Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[The Minsky Moment]

The very fact that Putin's long-term ally, Shoigu, had to be replaced with a communist-era economy-manager guy proves that the Russian economy is NOT doing well, whatever numbers they are cooking up.

The Russian economy wasn't exactly gangbusters even before the war.
But while the economy has definitely taken bad hits, we are far from a Japan 1945 level collapse. It's clear that Putin has decided to double and triple down and he is not going to deterred by some GDP dips.  This is going to be a long slog.

[Sheilbh]

In part, it's a war of production - and currently Russia(!?) is outpacing Europe.

[Josephus]

But while the economy has definitely taken bad hits, we are far from a Japan 1945 level collapse. It's clear that Putin has decided to double and triple down and he is not going to deterred by some GDP dips.  This is going to be a long slog.

Exactly. And the only way Ukraine is going to win in a "long slog" war is with a more direct West/NATO involvement--i'm talking boots on the ground or at least planes in the air. So the choice may well be a peace Zelenskyy won't be happy with or a world war.

[Josquius]

In part, it's a war of production - and currently Russia(!?) is outpacing Europe.

Not entirely what I heard.
Russia has done a good job in getting some things to high levels of production. Ammunition, drones, and so on.
On the other hand the word is they've got more artillery shells than they're able to fire. Their losses in vehicles and artillery barrels are way above what they're capable of replacing.

Basically Russia has no problem with ammo, but it is running out of guns. Ukraine on the other hand has a good supply of guns, but has been struggling with ammo.

I do think in the long term the odds favour Ukraine. Its supplies are steadier- with on the ammo side Europe on track to ramp up to fill its needs by the end of the year iirc. It also has western money keeping its state functioning.
The concern is short term whether they can hold out or if Russia will break through and/or Ukrainian morale will collapse.

[crazy canuck]

In part, it's a war of production - and currently Russia(!?) is outpacing Europe.

Yes, and according to what the Guardian and NYTimes are reporting about the new guy in Russia, he is the person for that job.

[Sheilbh]

Maybe - but I think it slightly depends what that job is/what the obstacles are.

But definitely from what I've read it's a more of the same but more efficiently.

[crazy canuck]

Maybe - but I think it slightly depends what that job is/what the obstacles are.

But definitely from what I've read it's a more of the same but more efficiently.

I"ll try to find the newspaper article I am thinking about.  Definitely not more of the same.  Much more like a transition to a wartime economy.  The point being made was that while that will not be great for Russia in the long term, there is no sign Russia is giving up in the foreseeable future.

Edit - here it is, gifted link

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/13/world/europe/russia-defense-minister-ukraine-belousov.html?unlocked_article_code=1.t00.j0aH.-boLzsxoJyE9&smid=url-share

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Maybe - but I think it slightly depends what that job is/what the obstacles are.

But definitely from what I've read it's a more of the same but more efficiently.

He only needs to outlast the west. Which may be a period between never and januari 6th, 2025.

[The Minsky Moment]

CSIS recently released a report on this issue.  Conclusions as follows:

While, in the first year of the war, Russia was largely unable to improve its domestic arms
production, the analysis shows the Russian MOD was able to increase defense production multiple
times over during the second year of the war.

One of the main developments has been the rapid emergence and massive scaling up of Russian
civilian and military drones providing significant ISR and assault capabilities to the Russian armed
forces, often launched with missiles for a maximum impact. While Russia has also invested in the
production of modern tanks, ammunition, and EW systems, CSIS research has revealed Moscow
is not self-sufficient and relies on partners such as Iran and North Korea to field enough of these
weapons on the battlefield. The analysis has also shown that while Russia indeed improved its
domestic arms production capacity in 2023 compared to 2022, it has nonetheless continued to tap
into its Soviet-era stockpiles by, for instance, refurbishing and sending its 60- and 70-year-old tanks
to Ukraine. Overall, last year saw Russia transition into a long war of attrition while increasingly
shifting to low-cost and lower-quality weapons systems.

In this context, in 2023 the Kremlin moved away from Western-made high-end military components
toward dual-use or even purely civilian technologies to fuel its war machine. As a consequence,
Russia's international suppliers also changed as more and more military goods flowing into Russia
were obtained from civilian or dual-use suppliers primarily based in China and Hong Kong, as well as in Turkey, among others. These shifts in military supply chains have also led to more Russian and
foreign companies with a principally civilian footprint finding themselves on sanctions lists. Russia
will likely continue following such import diversification efforts in 2024 as well.

One implication is that the refinery strike campaign - whose efficacy I questioned - was well conceived. While the campaign may not force mission critical shortages of fuel for operations, it is a cost-effective way of forcing Russia to dig further into an already taxed import budget and/or reduce export revenue. Because Russia is increasingly reliant on imports to remedy shortfalls, any hit to its balance of trade is going to cause problems.

[The Minsky Moment]

BTW report mentions that Russia has significantly increased shell production and enjoys a huge production advantage vs Ukraine but that it is still not self-sufficient given the rate of use, and questions sustainability of imports from Iran and NK.

[Tamas]

Russia is looking to redraw sea borders in the Baltic: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c6ppl5v1lwzo

[The Brain]

Russia is looking to redraw sea borders in the Baltic: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/c6ppl5v1lwzo

A Russian source later told Tass and other news agencies there were no plans to revise Russia's territorial waters in the Baltic.

DEBUNKED

[Tonitrus]

But even that is a gamble, as any Putin successor will be obligated to carry the baton onward if they are to remain credible.

Considering how much of Russia has become concentrated with Putin in control as the war has gone on, I think it's very difficult to predict what will happen once he dies.

Completely agree.  The post-Putin succession is probably impossible to predict.  However it works out though, I think it would be someone who is essentially the same (carries forth the same policy), or is much worse (thinks dropping a nuke on London is a good idea).  It is very hard to believe any successor would moderate the situation/war...their position would be immediately non-credible to the existing power structure.

But, to be fair, the outcome/fallout from the fall of the USSR was definitely not predicted.  And remarkably bloodless (I know, not completely) for the fall of a nuclear power/authoritarian regime.  I am sure at the time of the hardliner coup, there were lots of dire predictions as well...but I think the Russian society/populace is in a very different place.  The political apathy among Russians is palpable.  Those who are not apathetic either support the regime or are in jail/left the country.

Putin is also probably wisely cunning in not indicating a successor...doing so immediately makes them a target (of a sort) while at the same time putting him at risk.  His death will undoubtedly cause confusion...might even stall the war for a bit...but I don't think it will cause the state/power structure to collapse.  But again...just my take...and near impossible to predict clearly. 

[crazy canuck]

There is more clarity now on the US prohibition on using arms to attack within Russia.

If the quote JR linked was accurate, it did not reflect the policy of the US.  Here is an article describing the debate within the Biden administration to remove the prohibition.

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/22/us/politics/white-house-ukraine-weapons-russia.html?unlocked_article_code=1.uE0.vFpt.wkH5BNkBfTQA&smid=url-share

[Tamas]

So General Popov, the guy who saved Russia's ass from a bigger rout in Kherson allegedly, and who only avoided arrest a year or so ago because of (again, alleged) threats of mutiny by being sent to Syria, has now been called back and arrested.

The Russian Youtube guy I follow (CC before you get a stroke, I consider this the private opinion of a reasonable-sounding private individual, not gospel ) reads this and the previous arrests due to corruption as the KGB FSB moving in on the army, especially since Popov (arrested for stealing money from buying fences for Kherson fortifications) has been sent to a FSB prison.

The guy speculates this is early days of the FSB v. Army power struggle, because when Putin falls/dies it'll be these two with the most influence and the army already foiled the KGB's coup the last time there was a power vacuum in 89.