Brexit and the waning days of the United Kingdom

[mongers]

Whilst not adverse to the ceremony, I guess if we're going to keep a monarchy, the bloke does need to be crowned, I do find the pledge at your tv screen rather cringeworthy. 

[Richard Hakluyt]

English republicans are "right but repulsive" as we all know from our schoolbooks 

[Duque de Bragança]

Structural and chronological differences, you mentioned Spain and Portugal as if their slave trades were the same, at the same time, as the British ones (even for the French I would have reservations).

There's definitely chronological differences - although that's not really the comparison I was meaning to draw. What's the structural difference though?

Different phases or cycles: gold, spices and eventually, slaves per se. Brazilian history used to be described as cyles (brazilwood, sugar cane, coffee).
See Madeira (pre Atlantic slave trade at that trade began in 1445 with Antão Gonçalves and Madeira was discovered settled earlier) and Azores vs São Tomé and Brazil.

With the independence of Brazil in 1822, recognised by Portugal in 1825 (easier between Braganças) and the late abolition of slavery in 1888 with the Lei Áurea (transatlantic slave trade was theoretically banned form 1850 in Brazil), there was the peak.

[Sheilbh]

But I still don't really see what the distinction you're drawing is - or at least how it changes the point I was making? I don't quite get the relevance.

[Duque de Bragança]

But I still don't really see what the distinction you're drawing is - or at least how it changes the point I was making? I don't quite get the relevance.

This part:

The UK is like Spain, France, Portugal. Slavery and the trade in people was something that happened from trading posts in Africa to the Caribbean (and in the 17th and 18th century, to North America).

Comparing apples and oranges

That it is physically separate, is reflected in a mental comparmentalisation that's still present - I think empire is possibly a tool to compartmentalise. In the case of Caribbean in particular the process didn't lead to countries with a large black population but eliminated the cultural presence of the existing peoples and populating it instead with people who'd been violently torn from their people and memory and place. And it's the great theme of a lot of Caribbean literature - Derek Walcott's The Swamp or Patrick Chamoiseau's Texaco for example.

The case of Caribbean cannot apply to Portugal, obviously. Brazil? Gilberto Freyre would disagree.
Pontecorvo's Queimada does not count (sorry Sav).

PS: you also mentioned Tunisia for France. The parallel of using (real) slavery to conquer/invade (diplomatic and money issues also), not colonise at first, would suit better Algeria. Tunisia did not get a real protracted invasion war as Algeria besides, and was never a colony but a protectorate. So lighter domination. By the way,  with the III Republic, settlement (colonisation) of Algeria really began. Napoleon III did not really know what to do with the Algerian regency conquest (Arabic kingdom?).

[Sheilbh]

Right but the bit I don't understand is why they're apples and oranges - that's where I don't get your point. What are the structural differences you mean and what's their impact?

[Duque de Bragança]

Right but the bit I don't understand is why they're apples and oranges - that's where I don't get your point. What are the structural differences you mean and what's their impact?

The scale, it took off very late, the fact that slaves in the beginning were bought from and traded to other Africans (following a phase where they had to be bought from North African Muslims).
That internal African slave trade still happened for most of the period but became secondary.

Gold was the first priority, then spices (São Tomé more than Cape Verde experienced some plantation system but Brazil was way more important). Compare that to the British plantation system in Ireland. See?

After the decline of Portuguese India, Brazil became more important so the slave trade grew. Then the "Golden Era" for Portuguese slavers during 1580-1640, with the preferential access to the Spanish America market.

After that, dominance in the trade was lost with GB, the Netherlands and France being key players in the slave trade, with Brazil being critical for the Portuguese Crown.
Last terrible rebound in the 19th century with the Brazilian rise as part of the Portuguese United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil and Algarves, following the transfer of the Portuguese court to Rio de Janeiro, before independence. Incidentally, the last armed encounter/siege between Portuguese and "Brazilian" (Portuguese before) rebels was in Uruguai.

You might have a better case with Brazil. Gilberto Freyre would disagree, as I said e.g racism intensity (sometimes embellishing according to his critics)..
That would also ignore the bandeirantes' slave raids vs natives, sometimes increasing when slaves from the atlantic slave trade (oriental/arabic slave trade from Mozambique notwithstanding) were in short supply;

Try this bit also

I think the US and the UK are different in this history though.

All I said about Portugal does not apply to Spain, but Spain is still a different case from the UK.

[Sheilbh]

I don't dispute any of that. But I don't think it alters my point that for European states, slavery was imperial in character: it was the trafficking of people from Africa to imperial holdings. The repercussions are somewhere else but the capital is compouding in Europe. While for America and Brazil it was domestic.

I also don't really see that there's any material difference in the nature of the slave trade - even though there are different domestic or imperial economies.

[Duque de Bragança]

If you don't see the differences between a colonial trading system where slaves are just a means to get the desired product, instead of a critical part of settling and exploiting (in more ways than one) colonial holdings, by following the tracks then replacing  in great part of a previous and/concomitant slave trade (oriental or internal) then there is nothing else do discuss, really.

PS: Coronation trend hijacked? Not a British subject, so no apologies needed I guess.

[Sheilbh]

But what's the difference for the enslaved? Or for the West African area whose economies and societies are utterly transformed by the Atlantic slave trade (especially as people become the primary thing that Europeans are interested in trading)? Or for those imperial holdings in the Americas producing trade goods (sugar, cotton, brazilwood etc)? You mention the cycles of brazilwood, sugar, coffee - who's producing it?

I just struggle to see the real difference - maybe I'm missing something.

I don't disagree that there are different forms of colonialism - climate and disease is a big part of that. The Caribbean is different than mainland South America which varies but is different than North America (which, again, varies). I think the impact that has is primarily on the indigenous population.

The plantation model and city designs from the Stuarts in Ireland are replicated in Virginia - but they're not in Jamaica or Grenada or Guyana.

[Duque de Bragança]

But what's the difference for the enslaved? Or for the West African area whose economies and societies are utterly transformed by the Atlantic slave trade (especially as people become the primary thing that Europeans are interested in trading)? Or for those imperial holdings in the Americas producing trade goods (sugar, cotton, brazilwood etc)? You mention the cycles of brazilwood, sugar, coffee - who's producing it?

The West African area was already subject to the Oriental slave trade, the changes, already there, opened the way for the Atlantic slave trade, gold or spice trading for slaves did not change significantly compared to the pressures of the oriental slave trade, already high.

Early Portuguese traders wanted to bypass the muslim/oriental trade, to avoid a hated middleman with Coastal West African societies/polities (already used by and to the Oriental slave trade) gaining another market.

Brazilwood did not need the plantations of sugar cane and coffee, for one. Natives could do it. The resource was depleted quickly, besides.

Also, the explorations of the African coast to India, while needing some trading posts and ports for the ships do not need massive numbers of slaves to maintain.

I just struggle to see the real difference - maybe I'm missing something.

See above. Also Arguim and Elmina is not the same situation as the Kongo kingdom, further south, never objecting to the slave trade but objecting to the scale.
Nzinga/Ana de Sousa, later on also, with a more anti-colonial position however.

I don't disagree that there are different forms of colonialism - climate and disease is a big part of that. The Caribbean is different than mainland South America which varies but is different than North America (which, again, varies). I think the impact that has is primarily on the indigenous population.

Could be or could not that since while diseases (infected blankets are a different story) made quite a dent of the native populations of say Spanish South America (Caribbean is a different story), near extermination levels, they increased again after a while, recovering, something which did not happen in non-Spanish North America. The French case is also different.

The plantation model and city designs from the Stuarts in Ireland are replicated in Virginia - but they're not in Jamaica or Grenada or Guyana.

See? So Imagine, when you are projecting Stuart designs to Spanish, Portuguese and French holdings.

PS: participating or entering a slave trade system is the thin end of a wedge, of course.

[Sheilbh]

The West African area was already subject to the Oriental slave trade, the changes, already there, opened the way for the Atlantic slave trade, gold or spice trading for slaves did not change significantly compared to the pressures of the oriental slave trade, already high.

Early Portuguese traders wanted to bypass the muslim/oriental trade, to avoid a hated middleman with Coastal West African societies/polities (already used by and to the Oriental slave trade) gaining another market.

I don't think that's true - Toby Green's A Fistful of Shells is really interesting on this and focused on the economics of West Africa which obviously includes Saharan slave trade. I just don't think it's right to say that trading for slaves didn't change when, over the course of the 17th century for example, the default of unit in value in trade between Africans and Europeans becomes people. In previous times at different points there were different units of value but they are displaced and become convertible by reference to enslaved people. In region after region you see the same shift from slavery being part of the trading relationship which also includes clothes, gold, copper etc to slavery becoming the dominant focus of trading because of European demand.

This doesn't just happen when the Dutch or English turn up, not least because they are part of the same process. I think it's a slight mistake to view there as being different slave trades. I think there is a single historical process with different participants (accruing capital) who have slightly different destinations and goods coming from the Americas. There may well be some specific differences but I think there's broadly a single process centred around the Atlantic and particularly Africa and the Americas.

There are states that collapse - Kongo and Loanga are perhaps extreme examples - due to the social and economic revolutions caused by the Atlantic slave trade. In particular there is a shift from just enslaving "outsiders" (prisoners of war, people with no kinship protections) to elites enslaving their own people for trade with Europeans - which obviously has a huge impact on those societies.

See? So Imagine, when you are projecting Stuart designs to Spanish, Portuguese and French holdings.

But that's not what I'm doing. I think you've misunderstood my point.

[Duque de Bragança]

I don't think that's true - Toby Green's A Fistful of Shells is really interesting on this and focused on the economics of West Africa which obviously includes Saharan slave trade. I just don't think it's right to say that trading for slaves didn't change when, over the course of the 17th century for example, the default of unit in value in trade between Africans and Europeans becomes people. In previous times at different points there were different units of value but they are displaced and become convertible by reference to enslaved people. In region after region you see the same shift from slavery being part of the trading relationship which also includes clothes, gold, copper etc to slavery becoming the dominant focus of trading because of European demand.

Again, the 17th century, again when Portugal loses its dominance in that area. Yet you keep conflating, Portugal and Spain (never really present there).
The Atlantic slave trade started in 1445. The oriental slave trade, in the second half of the 7th century.

This doesn't just happen when the Dutch or English turn up, not least because they are part of the same process. I think it's a slight mistake to view there as being different slave trades. I think there is a single historical process with different participants (accruing capital) who have slightly different destinations and goods coming from the Americas. There may well be some specific differences but I think there's broadly a single process centred around the Atlantic and particularly Africa and the Americas.

That's precisely when the Dutch and English appear, however.

There are states that collapse - Kongo and Loanga are perhaps extreme examples - due to the social and economic revolutions caused by the Atlantic slave trade. In particular there is a shift from just enslaving "outsiders" (prisoners of war, people with no kinship protections) to elites enslaving their own people for trade with Europeans - which obviously has a huge impact on those societies.

Kongo also benefitted from European rivalries by using the Dutch against the Portuguese, at least for a while.

Actually, the real end of those African states and most others was after the end of slavery, with effective colonisation ending slave trade or at least beginning a process, in the second half of the 19th century.
Kongo survived as a Portuguese vassal until 1914, but as sovereign until the 1850s.
Loango (Kongo splinter) ended earlier, but under the French.

It's actually more wars against (weaker) neighbors from inner Africa preferably than enslaving their "own" people. With tribal and ethnic divisions plenty, easy to find reasons, of course.
See also  the oriental slave tarde where even black muslims were sometimes not considered as muslims so fair game for enslavement.

See? So Imagine, when you are projecting Stuart designs to Spanish, Portuguese and French holdings.

But that's not what I'm doing. I think you've misunderstood my point.

Then what is your point?

[Oexmelin]

Obviously, the estimates for the Trans-Sahara slave trade and the Indian Ocean slave trade are much harder to come by. The general estimate of 6-9 millions are for a much longer period than the Atlantic Slave trade (600 AD - 1880), and the most reliable estimates for the pressures exerted by the Trans-Sahara slave trade on West Africa are 7,000-9,000 per year. Compare with estimates for West African slaves sent from West Africa as early as 1550 set at 45,000 per year.

[Oexmelin]

Again, the 17th century, again when Portugal loses its dominance in that area. Yet you keep conflating, Portugal and Spain (never really present there).
The Atlantic slave trade started in 1445. The oriental slave trade, in the second half of the 7th century.

Slave exports, 17th century:

Spain: 146k
Portugal/Brazil: 1M
UK: 428k
Netherlands: 220k
France: 38k

Spain, never really present? Portugal, losing its place?

Olivier Pétré-Grenouilleau's book was published in 2004. There has been 19 years of research since then.