The EU thread

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Zoupa is right about Putin overplaying a weak hand, I think. And he's only doing it because we, as a collective, the EU and EEA are even weaker. We are rich in words and principles and have about two guys in a tent with a shotgun to back those up.

We might buy all the guns and ammo in the world, lord knows Europe can afford it, but we can't train 700.000 soldiers overnight.

And even if these forces are just going to be rear echelon troops, it'd be nice if they had some training, yeah? 

European armed forces, when put together,  aren't smaller than those of the us or Russia though. We also have have good equipment.
Problem is that our armed forces aren't put together, and are lacking in logistics and sufficient deep stocks.
Which makes them weaker. But that is rectifyable, at cost in money, time and will (it would greatly diminish the leeway for individual states having their own foreign policy).
But then again: a common enemy is not necessarily a bad thing.

[The Minsky Moment]

The EU has a strong industrial base and a highly trained and educated work force.  If the resources are made available and the political will exists, military production could be increased pretty quickly.  Bringing individual national forces up to par may be a more complex challenge.

[Razgovory]

Josq, are you certain you have the munitions for a prolonged campaign?  Last time, during the Libya thing, you had to bum weapons off the US.  I am looking the at the RAF Wiki page, and you have about 170 fighter aircraft.  137 Typhoons and 35 F-35s.  Not all of these are going to be operational at any one time, and the ones you do have will quickly suffer attrition.

The shell supply issue has been pretty much solved. Europe can keep Ukraine supplied there. I don't see much trouble keeping it's own troops supplied.

Europe has access to the skills and parts to maintain and repair much of their equipment (and US links aren't totally gone yet)
Russia doesn't.

Smart weapons are where there's a issue. Even with a friendly America the US is prioritising it's own stocks. Clear area Europe needs to shift away from America and probably develop something simpler than the million dollar missile to shoot a 10000 dollar drone setup.

I have not see where the shell supply issue has been pretty much solved.  I was thinking about weapons that your air force would use, since that talking about with your tripwire statements.  We have spent 3 years underestimating the Russians, they seem to have the ability to replace their lost equipment.

[crazy canuck]

The EU has a strong industrial base and a highly trained and educated work force.  If the resources are made available and the political will exists, military production could be increased pretty quickly.  Bringing individual national forces up to par may be a more complex challenge.

Yeah, but for now all we're talking about is bringing it up to the level of having to take on the Russians. So can't be too long a training regime to meet that standard with the technological advantage of the western armies would have.

[The Minsky Moment]

Well we know that the Ukranian army alone, properly equipped, can effectively stalemate the Russians and impose hideous casualty rates. But an EU conventional force would likely have greater ambition than that.

[crazy canuck]

Well we know that the Ukranian army alone, properly equipped, can effectively stalemate the Russians and impose hideous casualty rates. But an EU conventional force would likely have greater ambition than that.

What we know now is that a Ukrainian Army very poorly equipped can stalemate the Russians.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

and we also know that Russia's cold war stocks are not unlimited. And that the production rate of their heavy equipment is not on replacement level (once you take out the refurbishing)

[Zoupa]

my brothers in christ, I beg of you to visit r/combatfootage and sort by new. You'll see what kind of "replacement equipment" the russians are using in 2025.

[Josquius]

Yeah, Russia really haven't shown an ability to replace their equipment at all.
Their artillery advantage has dropped from 10:1 to 2:1, they're launching assaults on golf buggies, logistics on donkeys, ww2 vintage tanks, etc...
Their air force has suffered hugely too - they've had a bit shot down but also burned out much of the rest: they only have limited flight hours in them before needing major replacement.

I can't find a direct link on Europe's shell efforts but Google it and you see lots of hints around it. They've got to meeting immediate needs levels and continue to expand.


Here's something on the topic
https://themilitaryanalyst.com/2025/03/18/europe-isnt-wasting-time/

[The Minsky Moment]

But the Russians do have those super high quality North Korean 1960s era reserve stocks to draw on.

Who cares about failure rate when you've got that warm aura of juche energy all around you?

[Iormlund]

The EU has a strong industrial base and a highly trained and educated work force.  If the resources are made available and the political will exists, military production could be increased pretty quickly.  Bringing individual national forces up to par may be a more complex challenge.

That is what I find most infuriating.

Most people just cannot comprehend the sheer size of our heavy industry.
We could drown Russia in gear in just a couple years without breaking a sweat.

[Neil]

Maybe, but Russia will be equipped with substantial amounts of weaponry from the US in a prospective war with Europe. 

And there's always the concern that Russia would just use nuclear weapons to overcome their weakness in conventional arms. 

[Razgovory]

Or more realistically, China becomes involved.

[Neil]

Or more realistically, China becomes involved.

China is an irrelevancy. 

[Sheilbh]

The EU has a strong industrial base and a highly trained and educated work force.  If the resources are made available and the political will exists, military production could be increased pretty quickly.  Bringing individual national forces up to par may be a more complex challenge.

Including in arms - France is the world's second largest arms exporter - and in 5-8 are Germany, Italy, UK and Spain. I'm sure there are probably some gaps but nothing beyond the ken of man.

Those companies, in respect of the artillery shells challenge, said there was a lot of talk and money from the EU and European governments - but there was very limited appetite for long-term commitments.

I think on political will the key is that it is sustainable. The more I think about it the more I think for much of Europe 2022 was a shock but didn't really change their understanding of the world (for some countries, such as Germany, I think it ended the delusion that Russia could, in any sense, be a partner at this stage). I hope that this (second) Trump shock prompts a structural shift.

I also think the test of that will be how this interacts with the other arguably self-imposed constraints of European politics. So the EUCO meeting this week involved some member states (Spain and Greece leading the charge) calling for more grants from the EU for re-arming; others (with the Netherlands in the lead - "there will be no Eurobonds") insisting it must be loans to member states to be repaid. I think Merz could be decisive on that point.

There is also the fiscal constraints - France is currently having to use the President's constitutional powers to effectively oppose budgets because Macron doesn't have the votes, but is under "excessive deficit procedures". Poland has increased defence spending by 50% and is also in "excessive deficit procedures". I think there may reach a point where increasing defence spending while having to cut budget deficits (so either raising taxes or cutting the rest) will cause difficulties politically. Given the pace of de-industrialisation in Europe at the minute, especially for energy intensive sectors, I also wonder if increasing arms manufacturing capacity (not sure how energy intensive it is) will run into the net zero and energy transition/prices politics.

None of that's insurmountable and I think those are areas that'll be useful to see if there's a structural shift in how European states are viewing the world and what they need to do, or if is another shock to which there is another short, sharp response before reverting to the norm (until the next shock).