Iran warns the US carrier against returning to the Persian gulf

[Kleves]

Interesting, grumbler. It does seem a little silly for the general to complain he was robbed of his victory. Or is there actually some career advantage to being the victorious hero of one of these exercises?

Didn't Zhukov kick ass in a pre-WWII Red Army wargame when playing as the Germans? He wasn't shot, so it must have helped his career.

[Admiral Yi]

I think Vinegar Joe got points for playing the bad guys well too.

[grumbler]

Yeah, interesting stuff. Sounds like the good general is grandstanding.

I guess that goes with having an awesomely appropriate name. 

Somebody who played the game well was Admiral Bobby Inman.  Back in the early and mid-1980s, he was with the CIA and then the defense Science Board, and had a particular interest in the US Navy's assumptions about Soviet strategies in the event of a protracted conventional war.  He was particularly concerned that the USN assumed that the Soviets would employ the bulk of their front-line SSNs escorting and protecting their boomers, and proposed as an alternate scenario that the Soviets be assumed to withdraw their SSBns into the Kara Sea, use a fraction of their SSNs to keep the USN out of the Kara Sea, and release the rest of the SSN force against the allied sea lines of communication and any carriers that tried to enter the Norwegian Sea.

No one was interested in testing the potential significance his "wacky idea" on US strategy.  The annual ASW command post exercises (in which I participated as a support analyst) never had his scenario. 

Inman, though, was smart.  He talked with Tom Clancy, then writing a follow-up to The Hunt for the Red October, and, in passing, noted how neat it would be if the book included an innovative Soviet strategy, like the "Bastion Strategy" of moving their SSBNs into a Kara Sea "bastion" and sending their SSNs after the allied SLOC and carriers.  Clancy included this concept in his 1986 novel Red Storm Rising (I never heard definitively whether the Iceland Takeover part of the scenario was Inman's idea, or Clancy's, but it never made it into the scenario list).

From the time that book came out, the audience for the annual ASW strategy conferences/wargames assumed that the scenario Clancy outlines was the default strategy for the Soviets, and tended to reject strategies that didn't agree with what Clancy had proposed in his novel.  It wasn't that the audience thought that Clancy's book was "real," it was just that they carried with them, after reading the book (and everyone in the budiness read that book), a feeling that they "knew' what a real strategy looked like.  Inman's scenario became the baseline.

And he was right.  The US got its clock cleaned in that scenario.  Inman was a genius and his tactic here changed US ASW procurement and strategy profoundly.

[Darth Wagtaros]

And now you know the rest of the story.

[lustindarkness]

Yeah, interesting stuff. Sounds like the good general is grandstanding.

I guess that goes with having an awesomely appropriate name. 

Somebody who played the game well was Admiral Bobby Inman.  Back in the early and mid-1980s, he was with the CIA and then the defense Science Board, and had a particular interest in the US Navy's assumptions about Soviet strategies in the event of a protracted conventional war.  He was particularly concerned that the USN assumed that the Soviets would employ the bulk of their front-line SSNs escorting and protecting their boomers, and proposed as an alternate scenario that the Soviets be assumed to withdraw their SSBns into the Kara Sea, use a fraction of their SSNs to keep the USN out of the Kara Sea, and release the rest of the SSN force against the allied sea lines of communication and any carriers that tried to enter the Norwegian Sea.

No one was interested in testing the potential significance his "wacky idea" on US strategy.  The annual ASW command post exercises (in which I participated as a support analyst) never had his scenario. 

Inman, though, was smart.  He talked with Tom Clancy, then writing a follow-up to The Hunt for the Red October, and, in passing, noted how neat it would be if the book included an innovative Soviet strategy, like the "Bastion Strategy" of moving their SSBNs into a Kara Sea "bastion" and sending their SSNs after the allied SLOC and carriers.  Clancy included this concept in his 1986 novel Red Storm Rising (I never heard definitively whether the Iceland Takeover part of the scenario was Inman's idea, or Clancy's, but it never made it into the scenario list).

From the time that book came out, the audience for the annual ASW strategy conferences/wargames assumed that the scenario Clancy outlines was the default strategy for the Soviets, and tended to reject strategies that didn't agree with what Clancy had proposed in his novel.  It wasn't that the audience thought that Clancy's book was "real," it was just that they carried with them, after reading the book (and everyone in the budiness read that book), a feeling that they "knew' what a real strategy looked like.  Inman's scenario became the baseline.

And he was right.  The US got its clock cleaned in that scenario.  Inman was a genius and his tactic here changed US ASW procurement and strategy profoundly.

I find this more interesting than the Gen Van Riper story.

[The Minsky Moment]

Here's a totally different question:
Why hasn't Oman upgraded its port facilities and pipeline connections to allow for the export of more oil bypassing the Straits of Hormuz?  Or alternatively why haven't the other Gulf states come together to facilitate something like that?

[alfred russel]

Yeah, interesting stuff. Sounds like the good general is grandstanding.

I guess that goes with having an awesomely appropriate name. 

Somebody who played the game well was Admiral Bobby Inman.  Back in the early and mid-1980s, he was with the CIA and then the defense Science Board, and had a particular interest in the US Navy's assumptions about Soviet strategies in the event of a protracted conventional war.  He was particularly concerned that the USN assumed that the Soviets would employ the bulk of their front-line SSNs escorting and protecting their boomers, and proposed as an alternate scenario that the Soviets be assumed to withdraw their SSBns into the Kara Sea, use a fraction of their SSNs to keep the USN out of the Kara Sea, and release the rest of the SSN force against the allied sea lines of communication and any carriers that tried to enter the Norwegian Sea.

No one was interested in testing the potential significance his "wacky idea" on US strategy.  The annual ASW command post exercises (in which I participated as a support analyst) never had his scenario. 

Inman, though, was smart.  He talked with Tom Clancy, then writing a follow-up to The Hunt for the Red October, and, in passing, noted how neat it would be if the book included an innovative Soviet strategy, like the "Bastion Strategy" of moving their SSBNs into a Kara Sea "bastion" and sending their SSNs after the allied SLOC and carriers.  Clancy included this concept in his 1986 novel Red Storm Rising (I never heard definitively whether the Iceland Takeover part of the scenario was Inman's idea, or Clancy's, but it never made it into the scenario list).

From the time that book came out, the audience for the annual ASW strategy conferences/wargames assumed that the scenario Clancy outlines was the default strategy for the Soviets, and tended to reject strategies that didn't agree with what Clancy had proposed in his novel.  It wasn't that the audience thought that Clancy's book was "real," it was just that they carried with them, after reading the book (and everyone in the budiness read that book), a feeling that they "knew' what a real strategy looked like.  Inman's scenario became the baseline.

And he was right.  The US got its clock cleaned in that scenario.  Inman was a genius and his tactic here changed US ASW procurement and strategy profoundly.

What would be interesting is the story of what the Soviet tactics actually were, and whether anyone was right in thier predictions.

[The Minsky Moment]

Here's a totally different question:
Why hasn't Oman upgraded its port facilities and pipeline connections to allow for the export of more oil bypassing the Straits of Hormuz?  Or alternatively why haven't the other Gulf states come together to facilitate something like that?

Never mind, figured out the answer.
There is a big project to do just this with a pipeline outletting in the UAE emirate of Fujairah, which fronts out on the Sea of Oman.

[dps]

Interesting, grumbler. It does seem a little silly for the general to complain he was robbed of his victory. Or is there actually some career advantage to being the victorious hero of one of these exercises?

Didn't Zhukov kick ass in a pre-WWII Red Army wargame when playing as the Germans? He wasn't shot, so it must have helped his career.

Actually, as I understand it, the Red Army did 2 separate wargames on the subject of countering a German attack with the players changing sides after the 1st game.  Contrary to what has generally been reported, the Soviet side eventually won both times, but the Germans were able to initially gain far more territory and cause a lot more casualties than the Soviets had expected.  The boost the games provided to Zhukov's career apparantly had more to do with his recommendations about how to remedy the problems with Soviet forces that had been revealed by the wargames than his actual performance in the games.

[Ed Anger]

Stalin devalued his games by punching the counters out.

[Berkut]

But did he clip them???

I bet not...

[Ed Anger]

He sent them to Counter Clipping Gulag #3.

[grumbler]

What would be interesting is the story of what the Soviet tactics actually were, and whether anyone was right in thier predictions.

Interesting in a different way, yes.  Inman outflanked his opposition by planting his preferred Red strategy in a work of popular fiction, changing the question from "why should we suppose a bastion strategy?" to "why shouldn't we suppose a bastion strategy?" in a Top Secret military CPX.  That was frickin' genius, IMO.  It didn't matter what strategy the Soviets were actually contemplating, in that sense.  A good strategy has to account for the worst that an enemy could do, not what you think he is going to do.

I briefed Inman and the Defense Science Board several times.  He always was the smartest guy on the board, and asked the best questions.  He was hell on lazy or hazy assumptions.

[jimmy olsen]

Looks like Iran's economy will take a big hit.  Will this make them desperate enough to lash out? Stay tuned...

http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/05/world/europe/europe-moves-toward-ban-on-iran-oil.html

E.U. Countries Take Step Toward Oil Embargo on Iran
By STEVEN ERLANGER
Published: January 4, 2012

PARIS — The countries of the European Union have taken their boldest step so far in the increasingly tense standoff with Iran over its nuclear program, agreeing in principle to impose an embargo on Iranian oil, French and European diplomats said on Wednesday.

A final decision by the European Union will not come before the end of January and would be implemented in stages to avoid major disruptions in global oil supplies. But the move by some of Iran's most important oil customers appears to underscore the resolve of Western allies to impose toughest round of sanctions on Iran to date, increasing pressure on Tehran to stop enriching uranium and negotiate an end to what Western leaders argue is an accelerating program to build a nuclear bomb.

Tehran denies any military intent and refuses to stop enrichment of uranium for what it describes as civilian purposes. But it has responded to the threat of new American and European sanctions by a series of military and diplomatic threats. It has test-fired new missiles, threatened to shut the Strait of Hormuz to shipping, held naval war games, announced the production of its first nuclear-fuel rod and, on Tuesday, warned an American aircraft carrier not to return to the Persian Gulf. It also said that it wanted to reopen talks with the West on the nuclear issue, which was interpreted in Paris as an effort to buy time.

The threats from Tehran, aimed both at the West and at Israel, combined with a recent assessment by the International Atomic Energy Agency that Tehran's nuclear program has a military objective, is becoming an important issue in the American presidential campaign. Republican presidential candidates are urging stronger measures against Tehran, including some urging the use of military force, to stop the Islamic government from getting nuclear weaponry and to better protect Israel.

Israel itself has warned that time was running out to stop Iran from developing a nuclear weapon, given that Tehran has been moving its enrichment facilities deep into mountains, making it much harder to attack them militarily. Israel has called on Washington and the West to enhance sanctions to a more punishing level in order to get Iran to negotiate seriously and make the development of a nuclear weapon more costly for an economy already suffering from an array of financial and trade sanctions.

Last weekend, President Obama signed legislation aimed at sanctioning foreign companies that do business with Iran, which could reduce Iran's ability to sell its oil and other exports. Iran's first vice president, Mohammad-Reza Rahimi, then declared that if sanctions are imposed on Iranian oil exports, Iran would block shipping through the Strait of Hormuz.

While American officials discounted the threat as self-defeating for Iran, at the same time they said they had plans to keep the Strait open.

Iran has its own domestic politics, with parliamentary elections in March, and the government wants to show that it will protect Iran's interests, both economic and military.

The increasingly shrill tone from Tehran seemed a direct response, diplomats suggested, to economic sanctions that are finally biting hard and threaten to damage Iran's ability to export oil. Oil represents some 60 percent of Iran's economy, and oil exports are a vital source of foreign currency. In 2010, European countries bought some 18 percent of Iranian oil exports, with most of the rest going to Asia. So a European oil embargo would have a limited but significant effect on Iran, which depends heavily on its oil exports for cash to buy needed imports.

The United States and France has been pushing hard for an embargo and sanctions targeting Iran's central bank. But some European nations depend heavily on Iranian oil and have been reluctant to cut off their imports during a severe economic slump.

At the end of December, lower-ranking diplomats agreed in Brussels to the shape of a European oil embargo on Iran, vowing to meet objections by some states that have significant oil imports from Iran, including Italy, Spain and Greece.

[mongers]

Looks like Iran's economy will take a big hit.  Will this make them desperate enough to lash out? Stay tuned...

Tim Taint.

Thank God, nothing will happen this year, hopefully that'll the Syrians enough of a window of opportunity to throw out the Al-Assads.