Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Tamas]

Maybe, Legbiter, but I don't think this is something that would be risked if the military organisation being upheaveld is managing a well-going war at the moment.

CC, I think corruption is too central to the feudal Russian regime to assume that it would be fought past as an excuse for one power bloc to attack the other.

[Jacob]

Both potential readings seem reasonable to me.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

Both potential readings seem reasonable to me.

And can be true at the same time too.

[grumbler]

This could also be a "round up the usual suspects" operation to pinpoint some convenient scapegoats for the Russian military failures.

[crazy canuck]

Maybe, Legbiter, but I don't think this is something that would be risked if the military organisation being upheaveld is managing a well-going war at the moment.

CC, I think corruption is too central to the feudal Russian regime to assume that it would be fought past as an excuse for one power bloc to attack the other.

I suggest you read the article which sets out the reasons why they have reported that is the reason, you might just learn something

[Tamas]

Maybe, Legbiter, but I don't think this is something that would be risked if the military organisation being upheaveld is managing a well-going war at the moment.

CC, I think corruption is too central to the feudal Russian regime to assume that it would be fought past as an excuse for one power bloc to attack the other.

I suggest you read the article which sets out the reasons why they have reported that is the reason, you might just learn something

I can't until my altar for the article is ready.

[Josquius]

Regardless of the state of the war in actuality in the long term, which does indeed seem not great for Russia, it can't be denied the current situation is just past the best it has been since the start of the invasion for them.
The timing of all these moves does seem to be to leap on that and hide behind current successes/stop others using them?

[Zoupa]

Muscovites hit a Ukrainian version of Home Depot today. 6 people confirmed dead, 14 still missing, over 40 wounded.

bUt LEt'S nOt EsCAlaTE!!111!!!!one!!!

[crazy canuck]

I can't until my altar for the article is ready.

I am not sure why you would not want to read something that will enhance your understanding of the situation.

[Sheilbh]

I"ll try to find the newspaper article I am thinking about.  Definitely not more of the same.  Much more like a transition to a wartime economy.  The point being made was that while that will not be great for Russia in the long term, there is no sign Russia is giving up in the foreseeable future.

So I agree Russia's not giving up for the foreseeable. I disagree that this indicates a transition. Russia has doubled defence spending as a share of GDP since the start of the war - it's now at around 35% of state spending. Which means there have been commensurate cuts elsewhere with the impact on social services but also a lot of reports of day to day, low level police corruption increasing (because there's less state spending on the police/allowing the police larger scale corruption). They're already pushing for 24/7 production lines etc - but, interestingly, a very close ally of the Rostec CEO was also promoted and Rostec are the main arms manufacturer and their CEO recently pushed back quite strongly on further increases of production that would move their profit margin from 10% to only 2%. Which I think is an interesting combination.

That all happened under Shoigu. It might increase but I'm not sure it will and I'm not sure how much it can.

So I think in that context Belousev makes sense. We've transitioned to a war economy and need it now to run effectively. Which is why I've seen Russia analysts basically interpret as more of the same but efficiently - especially as Putin said there were no plans (at this point - and who knows with Tamas' post) to replace Gerasimov. In that context they also noted the way the MoD is structured in Russia is that the Chief of the General Staff reports directly to Putin as Commander in Chief. So they're basically in charge of the war-fighting bit and related directly to Putin, while the Defence Minister is there to support that politically and administratively.

Following on from that is the question of whether it'll work - and I think that depends on your view of whether what's holding Russian production back is inefficiency or corruption. I think Belousev may be able to make a difference if it's inefficiency. It's pre-war but the Federal Prosecutor in Russia found that something like 40% of defence procurement spending was basically stolen - and we've seen this in all the equipment that looks super modern but on the inside is very cheap Chinese knock-off equipment. There's been a lot Potemkin equipment which is directly because of that corruption. I think if corruption is the issue I'm not sure Belousev will be able to make much difference because I think you need someone who is very politically adept (and he's mainly been a technocrat so far) or in Putin's inner circle and directly protected (which he isn't). That could change, of course. I think there's a lot to the Robert Caro line that power doesn't corrupt, power reveals - and there are many examples of people who really grow into office.

And on that note Shoigu's new role also seems, arguably to suit him and his skillset a lot more. Given how much he's been implicated in corruption and that his deputy was prosecuted for it, it is striking he's been moved to a role that has daily contact with Putin and that, under Patrushev, has become very important. Which I think indicates that if you're a guy who goes on long hikes with Putin and plays hockey with him every week, you will still be safe.

Which gets to the corruption point. If that's the issue is it something Putin can even rein in given the patrimonial, divide and rule nature of his power? Or would confronting that undermine the very foundations of his rule?

I also think those declining social services, the reported increase in low level corruption, the reported increase in organised crime activities are inevitable consequences of Putin's choices. But in terms of his rule they strike me as dangerous because his great legitimising achievement is ending the chaos of the 90s and I think there are signs that the shift to a war economy, corresponding spending cuts, sanctions are starting to move Russia in a direction that looks a lot more like the 90s.

[crazy canuck]

The article I linked for you made the point that the shift is toward more state production rather than contracting out the production.

[Josquius]

Surely what's holding Russian production back isn't ineffiency or corruption. It's lacking the skills, equipment, and raw resources to make microchips and needing to import them through increasingly scrutinised round about paths.

[Sheilbh]

Rostec is a state corporation. It's a state owned conglomerate which reports to the MoD and the military. Most of the arms companies in Russia are its subsidiaries - a lot of them were consolidated under Rostec as part of a state restructuring of debts, interestingly that happened between 2014 and 2022. I don't think, unlike the West, that Russia ever really had an arms industry that was separate from state needs. I'm not sure that's a meaningful distinction in Russia.

I think Belousev may well be able to lobby for tax increases - particularly on the rich or business - which might help increase production. Maybe he can argue against Rostec's sacred 10% profit margin (although as I say Putin also promoted someone very, very close to Rostec to Deputy PM). As I say the argument I've seen, which seems plausible, is that if the issue is efficiency he may be able to make a change; if the issue is corruption, he doesn't seem to be the guy (which is also a point in that article). But he could be.

[Josquius]

In other news. French troops begin to creep onto Ukrainian soil it would seem.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-commander-french-military-instructors-visit-ukrainian-training-centres-2024-05-27/

[Sheilbh]

Surely what's holding Russian production back isn't ineffiency or corruption. It's lacking the skills, equipment, and raw resources to make microchips and needing to import them through increasingly scrutinised round about paths.

I don't think so - sanctions will be having an impact but I don't think they're the main issue. Those strange export routes - every country in Europe seeing a huge spike in exports to Kyrgyzstan or Armenia immediately after sanctions were imposed - are being scrutinised but I'm not seeing any sign of action on that. They are still largely importing microchips from the US and Europe (but also domestic production, which does exist, and China) through weird routes - and also organised crime is playing some role.

In other news. French troops begin to creep onto Ukrainian soil it would seem.

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/ukraine-commander-french-military-instructors-visit-ukrainian-training-centres-2024-05-27/

FWIW I'm almost certain (as Scholz hinted) that French and British special forces are in Ukraine advising on targeting with Storm Shadow/Scalp.