Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Zanza]

The German word Schadenfreude comes to my mind here. 

[Crazy_Ivan80]

uncle lukashenko's jet landed in Turkey it seems. No news wether or not he was on board though. (from operator starsky)

[jimmy olsen]

If true, LMFAO
https://twitter.com/Gerashchenko_en/status/1672534974468112385

Prigozhin lied about "shell famine" and prepared for civil war for 2 months by stockpiling ammunition - Gulagu. net

https://twitter.com/SameralAtrush/status/1672496945951121410

Reuters: RUSSIAN SECURITY SOURCE TELLS REUTERS WAGNER FIGHTERS HAVE TAKEN CONTROL OF ALL MILITARY FACILITIES IN CITY OF VORONEZH ABOUT 500 KM SOUTH OF MOSCOW

[Tamas]

On these recent footages I have seen one or two parked civilian cars with a small Z on them no doubt to show support for the war. I sincerely hope their owners get caught in the Russian-on-Russian crossfire. Reap what you sow, fuckers.

[Josephus]

About a year ago I posted on here "how's this going to end for Putin, anyway?"

Well, I think the answer is about to unfold

[Josephus]

Thing is as the saying goes, "i'd rather the devil you know than the devil you don't."
Prigrozhin can be more dangerous than Putin. Where is this going to lead? Stay tuned.

[Sheilbh]

Thought these last couple of sections of analysis from Lawrence Freedman were interesting - in terms of the last line about Ukrainian high command, from what I've read, Rostov and Voronezh are pretty essential logistical and command hubs:

What is going on?

Maybe this was an elite fight that got out of hand, a consequence of a military system that failed to achieve unity of command and allowed a number of these private military companies, not just Wagner, to operate independently and according to their own agendas. Since he moved out of the shadows during the course of this war Prigozhin has shown an interest in an eventual political career. He has his own propaganda machine and significant name-recognition among the population. Most importantly he commands a substantial body of men – as many as 25,000 engaged in his current manoeuvres.

The language we have to describe these events often fails to grasp their singular nature. When we talk of coups we imagine armed men rushing into the Kremlin to arrest or kill Putin and installing a new leader, with the main media outlets seized to ensure that everyone knows who is now in charge. In that sense it is not a coup and Prigozhin has insisted that he is not mounting one. His aim is solely to remove Shoigu and Gerasimov and replace the 'meat-grinding' strategies they have followed in the war. At any rate following Putin's speech whether or not this was his intention, Prigozhin is in a direct confrontation with the Russian President. One of them will be a loser.

Prigozhin will have some supporters among the civil and military elite, for his arguments if not for his character, and he is after all not short of funds when it comes to buying favours and intelligence. And while most will take it for granted that their careers and wellbeing depend on Putin's survival, few can have many illusions left about the mismanagement of this war and the costs it is imposing on Russian society and economy. Most for now will be keeping their heads down, but if this goes much further then there will be demands for loyalty that will carry their own risks.

There has been some fighting, sufficiently serious for Wagner to claim to have shot down three helicopters, but it has not yet got close to a civil war, which would mean that the armed forces were completely divided against each other as if they were confronting an external enemy. On the ground Wagner does not appear to have faced much resistance, even as he walked into the Russian army's main command centre.

Nor is it an insurrection. Prigozhin has urged people to go out on to the streets to get rid of their 'weak government', ('we will find weapons'). To the extent that they know what is going on the Russian people are likely to be alarmed and perplexed but they are not going to rush out onto the streets and start building barricades. It is certainly not a drive to make peace. At Rostov Prigozhin has taken care to show that he is not interfering with the business of Southern Command as it tries to manage the war, although one must assume that the officers involved must be a tad distracted at the moment. He wants to appear patriotic and claims that he has a better way to fight the war.

It is, however, a mutiny. As such everything for Prigozhin depends on whether his accusations ring true to other troops and prompt them to join his ranks, or at least refuse to start fighting his men. By and large Wagner has shown more discipline and elan than many other Russian forces and it would not be surprising if they gained the upper hand in any fighting. This could soon have a knock-on effect on the cohesion of the loyalist military response.

Prigozhin is clearly not alone in his disdain for the higher command of this war. There are many military bloggers, often extremely nationalistic and pro-war, who are candid about the failings of Russian forces and also blame corruption and complacency at the top. What distinguishes him from others is that he has a large and apparently loyal force at his disposal. Unlike other generals he also has actual victories to his credit, albeit pyrrhic in nature. His men were to the fore in the capture of Soledar and Bakhmut. Elsewhere during the recent Russian offensive there were only costly failures.

Furthermore we know that for many in the front lines, especially those that have been fighting in the Donbas, conditions have been miserable, casualties extremely high, and commanders absent. The Wagner group has claimed that contracted Russian troops would rather be with them than under Gerasimov's chain of command. Those in the Donbas have supposedly served as part of the LNR and DNR militias, but these have been hollowed out, as their troops kept on getting killed, and now seem to be run as rackets by the remaining local warlords. One of the many tragedies of this war is how those supposedly being protected from mythical Ukrainian atrocities have suffered harsh treatment at the hands of their protectors. Vital cities have been reduced to ruin. Since the first moves in the Donbas to challenge the Ukrainian authorities in the spring of 2014 this region has been impoverished.

What Next?

It is telling that Moscow's instinctive response is to insist that the mutiny is already failing and that Wagner fighters are seeing the error of their ways and returning to join their true comrades. There is a hope, present in Putin's speech, that the Wagner troops can be divided from their leader. Denying bad news is the default position of this regime but there is no evidence for now that the mutiny is faltering.

The big question is how the rest of the armed forces will respond. One of the most remarkable videos to emerge so far shows Prigozhin talking in Rostov with Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov and Vladimir Stepanovich Alekseev, the deputy chief of Russia's military intelligence service, who were both presumably on duty at the command HQ, and now appear to be effectively hostages. Alekeev had not long before issued his own video urging Prigozhin to abandon his adventure. Intriguingly from the same room Prigozhin's main ally in the high command, General Sergei Surovikin (incidentally a participant in the 1991 coup against Gorbachev), had issued a similar appeal, delivered more in sadness than in anger. So where is Surovikin now? He is potentially a key player.

Shoigu and Gerasimov, who Prigozhin also claimed to be in Rostov, do not appear to be there now. As they still have Putin's backing it will be up to them to organise the counter-mutiny. Prigozhin now has to decide whether to continue with his march on Moscow as he has promised knowing that preparations are being made to receive him. The UK MOD claims that his men have already reached a half-way point at Voronezh What happens now depends on the loyalty of troops. There are reports – rumours – of some from mainstream forces going over to Wagner. Many more may be passive spectators. If he can't mobilise substantial loyalist units then Putin is in trouble. If he can then Prigozhin will be isolated and potentially crushed. One factor in all of this is where the loyal troops come from given that so much of the army is bogged down in Ukraine.

Even if Wagner is defeated quickly, which I would not take for granted, then this is still a big shock to the regime and it will have been weakened. If the confrontation goes in the other direction then all bets are off and panic may start to grip the Kremlin. The problem for autocrats like Putin is that they don't really know what is going on among their people, and that tends to add to the panic. Moreover once the high command looks vulnerable what will the junior commanders do in their battles with Ukrainian forces? How keen will they be to die for a cause that seems lost? For now those watching events with the greatest enthusiasm will be the Ukrainian high command. There are opportunities opening up for offensive operations that they never expected.

Edit: And on the point of this as a mutiny - can't help but feel Prigozhin's accusations ring true, because they are true. Soldiers in a meat grinder, thousands dying for minimal advances, failures of logistics and support while the leadership have been embezzling etc.

[Tamas]

Thing is as the saying goes, "i'd rather the devil you know than the devil you don't."
Prigrozhin can be more dangerous than Putin. Where is this going to lead? Stay tuned.

To me it seems impossible that Prigozhin can stabilise his rule even if he manages the coup. He would have zero legitimacy with a LOT of very powerful people in the country he could not trust. Unless he manages to trigger a popular uprising by, I don't know, promising people he'll distribute the oligarch's wealth among them, I can't see him lasting long. Or if he does, it'll be at the price of instituting a North Korea style regime. Which would effectively disable Russia for a long time.

Whatever happens short of nukes being lobbed around, the rest of the world will benefit.

[Tamas]

[Crazy_Ivan80]

depending on how this rolls: what will China do?

[Hamilcar]

depending on how this rolls: what will China do?

Encourage republics in the far east to declare independence, then take them over.

[Syt]

Khodorkovski's released a statement basically saying that yes, Prigozhin sucks, but if it means getting rid of Putin we should support him; we can still fight him afterwards.

[Iormlund]

Whatever happens short of nukes being lobbed around, the rest of the world will benefit.

That's the thing, though. Nukes.

I don't see how Prigozhin can win unless this was a prepared coup. But even if he can't win, it seems like he has the only organized, veteran force around Rostov.
What happens if he simply goes for a nuke depot? Surely he knows where those are.

[Legbiter]

I hope this collapses the Ukrainian front for the vatniks.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cfAL2uhAh5o&ab_channel=UkraineNewsTV

the memish news for today. If some additional laughs are needed