The EU thread

[Jacob]

You could post your source...

I mean... while I'm far from confident that the EU + UK is in a good position to confidently beat Russia if it came to outright war,  it is a bit curious how Russia hasn't been using some of its 3,500+ airframes to turn the tide in Ukraine decisively.

Whatever the reason for that is (the numbers are inflated? Logistical issues? Ukrainian defenses are such that it's too risky to deploy?) will probably also apply in the case of a wider conflict with the EU + UK.

[Sheilbh]

I don't think Chinese fighters in Ukraine is more substantial than other random 3rd countries, like Colombians or whatever.

I also don't know if China sees it in their interest to actively support Russia to win in Ukraine and openly break with the EU.

I agree and I'd add there are Chinese citizens on both sides.

I also read an article about one Chinese citizen fighting for the Russians who explained his reason as being that he'd heard Japanese citizens were signing up to fight or Ukraine and he wants to fight Japanese. To an extent I can only respect that level of beef

But if China throws even a fraction of its production capacity towards supporting Russia, then Ukraine and the EU is going to be in big trouble IMO. I haven't seen any indication that it's on the table at this moment. China has, IMO, been quite restrained (thankfully).

Yeah - I agree. Although I can't help but think that's because they anticipate needing their own military equipment, which is less reassuring.

So, not great.  I question the readiness of French and British aircraft after decades of low military spending, if they can maintain a sustain campaign.  During the Libyan thing a decade ago they could not.

Money matters but it isn't everything - Germany spends as much as the UK or France (obviously lower as a share of GDP) but has a significantly less deployable military.

I'd argue more relevant than spending is that France has been fighting its forever war in the Sahel for the last decade until literally the last year or two and the British were in Afghanistan and Iraq for the duration. The RAF was helping shoot down Iranian missiles targeting Israel (with the US) and just two nights ago the RAF was helping the US in striking the Houthis.

There are absolutely gaps of capability in the UK and France - I think naval (although given the Black Sea I think Europe would probably be able to handle Russia navally), the "enablers" and also a broad military for interstate combat (in part because both countries have tried to find a bit of a niche within NATO). But the air forces of both countries (and the special forces) have been pretty active for the last few decades, often supporting the US.

[Jacob]

On Naval - Denmark recently announced they are getting 25 new ships (2024-2033)

Which is good, because apparently Danish naval capacity has been quietly rotting for a while.

[Razgovory]

You could post your source...

I mean... while I'm far from confident that the EU + UK is in a good position to confidently beat Russia if it came to outright war,  it is a bit curious how Russia hasn't been using some of its 3,500+ airframes to turn the tide in Ukraine decisively.

Whatever the reason for that is (the numbers are inflated? Logistical issues? Ukrainian defenses are such that it's too risky to deploy?) will probably also apply in the case of a wider conflict with the EU + UK.

Probably for several reasons, one is that SAMS make aircraft less useful, 2nd is that operating that many planes is expensive and Russia has been trying to do this on the cheap; they have only partially mobilized, 3rd is that planes can't take ground.

[Sheilbh]

Russia's in no way trying to do this on the cheap - they've moved in a really substantial way to a war economy even if, for political reasons, Putin is still hesitant over conscription (as Zelensky is).

I think that's one of the reasons I think Europe needs to prepare. Demobilising the economy (especially without significant sanctions relief) is going to be a pretty jolting shift and if you have a hammer...

[Valmy]

2nd is that operating that many planes is expensive and Russia has been trying to do this on the cheap;

Source that Russia is trying to do this on the cheap? They are tanking their entire economy, mortgaging their entire country's future on this war by throwing away hundreds of thousands of young people they desperately need (And driving a million more into exile), and risking the political legitimacy of their entire regime. The stakes could not be higher for them.

Yet you claim they are only using half measures? The Russians must be the biggest idiots in the history of the world if that is true. They could win this at any time but they CHOOSE to engage in an endless slogfest by only using half measures.

[Valmy]

I'm looking at this
https://www.wdmma.org/russian-air-force.php
https://www.wdmma.org/royal-air-force-britain.php
https://www.wdmma.org/french-air-force.php

So, not great.  I question the readiness of French and British aircraft after decades of low military spending, if they can maintain a sustain campaign.  During the Libyan thing a decade ago they could not.

LOL

But: https://www.wdmma.org/ukrainian-air-force.php

I guess going by this source, air forces are completely useless.

[Valmy]

You will just have to excuse my skepticism. After decades of Soviet and Russian military failure and just general un-impressiveness that they really are this mighty military machine that their paper strength constantly portrays them as.

My confidence the Euros can handle them is not so much a reflection of my admiration for European military capacity as it is for my expectations for Russian military incompetence.

[Razgovory]

2nd is that operating that many planes is expensive and Russia has been trying to do this on the cheap;

Source that Russia is trying to do this on the cheap? They are tanking their entire economy, mortgaging their entire country's future on this war by throwing away hundreds of thousands of young people they desperately need (And driving a million more into exile), and risking the political legitimacy of their entire regime. The stakes could not be higher for them.

Yet you claim they are only using half measures? The Russians must be the biggest idiots in the history of the world if that is true. They could win this at any time but they CHOOSE to engage in an endless slogfest by only using half measures.

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=RU

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_with_highest_military_expenditures

It's like 7% of GDP.  Ukraine is spending 34% of its GDP on military stuff.  In WW2 the US spent 40% of it's GDP on military.  That's full war production.  In 1968, during the Vietnam war the US spent 10% of the GDP on military.  So it is less than the US in Vietnam.  So yes, half measures.

[Valmy]

It's like 7% of GDP.  Ukraine is spending 34% of its GDP on military stuff.  In WW2 the US spent 40% of it's GDP on military.  That's full war production.  In 1968, during the Vietnam war the US spent 10% of the GDP on military.  So it is less than the US in Vietnam.  So yes, half measures.

Very cute. Oh Russia is actually VERY STONK!!!111 They just fail because they are not even trying. THEY ARE HOLDING THEIR BEST TROOPS BACK!

Bullshit. I mean Russia is a huge country with collapsing infrastructure and decaying cities. They probably do need to spend a bit more of their GDP just to keep the whole collapsing structure from failing.

But this whole Russia worship nonsense based on paper bullshit is a trick I have seen wheeled out for decades of Russian failure. I will believe it when I finally see non-half measures deployed. But it never will because this is just a lie. This is the best they can do.

They get zero benefit of the doubt from me. Show me. In real life, not on paper.

[Sheilbh]

It depends how you frame it - but a really important point is that Russia in the 2020s is in no way equivalent to the US (or Soviet Union) in 1941 or 1971. 7% of GDP on deence (excluding state subsidies to war production) - or roughly 40% the federal budget, or 20% of all state spending, which is roughly equivalent to US spending in Vietnam. It's also basically trebled from pre-war levels. And worth pointing out that basically every year in the war actual military spending at year end has been significantly (up to 60%) higher than budgeted - so I'm not sure if those numbers are budget or actual spending. If you add in spending on the "national economy" (basically subsidies to defence companies) then total spending on the war is well over 50% of Russia's federal budget is going on the war. I'd add that there's fairly significant quasi-state takeovers (particularly in the finance sector) either through restructuring or refinancing by the state.

Obviously Russian spending is constrained because it's largely been cut of from most sources of credit. It is running a very small budget deficit and has a very low debt-to-GDP ratio. There's some debt, some QE/central bank innovation, some tax rises but largely it's oil and gas exports that is paying for the war.

But I don't think that spending alone is the right way to understand it. I'd say you need to look at the economy overall. Unemployment is at a post-Soviet record low and there are labour shortages. But this is becoming a highly distorted because there's heavily subsidised war production running 24/7 (and army sign-up fees) - so there are very good wages in the war economy, but not elsewhere. As a consequence of the sanctions, central bank and war economy official inflation is running at just under 10% but some staples are at over 50% inflation and rates are over 20%. Obviously if you have a bifurcated labour market where basically the war economy is having money thrown at it but everything else is not that inflation is being felt very differently by different sectors. But it does look like domestic demand is pretty consistently outpacing supply - with labour being a key problem.

I also think it's worth looking at the other bits of the budget - social spending has been cut by about 20% and is now at less than 50% of the military budget, internal security has also been cut. On internal security the consequences look pretty clear - there's increasing reports of more and more open conflict within the organised crime world and as police/security salaries are not keeping pace with inflation (far less the wage growth of their military and military production comrades - spending on military production is higher than spending on internal security) there are a lot of reports of a return to low level pervasive corruption (not the big ticket stuff but extorting bribes from everyday people). There's also increasing reliance on regional government including paramilitary forces like Kadyrov's - but also other more normal governors - which will have consequences. On social welfare again a lot is being regionalised which will have consequences and there are other shifts - a lot of payments are being funnelled to war widows etc.

There's economic resilience which is a huge testament to the skill and creativity of Russia's technocrats, particularly in the central bank, but there are real challenges and it's profoundly distorting the Russian economy. I think the big sign of the gamble - or extent that Putin is all in - is that I think there's a risk that is being taken here. Putin's great legitimating success is ending the chaos of the 90s: strengthening and some increasingly restive regions, weakening security apparatus that is increasingly reliant on graft to deal with price rises, declining social welfare. I don't think it's going to come to a head imminently or even will but I think it's a very striking risk of Putin recreating the conditions that he came to power vanquishing (and, in the high payments for volunteers, the wounded and widows - I think it's impossible to see a desperate attempt to avoid any situation like Afghanistan).

From what I've read on both the supply/production and economic front things are expected to come to a head by the end of 2025.

And obviously it's utterly incomparable than Ukraine whose economy has collapsed, has the most intensive war in Europe since 1945 in its territory and is fighting an (almost) total war for survival. (I say almost as, for understandable reasons, Zelensky is also not doing full mobilisation/conscription).

[Razgovory]

You asked for a source, I provided you one.  Look, we continually underestimated Russia here.  I was happy to believe back in in 2022 that sanctions were going to cause Russia to collapse, or that this is new weapon system introduced would cause Russia to collapse, or that people of Russia were on the verge of an uprising, or that the Ukrainian offensive in 2023 was going to break the Russian lines.  None of that happened.  So let's stop pretending that Russia is collapsing or that Putin has cancer and is on death's door or what ever other kind of silly bullshit we've swallowed to keep our spirits up. One swift kick from some hypothetical force of French and Britons is not going to bring this structure down.

[The Minsky Moment]

The effectiveness of sanctions and economic warfare is almost always over-estimated. That is especially for a large continent-sized nation like Russia with huge resource reserves.  There is a lot of ruin in a nation and Russia has plenty left to give.

At the same time, it is also clear the military analysts initially over-estimated the effectiveness of the Russian military, and perhaps this still continues.

[Valmy]

You asked for a source, I provided you one.

You provided wikipedia. Come on.

Look, we continually underestimated Russia here.

Bullshit. Everybody was saying they were going to easily overrun Ukraine. I was one of the few people who expressed skepticism based on their past performance.  If anything they have done even worse than I suspected.

I was happy to believe back in in 2022 that sanctions were going to cause Russia to collapse, or that this is new weapon system introduced would cause Russia to collapse, or that people of Russia were on the verge of an uprising, or that the Ukrainian offensive in 2023 was going to break the Russian lines.  None of that happened.

I don't think bringing up all the times you were wrong in the past, makes you look good here.

So let's stop pretending that Russia is collapsing or that Putin has cancer and is on death's door or what ever other kind of silly bullshit we've swallowed to keep our spirits up. One swift kick from some hypothetical force of French and Britons is not going to bring this structure down.

Russia is collapsing. But it is a slow motion car crash. And Ukraine was in far worse shape than they were before this war even started. The fact they couldn't easily run over a smaller country in truly desperate shape is pathetic but predicable. Ukraine's army is full of middle aged men using backwards equipment.

And me saying I think the Euros could stop a Russian offensive is hilariously different from suggesting they are going to easily drive on Moscow and the whole thing is going to collapse in five minutes.

You, on the other hand, keep acting like nobody is a match for the mighty Russian bear and it is practically futile to even try. Just ridiculous.

[Sheilbh]

The effectiveness of sanctions and economic warfare is almost always over-estimated. That is especially for a large continent-sized nation like Russia with huge resource reserves.  There is a lot of ruin in a nation and Russia has plenty left to give.

Also as has been pointed out by Nicholas Mulder especially (and flagged helpfully by Matt Zeitlin), sanctions and economic warfare have been the preferred tool of the west for a while and it's based on  weaponising the interconnectedness of globalisation and our interdependence. Which works most effectively from a position of power within that globalised world.

But it sets your adversaries off on perhaps quite profound economic shifts to increase their resilience - it encourages your adversaries to expand their own economic zone and relationships to achieve self-suficiency. And at a certain point they kind of can start to take the risk - and, ironically, if you're in the position of power within an interdependent world necessary to make sanctions effective, you may be more exposed and vulnerable if your adversaries have built up their alternative economic zone and supply chains.

Obviously just talking in the abstract and in no way related to anything else that's going on in the world