Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Zoupa]

muscovites are already claiming they killed our paratroopers around Kherson.

Nvm that the regiment they got a patch from for their psyop is still stationed in Orleans.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

muscovites are already claiming they killed our paratroopers around Kherson.

Nvm that the regiment they got a patch from for their psyop is still stationed in Orleans.

They also claim to have destroyed the Ukrainian airforce 10 times over, 100s of himars and entire armies worth of nato troops.

So as always: how do you know a Russian lies? It speaks.

[grumbler]

So as always: how do you know a Russian lies? It speaks.

I've always preferred the formulation of that line as: "How do you know when a Russian is lying? His lips are moving."

[Crazy_Ivan80]

So as always: how do you know a Russian lies? It speaks.

I've always preferred the formulation of that line as: "How do you know when a Russian is lying? His lips are moving."

Does cover cases where the Russian is yapping without sound. So indeed better

[The Minsky Moment]

Surely what's holding Russian production back isn't ineffiency or corruption. It's lacking the skills, equipment, and raw resources to make microchips and needing to import them through increasingly scrutinised round about paths.

I don't think so - sanctions will be having an impact but I don't think they're the main issue. Those strange export routes - every country in Europe seeing a huge spike in exports to Kyrgyzstan or Armenia immediately after sanctions were imposed - are being scrutinised but I'm not seeing any sign of action on that. They are still largely importing microchips from the US and Europe (but also domestic production, which does exist, and China) through weird routes - and also organised crime is playing some role.

The problem goes beyond microchips per se.  The Russian economy is just weak for a country of its size and ambitions. It was weak before the war and the pressures of the war aren't going to transform it.  Prewar it was roughly equivalent to Mexico (at least in PPP terms). But while Mexico under the NAFTA regime became an exporter of certain industrial products, Russia under Putin cemented its position as a colonial-type economy, exporting oil, gas, coal, primary metals, fertilizer and grain, while importing finished industrial goods, cars, pharmaceuticals. No efficiency drive or crackdown on corruption is going to turn that into a first-rate, 21st century defense industrial complex.

[Sheilbh]

The problem goes beyond microchips per se.  The Russian economy is just weak for a country of its size and ambitions. It was weak before the war and the pressures of the war aren't going to transform it.  Prewar it was roughly equivalent to Mexico (at least in PPP terms). But while Mexico under the NAFTA regime became an exporter of certain industrial products, Russia under Putin cemented its position as a colonial-type economy, exporting oil, gas, coal, primary metals, fertilizer and grain, while importing finished industrial goods, cars, pharmaceuticals. No efficiency drive or crackdown on corruption is going to turn that into a first-rate, 21st century defense industrial complex.

Yes but I think there's (not unlike pre-revolution imperial Russia) islands of modernity within that extractive economy. In particular, I think, arms manufacturing and nuclear power - both areas where Russia is still a leading industrial and exporting power. Both, perhaps not uncoincidentally, reorganised into state-owned conglomerates by Putin.

I agree it's economy is weak and is going to get worse because of the war and the sanctions. That's Putin's choice. But I think saying they won't develop a first rate defence industry is true but also makes you ask do they need to? Is that the war they're fighting?

And that's where I think the question of whether Belousev matters or is a change or not comes in. At the minute it's a war of production v Ukraine and their suppliers (with Ukrainian use of those weapons constrained by Western restrictions and that is a little bit lumpy). I don't think he represents a fundamental change.

[The Minsky Moment]

Yes but I think there's (not unlike pre-revolution imperial Russia) islands of modernity within that extractive economy. In particular, I think, arms manufacturing and nuclear power - both areas where Russia is still a leading industrial and exporting power. Both, perhaps not uncoincidentally, reorganised into state-owned conglomerates by Putin.

Both are carry overs from the Soviet legacy.  The arms trade was in decline pre-2022; Russia's share of the trade has been steadily declining for a long time, a fact which reflects both declining influence and concerns over quality.

I agree it's economy is weak and is going to get worse because of the war and the sanctions. That's Putin's choice. But I think saying they won't develop a first rate defence industry is true but also makes you ask do they need to? Is that the war they're fighting?.

The war they have been fighting is not a particularly successful one.  The war they wanted to fight - lightning strikes to decapitate leadership and seize core territory - was beyond their means.  The war they are fighting - a brutal, grinding war of attrition - is taxing their production resources and forcing them to turn to dubious sources of supply for basic munitions.

This is opportunity here but only if Ukraine is backed by firm, strong and STEADY Western support.

[Sheilbh]

Both are carry overs from the Soviet legacy.  The arms trade was in decline pre-2022; Russia's share of the trade has been steadily declining for a long time, a fact which reflects both declining influence and concerns over quality.

[...]

The war they have been fighting is not a particularly successful one.  The war they wanted to fight - lightning strikes to decapitate leadership and seize core territory - was beyond their means.  The war they are fighting - a brutal, grinding war of attrition - is taxing their production resources and forcing them to turn to dubious sources of supply for basic munitions.

This is opportunity here but only if Ukraine is backed by firm, strong and STEADY Western support.

Absolutely agree on all of this, particularly all of the Soviet legacy.

The only point I'd question is the extent to which Western support for Ukraine is not of a type that would enable Ukraine to fight a Western style war? I think from the offensive Ukraine isn't necessarily able to fight that way either - and it would be a shift for them to - but particularly without Western aid that would enable them to have air supremacy which is an assumption for all Western militaries.

So while I agree on the need for strong, steady support - the only slight point I wonder about is whether Russia's war industry is actually better suited for the war Russia is trying to fight (grinding, attritional etc) than Western equipment for Ukraine? Edit: Particularly if, as I say, we're not willing to give the equipment that would enable Ukraine to fight a "Western-style"/21st century war or are putting such restrictions on their use of our supplies.

[Jacob]

I agree with both of you, but my lens is that Russia is also fighting a hybrid war against the West - by attacking institutions, public sentiment, and political processes. This is making it harder for the West to provide the kind of "firm, strong, and STEADY Western support" that's required for victory, and so far the West is not doing that great a job responding to that IMO.

We may have the better war industries and better technologies, and our potential if realized may be orders of magnitude greater than the 3rd-rate Russians. But if we don't deploy those industries and technologies to the war at hand, and if we leave our potential unrealized we can still sleepwalk our way to defeat.

When it comes to propaganda, influence operations, and hybrid warfare it seems to me the West has basically ceded the field.

[Tamas]

I don't think it's fair to use the counter-offensive to conclude Ukraine can't fight like a Western army, because they lacked something all Western armies have had since 1944 at least: absolutely overwhelming aerial superiority.

[Jacob]

PARIS/BERLIN, May 28 (Reuters) - France and Germany's leaders said on Tuesday Ukraine should be allowed to hit military sites inside Russia from which missiles were being fired at Ukrainian territory, but not other targets.
Russian President Vladimir Putin warned the West earlier in the day that NATO members in Europe were playing with fire by proposing to let Ukraine use Western-supplied weapons to strike inside Russia, which he said could trigger a global conflict.

"We support Ukraine and we don't want escalation, that hasn't changed," French President Emmanuel Macron said at a joint news conference with German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Meseberg, Germany.

"We think we should allow them to neutralise military sites from which missiles are fired, military sites from which Ukraine is attacked, but we shouldn't allow them to hit other targets in Russia and civilian or other military sites in Russia."

Scholz said he agreed with Macron and that as long as Ukraine respected the conditions given by countries that supplied the weapons, including the United States, and international law, it was allowed to defend itself.

"Ukraine has every possibility under international law for what it is doing. That has to be said explicitly," Scholz said.

"I find it strange when some people argue that it should not be allowed to defend itself and take measures that are suitable for this."

Over two years into the deadliest land war in Europe since World War Two, as the West considers what to do about Russian military advances in Ukraine, Putin is increasingly evoking the risk of a global war, while Western leaders play it down.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg told the Economist that alliance members should let Ukraine strike deep into Russia with Western weapons, a view supported by some European members of the transatlantic alliance though not the United States.

In Germany too, there is some resistance to the idea, with fears of an escalation into a wider conflict likely to play a role in upcoming local and state elections in the formerly communist east of the country.
Scholz has refused to provide Kyiv Germany's long-range Taurus missiles, which could potentially reach Moscow.

Reporting by Michel Rose in Paris and Sarah Marsh, Emma-Victoria Farr and Andreas Rinke in Berlin; editing by Mark Heinrich

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/french-german-leaders-say-ukraine-allowed-strike-inside-russia-2024-05-28/

So this is a "we think they should be allowed to counterfire into Russia" statement, which is fair enough. But does it have a practical impact? Are there French and German armaments that can be used for this now, or is this simply a signal that doesn't mean anything until Biden gives the go-ahead?

[Tamas]

I am so tired of people listening to Putins threats. The more we heed them the more he will be making them.

[The Minsky Moment]

So while I agree on the need for strong, steady support - the only slight point I wonder about is whether Russia's war industry is actually better suited for the war Russia is trying to fight (grinding, attritional etc) than Western equipment for Ukraine? Edit: Particularly if, as I say, we're not willing to give the equipment that would enable Ukraine to fight a "Western-style"/21st century war or are putting such restrictions on their use of our supplies.

The lesson of the two World Wars - and indirectly the Cold War as well - is that the military capacity of a country ultimately derives from its overall economic strength. The US has negligible military production in the late 30s outside of ship construction, but it able to convert civilian industry to military production very quickly.  Looking at through that lens, Russia is roughly on the level of fascist Italy on the eve of WW2, with a top heavy military production complex sitting on top of a weakish economic base. My conclusion is that attritional warfare is problematic to both sides, but in somewhat different ways.

[Sheilbh]

I agree - and to be clear I'm in the camp that Russia cannot win the war that it started.

I think in a war it isn't isolated but comparing the two sides. Currently, I think this is a war of production - and at this point the Western countries, who are the rightest in the world with vastly superior economic strength are not producing sufficient for Ukraine (and Ukraine's economic base is far, far worse than Russia's). I think the challenge of Ukraine surviving economically at the minute is far tougher than for Russia (and there's strong Western support on that - because it's just money) but the military production hasn't kept pace, though it may increase over the next year (as we hoped this time last year) because money alone isn't enough.

There are other costs to that and Russia may be able to squeeze more out - similarly I think the recent prosecutions for corruption in the military might well have no more significance than an attempt to reduce waste and graft during a war.

And again, as you say, highlighting the steadiness - I think it's a concern how much of Western aid is lumpy and perhaps best prompted by crisis. Europe is vastly richer than Russia, this has overwhelming political support, it would insulate against Biden's restrictions on the use of US weapons or the risk of a Trump presidency - but we're not doing it (or not with the urgency that's needed). Edit: And I think we can do this which is what I find most frustrating.

[crazy canuck]

So while I agree on the need for strong, steady support - the only slight point I wonder about is whether Russia's war industry is actually better suited for the war Russia is trying to fight (grinding, attritional etc) than Western equipment for Ukraine? Edit: Particularly if, as I say, we're not willing to give the equipment that would enable Ukraine to fight a "Western-style"/21st century war or are putting such restrictions on their use of our supplies.

The lesson of the two World Wars - and indirectly the Cold War as well - is that the military capacity of a country ultimately derives from its overall economic strength. The US has negligible military production in the late 30s outside of ship construction, but it able to convert civilian industry to military production very quickly.  Looking at through that lens, Russia is roughly on the level of fascist Italy on the eve of WW2, with a top heavy military production complex sitting on top of a weakish economic base. My conclusion is that attritional warfare is problematic to both sides, but in somewhat different ways.

If Russia is Italy, then Ukraine is I suppose Ethiopia?