germany it could still be pretty dicey. I don't know how much damage Putinist fellow travelers can do if they get a majority in the upcoming French parliamentary elections.

But hopefully the scenario plays out as you propose

[Legbiter]

Canada will save the day.

[The Minsky Moment]

If they are calculating their chances to be successful in nuclear weapon use without melting the world, they are going to plan based on NATO capabilities, not their assumptions about NATO intentions.

They are going to be making judgments on the likelihood and risks of escalation in response to a limited battlefield use of a low yield weapon, knowing that the US lacks the quantity and variety of such weapons that Russia has and knowing that there are external constraints on the US ability to use them. The immediate risk is not melting the world, because Russia will likely assume that the response to a single low yield strike will not be an all-out nuclear attack on Russia by the US.  The Russians have the ability to escalate (or refrain from esacalation) incrementally before that point is reached.  The US will also have to take into account that Russian strategic decision-making may not follow strict Weberian bureaucratic processes but may include idiosyncratic personal elements. The Russians (and Putin personally) will also know the US will be factoring that consideration.  It's a complex game theory problem and the mere fact that a capability exists doesn't determine an outcome. But I think you basically agree with that based on your earlier comment in the thread about the likely thinking of the Biden security team.

[Tonitrus]

I think perhaps the only realistic chance of Russia risking a low-yield nuclear weapon would be if it were facing the imminent loss of Crimea.  And even that is iffy (where would you drop it except the peninsula itself?). 

The way they've treated conscripts from the Donetsk regions as cannon-fodder, maybe even the loss of those areas.  But short of a formal/signed end to the conflict (and maybe even with one), that region will alway be a mess of conflict; low-level if not large-scale.

[grumbler]

I think perhaps the only realistic chance of Russia risking a low-yield nuclear weapon would be if it were facing the imminent loss of Crimea.  And even that is iffy (where would you drop it except the peninsula itself?). 

That was one of the Puck Nielson observations that I found most salient:  that a Russian use of tactical nuclear weapons is useless unless they have the operational reserves to exploit such use.  Russian has never had such a reserve in the entire history of their invasion, so the chances that they can assemble one now seems remote.  Any effort to assemble such a reserve invites defeat in detail before they can exploit it, and in any case signals some desire to engage in tactical nuclear warfare, so the latter would not take the West by surprise.

[Tonitrus]

Indeed.  Any use would likely just be a weak spoiler move (lolz, we'll drop it on the neck of the Crimean peninsula while the Ukrainians are trying to enter!) with little actual gain...other than "See!  We're serious!" to try and push the escalation needle up a notch.  But I would hope any level of nuclear use will trigger worldwide responses that make it an immediate loser of an idea.

[Jacob]

General question for the thread: do you have any go-to analysts or commenters who you think are insightful on this war?

[Admiral Yi]

There was a Lt. Gen Hodges ret who I thought was acing all the calls in the first 9 months of the war.  Then he got it wrong.  He called Russian collapse this summer.  He said Crimea and Donbass overrun. 

I propose we start making some book to sharpen our predictive skills. 

[Josquius]

Any particular reason why he got it wrong?

[Admiral Yi]

He never laid out his reasoning.  Kind of a *wave your hands* deterioration argument.

[Tamas]

Summer has 2.5 months to go

[Crazy_Ivan80]

He never laid out his reasoning.  Kind of a *wave your hands* deterioration argument.

I'm guessing he assumed western aid would be more energetic and the AFU more successful wth their operations.
Too much optimism as it where.