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Probably apocryphally, von Moltke, when asked about whether he was studying the American Civil War, commented, "I have no time to waste in studying the struggles of two armed mobs."

I've been reading a bit about the war recently, and the European perspective seems to regard the large number of stragglers in both armies with some disdain. Both sides seem to have discipline problems and a shortage of quality officers (electing officers doesn't seem prone to the promotion of discipline). At least one Confederate general believed his army numbered only 30k at Antietam because significant numbers declined to make the trek into Maryland. Some sources believe the Confederate army was back to its pre Antietam numbers within a day or two after the battle as stragglers returned.

There also seems to have been curiosity regarding the lack of bayonet charges, and some officers commented men their units declined to charge.

I was reading about a recent revelation that a famous photo of the confederate army long attributed to 1862 was properly identified as 1864 - and what first tipped the investigators off to the false date was the absence of bayonets in the unit--by 1864 many soldiers had decided they didn't want to carry a bayonet anymore and thus didn't have one.

On the other hand plenty of guys were disciplined enough to get themselves killed and wounded.

Please no ACW hijacks in this thread.

What also prompted this is I was recently found the service record of an ancestor who was an officer. I was surprised to find two reports indicating he was AWOL (1 in 1863 and 1 in 1865). However, he was never demoted and there is no indication of punishment.

One of the more remarkable things about the US civil war is that junior officers were set up to command entire armies.  Grant retired from the army as a captain,  So did Sherman.  Custer went for 2nd LT to Major General in only a few years.  I think the only man in the entire hemisphere who had commanded more than 20,000 men in battle was Winfield Scott.  And he was much too old and too fat to command an army in the field.  It's amazing that anything got done.

Hmm, I never really thought or read a lot about the discipline in all the books/stories I've read on the ACW. I would have figured discipline was pretty good, given that it would seem punishment of the day was a lot more harsh than a century later or today. Then, as you state in the opening post, to get men to form into lines, making easier targets, and then walk/march into battle would have to require some heavy discipline, I would think. The egregious casualties incurred certainly must have caused many soldiers to desert but still, most remained even under that huge stress.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 29, 2019, 05:44:43 PM
I've been reading a bit about the war recently, and the European perspective seems to regard the large number of stragglers in both armies with some disdain. Both sides seem to have discipline problems and a shortage of quality officers (electing officers doesn't seem prone to the promotion of discipline). At least one Confederate general believed his army numbered only 30k at Antietam because significant numbers declined to make the trek into Maryland. Some sources believe the Confederate army was back to its pre Antietam numbers within a day or two after the battle as stragglers returned.

The argument exists that the Confederate army at Antietam was much larger than reported, and that all those reports about stragglers was basically an excuse for why Lee lost the battle.

http://languish.org/forums/index.php/topic,8360.0.html

Lee didn't exactly lose--tactically, the battle was a draw.

Whatever the actual numbers of men present, though, McClellan deserves a lot of criticism for how he conducted the battle.  He basically drew up a battle plan the night before, then stood back and watched his corps commanders try to carry it out.  He didn't do anything to help them coordinate there attacks, or much of anything else, either.  He pretty much just acted as a spectator during the battel, not a commander.

Quote from: KRonn on May 29, 2019, 07:38:37 PM
Hmm, I never really thought or read a lot about the discipline in all the books/stories I've read on the ACW. I would have figured discipline was pretty good, given that it would seem punishment of the day was a lot more harsh than a century later or today. Then, as you state in the opening post, to get men to form into lines, making easier targets, and then walk/march into battle would have to require some heavy discipline, I would think. The egregious casualties incurred certainly must have caused many soldiers to desert but still, most remained even under that huge stress.

Desertion for wars fought in the 20th century and this century was fairly uncommon.  It was somewhat difficult to desert while on an island in the middle of the Pacific or fighting in a country where you don't know the language.  In the US civil war (and War of 1812 and the Revolutionary war), you could just walk off.

Quote from: dps on May 29, 2019, 09:24:06 PM
Lee didn't exactly lose--tactically, the battle was a draw.

Whatever the actual numbers of men present, though, McClellan deserves a lot of criticism for how he conducted the battle.  He basically drew up a battle plan the night before, then stood back and watched his corps commanders try to carry it out.  He didn't do anything to help them coordinate there attacks, or much of anything else, either.  He pretty much just acted as a spectator during the battel, not a commander.

Lee and his army were in a terrible position but Lee decided to fight anyway because he knew McClellan was a loser. Considering how disastrous the Confederate strategic position was, it was a miracle he even got his army back to Virginia.

And what you described was pretty much how he commanded the army generally. He would make bad plans that were poorly thought out and then leave his confused and inexperienced corps commanders to their own devices while he hid in the rear somewhere. It worked great that one time his subordinate was Rosecrans, but not so much the other times.

As far discipline there are all kinds of anecdotes about terrible discipline among both armies. Stories of drunkeness on duty and going randomly AWOL are pretty common. Wasting gear and equipment was supposedly something that drove commanders insane. During the Civil War soldiers would be issued gear that they would supposedly just get rid of if they decided they didn't need it. There was a story where some Confederate unit received a bunch of winter clothes at some point as winter approached and the story goes that you could trace their marching route the next day by all the winter clothes the soldiers just tossed on the side of the road.

There are also tons of stories about deserters from both armies terrorizing the countryside.

And there is that story about how after the Battle of Fredericksburg many Southern soldiers just went home for Christmas without leave.

But those are anecdotes. I have no idea how endemic those problems were.

One thing to consider is that these were armies of amateurs and the officers who were expected to enforce discipline were often local politicians or prominent citizens in the same communities their soldiers came from. They couldn't very well enforce draconian discipline and then go home to their communities after the war. But I am sure it varied from unit to unit.

What about discipline in antebellum finishing schools?

I just finished a basic book in the ACW. The author claimed that there were failed harvests in 1862, 63 and 64 in the south. So the previously self-sustained food economy collapsed. The troops got fed, although not really enough, but the families were not so lucky. Heartbreaking letters from the wife and kids caused many confederate desertions. No such bad luck for the Union.

One other interesting tidbit was that at the time of publishing a few years ago there was still one, and only one, child of a union veteran receiving "pension" because of the fathers service in the army. And that guy was a deserter from the confederacy.

With the war being fought almost entirely by what were essentially state militia units, discipline problems don't seem too surprising.  I still can't get over how so many men willingly marched to their deaths in all those moronic frontal assaults against troops in prepared positions and armed with rifled muskets.

Speaking of which, I dug up some more info on my direct paternal ancestor that fought in the 126th OVI.  Apparently he just missed all the fun at Cold Harbor, but got to his regiment in time to take part in one of the first assaults at Petersburg, which was semi-successful. 

Quote from: jimmy olsen on May 29, 2019, 08:43:16 PM

The argument exists that the Confederate army at Antietam was much larger than reported, and that all those reports about stragglers was basically an excuse for why Lee lost the battle.

http://languish.org/forums/index.php/topic,8360.0.html

Not to distract from the point I want to make below, but stragglers plaguing the Army of Northern Virginia is hardly an excuse for Lee -- he was in charge of the army and ultimately responsible for its discipline.

I've thought the battle of Antietam is too often looked at in isolated terms rather than the broader Maryland campaign - which was launched just 5 days after 2nd bull run and lasted only 2 weeks. Lee divided his army with one part attacking Harper's Ferry and the other engaged in Maryland. The half attacking Harper's Ferry had dramatic success, while the half attacked at Antietam survived (in part because Harper's Ferry fell quickly enough to allow reinforcements from Harper's Ferry). The result of the 2 actions was significantly higher losses to the Union--maybe around 2:1, even with Antietam probably being closer to 1:1, and the South got significant supplies and munitions from Harper's Ferry.

I don't know if even getting 2:1 in terms of losses was a good trade for the South considering their numerical inferiority, but it was probably a net success.

Antietam did end the Maryland Campaign resulting in the campaign not accomplishing what it hoped (relieving pressure on Virginia, threatening Northern cities) --but the Maryland Campaign wasn't the well planned offensive that the Gettysburg campaign was 9 months later--it was more of an opportunistic incursion.

The point being: if you gave him a crystal ball with the results, i'm not sure that Lee would have not launched the Maryland campaign and taken the results.

The major political effect of the campaign was the Emancipation Proclamation which was a disaster for the Confederate cause but was going to come at some point.

Lee's decision to fight at Antietam was almost suicidally reckless, even for him. I wonder if his ego got in the way after what was a shocking defeat at South Mountain. Even with McClellan's disorganization and ineptitude it took a miracle, or at least a very timely coincidence, for his army to survive.

QuoteI don't know if even getting 2:1 in terms of losses was a good trade for the South considering their numerical inferiority, but it was probably a net success.

That would be very advantageous. The Confederacy rarely had that kind of trade for losses in its campaigns. Though how many of those were prisoners from Harper's Ferry? Prisoners were still often paroled pretty often that early in the war.

Edit: Yeah they were all paroled, 12,000 of them. Many of those garrison troops from Harper's Ferry would have eventually returned to service.

Quote from: KRonn on May 29, 2019, 07:38:37 PM
Hmm, I never really thought or read a lot about the discipline in all the books/stories I've read on the ACW. I would have figured discipline was pretty good, given that it would seem punishment of the day was a lot more harsh than a century later or today. Then, as you state in the opening post, to get men to form into lines, making easier targets, and then walk/march into battle would have to require some heavy discipline, I would think. The egregious casualties incurred certainly must have caused many soldiers to desert but still, most remained even under that huge stress.

But discipline on the battlefield is just a small component of discipline.

Valmy's described a unit that threw away its winter clothes to avoid carrying them on a march. I wouldn't be surprised to read they were freezing that winter. It isn't a stretch to extend a lack of discipline there to latrines and any number of camp issues that would result in disease--and a lot more soldiers died from disease than combat.

Apparently throwing away bayonets became so common that you can date photographs based on whether they are present (by late war apparently they were mostly gone). I know care for rifles was a problem to an extent that they wouldn't work.

An undisciplined unit of brave guys probably wouldn't be that effective if they didn't have functioning weapons and were hobbled by disease.

Quote from: Valmy on May 30, 2019, 09:34:05 AM

That would be very advantageous.

Advantageous in terms of more successful than normal. But the Maryland Campaign was an elective attack of Lee. From an attritional point of view, was 2:1 enough for the South?

QuoteEdit: Yeah they were all paroled, 12,000 of them. Many of those garrison troops from Harper's Ferry would have eventually returned to service.

But exchanged for Southerners. Which was probably more valuable for the South than actual Northern casualties.

Quote from: Razgovory on May 29, 2019, 06:16:04 PM
One of the more remarkable things about the US civil war is that junior officers were set up to command entire armies.  Grant retired from the army as a captain,  So did Sherman.  Custer went for 2nd LT to Major General in only a few years.  I think the only man in the entire hemisphere who had commanded more than 20,000 men in battle was Winfield Scott. 

Same was probably true for the US army in WW1.  The commander of the US 1st division had been an aide in the Spanish-American war, the commander of the 1st Brigade had led a cavalry regiment in that war.  And it's not like fighting Spanish soldiers in Cuba in the 1890s necessarily prepared one to right the c1918 German army in France. Even Pershing didn't have a lot meaningful large-scale command experience beyond the punitive expedition in Mexico - again, hardly ideal preparation for commanding up to 1 million men on the  Western Front.

As a general matter, I don't think it's true that the most successful generals in a given war are always the ones with the most command experience entering into the war.  Anecdotally it seems a case could be made for the opposite.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 30, 2019, 09:57:54 AM
Advantageous in terms of more successful than normal. But the Maryland Campaign was an elective attack of Lee. From an attritional point of view, was 2:1 enough for the South?

But to continue on that line of thinking, was any realistic ratio enough for the South, given their extreme disadvantage in numbers?  I think their only hope was to continue scoring victories that would continue to demoralize the North.  A victory for Lee in Maryland would have certainly been demoralizing.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 30, 2019, 10:15:53 AM
As a general matter, I don't think it's true that the most successful generals in a given war are always the ones with the most command experience entering into the war.  Anecdotally it seems a case could be made for the opposite.

Also, it's not as if junior officers didn't receive instruction as to how to command larger scale units.  It's what many of them were being groomed for.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 30, 2019, 10:15:53 AM

Quote from: Razgovory on May 29, 2019, 06:16:04 PM
One of the more remarkable things about the US civil war is that junior officers were set up to command entire armies.  Grant retired from the army as a captain,  So did Sherman.  Custer went for 2nd LT to Major General in only a few years.  I think the only man in the entire hemisphere who had commanded more than 20,000 men in battle was Winfield Scott. 

Same was probably true for the US army in WW1.  The commander of the US 1st division had been an aide in the Spanish-American war, the commander of the 1st Brigade had led a cavalry regiment in that war.  And it's not like fighting Spanish soldiers in Cuba in the 1890s necessarily prepared one to right the c1918 German army in France. Even Pershing didn't have a lot meaningful large-scale command experience beyond the punitive expedition in Mexico - again, hardly ideal preparation for commanding up to 1 million men on the  Western Front.

As a general matter, I don't think it's true that the most successful generals in a given war are always the ones with the most command experience entering into the war.  Anecdotally it seems a case could be made for the opposite.

It's a commonly recurring problem that the skills necessary to advance up the ladder of promotion in peacetime are not necessarily the same skills necessary to win battles in war; also, that many generals do not age well - could have been great as young men, not so great as old duffers facing radically changed circumstances.

But how to select young men of command ability, without some sort of "Ender's Game"-like process?  :D

Quote from: derspiess on May 30, 2019, 10:24:01 AM
But to continue on that line of thinking, was any realistic ratio enough for the South, given their extreme disadvantage in numbers?  I think their only hope was to continue scoring victories that would continue to demoralize the North.  A victory for Lee in Maryland would have certainly been demoralizing.

They were probably outnumbered something like 2.5:1. so from an attritional point of view I think that is the breakeven line--2:1 in the Maryland campaign was reasonably close. Though the south probably needed a bigger number than that since it more fully mobilized.

There were probably 3 scenarios that theoretically could have resulted in a victory for the South:
1) ring up a massive number of victories (and body count) to demoralize the north,
2) win a massive victory to demoralize the north (such as destroying the army of the Potomac),
3) remaining viable into 1865 with Lincoln losing the election

Attrition was never going to work. The Maryland Campaign really didn't contribute to any of these.

Lee obviously wanted to win through #2.

One of the advantages the South had, really what could have been its decisive advantage, was its vast size and the fact its infrastructure was all pointed seawards. It was a pretty difficult area to invade. The South needed to aggressively raid nearby northern territory and hold strong points and threaten supply lines. They had a series of costly failures in 1861 and 1862 in the west that hindered their ability to do those things. I think if they had not lost so badly in Missouri and Kentucky and on the Mississippi early on they might have had a pretty good chance of winning. But who knows?

Early on the southern strategy was defensive and passive (granted they had an army to train and organize so that was mostly by necessity) and they stretched their armies out in a thin line to guard the border, which was absolutely not what they should have done and it cost them.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 30, 2019, 10:44:20 AM

Quote from: derspiess on May 30, 2019, 10:24:01 AM
But to continue on that line of thinking, was any realistic ratio enough for the South, given their extreme disadvantage in numbers?  I think their only hope was to continue scoring victories that would continue to demoralize the North.  A victory for Lee in Maryland would have certainly been demoralizing.

They were probably outnumbered something like 2.5:1. so from an attritional point of view I think that is the breakeven line--2:1 in the Maryland campaign was reasonably close. Though the south probably needed a bigger number than that since it more fully mobilized.

There were probably 3 scenarios that theoretically could have resulted in a victory for the South:
1) ring up a massive number of victories (and body count) to demoralize the north,
2) win a massive victory to demoralize the north (such as destroying the army of the Potomac),
3) remaining viable into 1865 with Lincoln losing the election

Attrition was never going to work. The Maryland Campaign really didn't contribute to any of these.

Lee obviously wanted to win through #2.

Agree.  I do think that a Maryland Campaign could have worked for Lee, just not the way he planned it.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 30, 2019, 10:15:53 AM

Quote from: Razgovory on May 29, 2019, 06:16:04 PM
One of the more remarkable things about the US civil war is that junior officers were set up to command entire armies.  Grant retired from the army as a captain,  So did Sherman.  Custer went for 2nd LT to Major General in only a few years.  I think the only man in the entire hemisphere who had commanded more than 20,000 men in battle was Winfield Scott. 

Same was probably true for the US army in WW1.  The commander of the US 1st division had been an aide in the Spanish-American war, the commander of the 1st Brigade had led a cavalry regiment in that war.  And it's not like fighting Spanish soldiers in Cuba in the 1890s necessarily prepared one to right the c1918 German army in France. Even Pershing didn't have a lot meaningful large-scale command experience beyond the punitive expedition in Mexico - again, hardly ideal preparation for commanding up to 1 million men on the  Western Front.

As a general matter, I don't think it's true that the most successful generals in a given war are always the ones with the most command experience entering into the war.  Anecdotally it seems a case could be made for the opposite.

The US army didn't preform that well in WW1 either...

Interesting stuff.

Not getting the bayonet tossing though. A way of making it so their commanders couldn't order bayonet charges?

Did Johnston have the right idea with his fabianish defence against Sherman?

Quote from: Threviel on May 30, 2019, 12:18:32 PM
Did Johnston have the right idea with his fabianish defence against Sherman?

Yes, though it needed to be complemented by raids and attacks on Sherman's rear areas and supply lines. Granted that was not really an option for Johnson in those circumstances. I think he did the best he could with what he had.

The Confederacy needed an active defense, I think.

But that is just, like, my opinion man. I am no military expert.

I got the impression that parliamentary forces were relatively undisciplined until Cromwell professionalised his NMA and that influence spread.  :bowler:

Quote from: Tyr on May 30, 2019, 12:09:00 PM
Interesting stuff.

Not getting the bayonet tossing though. A way of making it so their commanders couldn't order bayonet charges?

Supposedly there was a pattern where soldiers who were making a bayonet attack tended to stop short and just start firing into the opposing force at point blank range. For whatever reason (psychology?) they very rarely managed to actually get into that sort of contact.

Early in the war Texas had a force of lancers, complete with little Texas flags on their lances. When they were ordered to charge the enemy they did something similar, coming very close to the Union line but ultimately stopping short and falling back (because, being lancers, they had no guns).

The soldiers had almost suicidal bravery when it came to fire fights but for whatever reason they had a hard time applying shock tactics.

The argument from my latest book was that Lee, however well he fought his battles, was not going to get a positive casualty ratio enough to win the war. Even his greatest victories weakened the Confederacy more than the Union. Sure, he might do it with a huge victory ending with the destruction of the army of the Potomac, but that was realistically not going to happen.

A defence based on making the Union assault prepared defences while their rear was harassed would have been optimal, but that's not what the Confederacy did.

Quote from: Threviel on May 30, 2019, 12:28:20 PM
A defence based on making the Union assault prepared defences while their rear was harassed would have been optimal, but that's not what the Confederacy did.

They tried this, in the west anyway, and had some success but it was too little too late.

But yeah I think this was how the South wins the war.

Yeah, that's what I meant with the Johns(t)on comment.

Quote from: Valmy on May 30, 2019, 12:24:45 PM

Quote from: Tyr on May 30, 2019, 12:09:00 PM
Interesting stuff.

Not getting the bayonet tossing though. A way of making it so their commanders couldn't order bayonet charges?

Supposedly there was a pattern where soldiers who were making a bayonet attack tended to stop short and just start firing into the opposing force at point blank range. For whatever reason (psychology?) they very rarely managed to actually get into that sort of contact.

Early in the war Texas had a force of lancers, complete with little Texas flags on their lances. When they were ordered to charge the enemy they did something similar, coming very close to the Union line but ultimately stopping short and falling back (because, being lancers, they had no guns).

The soldiers had almost suicidal bravery when it came to fire fights but for whatever reason they had a hard time applying shock tactics.

My guess is that the soldiers had a much better understanding of the effectiveness of the rifled musket than their senior leadership did, and acted accordingly.

Quote from: Valmy on May 30, 2019, 10:52:00 AM
One of the advantages the South had, really what could have been its decisive advantage, was its vast size and the fact its infrastructure was all pointed seawards. It was a pretty difficult area to invade. The South needed to aggressively raid nearby northern territory and hold strong points and threaten supply lines. They had a series of costly failures in 1861 and 1862 in the west that hindered their ability to do those things. I think if they had not lost so badly in Missouri and Kentucky and on the Mississippi early on they might have had a pretty good chance of winning. But who knows?

Early on the southern strategy was defensive and passive (granted they had an army to train and organize so that was mostly by necessity) and they stretched their armies out in a thin line to guard the border, which was absolutely not what they should have done and it cost them.

I'm not sure anything would have helped much in the end.  At no point was the South ever winning the war.  The best that could be said about lee, despite all the claims of his strategic brilliance, was that he was losing slower than anyone else.

Quote from: Razgovory on May 30, 2019, 01:18:00 PM
At no point was the South ever winning the war.

Well I totally agree but I think this was because they did so badly in the early stages. If they had been able to keep the war in Kentucky and Missouri in 1862 things might have turned in their favor.

They could have created more slave regiments. Slave soldiers have been used successfully by many. The Ottomen, Skaven...

Quote from: Valmy on May 30, 2019, 12:24:45 PM

Quote from: Tyr on May 30, 2019, 12:09:00 PM
Interesting stuff.

Not getting the bayonet tossing though. A way of making it so their commanders couldn't order bayonet charges?

Supposedly there was a pattern where soldiers who were making a bayonet attack tended to stop short and just start firing into the opposing force at point blank range. For whatever reason (psychology?) they very rarely managed to actually get into that sort of contact.

Early in the war Texas had a force of lancers, complete with little Texas flags on their lances. When they were ordered to charge the enemy they did something similar, coming very close to the Union line but ultimately stopping short and falling back (because, being lancers, they had no guns).

The soldiers had almost suicidal bravery when it came to fire fights but for whatever reason they had a hard time applying shock tactics.

Needed to import some Swedish Caroleans.  :D

Bayonet charges require a lot of discipline and training.  Most people would rather not get into a brawl armed with a very poor spear.  I know that many soldiers carried pistols which were a much, much better weapon for close combat.  They probably prefer to use those if they could.

A lot of ink has been spilled about the importance of rifled muskets, but I'm not convinced they preformed much better than the previous muskets.  Soldiers didn't have much training in marksmanship, and after a few minutes of combat, smoke was so dense they couldn't even see the enemy clearly.

They were still more accurate than smoothbore muskets, and had a much greater effective range. 

Keagan, in The Face of Battle, says that during the Napoleonic Wars bayonets very rarely touched bayonets.  Either the defender ran in fear or the attacker got shot up and ran back.

Quote from: dps on May 29, 2019, 09:24:06 PM
Lee didn't exactly lose--tactically, the battle was a draw.

Whatever the actual numbers of men present, though, McClellan deserves a lot of criticism for how he conducted the battle.  He basically drew up a battle plan the night before, then stood back and watched his corps commanders try to carry it out.  He didn't do anything to help them coordinate there attacks, or much of anything else, either.  He pretty much just acted as a spectator during the battel, not a commander.

There actually isn't even much evidence that Mac had any such plan to begin with - the only "plan" produced was shown after the fact.

Certainly the unfolding of the battle didn't seem to indicate much of a plan on his part.

Quote from: Tyr on May 30, 2019, 12:09:00 PM
Interesting stuff.

Not getting the bayonet tossing though. A way of making it so their commanders couldn't order bayonet charges?

The number of wounds suffered by bayonet during the war was basically zero - maybe 1% or something like that. They were completely psychological weapons, and by the middle part of the war, everyone understood that charges were resolved, one way or the other, long before anyone actually gt into bayonet range.

If the Union had just coordinated their assaults at roughly the same time-- or even just the same part of the day :frusty:

Quote from: derspiess on May 30, 2019, 02:18:35 PM
They were still more accurate than smoothbore muskets, and had a much greater effective range. 

They were pretty incredible weapons compared to what came before, no doubt.

They changed the way battles were fought, and changed what defined the decisive elements of victory, from morale and espirit to discipline and fire control.

Hell, in the Nappy Wars, one of the most effective French tactical formations was the attack in column, where you basically just march your bad ass troops up to close range ignoring the defenders fire, then deployed at short ranged and smashed the defender with concentrated musket fire. This required incredible esprit and a offensive mindset. Your troops had to be able to basically just ignore medium and long range musket fire, but once they got to effective range, they could deliver their own fire that was just as effective as the defenders.

This was a non-starter in the ACW, because you could not just ignore medium and long range rifled musket fire, to say nothing of the vastly better artillery available. No matter how brave your men are, they are going to be shot down trying to attack in column.

So instead an attack had to be made in line, and even that was pretty damn hard, but it could be done, at least in theory.

Once the lines got close enough for muskets to actually be effective, the superiority of the rifled musket over the smoothbore is obviously considerably less, but only a small number of engagements would that be the decisive moment.

Let's just imagine Pickets charge where everyone has muskets instead of rifles. And where the artillery is all smoothbore. That kind of thing might actually work, if the defenders break under the attack that can actually get close enough cohesively to deliver their own counter fire. ACW? Nope, no chance. By the time any of Picketts men were in musket range, the attack had already failed, and failed badly.

There was a reason that it was pretty clear pretty quickly that men armed with muskets were at a considerable disadvantage.

Hell, that doesn't even begin to discuss how much more effective skirmishing was with rifles, where by the mid and late wars it was not uncommon for the armies to be deploying 25% of their men on picket lines. This, of course, would eventually foreshadow infantry combat where the "skirmish" line is no longer ancillary to the main battle line, but rather IS the main battle line.

Quote from: derspiess on May 30, 2019, 02:54:37 PM
If the Union had just coordinated their assaults at roughly the same time-- or even just the same part of the day :frusty:

Come on, how could they though? I mean, the Confederates outnumbered them like 2-1!

Quote from: Valmy on May 30, 2019, 10:52:00 AM
Early on the southern strategy was defensive and passive (granted they had an army to train and organize so that was mostly by necessity) and they stretched their armies out in a thin line to guard the border, which was absolutely not what they should have done and it cost them.

"The South" was not a tightly organized and disciplined national state reasonably capable of conceiving and implementing a grand strategy that would deliberately leave territory wide open to invasion.  It was a hastily improvised assemblage of jealous mini-sovereigns.

Jefferson Davis's leadership of the South precluded grand strategy. The man was Lincoln's inferior in every subject possible except direct military experience. And, arguably, that was to Davis's detriment and Lincoln's favor considering the shape of the war.

Quote from: Threviel on May 30, 2019, 12:28:20 PM
The argument from my latest book was that Lee, however well he fought his battles, was not going to get a positive casualty ratio enough to win the war. Even his greatest victories weakened the Confederacy more than the Union. Sure, he might do it with a huge victory ending with the destruction of the army of the Potomac, but that was realistically not going to happen.

A defence based on making the Union assault prepared defences while their rear was harassed would have been optimal, but that's not what the Confederacy did.

I don't think so. I think Lee was right and needed a shock and awe victory to bring the North to the peace table.

The problem is that there was far too much territory to defend, the South didn't have a navy, and the South was badly outnumbered. That the South was running a slave economy also badly hurt it--it made the occupation of its territory much more tenable as there were large segments of the population ready to collaborate with and join the North.

To point out that Johnston didn't have the right idea--Sherman left the Chattanooga area in early May and was on the outskirts of Atlanta by the end of June. That is over 100 miles - the distance between Chattanooga and Atlanta is slightly more than Washington DC to Richmond. It isn't just that all that territory was ceded without a major threat to Sherman--but that Georgia territory was part of one of the last Confederate states not directly impacted by the war. It was needed to sustain the war effort.

The focus is always on the east, but by the end of August 1863 the situation in the confederacy was such:
1. Mississippi River was completely controlled by the Union with the fall of Vicksburg. New Orleans (the largest Confederate city) was lost back in April 1862.
2. Tennessee was effectively lost with the occupation of Chattanooga.
3. The situation in the east was by contrast relatively positive. The army of northern virginia was obviously smarting after the gettysburg campaign, but was stable enough to send the better part of a corps to tennessee to try to stabilize the situation there.

The point being: I think the history of the civil war is that the south gets its ass kicked everywhere but in the headline theater. The war only lasted until 1865 because the south was so big it took the union a long time to walk everywhere and the south wouldn't give up with the army of northern virginia still viable and richmond unconquered.

If Lee had focused more on defense, I don't see a path to victory for the South. I think he was ultimately right that he needed to bag the army of the potomac (which anyway may not have been enough). While a few seemingly came close several times, I think it is telling that for whatever reason armies in the field were basically never destroyed during the war on either side. The technology of the era may have been such that he was chasing an impossible dream.

But then on the other hand, in European wars of the era armies were quickly routed by the Prussians. I know the theater of operations in Europe was much more contained, but that still seems a bit odd to me.

Quote from: Habbaku on May 30, 2019, 03:11:42 PM
Jefferson Davis's leadership of the South precluded grand strategy. The man was Lincoln's inferior in every subject possible except direct military experience. And, arguably, that was to Davis's detriment and Lincoln's favor considering the shape of the war.

The problem with shitting on Davis's strategy is that the Confederacy lasted until April 1865.

Suppose I put you in charge of a newly cobbled together country that is poor and agrarian and going to war with a wealthy and industrialized country next door. It has 27 million people. I give you 5 million white folks, which you have to use to not just beat that country next door but also to oppress 4 million slaves. By the way, you don't get a real navy and your enemy does.

What is the over/under for how long you last?

Why is my personal ability at all relevant to Davis's not having a strategy and being an incompetent leader?

Quote from: Admiral Yi on May 30, 2019, 02:44:20 PM
Keagan, in The Face of Battle, says that during the Napoleonic Wars bayonets very rarely touched bayonets.  Either the defender ran in fear or the attacker got shot up and ran back.

Yes they're great for beating the enemy.

What the South needed to win was AK-47s.

Turtledove hijack complete.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 30, 2019, 03:38:30 PM

Quote from: Habbaku on May 30, 2019, 03:11:42 PM
Jefferson Davis's leadership of the South precluded grand strategy. The man was Lincoln's inferior in every subject possible except direct military experience. And, arguably, that was to Davis's detriment and Lincoln's favor considering the shape of the war.

The problem with shitting on Davis's strategy is that the Confederacy lasted until April 1865.

Suppose I put you in charge of a newly cobbled together country that is poor and agrarian and going to war with a wealthy and industrialized country next door. It has 27 million people. I give you 5 million white folks, which you have to use to not just beat that country next door but also to oppress 4 million slaves. By the way, you don't get a real navy and your enemy does.

What is the over/under for how long you last?

Let's say I put you in charge of an assemblage of revolting mini-states that isn't a country at all, suffering from grave internal division, with around 1/3 of the population favoring and supporting the enemy forces.  It has no navy to speak of, and no real army either, other than a quickly assembled force of about 25,000 poorly trained and inexperienced men and a grab bag of unorganized militia. Most of its population, commerce, and infrastructure, is located on or near its virtually indefensible coastline, at the mercy of its enemy. It faces the most powerful nation on the face of the Earth, with a population more than triple its size, disposing of vast naval forces and highly disciplined and well trained regular soldiers.

That was the situation of the revolting US states in 1776.  It's not hard too see why southern leaders could think they could turn the trick again, especially given the daunting task for the Union of penetrating and pacifying the vast interior of the southern states c. 1861.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 30, 2019, 04:00:22 PM

Let's say I put you in charge of an assemblage of revolting mini-states that isn't a country at all, suffering from grave internal division, with around 1/3 of the population favoring and supporting the enemy forces.  It has no navy to speak of, and no real army either, other than a quickly assembled force of about 25,000 poorly trained and inexperienced men and a grab bag of unorganized militia. Most of its population, commerce, and infrastructure, is located on or near its virtually indefensible coastline, at the mercy of its enemy. It faces the most powerful nation on the face of the Earth, with a population more than triple its size, disposing of vast naval forces and highly disciplined and well trained regular soldiers.

That was the situation of the revolting US states in 1776.  It's not hard too see why southern leaders could think they could turn the trick again, especially given the daunting task for the Union of penetrating and pacifying the vast interior of the southern states c. 1861.

While that is true, there are also a lot of differences (the confederacy being a slave state principal among them).

Also, while pacifying the vast interior of the southern states was indeed a daunting task, I don't think that occupying Richmond would seem as challenging.

Quote from: derspiess on May 30, 2019, 02:18:35 PM
They were still more accurate than smoothbore muskets, and had a much greater effective range.

What good is a more accurate rifle if you don't aim it?

Quote from: Razgovory on May 30, 2019, 06:36:29 PM

Quote from: derspiess on May 30, 2019, 02:18:35 PM
They were still more accurate than smoothbore muskets, and had a much greater effective range.

What good is a more accurate rifle if you don't aim it?

The value of rifled muskets wasn't really the improved accuracy--as you point out, that doesn't matter much unless you aim.  And in battles, nobody except the specially trained snipers really aims.  That's pretty much always been true, and as best as I can tell, is still true even on modern battlefields.  The real value of the rifled muskets was the increased range.  With a smoothbore, you might only get 3 or 4 shots off against an infantry charge (and you'd be luck to get 2 shots against a cavalry charge).  With rifles, your shot could travel maybe 3 times as far, so you could fire 3 times as many shots against enemy forces within effective range (actually, even more, because the effective range of smoothbores was about the same as the distance troops could sustain a full charge--with rifles, you could hit them at a distance greater than that at which the could charge, so the time you had them under effective fire wouldn't just be tripled, it would be increase by a factor of 4 or 5, maybe even 6).  Even without taking that last bit into consideration, you'd render ineffective 3 times as many enemy troops even without any improvement in the accuracy of your fire.

When discussing leadership, keep in mind that the US Army was tiny during peacetime--this didn't really change until after WWII.  I believe I've read that before the Civil War, the Army only had about 16,000 men.  I looked on Wikipedia, but I couldn't find any confirmation of that, though it did say that the before the Mexican-American war the strength of the Army was only 6,000.  There simply weren't enough troops before war to give officers any experience leading large forces, and with the wartime expansion of the Army, there weren't enough of even the minimally experience Regular Army officers to go around.  And while a lot of the better-known ACW generals had seen action during the Mexican-American War, they were all relatively junior officers--the Mexican-American War generals were largely the War of 1812 veterans who were still active, who were all either dead or too old or otherwise unfit for field command by 1860.

I think that A.S. Johnston was the only prominent ACW general who had ever commanded even a full regiment prior to the war, and even he hadn't ever lead a full regiment in active operations.  I could be wrong about that;  I'd probably have to dig into primary sources I don't have easy access to to be sure, and even if I had such access, I don't really have the time.

EDIT:  found on Wikipedia that the pre-ACW size of the US Army was 16,367.  'Bout what I had thought.

Quote from: Valmy on May 30, 2019, 12:24:45 PM

Quote from: Tyr on May 30, 2019, 12:09:00 PM
Interesting stuff.

Not getting the bayonet tossing though. A way of making it so their commanders couldn't order bayonet charges?

Supposedly there was a pattern where soldiers who were making a bayonet attack tended to stop short and just start firing into the opposing force at point blank range. For whatever reason (psychology?) they very rarely managed to actually get into that sort of contact.

Early in the war Texas had a force of lancers, complete with little Texas flags on their lances. When they were ordered to charge the enemy they did something similar, coming very close to the Union line but ultimately stopping short and falling back (because, being lancers, they had no guns).

The soldiers had almost suicidal bravery when it came to fire fights but for whatever reason they had a hard time applying shock tactics.

I've posted this before, but maybe you missed it.

Basically, melee combat is far more terrifying to soldiers than missile combat. Unless your army is as disciplined as the Romans or early modern European armies, they just aren't going to bring themselves to do it.
http://scholars-stage.blogspot.com/2015/10/pre-modern-battlefields-were-absolutely.html

QuotePre-Modern Battlefields Were Absolutely Terrifying

"Man does not enter battle to fight, but for victory. He does everything that he can to avoid the first and obtain the second"

Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern Battle, trans. John Greely and Robert Cotton (or. pub. Paris, 1870; trans. edition, New York, 1921), pg. 1.

Of the many books and articles published explaining the tactical mechanics of ancient and medieval warfare, none have influenced my views on the topic more than a short article by Philip Sabin titled "The Face of Roman Battle." In this article Sabin attempts to draw an accurate description of the way a Roman legion and its maniples actually worked on the battlefield. He is not the only one to attempt this feat. The clearest description of the pre-Marian armies is the account found in the eighteenth book of Polybius's Histories, and historians have been squabbling over just what Polybius's rather ambiguous report means for the better part of the last two centuries. I believe that Sabin's is the best of their efforts. What makes his description so convincing is the building blocks he uses to construct it. Sabin starts his reconstruction with a few general insights about the nature of ancient combat, especially the hand-to-hand sort. His most important insight is this: close combat is absolutely terrifying. When you realize just how terrifying it is much of what we find in the ancient and medieval source starts to make a lot more sense.

Sabin's case study is the Roman legion. In his essay's first section Sabin surveys common features of battle narratives preserved in the extant histories and concludes that any description of Roman battle mechanics must be able to explain a few odd features of these accounts to be considered legitimate:

Roman heavy infantry engagements possessed several clear characteristics which must be accounted for by any model of the combat mechanics involved. If not decided at the first clash, the contests often dragged on for an hour or more before one side finally broke and fled. The losers could suffer appalling casualties in the battle itself or in the ensuing pursuit, but the victors rarely suffered more than 5 per cent fatalities even in drawn-out engagements. The fighting lines could shift back and forth over hundreds of yards as one side withdrew or was pushed back by its opponents. Finally, the Romans had a practical system for the passage of lines, and preferred to reinforce or replace tired units with fresh ones rather than maximizing the depth of the initial fighting line. [1]

As Sabin read the ancient accounts he realized that parallels for many features of Roman combat could be found in descriptions of early modern Europe's bayonet charge:

We know from eighteenth- and nineteenth-century engagements that bayonets caused only a tiny proportion of battle casualties, but bayonet charges do seem to have been decisive in triggering routs. The explanation for this apparent paradox seems to be that cold steel held a unique terror for troops, over and above that caused by the more random and impersonal perils of shot and shell. The morale of opposed infantry formations appears to have been closely interlinked, such that if one side could nerve itself to launch a bayonet charge in the conviction that the enemy would not stand, the enemy did indeed break before contact. Conversely, if mutual deterrence was maintained, then the combat could bog down into a bloody close-range firefight between the opposing lines, often lasting for hours....

There are striking parallels between the psychological role of bayonet charges in modern warfare and the way in which many ancient combats were decided at or before the first shock, with a charge by one side prompting its enemies to take flight at once. Hoplite engagements seem to have been particularly susceptible to such an early resolution, sometimes even producing 'tearless battles' when one side fled so soon that it outdistanced any pursuit. Goldsworthy claims that late Republican and early Imperial legionaries exploited their professionalism and esprit de corps by winning similar swift victories against less resolute opponents through a coordinated volley of pila followed by a fierce charge. This chimes exactly with Paddy Griffith's argument that the disciplined British infantry of the Napoleonic Wars beat the French not through winning prolonged firefights but through a single devastating musket volley followed by a charge with the bayonet. [2]

Why was cold steel a "unique terror" for troops in combat? On the face of it a sword does not seem any more frightening than the cannon-ball. Pop culture portrayals of small imperialist forces putting hordes of backward natives to flight with nothing but gun and powder suggest the opposite conclusion. Images of countless thousands led to the slaughter on the banks of the Somme or hills of Verdun only strengthen the impression. But those men who actually withstood both the bullet and the bayonet overwhelmingly preferred to face the former. A similar preference for arrows and cross-bows shot from afar over spear thrusts and sword strokes closer to home pervades the ancient and medieval sources.

To understand why this was so you must discard Hollywood notions of close combat. This is hard to do, for the notions are much older than Hollywood. The classical Chinese novels Outlaws of the Marsh and Romance of the Three Kingdoms speak of warriors who exchange five, ten, twenty, and even fifty "rounds" or "clashes" on the battlefield. The long duels of ancient India's great war epic, the Mahabharata, are matched only by the extended contests of its Greek counterpart, the Iliad. All of it is poppycock. Ancient battles did not descend into a series of extended melees when the two front lines collided. The silliness of the Hollywood style of battle becomes immediately apparent when you watch sparring competitions that use pre-modern weapons:

VIDEO

As you can see, most close quarter engagements are decided within seconds. To engage in hand to hand combat is to hang your life on a the balance of a few split second decisions. This is terrifying. It is all the more terrifying if the enemy force is as committed and disciplined as your own.  If you survive the first encounter--that is, if you successfully kill the first man who attempts to kill you--there will be another, and then yet another to fill in his place. How long can you keep making instant life-or-death decisions before you make a mistake? The odds are not in your favor. The physical and mental strain of close quarters combat on those in the front lines is simply more than can be borne for any great stretch of time.

Sabin explains why this is important:
What does all this mean for the many cases in Roman infantry battles where neither side broke at the outset, and the combat turned into a prolonged affair? I suggest that close-range sword dueling between steady bodies of infantry must have been a highly unstable state, and one that would require massive injections of physical and psychological energy either to initiate or to sustain for any length of time. It was clearly only the availability of protective armor and shields that made such duels endurable at all, given their apparent intolerability for the unprotected troops of more modern times. I would argue that there must also have been a more physically and psychologically sustainable 'default state' within protracted Roman infantry contests, into which the combatants would naturally relapse if the initial advances by either side failed to trigger an early rout.

We can see such 'default states' in a wide variety of other forms of human combat. Anthropological observations of primitive tribes confirm the image in heroic poetry of protracted stand-offs in which individual warriors would move forward to do battle and then retreat into the safety of the supporting mass. Even when lethal weapons are not involved, we can see similar stand-offs between rioting mobs and lines of police, or at an individual level between dueling boxers, who spend much more time circling each other warily and looking for an opening than they do in the actual flurries of blow and counter-blow. I suggest that the default state in protracted Roman infantry combats would have been similar to that between eighteenth- and nineteenth-century infantry, namely a small separation of the two lines so that they could exchange insults and missile fire but were not quite close enough for hand-to-hand dueling. If such a default state existed in Roman infantry clashes, this raises the question of the frequency and duration of actual sword fighting between the opposing lines. Could troops who had closed for such sword play disengage without routing, and re-establish the 'safety distance'? How long a period of sword fighting was physically and psychologically sustainable before the tension had to be broken either by a reversion to the default stand-off or by the flight of one side? What proportion of the overall length of infantry clashes was spent in sword dueling, and what proportion in sporadic missile exchanges from a short distance away? [3]

Sabin does not believe that "pure missile duel" style of battle, decided by one great final charge at its end, accords with the surviving narrative sources:

Such a radical image seems to me incompatible with the many references in the literature to true hand-to-hand fighting, and it makes it difficult to explain how one side could 'push back' its adversaries during the course of the contest. Hence, unlike in the stalemated firefights of more recent times, I believe that in most Roman battles the lines did sporadically come into contact, as one side or the other surged forward for a brief and localized flurry of hand-to-hand combat. The flurry of combat would end when one side got the worst of the exchange, and its troops would step back to re-impose the 'safety distance' while brandishing their weapons to deter immediate enemy pursuit....

The model of Roman infantry combat as a dynamic balance of mutual dread fits the overall characteristics of the phenomenon far better than do the alternative images of a protracted othismos [i.e. a group of massed infantry pressing each forward, hopolite style] or continuous sword dueling. It helps to explain why some clashes were decided at the first onset while others dragged on for hours. It accounts for the relatively low casualties suffered by the victorious army, since periods of close range stand-off would be far less bloody than the equivalent firefights in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, given the much lower numbers of missiles available and the fact that the great majority would be blocked by the large infantry shields (cf. Livy 28.2, 28.32-3; Caesar, BGI .26; Josephus, BJ 3. I I2-I4). The model also suggests how one side could gradually 'push' another back over distances of hundreds of yards, since if it was always the same side that gave way after the sporadic flurries of hand-to-hand dueling, the accumulation of such small withdrawals would have significant grand tactical impact over time. [4]

But if cold steel was so frightening, why would men engage in close quarters combat at all? Again, Sabin explains:

Why would parts of each line sporadically surge forward into contact? The key individuals would surely be the 'natural fighters' and junior leaders, who would encourage a concerted lunge forward to overcome the understandable reluctance among their comrades to be the first to advance into the wall of enemy blades. Roman sub- units such as centuries, maniples, and cohorts offered an ideal basis for such localized charges, whereas tribal warriors would mount less disciplined attacks led by the bolder spirits among them. The many accounts of Roman standard-bearers carrying or flinging their standards towards the enemy to embolden the onslaught of their comrades (as at Pydna and in Caesar's invasion of Britain) are of obvious relevance in this connection (Plutarch, Aem. 20; Caesar, BG 4.25). Across an overall infantry battlefront many hundreds of yards wide, the back and forth movement of individual sub-units or warrior bands just the crucial few yards to engage in or disengage from hand-to-hand combat would not prejudice the maintenance of the overall line. If such flurries of sword fighting were not quickly decisive, then sheer physical and nervous exhaustion, coupled with the killing or wounding of the key junior leaders who were inspiring their men to engage, would lead the two sides to separate back to the default stand-off. The fact that even phalangites could step back facing the enemy (as at Sellasia) indicates that there was usually sufficient 'give' within infantry formations to allow front-rankers to shy away from their adversaries without bumping immediately into the man behind. Indeed, when this flexibility was removed and troops became too closely packed together, thereby hindering their ability to use their weapons properly or to step back from clashes which were not going well, they risked exposing themselves to one-sided slaughter. Something like this clearly happened at Cannae, and it could well be that a key reason why flank and rear attacks were so devastating was not just the psychological shock they caused but the fact that they crowded the victims in on one another, removing their ability to re-establish the 'safety distance' and so to recover their cohesion and fighting effectiveness. [5]

Sabin goes on to describe how this model of legionary activity makes sense of the ambiguous descriptions of Rome's famous maniple system, and why the maniples would be so effective in this style of combat. I encourage those interested in Roman history to read the entire thing. But I hope readers can see how easily Sabin's insights transfer to the wars of men who lived far from Rome. Not every army in the pre-modern world had maniples, but many had large infantry contingents intended to destroy their enemies in close quarters. The tempo of their battles would have been decided by fear and terror, as it was with the Romans. Sabin's model of periodic surges of courage temporarily hurling front lines together should be the default image of every mass infantry battle waged in the pre-modern era.

EDIT (27/10/2015 11:00 AM): A reader has pointed out to me that Philip Sabin has recently published a book that fleshes out this model and uses it to analyze the narrative accounts of famous Roman and Greek battles. I have not read it yet, but it looks interesting: Lost Battles: Reconstructing the Great Clashes of the Ancient World.

EDIT (27/10/2015 4:00 PM): Also see my short follow up post to this one: "A Few More Thoughts on the Terrors of Pre-Modern Battle."

Quote from: dps on May 30, 2019, 07:52:52 PM

Quote from: Razgovory on May 30, 2019, 06:36:29 PM

Quote from: derspiess on May 30, 2019, 02:18:35 PM
They were still more accurate than smoothbore muskets, and had a much greater effective range.

What good is a more accurate rifle if you don't aim it?

The value of rifled muskets wasn't really the improved accuracy--as you point out, that doesn't matter much unless you aim.  And in battles, nobody except the specially trained snipers really aims.  That's pretty much always been true, and as best as I can tell, is still true even on modern battlefields.  The real value of the rifled muskets was the increased range.  With a smoothbore, you might only get 3 or 4 shots off against an infantry charge (and you'd be luck to get 2 shots against a cavalry charge).  With rifles, your shot could travel maybe 3 times as far, so you could fire 3 times as many shots against enemy forces within effective range (actually, even more, because the effective range of smoothbores was about the same as the distance troops could sustain a full charge--with rifles, you could hit them at a distance greater than that at which the could charge, so the time you had them under effective fire wouldn't just be tripled, it would be increase by a factor of 4 or 5, maybe even 6).  Even without taking that last bit into consideration, you'd render ineffective 3 times as many enemy troops even without any improvement in the accuracy of your fire.

When discussing leadership, keep in mind that the US Army was tiny during peacetime--this didn't really change until after WWII.  I believe I've read that before the Civil War, the Army only had about 16,000 men.  I looked on Wikipedia, but I couldn't find any confirmation of that, though it did say that the before the Mexican-American war the strength of the Army was only 6,000.  There simply weren't enough troops before war to give officers any experience leading large forces, and with the wartime expansion of the Army, there weren't enough of even the minimally experience Regular Army officers to go around.  And while a lot of the better-known ACW generals had seen action during the Mexican-American War, they were all relatively junior officers--the Mexican-American War generals were largely the War of 1812 veterans who were still active, who were all either dead or too old or otherwise unfit for field command by 1860.

I think that A.S. Johnston was the only prominent ACW general who had ever commanded even a full regiment prior to the war, and even he hadn't ever lead a full regiment in active operations.  I could be wrong about that;  I'd probably have to dig into primary sources I don't have easy access to to be sure, and even if I had such access, I don't really have the time.

EDIT:  found on Wikipedia that the pre-ACW size of the US Army was 16,367.  'Bout what I had thought.

Do we actually know that people were firing at three times the range of the previous weapons?  Also, why would the bullet be traveling three times as far?  A rifled barrel doesn't make the gun powder stronger.  I imagine that the quality of the gunpowder was better than the Napoleonic wars, and the percussion cap made the weapon much more reliable, but I wouldn't expect the amount of energy behind the bullet would increase so dramatically.

I was curious so I used Wikipedia to compare the 1861 Rifle to the Springfield 1812 musket and shows the same muzzle velocity.  It is Wikipedia, so that's not exactly definitive, but on the other hand I don't see any particular reason to doubt it.  The actual rate of fire is also similar.  For the 1812 2-3 round a minute and for the 1861 it says 2-4 rounds a minute.  So about the same.

The rifling makes the bullet spin Raz, that means that it maintains a stable trajectory as it travels through the air and cuts down on wind resistance, so it flies much farther even though it was propelled with a similar amount of power.

Quote from: jimmy olsen on May 30, 2019, 10:48:05 PM
The rifling makes the bullet spin Raz, that means that it maintains a stable trajectory as it travels through the air and cuts down on wind resistance, so it flies much farther even though it was propelled with a similar amount of power.

Okay, why is the muzzle velocity the same?  I was under the impression that the range of a bullet is dictated by speed and gravity.

Wad up a piece of paper, and throw it as hard as you can.  Then throw an otherwise identical piece of paper as hard as you can.  Your arm speed didn't change, but the wadded up paper goes further.

Wad up? :x

There's a web site here: http://whitemuzzleloading.com/long-range-muzzleloading/ (http://whitemuzzleloading.com/long-range-muzzleloading/)  that answers a lot of the questions about the advantages of rifled muskets and minie balls versus other types of muzzleloaders.

Look at the bullet energy of the round ball from a Kentucky Rifle:
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwhitemuzzleloading.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F05%2Flong_r321.gif&hash=c18bd296996dec8814e8e1d4f427813fb3705a6c)

Compared that to the Minie ball:
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwhitemuzzleloading.com%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2015%2F05%2Flong_r391.gif&hash=03d955b1cadcb78a99b25d8441924809552fde84)

The Minie has 900 ft-lb of energy at 200 yards, the round ball 900 at 30 yards, even when both started near 1300.  Plus, the Minie is being driven by 80 grams of powder, the round ball by 125 grams (so much less kick, ergo the ability to fire more rounds before shooter exhaustion).

Note that a lot of the comparisons this author makes is between the Minie and a .69 round ball fired using 200 grams of powder, which isn't a practical military weapon, just the best that you could do with round balls.

Quote from: Habbaku on May 30, 2019, 03:11:42 PM
Jefferson Davis's leadership of the South precluded grand strategy. The man was Lincoln's inferior in every subject possible except direct military experience. And, arguably, that was to Davis's detriment and Lincoln's favor considering the shape of the war.

Lincoln had, IMO, just about the perfect combination of military experience and humility needed for someone in his position.

IE, no military experience at all. This served him well, since it meant:

1. He left military matters to the pros, and
2. He had no bad assumptions he needed to unlearn, but without any actual opportunity to unlearn them because, you know, he was kind of busy being President instead of going through the "Modern Lessons in Applied Military Theory (Why Everything You Think You Know About Tactics is Mostly Wrong)" classroom the military commanders were going through.

Combine that with a lot of humility, and he spent the first year or so pretty much letting his commanders do their thing, while he watched and learned. By the time he realized "Hey, these assholes don't actually know THAT much more than I do!" was right around the time he started exerting more direct control when needed. He sure as hell never showed up on any battlefields like fucking Davis.

Davis military experience was, IMO, a net negative for the South. They would have been MUCH better off if he had no idea about how the military worked at all. He knew just enough to think he knew enough to meddle.

And why would we assume that nobody aims?

Of course they aim - they aren't "aiming" in the sense of "I am going to shoot that guy right there" but they are certainly aiming in the sense that "I have been trained to fire at knee height at the center of that mass of marching men".

With a musket, at say 200 yards, the odds of the shot hitting anything are incredibly low. The round itself at 200 yards is not going to be anywhere near where you are pointing your musket, and will likely have plowed into the ground or sailed over the head of the targets.

A rifled minie ball, assuming you are reasonably trained, is rather likely to be placed into the aimed area of where the rifle is actually pointed. It might not hit something, but it has a reasonable chance to do so, and is likely to be in the vertical band of the target.

Jesus, there is a reason Civil War battles were so damn deadly, and that reason was the rifled musket.

Hell, even if we are talking about more "medium" range firefights, where both sides are basically lined up at 100-200 yards blazing away at one another, where the battle lines are quickly obscured by smoke, the rifled musket is STILL much more deadly, because even if you cannot specifically see your target, you are still "aiming" at where the enemy lines are expected to be, and a weapon that actually delivers the round where the barrel is pointed is clearly more likely to actually hit something than a weapon that is going to deliver the round a few feet higher or lower than where you point it.

You don't have to be a sharpshooter to benefit from a weapon that delivers the round where you point it, rather than one that does not.

Goddamn Civil War hijacks of Civil War threads.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 30, 2019, 04:06:41 PM
Also, while pacifying the vast interior of the southern states was indeed a daunting task, I don't think that occupying Richmond would seem as challenging.

Well the fact that taking Richmond was in fact quite difficult reflects one of the other big strengths of the south: military technology and tactics of the time greatly favored the defense over the offense.

Quote from: PDH on May 31, 2019, 08:07:57 AM
Goddamn Civil War hijacks of Civil War threads.

Quote from: mongers on May 30, 2019, 12:23:17 PM
I got the impression that parliamentary forces were relatively undisciplined until Cromwell professionalised his NMA and that influence spread.  :bowler:

:blush:

But what about the cavalier cavalry just running off and leaving their infantry unsupported? Clearly discipline problems were an issue with both sides.

Quote from: dps on May 30, 2019, 07:52:52 PM
When discussing leadership, keep in mind that the US Army was tiny during peacetime--this didn't really change until after WWII.  I believe I've read that before the Civil War, the Army only had about 16,000 men. 

Also promotions were mainly based on seniority.  To rise in rank you had to wait for the death or retirement of the person above you, hope for luck and make sure you hadn't made too many enemies.  That's why so many of the top ACW era generals with prior service records had retired from the Army as of 1860.  Career prospects were awful for most people with energy or ambition.

Quote from: Valmy on May 31, 2019, 08:12:20 AM
Well the fact that taking Richmond was in fact quite difficult reflects one of the other big strengths of the south: military technology and tactics of the time greatly favored the defense over the offense.

More reason for the South to think they should be able to win.
What the Southern leaders underestimated is the level of commitment, sacrifice and willingness to accept pain the North was prepared to bring to win the conflict, as well as the impact of a fully-mobilized industrial economy on the ability to wage war, something that never had been seen before.

Quote from: Berkut on May 31, 2019, 07:53:39 AM
And why would we assume that nobody aims?

Of course they aim - they aren't "aiming" in the sense of "I am going to shoot that guy right there" but they are certainly aiming in the sense that "I have been trained to fire at knee height at the center of that mass of marching men".

With a musket, at say 200 yards, the odds of the shot hitting anything are incredibly low. The round itself at 200 yards is not going to be anywhere near where you are pointing your musket, and will likely have plowed into the ground or sailed over the head of the targets.

A rifled minie ball, assuming you are reasonably trained, is rather likely to be placed into the aimed area of where the rifle is actually pointed. It might not hit something, but it has a reasonable chance to do so, and is likely to be in the vertical band of the target.

Jesus, there is a reason Civil War battles were so damn deadly, and that reason was the rifled musket.

Hell, even if we are talking about more "medium" range firefights, where both sides are basically lined up at 100-200 yards blazing away at one another, where the battle lines are quickly obscured by smoke, the rifled musket is STILL much more deadly, because even if you cannot specifically see your target, you are still "aiming" at where the enemy lines are expected to be, and a weapon that actually delivers the round where the barrel is pointed is clearly more likely to actually hit something than a weapon that is going to deliver the round a few feet higher or lower than where you point it.

You don't have to be a sharpshooter to benefit from a weapon that delivers the round where you point it, rather than one that does not.

exactly on point.  Soldiers did aim in the 17th-18th century with their muskets, they just didn't take their time to aim the Hawkeye way.  The idea was to shoot a mass volley of projectiles.  The goal was not to kill as many ennemies as possible, but to injure them, demoralize them, and finish them off with a charge, in the sense that their line would break and the army would rout.  That bayonet charge didn't aim to slaughter the ennemy, just to force them out of the field.  And that worked because after 6-7-8 volleys, the ennemy's ranks where thinned due to casualties, wounded, and demoralized soldiers.  The Prussian army of Frederick the Great could not only fire faster than others (4-5 volleys a minute, I think, compared to 2-3 for the French), they could withstand ennemy fire with more discipline before breaking.

(not relevant to ACW, but for musket fire: https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/daily/military-history/fire-by-volley-european-musketry-at-war/ )


As for the rifle muskets and the minie ball, from Wikipedia:

QuoteThe problem of slow loading of rifles caused by barrel fouling was solved by the Minié ball, which was invented in the 1840s by French inventor Claude-Étienne Minié. Despite its name, the Minié ball was not a round ball at all - it was long and conical, with an expanding skirt at the rear of the bullet. The skirt allowed the minié ball to be smaller than the barrel's bore, so it would slip in as easily as the ball of a smoothbore. When the weapon was fired, the skirt expanded to fit tightly against the inside of the rifle barrel, with less energy wasted in blow-by around the projectile and insuring that the rifling lands and grooves would impart a stabilizing spin to the minié ball.[6]

In the 1840s and 1850s, many smoothbore muskets had their barrels replaced with similar barrels that were rifled so that they could fire the new bullet. These "rifled muskets" or "rifle muskets" were long enough to serve the function of muskets in close formations of line and square, were as quick to load as the old muskets and as easy to use with minimal training. Yet the Minié-type rifled muskets were much more accurate than smoothbore muskets. Tests of a rifled musket firing Minié ball, and a smoothbore musket firing round ball, at various ranges against a 10 by 10 inches (25 cm × 25 cm) target, showed much higher accuracy for the rifled musket.[7] From a smooth-bore musket, from 42% to 48% of bullets hit the target at a distance of 200 yards. At a distance of 300 yards, 18% of the bullets hit the target. For a rifle, the results were much better. From a rifle, 46% to 58% of bullets hit the target at a distance of 300 yards; 24% to 42% at 500 yards.[8] This potential accuracy, however, required skills only acquired through advanced training and practice; a rifle-musket in the hands of a raw recruit would not have performed very much better than a smoothbore. Nevertheless, the musket was still a formidable force on the battlefield. At the beginning of the American Civil War, some infantry regiments chose to keep smooth-bore muskets, preferring them because they could shoot "ball and buck"

If officers fought like it was 1776 and 1812, with newer, deadlier weapons, that would explain the high casualty rates.  I think, also, armies were less likely to rout in the ACW than other, previous, "imperial" wars.  They fought to defend their homes, their country mostly, not some arbitrary ruler in search of glory.

Btw, about bayonnets, didn't  Stonewall Jackson attack a union camp with bayonnets only to maintain the element of surprise?  Or am I imagining something... ?

Quote from: viper37 on May 31, 2019, 09:18:39 AM
(4-5 volleys a minute, I think, compared to 2-3 for the French)

What? No way.

Seems that the South, a much weaker power once the North mobilized its resources, had two reasonable strategies available to it:

1. Go for a knockout punch ASAP before the North could mobilize its resources for the fight; or

2. Avoid any offensive actions, fight purely defensively, and simply wear down the North's enthusiasm for the fight.

The problem with the first strategy was that the South was even less organized for war than the North (having to create some sort of unity out of a bunch of squabbling states) and offences were inevitably more costly than defensive battles; the problem with the second strategy was that it relied on the North getting tired of the war - while the North would only grow comparatively stronger than the South as time went on.

Just seems that there was nothing, aside from a change in politics in the North, that could lead to the South winning. 

Quote from: Malthus on May 31, 2019, 09:21:49 AM
Just seems that there was nothing, aside from a change in politics in the North, that could lead to the South winning.

Had Trump's ancestors arrived in America by the ACW?

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on May 31, 2019, 08:43:16 AM

Quote from: Valmy on May 31, 2019, 08:12:20 AM
Well the fact that taking Richmond was in fact quite difficult reflects one of the other big strengths of the south: military technology and tactics of the time greatly favored the defense over the offense.

More reason for the South to think they should be able to win.
What the Southern leaders underestimated is the level of commitment, sacrifice and willingness to accept pain the North was prepared to bring to win the conflict, as well as the impact of a fully-mobilized industrial economy on the ability to wage war, something that never had been seen before.

There was a fantastic piece on Robert E. Lee in the Washington Post not so long ago:
Link (https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/retropolis/wp/2017/05/19/the-truth-about-confederate-gen-robert-e-lee-he-wasnt-very-good-at-his-job/?utm_term=.5df5e34053bd)

Quote from: The Brain on May 31, 2019, 09:32:28 AM

Quote from: Malthus on May 31, 2019, 09:21:49 AM
Just seems that there was nothing, aside from a change in politics in the North, that could lead to the South winning.

Had Trump's ancestors arrived in America by the ACW?

his grandpa was the first to set footh in America, sometime prior to WWI.

Quote from: Malthus on May 31, 2019, 09:21:49 AM
Just seems that there was nothing, aside from a change in politics in the North, that could lead to the South winning. 

As far as the first option remember that Washington DC was cut off and mostly defenseless for several critical weeks in 1861 thanks to efforts of secessionist elements in Maryland. The South just could have walked right in, but Jefferson Davis held back thinking it was important for political reasons to make the North appear the aggressor. That is a pretty big what-if.

Secondly they failed completely to execute the second option. The Southern defenses crumbled early on in several key disasters: Pea Ridge, Mills Springs, and Fort Henry and Donelson. Huge amounts of Southern territory were occupied just months into the conflict. The only thing that stopped a complete meltdown was the fact that the infrastructure in that part of the South was so bad the North eventually stretched their supply lines to the limit and had to stop, which allowed the South to regroup.

If either, or both, of those things had gone differently I think we are talking about an entirely different war.

Quote from: viper37 on May 31, 2019, 09:34:49 AM

Quote from: The Brain on May 31, 2019, 09:32:28 AM

Quote from: Malthus on May 31, 2019, 09:21:49 AM
Just seems that there was nothing, aside from a change in politics in the North, that could lead to the South winning.

Had Trump's ancestors arrived in America by the ACW?

his grandpa was the first to set footh in America, sometime prior to WWI.

Grandpa Trump earned his fortune in the Klondike Gold Rush.  :cool:

Quote from: Valmy on May 31, 2019, 08:12:20 AM
Well the fact that taking Richmond was in fact quite difficult reflects one of the other big strengths of the south: military technology and tactics of the time greatly favored the defense over the offense.

I'm not sure that this is really the case. First, it was not the experience in European wars of the same era--Prussia was quite aggressive and rolled up everyone. Second, the South had too much territory to defend. It couldn't create hardpoints and simply wait for the North to attack them for a few reasons: the North could simply walk around them, or concentrate its forces to attack the hardpoint with overwhelming numbers.

Napoleon commented that the only logical conclusion of a purely defensive campaign is surrender. The South had the issue that Lincoln was not going to give up. If it wanted to play defense, that meant it needed to survive until early 1865 without the war clearly turning against it (with Lincoln losing reelection and the newly elected president inheriting a war still in doubt and deciding to quit rather than press the affair). I just don't see how this happens with a defensive mindset - with 4 years the North was going to be on the advance.

To hijack the rifle hijack and bring us right back to the original thread topic, in the first few years of the war it was not universal for even prominent units to have rifles. This is from Wikipedia but it is something I had read elsewhere about the stonewall brigade:

QuoteThe Stonewall Brigade was initially armed with weapons captured from the arsenal at Harpers Ferry; its regiments went to First Bull Run carrying a wide range of muskets from Model 1816/1822 muskets converted to percussion to modern Model 1855 rifles to VMI cadet muskets (a Model 1842 musket downsized to .58 caliber). Company K of the 33rd Virginia, the Shenandoah Sharpshooters, had the misfortune of getting flintlock muskets. In September, Jackson received a request from Virginia governor John Letcher asking for the return of the VMI muskets (carried primarily by Company H of the 4th Virginia, known as the "Rockbridge Grays"). Jackson replied back that the muskets could not be returned until better weapons became available....

n the fall of 1861, Jackson was promoted to division command and reassigned to the Shenandoah Valley and Potomac River area, where they overwintered. During this time, a trickle of better weapons reached the Stonewall Brigade as Confederate agents began purchasing rifles from Europe. However, the brigade still had a large number of smoothbore muskets until the Gettysburg Campaign, by which time the majority of its men had .58 caliber rifles.

Whatever the merits of rifles versus muskets, I think there will be general agreement that the Stonewall Brigade was an effective combat unit--I'd guess because of the discipline enforced on them more than offset their less than ideal armament.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 31, 2019, 09:55:18 AM

I'm not sure that this is really the case. First, it was not the experience in European wars of the same era--Prussia was quite aggressive and rolled up everyone.

Those battles were all bloodbaths, hardly "rolling up" anybody.

QuoteSecond, the South had too much territory to defend. It couldn't create hardpoints and simply wait for the North to attack them for a few reasons: the North could simply walk around them, or concentrate its forces to attack the hardpoint with overwhelming numbers.

No it couldn't. That is ridiculous. The North had to take out the strongpoints. They had supply lines to worry about. Those long borders and lots of territory meant the northern forces had to set up isolated garrisons and left themselves open to raiding and counter attacks all the time.

QuoteNapoleon commented that the only logical conclusion of a purely defensive campaign is surrender. The South had the issue that Lincoln was not going to give up. If it wanted to play defense, that meant it needed to survive until early 1865 without the war clearly turning against it (with Lincoln losing reelection and the newly elected president inheriting a war still in doubt and deciding to quit rather than press the affair). I just don't see how this happens with a defensive mindset - with 4 years the North was going to be on the advance.

Well right, it needed to be an active defense. Northern Armies needed to be defeated Saratoga style at some point. They never managed to do it.

That the North would get sick of the carnage would have been a completely reasonable assumption - only no-one at the time the war started predicted in advance that the battles to come would result in such carnage!

Quote from: alfred russel on May 31, 2019, 09:55:18 AM

Quote from: Valmy on May 31, 2019, 08:12:20 AM
Well the fact that taking Richmond was in fact quite difficult reflects one of the other big strengths of the south: military technology and tactics of the time greatly favored the defense over the offense.

I'm not sure that this is really the case. First, it was not the experience in European wars of the same era--Prussia was quite aggressive and rolled up everyone.

Depends on the European Wars you are looking at. The long-lasting sieges of the Crimean War, the other first modern war, could have provided valuable lessons for the ACW.
And the Prussian Wars, are bloodier than you think, as Valmy pointed out.

Quote from: dps on May 31, 2019, 12:12:18 AM
Wad up a piece of paper, and throw it as hard as you can.  Then throw an otherwise identical piece of paper as hard as you can.  Your arm speed didn't change, but the wadded up paper goes further.

I didn't think of that.

Valmy, the Prussians defeated Austria in less than 2 months. The Franco Prussian War was more complicated but the Battle of Sedan was less than 3 months into the war and effectively determined the outcome. Both probably had more on paper parity than the North v. South. Both involved less dead than the ACW - but the point I was making was not that the Prussians avoided casualties--but that decisive offensive battles were possible with the era's technology. The point being -- while I grant that it seems very difficult to pacify an area as massive as the Confederacy--the Eastern theatre was quite constrained and I'm not seeing why marching into Richmond was necessarily more difficult than Paris.

Quote from: Valmy on May 31, 2019, 10:10:59 AM

No it couldn't. That is ridiculous. The North had to take out the strongpoints. They had supply lines to worry about. Those long borders and lots of territory meant the northern forces had to set up isolated garrisons and left themselves open to raiding and counter attacks all the time.

Sorry, I was quite unclear. Yes the North had to take out some strongpoints, set up garrisons, etc. However, the South couldn't set up true strong points everywhere. An example of the outcome when they tried was the loss of New Orleans--the North was pressing from the North, the South diverted troops to meet this challenge, and that left them open to the loss of their largest city with only minimal resistance.

Also, if we are arguing that the technology of the period made offensive tactics unattractive--I'd point out that an active defense like you mention is going to involve offensive tactics as well.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 31, 2019, 10:22:46 AM
Valmy, the Prussians defeated Austria in less than 2 months. The Franco Prussian War was more complicated but the Battle of Sedan was less than 3 months into the war and effectively determined the outcome. Both probably had more on paper parity than the North v. South. Both involved less dead than the ACW - but the point I was making was not that the Prussians avoided casualties--but that decisive offensive battles were possible with the era's technology. The point being -- while I grant that it seems very difficult to pacify an area as massive as the Confederacy--the Eastern theatre was quite constrained and I'm not seeing why marching into Richmond was necessarily more difficult than Paris.

In the case of Austria their political position was too fragile to fight a modern war at the time. In the case of France, well they just fucked up. They thought they were the power that supposed to be attacking but they were heavily outnumbered. Also neither the North or the South had anything like the Prussian mobilization system or rail network.

But even with that total disaster the Prussians had to besiege Paris for months against mostly amateurs.

But I concede that if the North had von Moltke and an enormous well trained army ready to go they would probably have been able to take Richmond in a few weeks.

Quote from: Valmy on May 31, 2019, 10:39:05 AM

In the case of Austria their political position was too fragile to fight a modern war at the time. In the case of France, well they just fucked up. They thought they were the power that supposed to be attacking but they were heavily outnumbered. Also neither the North or the South had anything like the Prussian mobilization system or rail network.

But even with that total disaster the Prussians had to besiege Paris for months against mostly amateurs.

But I concede that if the North had von Moltke and an enormous well trained army ready to go they would probably have been able to take Richmond in a few weeks.

Northern railways were not inferior to Prussia.

It is wikipedia, but there were almost 29,000 miles in 1860 in the US - a majority of which was in the east and new england.

The british had about 13,500 miles in 1870. I know that britain but i couldn't quickly find germany on google and i wouldn't expect germany to exceed britain by much (if at all) in the era (not to mention the problem that germany wasn't actually unified).

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_rail_transport_in_the_United_States

https://www.britannica.com/topic/British-Railways

The north certainly wasn't Prussia, but the south certainly wasn't france. As you mention, the south was arming guys with pikes and if you want to attribute a weak political situation to austria...what would you say about the south?

At the risk of posting too much, I'm really not sure what grand strategy the south could have done differently--and expected much better results. I know the idea of defending everywhere is controversial today, but I'm not sure the alternative---should they have announced that certain states would not be defended?

If we start with the premise that the South would try to defend its territory, I can't think of a winning strategy. My take on the war is that the South basically got its ass kicked from the start everywhere except the Eastern Theater. Its supposed biggest victory in the west was Chickamagua, which I'd argue was a phyrric victory if there ever was one.

If that premise is accepted, the south couldn't refocus troops between western theaters because that would just leave other theaters in even worse positions. There weren't excess troops to play with. However, troops could have been diverted from the east, and this was a plan long championed by certain officers (most prominently Longstreet).

I don't see this as an option before the Gettysburg campaign. In 1862 the Peninsula Campaign obviously gravely threatened Richmond, and the South was outnumbered at 2nd Bull Run and very significantly at Fredericksburg (while Antietam was in between, With the size of the union army in the east I doubt it was really feasible to divert a significant portion of the army west). It was after Chancellorsville that this was seen as a real opportunity.

Rather than diverting troops west the south decided to gather the eastern forces in the hopes of forcing a decisive battle in the north at something close to parity. Obviously this worked out disasterously for them, but I think the pertinent point is the south was already collapsing at this point. It was too late to do anything other than swing for the fences. Was it wiser to do that with Lee attacking into Pennsylvania or with Bragg fighting with home field advantage in Tennessee? There are pros and cons; Lee favored Pennsylvania and Davis agreed, but my guess is that they were deciding between losing options.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 31, 2019, 12:41:59 PM
At the risk of posting too much, I'm really not sure what grand strategy the south could have done differently--and expected much better results. I know the idea of defending everywhere is controversial today, but I'm not sure the alternative---should they have announced that certain states would not be defended?

This maybe not politically possible, but I think the most likely "winning" strategy would just be to try and trade territory for time.  The South was still a very large place.  Don't attack, but make the Union fight and bleed for every bit of territory they capture.  Force them into a costly occupation.  Recapture any territory after the Union moves on.  Just make it so costly for the Union that they eventually just give up.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 31, 2019, 11:02:15 AM
Northern railways were not inferior to Prussia.

It is wikipedia, but there were almost 29,000 miles in 1860 in the US - a majority of which was in the east and new england.

The british had about 13,500 miles in 1870. I know that britain but i couldn't quickly find germany on google and i wouldn't expect germany to exceed britain by much (if at all) in the era (not to mention the problem that germany wasn't actually unified).

It is as you suspected.

See: http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1744

"Germany" in 1860 had 11,000 km of track of which almost 6000 were in Prussia.  So quite a lot less than the 21,000 miles (34K km) of track in the northern US states alone.

The Union was also able to make very effective use of interior river networks during the war.

The South might have had a chance if it was able to convince Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland to join.  That would increased their manpower quite a bit and  give them some much needed industry.  Still...

Quote from: Razgovory on May 31, 2019, 01:10:37 PM
The South might have had a chance if it was able to convince Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland to join.  That would increased their manpower quite a bit and  give them some much needed industry.  Still...

I mean they sort of did convince Missouri and Kentucky to join, they just lacked the military success in those states to make it stick.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 31, 2019, 11:02:15 AM
The north certainly wasn't Prussia, but the south certainly wasn't france. As you mention, the south was arming guys with pikes and if you want to attribute a weak political situation to austria...what would you say about the south?

Austria had just barely recovered from a massive political revolution and had Hungarians and Italians ready to revolt at the slightest set back. I don't see anything comparable to the South. That is absurd.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 31, 2019, 11:02:15 AM
Northern railways were not inferior to Prussia.

It is wikipedia, but there were almost 29,000 miles in 1860 in the US - a majority of which was in the east and new england.

So not very useful in supporting troops in Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee then...

In any case I meant the way they used their railroads were mobilized and prepared for military use was superior. That is just a fact. In all of its wars Prussia had its armies fully operational and on the offensive in weeks if not days. The North was not capable of that, not even remotely.

Quote from: Barrister on May 31, 2019, 01:01:17 PM

Quote from: alfred russel on May 31, 2019, 12:41:59 PM
At the risk of posting too much, I'm really not sure what grand strategy the south could have done differently--and expected much better results. I know the idea of defending everywhere is controversial today, but I'm not sure the alternative---should they have announced that certain states would not be defended?

This maybe not politically possible, but I think the most likely "winning" strategy would just be to try and trade territory for time.  The South was still a very large place.  Don't attack, but make the Union fight and bleed for every bit of territory they capture.  Force them into a costly occupation.  Recapture any territory after the Union moves on.  Just make it so costly for the Union that they eventually just give up.

This was my "second option" above - problem being that it relies on a faltering of will on the part of the North to work, and as time progressed, the North would just get relatively stronger.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 31, 2019, 12:41:59 PM
At the risk of posting too much, I'm really not sure what grand strategy the south could have done differently--and expected much better results. I know the idea of defending everywhere is controversial today, but I'm not sure the alternative---should they have announced that certain states would not be defended?

The fact is they lost a series of battles, and massive amounts of territory, in the early stages of the war. They were not seriously outnumbered in those battles, and in at least one case had a large numerical superiority. Things could have easily gone better for them. And, as Raz states they could have had access to many more resources and manpower if they had not suffered those losses so quickly.

I just have a hard time accepting that losing Kentucky, Missouri, half of Arkansas, and half of Tennessee so quickly had zero impact on the course of the war because their defeat was inevitable anyway. I mean suppose Curtis' Army had been destroyed at Pea Ridge and the Confederacy is marching through Missouri and threatening St. Louis in 1862? Think of the recruits they could have attracted and the sorts of military and political pressure that would have put on the North. Instead they blew it and it was the North that was marching on Corinth and the Mississippi valley. Who knows what might have happened otherwise?

Van Dorn for the win! Huzzah!

Died with his boot on!

Quote from: Barrister on May 31, 2019, 01:01:17 PM

This maybe not politically possible, but I think the most likely "winning" strategy would just be to try and trade territory for time.  The South was still a very large place.  Don't attack, but make the Union fight and bleed for every bit of territory they capture.  Force them into a costly occupation.  Recapture any territory after the Union moves on.  Just make it so costly for the Union that they eventually just give up.

First the Mississippi River could be accessed by warship and only the North had a real Navy. The North was not ignorant of this and thus quickly moved to cut the confederacy in two by controlling the Mississippi. The vast territory west of the Mississippi became more or less irrelevant.

The second problem is that the most significant territories were often on the border. The largest city was New Orleans which was exposed to naval attack (and actually was captured early in 1862). The most significant state in terms of population and industry was Virginia, which was obviously on the border. Richmond was not only the political capital but also the the only portion of the Confederacy with any significant industry.

The third consideration--and I think that this is a crucial one--is that the North didn't need to conquer and occupy the South to topple the house of cards that was the southern economy. You have to keep in mind that the South had a population of about 9 million and of that almost 4 million were slaves waiting to be emancipated, and the South was trying to fight an industrialized war with an agrarian economy and just rudiments of industrialization. Sherman didn't conquer and occupy territory on his march to the sea. He started by abandoning Atlanta (and burning it on the way out). He destroyed the railroads, the cotton gins, freed the slaves, and had his army live off the land rather than supply lines. In the end, even though Lee's army in Virginia had dwindled to 30k, the country could no longer support it, and i've read estimates that soldiers were being fed about 1000 calories a day. The Union had a joke that the Confederacy had a new general: General Starvation. Lee proposed at one point evacuating all non essential civilians from the Richmond area to get more food to his army.

At the very least, once the North issued the Emancipation Proclamation, it wasn't enough to keep the North from controlling Southern territory--they needed to prevent Northern access to it. Which is a far more difficult proposition.

A more interesting what-if I think is East vs West. The West has hardy frontiersmen and ornery 49ers, the East has enormous population and industry but is fiercely divided over slavery.

Quote from: Barrister on May 31, 2019, 01:01:17 PM

Quote from: alfred russel on May 31, 2019, 12:41:59 PM
At the risk of posting too much, I'm really not sure what grand strategy the south could have done differently--and expected much better results. I know the idea of defending everywhere is controversial today, but I'm not sure the alternative---should they have announced that certain states would not be defended?

This maybe not politically possible, but I think the most likely "winning" strategy would just be to try and trade territory for time.  The South was still a very large place.  Don't attack, but make the Union fight and bleed for every bit of territory they capture.  Force them into a costly occupation.  Recapture any territory after the Union moves on.  Just make it so costly for the Union that they eventually just give up.

If the Confederacy had defended New Orleans and Nashville as tenaciously as they defended Richmond, and it had cost the Union as much to take those cities as the Petersburg campaign cost them, I suspect that there would have been a real danger of Lincoln being defeated by a peace candidate in 1864.

A tenacious defense of Nashville would have been a tough proposition, and I'm not sure that it could have been done, but there's no good reason for letting New Orleans fall as easily as it did.

The one thing you wanted to do in Victory Games ACW (best strategic simulation of ACW ever) as the Confederate side was hold New Orleans.

Quote from: The Brain on May 31, 2019, 05:22:57 PM
A more interesting what-if I think is East vs West. The West has hardy frontiersmen and ornery 49ers, the East has enormous population and industry but is fiercely divided over slavery.

That requires a lot of alt history backstory. There's no plausible scenario for that historically.

Quote from: Eddie Teach on June 01, 2019, 02:07:35 AM

Quote from: The Brain on May 31, 2019, 05:22:57 PM
A more interesting what-if I think is East vs West. The West has hardy frontiersmen and ornery 49ers, the East has enormous population and industry but is fiercely divided over slavery.

That requires a lot of alt history backstory. There's no plausible scenario for that historically.

I have a map ready.

Quote from: Eddie Teach on June 01, 2019, 02:07:35 AM

Quote from: The Brain on May 31, 2019, 05:22:57 PM
A more interesting what-if I think is East vs West. The West has hardy frontiersmen and ornery 49ers, the East has enormous population and industry but is fiercely divided over slavery.

That requires a lot of alt history backstory. There's no plausible scenario for that historically.

Not in 1860, but maybe somewhere in the 1790-1820 or so timeframe.

Discipline, at least in the CSA Army, was certainly better in the 1st half of the war (pre-draft)

My Dad's side is from Western North Carolina, was there during the war, and our people were in the 25th NC Infantry.  Looking through the unit records, it seems that the early war 12 month enlistments worked well enough... but after the CSA instituted the draft, the desertion rate skyrocketed. 

Students of the USCW are well aware that the non-slave owning hillbillies were lukewarm about getting killed for rich plantation assholes, so it shouldn't be any big shock that E TN, W NC, and N GA folks started bouncing when they were

A) - Drafted against their will (as opposed to signing on voluntarily with an enlistment bonus)
B) - Weren't allowed generous leave to return home for the harvest
C) - Once their wives and kids began getting sick and on the thin side, they were for damned sure not leaving home to rejoin the army.
D) - E TN and W NC were hotbeds of Unionism, and draft-dodgers and deserters were thick as flies.  The CSA (ha, DRAFTED) units to go after the draft-dodgers and deserters.  About 2 miles NW of the family farm, there's a memorial to some poor kid who got caught and strung up by a patrol - a patrol that were all locals and were likely relatives of that poor kiddo. 

It's probably different from unit to unit, but I can assure you that Southern hillbilly units fall under this category - good in combat, poor in cantonment.  Discipline nightmare, as they tended to ignore CSA (and state) directives.

Quote from: alfred russel on May 29, 2019, 05:47:09 PM
What also prompted this is I was recently found the service record of an ancestor who was an officer. I was surprised to find two reports indicating he was AWOL (1 in 1863 and 1 in 1865). However, he was never demoted and there is no indication of punishment.

Not uncommon in the slightest, at least with the CSA.

My g-g-g-grandfather overstayed his leave - he had gone home to find the family all sick with scarlet fever or somesuch.  He stayed until his wife recovered, and THEN returned back to his unit - at least a week late.  He was court-martialled, and sentenced to be shot.  As near as I could tell, when they attempted to carry out the sentence... his 16 year old son drew a pistol and threatened to shoot the first person that laid a hand upon his pa.  The sentence was not carried out.  Of note, this is Co A, 25th NC, and I know for damned sure that he was related to at least 20% of that unit... so perhaps nobody wanted to shoot their cousin.

Hey, AnchorClanker :)

Quote from: Syt on July 01, 2019, 04:11:34 AM
Hey, AnchorClanker :)

Guten Tag!

Yeah, USCW is fun in our family as my Dad's side was CSA and my Mom's (those that were already here, most weren't) were Union.  Helping my Mom dig through some of the Union side found a great uncle who died in Paducah... lining up to board a river steamer, and some clown dropped his musket and it happened to be loaded... so if went off and killed him.  I am not sure if this was a small mercy or not, as this was right before the Battle of Shiloh...

Hey Ank. 

That reminds me I ought to dig some more into great uncles & other non-direct ancestors in the ACW.  Of my direct ancestors, two served as corporals in a Virginia cavalry regiment for the South and one (my direct paternal ancestor) was drafted into an Ohio infantry regiment in 1864-- for that dude I am kind of enjoying piecing his brief service record together.  But overall my direct ancestors are kind of boring.

BB, if you are still reading this thread, I'm interested how you would respond to my point that the South couldn't trade space for time (namely because they were slave society, and if they traded space that space was effectively lost forever--the manpower would effectively vanish, if not joining or supporting the enemy).

Not because I'm trying to drag you into an all out argument, but because your argument is a common one that I've always disagreed with--but I've seldom seen addressed.

My ancestors showed great discipline in fighting the Lemberg Tailors price war of 1869.  Not a one deserted even after some nasty accidental pin pricks.

I read some accounts of what the Confederates did in Western North Carolina.  Torture, murder, that sort of thing.  The sad thing is that the people there wave a flag of a regime that caused their ancestors enormous suffering.  The South lost the war but won the peace. :(

Quote from: Razgovory on July 01, 2019, 03:09:54 PM
The sad thing is that the people there wave a flag of a regime that caused their ancestors enormous suffering. 

Yes never let blacks feel like happy Americans because that would be sad. :rolleyes:

Quote from: alfred russel on July 01, 2019, 01:46:58 PM
BB, if you are still reading this thread, I'm interested how you would respond to my point that the South couldn't trade space for time (namely because they were slave society, and if they traded space that space was effectively lost forever--the manpower would effectively vanish, if not joining or supporting the enemy).

Had the Confederacy won independence, the labor pool could be replenished.

Although that would have probably required re-opening the African slave trade, which would have lead to conflict (not necessarily open warfare) between the Confederacy and European powers, as well as the USA.

Quote from: dps on July 01, 2019, 11:41:42 PM

Quote from: alfred russel on July 01, 2019, 01:46:58 PM
BB, if you are still reading this thread, I'm interested how you would respond to my point that the South couldn't trade space for time (namely because they were slave society, and if they traded space that space was effectively lost forever--the manpower would effectively vanish, if not joining or supporting the enemy).

Had the Confederacy won independence, the labor pool could be replenished.

Although that would have probably required re-opening the African slave trade, which would have lead to conflict (not necessarily open warfare) between the Confederacy and European powers, as well as the USA.

I think the Confederate constitution forbids this.

Even if not, they have to win the war first, or at least break the blockade.

Quote from: Razgovory on July 02, 2019, 12:19:16 AM

Quote from: dps on July 01, 2019, 11:41:42 PM

Quote from: alfred russel on July 01, 2019, 01:46:58 PM
BB, if you are still reading this thread, I'm interested how you would respond to my point that the South couldn't trade space for time (namely because they were slave society, and if they traded space that space was effectively lost forever--the manpower would effectively vanish, if not joining or supporting the enemy).

Had the Confederacy won independence, the labor pool could be replenished.

Although that would have probably required re-opening the African slave trade, which would have lead to conflict (not necessarily open warfare) between the Confederacy and European powers, as well as the USA.

I think the Confederate constitution forbids this.

I'm not sure, but I do know that some of the southern "fire-eaters" definitely wanted to re-open the slave trade.

Okay, let me phrase that with less ambiguity.  I am absolutely certain that the Confederate Constitution forbade the slave trade.  It is in article 1 section 9.

Quote from: dps on July 01, 2019, 11:41:42 PM

Had the Confederacy won independence, the labor pool could be replenished.

Although that would have probably required re-opening the African slave trade, which would have lead to conflict (not necessarily open warfare) between the Confederacy and European powers, as well as the USA.

My objection isn't just that the slaves were freed and thus post war there wouldn't be slaves. The "trade space for time" strategy as outlined by BB was that you avoid critical defeats while allowing the union to move forward, and simply move back into territory as the union moved elsewhere (the Confederacy being too large to completely occupy). My objection is that with the slaves being freed (and frequently assisting the Union's war effort), the railroads destroyed, cotton gins wrecked, etc, the territory reoccupied was no longer capable of supporting the military.

I think that BB was recommending that the South use Washington's Revolutionary War strategy. There were problems with this strategy caused by increases in population density and industrialization. But the biggest problem is that an anti slavery country was facing off with a slave state, and the slave portion was (quite logically) inclined to the union once the union got to them.

[But realistically, post war there wouldn't be slaves to replace those that were freed. This was the 1860s. The UK and other nations were not going to let the Confederacy replace millions of freed slaves with African imports, even if that was feasible (which it wasn't). ]

Yeah, the space for time strategy simply would not work except in very local areas, and even in those areas it had a huge political cost. Arkansas threatened to secede from the Confederacy when Confederate troops were pulled out, so they sent the army back in where it was promptly stomped on at Prarie Grove and Fort Hindman. Because there was no realistic way for the South to actually support a significant force out there.

That is actually kind of an interesting story. IIRC, van Dorn pulled his army out of Arkansas, Arkansas bitched up a storm and threatened to leave the Confederacy, so they sent another general (Hindeman) in - he got to Little Rock, noticed he didn't have an army, so promptly enforced marshal law, and just started drafting by force ever able bodied man he could find, and wasn't all that nice about doing so and "requisitioning" supplies for his new army. This kind of worked in that he was able to muster an army of some 12,000 men or so, but of course the howling of his being an authoritarian tyrant (YOU SAID YOU WANTED AN ARMY!) was loud.

Anyway, he marched off and lost the battle of Prarie Grove, and Arkansas was pretty much done with the war. Be careful what you wish for, you just might get it...

Quote from: Razgovory on July 02, 2019, 03:04:02 AM
Okay, let me phrase that with less ambiguity.  I am absolutely certain that the Confederate Constitution forbade the slave trade.  It is in article 1 section 9.

"importation."  Just conquer a piece of Africa for the CSA and Bob's your uncle.

why would a slave state stop the importation of slaves?

Quote from: dps on July 02, 2019, 01:28:48 AM

Quote from: Razgovory on July 02, 2019, 12:19:16 AM

Quote from: dps on July 01, 2019, 11:41:42 PM

Quote from: alfred russel on July 01, 2019, 01:46:58 PM
BB, if you are still reading this thread, I'm interested how you would respond to my point that the South couldn't trade space for time (namely because they were slave society, and if they traded space that space was effectively lost forever--the manpower would effectively vanish, if not joining or supporting the enemy).

Had the Confederacy won independence, the labor pool could be replenished.

Although that would have probably required re-opening the African slave trade, which would have lead to conflict (not necessarily open warfare) between the Confederacy and European powers, as well as the USA.

I think the Confederate constitution forbids this.

I'm not sure, but I do know that some of the southern "fire-eaters" definitely wanted to re-open the slave trade.

They had another plan: a Caribbean empire. More space and people for slavery.

Quote from: HVC on July 02, 2019, 09:33:31 AM
why would a slave state stop the importation of slaves?

The African Slave Trade was considered immoral. For reasons. Also the British wouldn't let them.

Quote from: Berkut on July 02, 2019, 08:02:24 AM
Yeah, the space for time strategy simply would not work except in very local areas, and even in those areas it had a huge political cost. Arkansas threatened to secede from the Confederacy when Confederate troops were pulled out, so they sent the army back in where it was promptly stomped on at Prarie Grove and Fort Hindman. Because there was no realistic way for the South to actually support a significant force out there.

That is actually kind of an interesting story. IIRC, van Dorn pulled his army out of Arkansas, Arkansas bitched up a storm and threatened to leave the Confederacy, so they sent another general (Hindeman) in - he got to Little Rock, noticed he didn't have an army, so promptly enforced marshal law, and just started drafting by force ever able bodied man he could find, and wasn't all that nice about doing so and "requisitioning" supplies for his new army. This kind of worked in that he was able to muster an army of some 12,000 men or so, but of course the howling of his being an authoritarian tyrant (YOU SAID YOU WANTED AN ARMY!) was loud.

Anyway, he marched off and lost the battle of Prarie Grove, and Arkansas was pretty much done with the war. Be careful what you wish for, you just might get it...

I think that the other obvious problem with space for time is that Lincoln wasn't going to give up. The earliest that Lincoln would leave office was March 1865. By this point the Confederacy was effectively out of space: every state capital save Florida's (which I understand was basically not captured for humanitarian reasons as the war was essentially over) was captured by April 1865, and a significant portion of the territory the union didn't control was ruined.

The Confederacy had a huge amount of territory, but losing territory at the rate it did left it effectively out of space at the earliest the Union would have quit with a space for time strategy.

Quote from: alfred russel on July 02, 2019, 09:41:18 AM

Quote from: Berkut on July 02, 2019, 08:02:24 AM
Yeah, the space for time strategy simply would not work except in very local areas, and even in those areas it had a huge political cost. Arkansas threatened to secede from the Confederacy when Confederate troops were pulled out, so they sent the army back in where it was promptly stomped on at Prarie Grove and Fort Hindman. Because there was no realistic way for the South to actually support a significant force out there.

That is actually kind of an interesting story. IIRC, van Dorn pulled his army out of Arkansas, Arkansas bitched up a storm and threatened to leave the Confederacy, so they sent another general (Hindeman) in - he got to Little Rock, noticed he didn't have an army, so promptly enforced marshal law, and just started drafting by force ever able bodied man he could find, and wasn't all that nice about doing so and "requisitioning" supplies for his new army. This kind of worked in that he was able to muster an army of some 12,000 men or so, but of course the howling of his being an authoritarian tyrant (YOU SAID YOU WANTED AN ARMY!) was loud.

Anyway, he marched off and lost the battle of Prarie Grove, and Arkansas was pretty much done with the war. Be careful what you wish for, you just might get it...

I think that the other obvious problem with space for time is that Lincoln wasn't going to give up. The earliest that Lincoln would leave office was March 1865. By this point the Confederacy was effectively out of space: every state capital save Florida's (which I understand was basically not captured for humanitarian reasons as the war was essentially over) was captured by April 1865, and a significant portion of the territory the union didn't control was ruined.

The Confederacy had a huge amount of territory, but losing territory at the rate it did left it effectively out of space at the earliest the Union would have quit with a space for time strategy.

Indeed.

Also, the real hope for the Confederacy lay in international recognition. And that relied on being able to present themselves as an actual, functioning sovereign nation.

The north was not going to just meekly take whatever territory the South was willing to concede. They aggressively carved the Confederacy into non-functional chunks. They seized the Mississippi, and specifically targetted (at least in the West) Southern infrastructure and transportation links, and its not like there were many to begin with....and the geography in the West, with the country being pierced by multiple large rivers that the North had control over, and the South relied on for transportation, made the actual amount of operational space much more limited than strict geography actually suggests.

Quite simply, while the South was geogrpahically large, it wasn't THAT large. And the parts with lots of empty space were mostly in the deep South, where it didn't matter much. The South had to have Texas, Tennessee, Kentucky,  Virginia, and the Mississippi corridor to be a viable nation in any practical sense of the word. They could not simply concede those states and hope for the best.

Interesting thread.

In terms of discipline I don't think it should be surprising at all that both sides were significantly undisciplined. America's Army going into 1861 was small and irrelevant compared to other industrial powers of the day. By the time the war ended Lincoln stood at the head of the actual largest army in the world, and one that, with major infrastructure and logistical improvements undertaken by Halleck, was probably the most modern in the world. Europe had a longer history of standing armies in 1861 than America for sure, and standing armies in Europe had been drilling and training extensively for tactics that dated back to the 18th century, and that emphasized incredible discipline and the force of will to execute brutal bayonet charges. Neither of those things is developed easily in men, and less so when you don't have the infrastructure set up to do that. A lot of the farm boys on both sides who had grown up shooting guns would be familiar with them, and would be skeptical of using their guns as a spear against a wall of men firing at them. As has been demonstrated too, the simple increase in effectiveness of 1860s era rifled muskets versus late 18th century to early 19th century muskets was simply very significant. At several points in the ACW it was very obvious the commanders were ignorant of this fact (Fredericksburg infamously), by the time of Pickett's charge there was no rightful way anyone was ignorant of it--but Lee's arrogance was on full display that day.

If you go to Gettysburg today and visualize the initial length of the line for the charge versus how much it had shrunk by the time it reached the high water mark, all due to men being ripped apart by incessant artillery and musket fire, it's fairly obvious just how devastating it was.

The Union's war effort was frequently ill conducted and disorganized, but the long list of advantages they had, and how it was much less disorganized than the South, and the fact they just had more factories and more men make victory for the South difficult.

I think if the South was to have won they'd need international support, and they also probably needed to win some decisive battles to bring that about, they would need to also win some more decisive battles to make the North lose enthusiasm for the war. A big issue for them was Lincoln had an iron will and a desire to fight, and no matter how unpopular the war got he was never going to be impeached. Might he have lost the 1864 election? Yes, but I think if you have to, as has been said, fight the Union until March 1865 that's a rough situation regardless. Insurrections have frequently benefited from guerrilla tactics but those would have been all but impossible for the South the carry out--for the same reasons a general Fabian strategy would have been difficult to execute.

It's very hard to execute tactics that by necessity require you to allow the enemy to take land, farms, slaves--when each individual state is quasi-independent at running the war (sometimes refusing to even send men/taxes to the war effort.) The South was also more critically split, with a large portion of its population being slaves who would run away the second they were freed, making the land they had worked incapable of contributing to the war effort again even after Union forces left. The South also was more divided on the war itself in my opinion. There were a number of Union regiments from Confederate states, and "Unionism" was a problem for the Confederacy throughout the South. A significant portion of their population may have held some sympathies with the Southern cause, but were highly skeptical of the "solution" of breaking away from the Union and fighting a war over it. While the North certainly had significant Copperhead activity and draft riots and general war opposition, it had a much larger population to begin with, and even still you never saw regions of the North turn into mini-civil wars with Unionists or at least Anti-Confederate/Anti-War armed bands periodically controlling internal portions of the CSA and fighting with men more aligned to the overall CSA war effort.

There's so many things the South likely needed to do in order to win, like defend Richmond, defend the West, stop the Union from taking the Mississippi, stop the Union from taking New Orleans, keep the CSA states politically aligned, keep the armies fed/supplied etc that they really, structurally, just couldn't do all at once.

The society and structure of the South was such that a more modern insurgency just wasn't possible. Fighting an insurgency like that is only palatable if your life is already pretty terrible. Most Southerners had land, homesteads, lives that they wanted to continue. The war directly impacted all of them in a negative way. The South's political leadership were mostly slaveowners who desperately wanted to retain their political and economic power, and there was no easy way to say, concede large swathes of territory and fight an insurgency, while attaining those goals. To a a non-slaveholding southerner and to a plantation baron, losing slaves and land and then hiding in the forests and swamps to bushwhack Yankees just isn't a deeply appealing way of life.

A Washington-esque Fabian Strategy ala the American Revolution was also going to be much harder to execute due to advantages the Union had versus the Brits. The Union had a big internal rail/water network, supply lines were vastly shorter (and didn't require shipping men and materials across the Atlantic Ocean), political opposition at home paralyzed British politics also, while Lincoln got a tight hold on power early and while he dealt with a lot of opposition, it never affected his ability to control the country. The British also were primarily fighting to keep the colonies because of perceived economic benefit and general imperialist desires. Laying waste to all the fields and destroying the domestic economy of the colonies would have seemed very counterproductive. The British adopted a strategy where they believed capturing and holding key cities would cause the insurrection to wither and die, and that just didn't work at all.

The Union and Lincoln were fighting to keep their country whole, and literally felt almost any price was worth paying--thus the tolerance for shocking casualties and economic cost. The North clearly had no problem completely despoiling the economy of the South, with general recognition there would be a rebuilding process after.

Quote from: HVC on July 02, 2019, 09:33:31 AM
why would a slave state stop the importation of slaves?

Because the British would hang anyone involved in the Atlantic slave trade as a pirate.  The US, a slave state at the time, outlawed the Atlantic slave trade in the early 19th century.  Continuing with the slave trade would likely create situations that could lead to war with Britain.

Quote from: Berkut on July 02, 2019, 09:48:28 AM


Indeed.

Also, the real hope for the Confederacy lay in international recognition. And that relied on being able to present themselves as an actual, functioning sovereign nation.

The situation is made complicated because the only hope for the Confederacy was in obtaining English recognition (and hopefully alliance) - but that was unlikely as long as the Confederacy remained a slave state. Yet ultimately the nation split on the issue of slavery - if the Confederacy gave up slavery, it had little reason to rebel.

Quote from: HVC on July 02, 2019, 09:33:31 AM
why would a slave state stop the importation of slaves?

Because restricting supply increases price and therefore makes existing slaveholders richer.

Quote from: Malthus on July 02, 2019, 12:40:38 PM
The situation is made complicated because the only hope for the Confederacy was in obtaining English recognition (and hopefully alliance) - but that was unlikely as long as the Confederacy remained a slave state. Yet ultimately the nation split on the issue of slavery - if the Confederacy gave up slavery, it had little reason to rebel.

I think what is underestimated is the impact that the war had on southern opinion. Secession was a controversial topic, but support for independence gained quite significant support with invasion.

The size of armies is debatable, but Wikipedia put the size of the manpower of the confederate army at 750k-1m (through the entire war). The union army was 2.2m.

There were roughly 5.5m whites in the south, and 22m people in the north. That means the south mobilized between 13.6% and 18.2% of its eligible population, while the north mobilized 10%. That probably understates the answer to the call to arms for the south, because a lot of its territory was occupied early in the war and the north enlisted quite a few immigrants and some former slaves.

There was an emancipation movement in the South--as a means to secure victory (not as a social justice issue). As early as the summer of 1861 General Ewell (a future confederate corps commander) told Jefferson Davis that the outcome of the war was very much in doubt and the slaves should be freed and armed. That was a fringe opinion at the time, but it wasn't by the war's conclusion (freed slaves were beginning training when the war ended--though a number of generals favored a more universal emancipation, the confederate congress only authorized slaves voluntarily freed to be eligible to serve).

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on July 02, 2019, 12:46:49 PM

Quote from: HVC on July 02, 2019, 09:33:31 AM
why would a slave state stop the importation of slaves?

Because restricting supply increases price and therefore makes existing slaveholders richer.

Also flooding the country with slaves will make a rebellion likely.

Quote from: alfred russel on July 02, 2019, 01:20:51 PM
There was an emancipation movement in the South--as a means to secure victory (not as a social justice issue). As early as the summer of 1861 General Ewell (a future confederate corps commander) told Jefferson Davis that the outcome of the war was very much in doubt and the slaves should be freed and armed. That was a fringe opinion at the time, but it wasn't by the war's conclusion (freed slaves were beginning training when the war ended--though a number of generals favored a more universal emancipation, the confederate congress only authorized slaves voluntarily freed to be eligible to serve).

The slaves were freed and armed...by the North.

And I guess I should point out that the mixed race troops Louisiana raised (because that had that wacky cast system) switched sides. Did the southerners calling for the slaves to be freed and armed think this through? They spent decades fretting about slave uprisings and they thought this population could be reliable in their war? I mean we all know General Ewell was a bad general but this almost makes me think he was a double agent of some sort.

Quote from: alfred russel on July 02, 2019, 01:20:51 PM
I think what is underestimated is the impact that the war had on southern opinion. Secession was a controversial topic, but support for independence gained quite significant support with invasion.

Agree.  Pushed a lot of them off the fence. 

Quote from: derspiess on July 02, 2019, 03:22:52 PM

Quote from: alfred russel on July 02, 2019, 01:20:51 PM
I think what is underestimated is the impact that the war had on southern opinion. Secession was a controversial topic, but support for independence gained quite significant support with invasion.

Agree.  Pushed a lot of them off the fence. 

Yeah and the ones that came down on the other side became even more radical in their Unionism. But that is what a crisis does.

By the time the South started arming slaves they were basically beaten, was pure desperation.

Quote from: Valmy on July 02, 2019, 03:21:03 PM


The slaves were freed and armed...by the North.

And I guess I should point out that the mixed race troops Louisiana raised (because that had that wacky cast system) switched sides. Did the southerners calling for the slaves to be freed and armed think this through? They spent decades fretting about slave uprisings and they thought this population could be reliable in their war? I mean we all know General Ewell was a bad general but this almost makes me think he was a double agent of some sort.

It is a long ass letter, but there was a well thought out proposal put on paper in January 1864.

https://www.battlefields.org/learn/primary-sources/patrick-cleburnes-proposal-arm-slaves

Presumably freed slaves wouldn't rebel as they were already free, and would be predisposed to the south because they were actually from the south, and in any event would be less inclined to assist the union effort.

Quote from: Valmy on July 02, 2019, 03:21:03 PMDid the southerners calling for the slaves to be freed and armed think this through? They spent decades fretting about slave uprisings and they thought this population could be reliable in their war? I mean we all know General Ewell was a bad general but this almost makes me think he was a double agent of some sort.

This happened in Haiti, in Martinique, in Guadeloupe: over and over again, slavers give weapons to slaves in the hopes that they will rise up to defend their beloved masters... Racist thinking means you never can fully believe that enslaved people can have the leadership necessary to win wars.

Quote from: Malthus on July 02, 2019, 12:40:38 PM
if the Confederacy gave up slavery, it had little reason to rebel.

States' rights.
;)   :lol:

Quote from: viper37 on July 02, 2019, 05:09:26 PM

Quote from: Malthus on July 02, 2019, 12:40:38 PM
if the Confederacy gave up slavery, it had little reason to rebel.

States' rights.
;)   :lol:

Heh. The only "right" that appeared to matter was the right ... to choose slavery. But by your emojis, I guess you know that.  ;)

Quote from: alfred russel on July 02, 2019, 01:20:51 PM

I think what is underestimated is the impact that the war had on southern opinion. Secession was a controversial topic, but support for independence gained quite significant support with invasion.

Certainly the war, as all wars do, gained a momentum of its own once it started.

The proposals by the South to free or arm slaves were all acts of desperation in response to the knowledge that unless the North chose to end the war unilaterally, the South was doomed to defeat; by the time any of these proposals were debated seriously, any hope that English intervention would save the South was basically lost - as the English were unlikely to join the visibly losing side.

What the South needed to do to win, or at least force some sort of negotiated settlement (which would have been a win), was get rid of slavery early, when a military victory still looked possible, and obtain English support then.

The South overestimated the immediacy of the economic impact of cotton on England, hoping self-interest would draw them into the war on their side; instead it drew them to ... looking for alternate suppliers; and to stockpiling cotton before the war even started. The South got lots of aid from blockade-running cotton, but not a pledge of military support. 

Damn it you guys, you're making a ACW thread rather interesting reading.  :mad:    :bowler:

OK, so one thing that I keep forgetting to mention that annoys me.

The idea that the South could fight a war of attrition and "waiting out" ala Washington and the Revolutionary War.

Like, to say that you have to really not know very much about the Revolutionary War. That worked because the Brits weren't all that interested in the war to begin with - and it showed by how many men they were willing to send across the ocean to fight it - all told? About 50,000. Total. And nearly half of those were "local" loyalists. The entire British Army at the start of the war was only 40,000 men. The entire British Army in the field at the peak of the Revolutionary War was smaller than either side had at Gettysburg. At any one time, the British Army in the colonies had about 20-25,000 men in the field.

It was impossible for the Brits to "occupy" the colonies, and they never tried. They could move about and beat up anyone who stood up to them, but they could never possibly pacify the colonies because they never had anywhere near enough men to do so.

The Union Army ended up around 2.2 million men. It actually could in fact occupy the South, at least in the practical sense that they could take all the important communication lines and junctions and ports. The Union literally put more than 100 times the number of men into the fight than the British could ever manage at a time.

The British sent their forces in assuming that it was just a minority of fanatics and that the majority of the colonial population was loyal. Sometimes the North had a similar fantasy, that once the Confederate Army was driven off thousands of Unionists would come out of the woodwork.

I mean lots of Loyalists and Unionists did come and join up with the British and the Union Army but never on the scale that was hoped and dreamed for. Fortunately for the Union, they were not counting on it like the British were.

Quote from: Malthus on July 02, 2019, 06:01:30 PM
Certainly the war, as all wars do, gained a momentum of its own once it started.

The proposals by the South to free or arm slaves were all acts of desperation in response to the knowledge that unless the North chose to end the war unilaterally, the South was doomed to defeat; by the time any of these proposals were debated seriously, any hope that English intervention would save the South was basically lost - as the English were unlikely to join the visibly losing side.

What the South needed to do to win, or at least force some sort of negotiated settlement (which would have been a win), was get rid of slavery early, when a military victory still looked possible, and obtain English support then.

The South overestimated the immediacy of the economic impact of cotton on England, hoping self-interest would draw them into the war on their side; instead it drew them to ... looking for alternate suppliers; and to stockpiling cotton before the war even started. The South got lots of aid from blockade-running cotton, but not a pledge of military support.

Agreed--though obviously the internal case for an abolition of slavery was very weak if the south thought it would win. However, that they would free slaves at war's end was more than idle speculation--it was discussed in the confederate military, it was discussed in southern newspapers, and the government was making moves in this direction. Sherman was apparently rather concerned about this, and while Freemantle (the british observer that appeared in Gettysburg and is ridiculed for predicting confederate victory in 1864) thought the south would win because he assumed that when push came to shove they would free the slaves and that the slaves would fight.

It is incredibly irrational from the outside that they didn't do this. Certainly in 1864-1865 there was a desire for independence, and in hindsight it is obvious that the south was about to lose and that would result in slavery ending and no independence. If slavery was going to end anyway, why not at least try to win? That perspective is even more clear for senior confederate leaders: sure they were generally significant slaveowners and would lose their slaves (not that slaves were worth anything by war's end--the price of slaves plummeted to almost nothing), but if the south got independence they would also be the leadership of a new country. If they lost, they could be hanged.

I think there were two factors:

1) In the years before the war the politics of the south was overwhelmed with legalism. They were very self conscious of being a minority region within the US government. As an example of this, Jefferson Davis was a military man--went to west point--and became a colonel in the Mexican American War. After the war, the president offered to make him a general with command of a militia brigade. Davis refused, because of his opinion that the president didn't have the authority to appoint an officer of a militia unit--that was reserved to the states. Fast forward to the civil war, and the CSA had a constitution that protected slavery. Slaves couldn't be legally freed without a constitutional amendment, and that couldn't be practically passed (both because there wasn't time and it couldn't be debated freely--you can't have all the political establishment openly acknowledge that they are losing the war and hope to keep up morale). I think that many outside observers thought the poltical leadership of the south would just cut through the legalism and as a wartime expedient begin freeing slaves willing to fight, but obviously that didn't happen.

2) I don't think that many recognized how dire the situation was. By war's end, there were papers advocating emancipating slaves that would fight. Others argued the situation wasn't that dire. I'm not sure the government even understood. In February 1865, just 3 months before the end of the war, there was a peace conference that offered the south some concessions, and the south walked away.

It's not like freeing the slaves would have saved them by 1864 or 65 anyway.

And the assumption that the slaves would actually fight for their former masters in large enough numbers and with any significant ability is...well, kinda laughable.

I have an ACW question and I thought I'd hijack this thread: I assume the Confederacy was at war during the ACW era, but was the Union at war?

Quote from: The Brain on July 03, 2019, 12:08:02 PM
I have an ACW question and I thought I'd hijack this thread: I assume the Confederacy was at war during the ACW era, but was the Union at war?

The Union did not recognize the Confederacy as a country so I don't think there was a formal declaration of war.

Quote from: Berkut on July 03, 2019, 12:01:47 PM
It's not like freeing the slaves would have saved them by 1864 or 65 anyway.

And the assumption that the slaves would actually fight for their former masters in large enough numbers and with any significant ability is...well, kinda laughable.

A problem was that the army of northern Virginia was being fed ~1000 calories a day at the end of the war. Moving slaves from the fields to the battlefield would not positively contribute to that.

That said, contemporary observers in the north, south and abroad thought it possible. There were a lot of slaves: you wouldn't need many as a percent of the total to contribute significantly--30k would be larger than the entire army of northern Virginia at the end of the war, for instance.

Quote from: The Brain on July 03, 2019, 12:08:02 PM
I have an ACW question and I thought I'd hijack this thread: I assume the Confederacy was at war during the ACW era, but was the Union at war?

While it was never declared, the Supreme Court in 1872 had to fix a date for purposes of a statute of limitations question.  They settled on when Lincoln said "blockade these states" as the start date.

QuoteThe proclamation of intended blockade by the President may therefore be assumed as marking the first of these dates, and the proclamation that the war had closed, as marking the second. But the war did not begin or close at the same time in all the States. There were two proclamations of intended blockade: the first of the 19th of April, 1861,* embracing the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; the second, of the 27th of April, 1861,t embracing the States of Virginia and North Carolina; and there were two proclamations declaring that the war had closed; one issued on the 2d of April, 1866,1 embracing the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, and Arkansas, and the other issued on the 20th of August, 1866,§ embracing the State of Texas.

In the absence of more certain criteria, of equally general application, we must take the dates of these proclamations as ascertaining the commencement and the close of the war in the States mentioned in them.

What took Texas so long?

Quote from: ulmont on July 03, 2019, 03:24:55 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 03, 2019, 12:08:02 PM
I have an ACW question and I thought I'd hijack this thread: I assume the Confederacy was at war during the ACW era, but was the Union at war?

While it was never declared, the Supreme Court in 1872 had to fix a date for purposes of a statute of limitations question.  They settled on when Lincoln said "blockade these states" as the start date.

QuoteThe proclamation of intended blockade by the President may therefore be assumed as marking the first of these dates, and the proclamation that the war had closed, as marking the second. But the war did not begin or close at the same time in all the States. There were two proclamations of intended blockade: the first of the 19th of April, 1861,* embracing the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas; the second, of the 27th of April, 1861,t embracing the States of Virginia and North Carolina; and there were two proclamations declaring that the war had closed; one issued on the 2d of April, 1866,1 embracing the States of Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Tennessee, Alabama, Louisiana, and Arkansas, and the other issued on the 20th of August, 1866,§ embracing the State of Texas.

In the absence of more certain criteria, of equally general application, we must take the dates of these proclamations as ascertaining the commencement and the close of the war in the States mentioned in them.

Seems weird that the union would be at war if it didn't recognize the secession of the states (or did it?). Shouldn't it be a domestic police action?

If they recognized the Confederacy an independent state, they wouldn't be fighting a war.

Quote from: Razgovory on July 03, 2019, 04:29:12 PM
If they recognized the Confederacy an independent state, they wouldn't be fighting a war.

If it was about slavery they might. But this doesn't matter for the state of war or not for the Union, I'm interested in what the Union actually did.

Quote from: alfred russel on July 03, 2019, 01:36:15 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 03, 2019, 12:01:47 PM
It's not like freeing the slaves would have saved them by 1864 or 65 anyway.

And the assumption that the slaves would actually fight for their former masters in large enough numbers and with any significant ability is...well, kinda laughable.

A problem was that the army of northern Virginia was being fed ~1000 calories a day at the end of the war. Moving slaves from the fields to the battlefield would not positively contribute to that.

That said, contemporary observers in the north, south and abroad thought it possible. There were a lot of slaves: you wouldn't need many as a percent of the total to contribute significantly--30k would be larger than the entire army of northern Virginia at the end of the war, for instance.

But doubling the ANV at the end of the war wouldn't help the south. The ANV was down to 30k because they were losing the war. Twice as many of very little doesn't change anything.

Quote from: The Brain on July 03, 2019, 04:00:28 PM
Seems weird that the union would be at war if it didn't recognize the secession of the states (or did it?). Shouldn't it be a domestic police action?

The case in question uses rebellion and war interchangeably.

Quote from: Eddie Teach on July 03, 2019, 03:44:44 PM
What took Texas so long?

Too far away to realize Grant's surrender and for the Union army to arrive and restore order, so it took longer there.

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 12:56:23 AM

Quote from: Razgovory on July 03, 2019, 04:29:12 PM
If they recognized the Confederacy an independent state, they wouldn't be fighting a war.

If it was about slavery they might. But this doesn't matter for the state of war or not for the Union, I'm interested in what the Union actually did.

I have no idea why slavery would make a difference.  The Union's position was the the Confederacy was not a country and did not have any diplomatic standing.

Quote from: Razgovory on July 04, 2019, 01:07:19 PM
I have no idea why slavery would make a difference.

It is sometimes claimed that the war as about slavery. But it doesn't matter for what I'm interested in here.

QuoteThe Union's position was the the Confederacy was not a country and did not have any diplomatic standing.

Which makes a Union at war weird to me. At war with what?

At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

At war with rebels.  I'm not seeing the problem here.  If the Union recognized the Confederacy as a independent state, then they would have no grounds to claim that the Confederate states are part of the US.  Do other countries give diplomatic recognition to insurrections in their own territory?  I don't think Syria built an Embassy and sent official ambassadors to ISIS.  Ukraine has not done so for either the Dontsk People's Republic or the Luhansk People's Republic.

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Quote from: Razgovory on July 04, 2019, 03:11:28 PM
At war with rebels.  I'm not seeing the problem here.  If the Union recognized the Confederacy as a independent state, then they would have no grounds to claim that the Confederate states are part of the US.  Do other countries give diplomatic recognition to insurrections in their own territory?  I don't think Syria built an Embassy and sent official ambassadors to ISIS.  Ukraine has not done so for either the Dontsk People's Republic or the Luhansk People's Republic.

Why would the Union recognize the Confederacy?

Likely other countries do not operate under US law, and I don't know much about for instance Syrian or Ukrainian law.

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Under the Geneva Conventions, they apply once one you start forming armies, wearing a uniform, etc.

Even if two states are at war, if one soldier takes off their uniform and starts committing crimes behind enemy lines they can be tried as a criminal, not captures as a POW.  And the flip side, eve if you don't recognize the legality of a state (such as ISIS), if they are armed combatants wearing uniforms you're supposed to give them those protections.

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:35:28 PM

Quote from: Razgovory on July 04, 2019, 03:11:28 PM
At war with rebels.  I'm not seeing the problem here.  If the Union recognized the Confederacy as a independent state, then they would have no grounds to claim that the Confederate states are part of the US.  Do other countries give diplomatic recognition to insurrections in their own territory?  I don't think Syria built an Embassy and sent official ambassadors to ISIS.  Ukraine has not done so for either the Dontsk People's Republic or the Luhansk People's Republic.

Why would the Union recognize the Confederacy?

Likely other countries do not operate under US law, and I don't know much about for instance Syrian or Ukrainian law.

No, other countries do not recognize US law, but most agree that you can not declare war on things that do not exist.  A declaration of war is a de facto admission of existence.  If the Confederacy exists then it is not part of the US.  This is why third parties of the time did not recognize the Confederacy either and why people sent by the confederacy to third powers wanted to convince them otherwise.

Is this different in Sweden?  Did Swedish monarchs recognized claims of sovereignty over Sweden by others?

Quote from: Barrister on July 04, 2019, 03:56:04 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Under the Geneva Conventions, they apply once one you start forming armies, wearing a uniform, etc.

Even if two states are at war, if one soldier takes off their uniform and starts committing crimes behind enemy lines they can be tried as a criminal, not captures as a POW.  And the flip side, eve if you don't recognize the legality of a state (such as ISIS), if they are armed combatants wearing uniforms you're supposed to give them those protections.

For the sake of simplicity I'll rephrase:

Would the US of the early 1860s be at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Quote from: Razgovory on July 04, 2019, 04:07:44 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:35:28 PM

Quote from: Razgovory on July 04, 2019, 03:11:28 PM
At war with rebels.  I'm not seeing the problem here.  If the Union recognized the Confederacy as a independent state, then they would have no grounds to claim that the Confederate states are part of the US.  Do other countries give diplomatic recognition to insurrections in their own territory?  I don't think Syria built an Embassy and sent official ambassadors to ISIS.  Ukraine has not done so for either the Dontsk People's Republic or the Luhansk People's Republic.

Why would the Union recognize the Confederacy?

Likely other countries do not operate under US law, and I don't know much about for instance Syrian or Ukrainian law.

No, other countries do not recognize US law, but most agree that you can not declare war on things that do not exist.  A declaration of war is a de facto admission of existence.  If the Confederacy exists then it is not part of the US.  This is why third parties of the time did not recognize the Confederacy either and why people sent by the confederacy to third powers wanted to convince them otherwise.

Is this different in Sweden?  Did Swedish monarchs recognized claims of sovereignty over Sweden by others?

I don't know what you're after with this line of discussion, if I did I might give you a better answer. FWIW I think it would have been extremely retarded by the Union to recognize the Confederacy, but since it didn't we can thankfully ignore that scenario when trying to ascertain the legal status of the conflict as it actually happened.

I am quite baffled by this as well.  You stated

QuoteHow is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

This indicates to me that you have some understanding.  There is no legal entity to be at war with.  If the Confederacy was legal entity, why would the US be at war with it?  It can't be because Confederacy controls US territory because if the Confederacy is a legal entity that their claim to the territory is just as good as the US claim if not better.  Is it because the Confederate government shot at US soldiers and took US forts and arsenals?  They were in Confederate territory.

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 12:59:49 AM


But doubling the ANV at the end of the war wouldn't help the south. The ANV was down to 30k because they were losing the war. Twice as many of very little doesn't change anything.

Agreed, though Sherman for example was concerned not that it would change the outcome but extend the war.

But while 30k in 1865 is pointless, in 1863 it increases the ANV's infantry at Gettysburg by 50%.

At a certain point the idea is irrelevant because the war was decided. Early on, for example when Ewell made his recommendation in July 1861, it is irrelevant because there was no conceivable way for it to happen (I can just imagine the response of Jefferson Davis saying, "Hey guys, I know we like slavery, and the north has states with slavery, but we need to free all our slaves.")

I think the interesting question is whether there is a point where it would become possible and there was a chance of it changing the outcome of the war. I think the answer is no. For the south to give up slavery (at least for those slaves and their families willing to fight), they had to understand they were losing. I think that understanding came shockingly late. The Cleburne proposal was in January 1864--whether that could have been accepted and quickly acted upon is highly doubtful, and it is possibly too late to make a difference, but it was probably the most promising option at that point.

Quote from: Razgovory on July 04, 2019, 04:39:22 PM
I am quite baffled by this as well.  You stated

QuoteHow is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

This indicates to me that you have some understanding.  There is no legal entity to be at war with.  If the Confederacy was legal entity, why would the US be at war with it?  It can't be because Confederacy controls US territory because if the Confederacy is a legal entity that their claim to the territory is just as good as the US claim if not better.  Is it because the Confederate government shot at US soldiers and took US forts and arsenals?  They were in Confederate territory.

What is your goal with this line of discussion? :) The scenario where the Confederacy is recognized by the Union doesn't interest me since AFAIK the Union didn't recognize the Confederacy.

I imagine Lt. Cushing, twice wounded and using a hand to hold in his intestines, unwilling to leave his battery because there was too little manpower after it had taken 50% casualties, with 12,000 men concentrating their assault on his position, thinking, "thank god this isn't a real war, because the confederacy lacks legitimate legal standing."

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Who says you need a legal entity to be at war with?

And no, the "Union" did not declare war, because there was no such entity, legal or otherwise, defined as the "Union" to begin with - that is just a description of the parts of the United States that were at war with the other parts of the United States that were in a state of rebellion.

There was no declaration of war, because, as you say, there was nobody to declare a legal war against, what with not being able to declare war on yourself and all.

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:07:34 PM

Quote from: Razgovory on July 04, 2019, 04:39:22 PM
I am quite baffled by this as well.  You stated

QuoteHow is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

This indicates to me that you have some understanding.  There is no legal entity to be at war with.  If the Confederacy was legal entity, why would the US be at war with it?  It can't be because Confederacy controls US territory because if the Confederacy is a legal entity that their claim to the territory is just as good as the US claim if not better.  Is it because the Confederate government shot at US soldiers and took US forts and arsenals?  They were in Confederate territory.

What is your goal with this line of discussion? :)

That is a really good question...but one I would direct at you.

I'm not really clear on your point or idea here.

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 05:21:36 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:07:34 PM

Quote from: Razgovory on July 04, 2019, 04:39:22 PM
I am quite baffled by this as well.  You stated

QuoteHow is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

This indicates to me that you have some understanding.  There is no legal entity to be at war with.  If the Confederacy was legal entity, why would the US be at war with it?  It can't be because Confederacy controls US territory because if the Confederacy is a legal entity that their claim to the territory is just as good as the US claim if not better.  Is it because the Confederate government shot at US soldiers and took US forts and arsenals?  They were in Confederate territory.

What is your goal with this line of discussion? :)

That is a really good question...but one I would direct at you.

I'm not really clear on your point or idea here.

I'm glad you asked (non-sarcastic). My interest stems from a curiosity about legal questions that aren't obvious to me. I find US law especially interesting because law is a subject of lively discourse in the US and things like the Constitution etc actually mean something, which I FWIW find very sound in a society. As an aside, Swedish legal stuff isn't as interesting to me because Swedes don't take law seriously, so what the law says doesn't matter as much. In many American discussions (my experience here and elsewhere) details of law are important and rarely left completely to a "uh but it feels like A...".

And to me it isn't obvious what the legal status of the conflict of the ACW era was in the US. It isn't obvious to me that it was war in a legal sense, and I'm intellectually curious about the legal mechanism that made it a war if in fact it was one.

The official US records of the war use the name "War of the Rebellion" if that helps anything.

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 05:20:17 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Who says you need a legal entity to be at war with?

And no, the "Union" did not declare war, because there was no such entity, legal or otherwise, defined as the "Union" to begin with - that is just a description of the parts of the United States that were at war with the other parts of the United States that were in a state of rebellion.

There was no declaration of war, because, as you say, there was nobody to declare a legal war against, what with not being able to declare war on yourself and all.

So what made it a war in a legal sense?

My impression from reading history and what little I happen to know about Swedish law is that often putting down rebellions is a domestic police action and the rebels are criminals. I don't know the exact legal situation in the US in the mid-19th century, hence my questions.

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:52:33 PM
My impression from reading history and what little I happen to know about Swedish law is that often putting down rebellions is a domestic police action and the rebels are criminals. I don't know the exact legal situation in the US in the mid-19th century, hence my questions.

There were a few reasons the leading confederates weren't tried for crimes:

1) it wouldn't have promoted reconciliation after the war, which was a priority,
2) in the US you get a trial by jury in the place you committed the alleged crime, and a conviction of leading confederates in jury trials to be held in the south was far from certain,
3) for those with military positions, the terms of surrender often included not being tried.

There were a few efforts to prosecute former confederates after the war, but for the most part they went no where.

Quote from: alfred russel on July 04, 2019, 05:58:50 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:52:33 PM
My impression from reading history and what little I happen to know about Swedish law is that often putting down rebellions is a domestic police action and the rebels are criminals. I don't know the exact legal situation in the US in the mid-19th century, hence my questions.

There were a few reasons the leading confederates weren't tried for crimes:

1) it wouldn't have promoted reconciliation after the war, which was a priority,
2) in the US you get a trial by jury in the place you committed the alleged crime, and a conviction of leading confederates in jury trials to be held in the south was far from certain,
3) for those with military positions, the terms of surrender often included not being tried.

There were a few efforts to prosecute former confederates after the war, but for the most part they went no where.

Yes, my impression is that there was (rightly or wrongly) a strong desire in the US to consider it a war.

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:47:13 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 05:20:17 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Who says you need a legal entity to be at war with?

And no, the "Union" did not declare war, because there was no such entity, legal or otherwise, defined as the "Union" to begin with - that is just a description of the parts of the United States that were at war with the other parts of the United States that were in a state of rebellion.

There was no declaration of war, because, as you say, there was nobody to declare a legal war against, what with not being able to declare war on yourself and all.

So what made it a war in a legal sense?

The US could be fighting a war to put down a rebellion without it having to be in an interstate conflict.

Quote from: mongers on July 04, 2019, 06:13:23 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:47:13 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 05:20:17 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Who says you need a legal entity to be at war with?

And no, the "Union" did not declare war, because there was no such entity, legal or otherwise, defined as the "Union" to begin with - that is just a description of the parts of the United States that were at war with the other parts of the United States that were in a state of rebellion.

There was no declaration of war, because, as you say, there was nobody to declare a legal war against, what with not being able to declare war on yourself and all.

So what made it a war in a legal sense?

The US could be fighting a war to put down a rebellion without it having to be in an interstate conflict.

And which legal mechanism made putting down a rebellion a war?

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 06:16:57 PM

Quote from: mongers on July 04, 2019, 06:13:23 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:47:13 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 05:20:17 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Who says you need a legal entity to be at war with?

And no, the "Union" did not declare war, because there was no such entity, legal or otherwise, defined as the "Union" to begin with - that is just a description of the parts of the United States that were at war with the other parts of the United States that were in a state of rebellion.

There was no declaration of war, because, as you say, there was nobody to declare a legal war against, what with not being able to declare war on yourself and all.

So what made it a war in a legal sense?

The US could be fighting a war to put down a rebellion without it having to be in an interstate conflict.

And which legal mechanism made putting down a rebellion a war?

War can be a process rather than a status.

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:47:13 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 05:20:17 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Who says you need a legal entity to be at war with?

And no, the "Union" did not declare war, because there was no such entity, legal or otherwise, defined as the "Union" to begin with - that is just a description of the parts of the United States that were at war with the other parts of the United States that were in a state of rebellion.

There was no declaration of war, because, as you say, there was nobody to declare a legal war against, what with not being able to declare war on yourself and all.

So what made it a war in a legal sense?

It was a war in the vernacular sense, but not a constitutionally defined war.

Quote from: alfred russel on July 04, 2019, 04:59:58 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 12:59:49 AM


But doubling the ANV at the end of the war wouldn't help the south. The ANV was down to 30k because they were losing the war. Twice as many of very little doesn't change anything.

Agreed, though Sherman for example was concerned not that it would change the outcome but extend the war.

But while 30k in 1865 is pointless, in 1863 it increases the ANV's infantry at Gettysburg by 50%.

Im not sure this is true.

Did Lee have 70k men because there weren't any more men anywhere to be found to go with him, or did he have 70k men because given his ability to sustain an army in the field, he ended up with about that many?

IE, would adding more bodies into the pool, and bodies that by definition are coming from the exact same pool of bodies used to actually grow food and do all the non-shoot-someone-with-a-rifle work needed in direct and indirect support of the national military, actually result in more bodies at the pointy end?

I don't think it does, in fact. It might increase strength a little bit, but I suspect every single black slave enlisted in 186s represents a net decrease in the Southern states ability to sustain a war over more than a couple months. Former slaves would be shitty soldiers until they are trained, likely be shitty soldiers fighting for the South even once trained (for the most part), and in constrast actually probably made pretty good "grow stuff in the fields" assets in comparison.

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Do declarations of war matter? By that logic the US hasn't been at war since WW2

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:07:34 PM

Quote from: Razgovory on July 04, 2019, 04:39:22 PM
I am quite baffled by this as well.  You stated

QuoteHow is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

This indicates to me that you have some understanding.  There is no legal entity to be at war with.  If the Confederacy was legal entity, why would the US be at war with it?  It can't be because Confederacy controls US territory because if the Confederacy is a legal entity that their claim to the territory is just as good as the US claim if not better.  Is it because the Confederate government shot at US soldiers and took US forts and arsenals?  They were in Confederate territory.

What is your goal with this line of discussion? :) The scenario where the Confederacy is recognized by the Union doesn't interest me since AFAIK the Union didn't recognize the Confederacy.

I'm trying to figure out what you want.

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:47:13 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 05:20:17 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well… The line isn't obvious to me.

Who says you need a legal entity to be at war with?

And no, the "Union" did not declare war, because there was no such entity, legal or otherwise, defined as the "Union" to begin with - that is just a description of the parts of the United States that were at war with the other parts of the United States that were in a state of rebellion.

There was no declaration of war, because, as you say, there was nobody to declare a legal war against, what with not being able to declare war on yourself and all.

So what made it a war in a legal sense?

What makes you think that, during the 1860's, there was a legally recognized definition of what does or does not constitute a war?

I think rebels are like pirates in that they are lawbreakers that are stopped by a military force.  I don't know when the ideas regarding who is and who is not a legal combatant were accepted by the people in the Western World.

The US has not declared war on anyone for 70 years.  The US has been at war a whole bunch of times since then.  I think a formal declaration of war would result in certain powers moving from the Executive to the Congress, and all the US presidents in that time have wanted to avoid that.

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 06:33:05 PM

Did Lee have 70k men because there weren't any more men anywhere to be found to go with him, or did he have 70k men because given his ability to sustain an army in the field, he ended up with about that many?

In terms of the Gettysburg campaign specifically, I think it was because there weren't any more men to be found to go with him. My understanding is that the confederacy saw a window of opportunity after Chancellorsville and with union enlistment terms coming up. There were debates on what to do: detach a significant force from Virginia to either relieve Vicksburg or attempt an offensive in Tennessee, or gather available forces for an invasion of the north to attempt a decisive engagement. I think there was disappointment that the 70k able to be gathered was not larger.

Later in the war that is absolutely not the case. With the union controlling the Mississippi, and effectively all of Tennessee while marching through the Carolinas, Alabama, and Georgia, the confederates couldn't feed the paltry forces they had left.

Nevertheless--there were 3.5m slaves. I don't think that it is unreasonable to think that a percent or two could be effective soldiers (many freed slaves were effective for the north after all). And if we are talking a number of soldiers that low, it wouldn't make a big difference in the labor available on the farms and plantations.

I disagree. There may have been 3.5m slaves, but surely at least half of those were women.

Of the remaining, a huge number would be children.

Of the remaining of those, most of them are likely too old, or unhealthy.

And of the ones who are male, of military age, and healthy enough to serve, I suspect that they also represented, by far, the most labor productive group enslaved as well. It's the same problem with non-slaves, of course, only almost certainly considerably worse. I suspect that amongst slaves the concentration of useful productive work being in the same demographic as useful military material is much greater than in the non-slave population, since slavery was primarily an agricultural endeavor, and a very physical one at that.

I think the South had trouble getting and keeping men under arms for a variety of reasons, only a couple of which could be alleviated by a new potential pool of former slaves of useful military caliber.

I suspect that a decision in 1862 to selectively offer freedom to slaves willing to fight (if we assume such a thing could somehow be politically acceptable) would not result in a significant increase in actual military capability of the South. Manpower was only one of their many issues. Not a small one to be sure, but still just one of many.

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 07:41:10 PM

I suspect that a decision in 1862 to selectively offer freedom to slaves willing to fight (if we assume such a thing could somehow be politically acceptable) would not result in a significant increase in actual military capability of the South. Manpower was only one of their many issues. Not a small one to be sure, but still just one of many.

The south had a white population of 5.5m and per Wikipedia got 750k to 1m under arms. Obviously that level of participation would not be met with the slave population, but it didn't need to in order to have an appreciable effect. Also, if you look at the casualties the south sustained (~300k dead, many more wounded and captured), it should be clear that a shortage of military manpower was a problem. I get that there were food shortages especially late in the war. However, a soldier would be more valuable than a field laborer.

The impact of freeing slaves would do much more than providing more soldiers: it would make possible foreign intervention, reduce northern recruiting, and reduce black support for the union war effort.

Why would it reduce northern recruitment?

Quote from: alfred russel on July 04, 2019, 08:53:16 PM
The impact of freeing slaves

How exactly could they do that? Each state would have to vote to free their slaves individually. None of them would have done so. So what is this shit? Some kind of fantasy? Why not speculate if the Confederacy had nuclear bombs or battle droids?

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 06:28:37 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:47:13 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 05:20:17 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Who says you need a legal entity to be at war with?

And no, the "Union" did not declare war, because there was no such entity, legal or otherwise, defined as the "Union" to begin with - that is just a description of the parts of the United States that were at war with the other parts of the United States that were in a state of rebellion.

There was no declaration of war, because, as you say, there was nobody to declare a legal war against, what with not being able to declare war on yourself and all.

So what made it a war in a legal sense?

It was a war in the vernacular sense, but not a constitutionally defined war.

That would make sense to me.

Quote from: jimmy olsen on July 04, 2019, 06:48:16 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Do declarations of war matter? By that logic the US hasn't been at war since WW2

I don't know to what extent they did in the 1860s. They apparently still mattered to some degree when the US declared war on Japan AFTER a massive military attack and a declaration of war on the US by Japan.

Quote from: dps on July 04, 2019, 07:15:51 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 05:47:13 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 05:20:17 PM

Quote from: The Brain on July 04, 2019, 03:27:00 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 03:08:44 PM
At war with a rebellious section of the country. How is this complicated?

How is it not? The Union hadn't declared war. There was no legal entity to be at war with.

Is the US at war with a single violent criminal? Probably not. A hundred criminals? A hundred thousand criminals? Well... The line isn't obvious to me.

Who says you need a legal entity to be at war with?

And no, the "Union" did not declare war, because there was no such entity, legal or otherwise, defined as the "Union" to begin with - that is just a description of the parts of the United States that were at war with the other parts of the United States that were in a state of rebellion.

There was no declaration of war, because, as you say, there was nobody to declare a legal war against, what with not being able to declare war on yourself and all.

So what made it a war in a legal sense?

What makes you think that, during the 1860's, there was a legally recognized definition of what does or does not constitute a war?

I'm asking because I don't know. My impression is that many legally recognized definitions of various kinds existed in the 1860s.

Quote from: Valmy on July 04, 2019, 11:24:58 PM

Quote from: alfred russel on July 04, 2019, 08:53:16 PM
The impact of freeing slaves

How exactly could they do that? Each state would have to vote to free their slaves individually. None of them would have done so. So what is this shit? Some kind of fantasy? Why not speculate if the Confederacy had nuclear bombs or battle droids?

Do you have a map?

Quote from: Razgovory on July 04, 2019, 07:24:57 PM
I think rebels are like pirates in that they are lawbreakers that are stopped by a military force.  I don't know when the ideas regarding who is and who is not a legal combatant were accepted by the people in the Western World.

The US has not declared war on anyone for 70 years.  The US has been at war a whole bunch of times since then.  I think a formal declaration of war would result in certain powers moving from the Executive to the Congress, and all the US presidents in that time have wanted to avoid that.

I wouldn't be surprised if there were some legal things in the 1860s that depended on whether or not the US was at war. For instance, was the crime of treason possible without a state of war? IIRC selling defense secrets to the Russians during the Cold War wasn't treason in the US (note: I don't know this but I seem to remember something along those lines). I don't know if treason was possible in a vernacular war.

Quote from: alfred russel on July 04, 2019, 08:53:16 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 07:41:10 PM

I suspect that a decision in 1862 to selectively offer freedom to slaves willing to fight (if we assume such a thing could somehow be politically acceptable) would not result in a significant increase in actual military capability of the South. Manpower was only one of their many issues. Not a small one to be sure, but still just one of many.

The south had a white population of 5.5m and per Wikipedia got 750k to 1m under arms. Obviously that level of participation would not be met with the slave population, but it didn't need to in order to have an appreciable effect. Also, if you look at the casualties the south sustained (~300k dead, many more wounded and captured), it should be clear that a shortage of military manpower was a problem. I get that there were food shortages especially late in the war. However, a soldier would be more valuable than a field laborer.

The level of participation of white soldiers being what it was was directly BECAUSE they had a lot of slaves able to at least in theory do a lot of that work the soldiers off fighting were not doing.

You are asking us to believe that the overall participation level could have been significantly increased - I've never seen any data that suggests that the South had a surplus of labor available, it just wasn't white so could not fight. In fact, everything I've seen, heard, and read is exactly the opposite - that the South had their existing troops often deserting to go back and work the farm to get a harvest in to keep people from starving. Hell, the entire impetus of the Gettysburg campaign was in great part to feed the ANV from Pennsylvania instead of Virginia.


The South had a huge shortage of labor in fact, and I think they put more men into the field than they could actually support. And history bears that out, with every single year seeing more and more stories and reports of the army lacking basic supplies and food. Each year was worse, which means that there was never an actually sustainable moment. Taking away from the people actually creating food and moving them over to the group consuming it would simply accelerate and already unsustainable process.

Quote

The impact of freeing slaves would do much more than providing more soldiers: it would make possible foreign intervention, reduce northern recruiting, and reduce black support for the union war effort.

Foreign intervention would require much more than freeing slaves to serve in the military, it would require ending slavery altogether, even for those NOT in the military. That is an entirely different proposition.

And how would it reduce northern recruiting?

Or black support for the war effort? You think blacks in the north would suddenly be all "Oh, I guess the South is super awesome now, they freed some slaves to fight so they could keep the other ones enslaved!" By the time the war was on, there was no way anything the south could do politically to effect the northern will to fight, except actually giving up.

Quote from: Eddie Teach on July 04, 2019, 09:35:03 PM
Why would it reduce northern recruitment?

The North had something like 200k black soldiers--100k of those were former slaves. There was also a significant abolitionist contingent in the union army. I don't think it is a stretch that those soliders would be less motivated to join without the issue of emancipation.

Quote from: Valmy on July 04, 2019, 11:24:58 PM
How exactly could they do that? Each state would have to vote to free their slaves individually. None of them would have done so. So what is this shit? Some kind of fantasy? Why not speculate if the Confederacy had nuclear bombs or battle droids?

Slavery was constitutionally protected in the CSA. Probably nothing could be done by the book (until it was too late probably nothing could be done at all).

I've linked you to the Cleburne proposal. If you want I can dig up newspaper editorials. Bobby Lee was apparently in favor of it by war's end--though i'm not sure if that was universal emancipation or just those willing to fight. If you can find a similar amount of proposals during the war to deploy nuclear bombs or battle droids I'll agree with you.

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 02:53:35 AM

Quote from: alfred russel on July 04, 2019, 08:53:16 PM

Quote from: Berkut on July 04, 2019, 07:41:10 PM

I suspect that a decision in 1862 to selectively offer freedom to slaves willing to fight (if we assume such a thing could somehow be politically acceptable) would not result in a significant increase in actual military capability of the South. Manpower was only one of their many issues. Not a small one to be sure, but still just one of many.

The south had a white population of 5.5m and per Wikipedia got 750k to 1m under arms. Obviously that level of participation would not be met with the slave population, but it didn't need to in order to have an appreciable effect. Also, if you look at the casualties the south sustained (~300k dead, many more wounded and captured), it should be clear that a shortage of military manpower was a problem. I get that there were food shortages especially late in the war. However, a soldier would be more valuable than a field laborer.

The level of participation of white soldiers being what it was was directly BECAUSE they had a lot of slaves able to at least in theory do a lot of that work the soldiers off fighting were not doing.

You are asking us to believe that the overall participation level could have been significantly increased - I've never seen any data that suggests that the South had a surplus of labor available, it just wasn't white so could not fight. In fact, everything I've seen, heard, and read is exactly the opposite - that the South had their existing troops often deserting to go back and work the farm to get a harvest in to keep people from starving. Hell, the entire impetus of the Gettysburg campaign was in great part to feed the ANV from Pennsylvania instead of Virginia.


The South had a huge shortage of labor in fact, and I think they put more men into the field than they could actually support. And history bears that out, with every single year seeing more and more stories and reports of the army lacking basic supplies and food. Each year was worse, which means that there was never an actually sustainable moment. Taking away from the people actually creating food and moving them over to the group consuming it would simply accelerate and already unsustainable process.

Quote

The impact of freeing slaves would do much more than providing more soldiers: it would make possible foreign intervention, reduce northern recruiting, and reduce black support for the union war effort.

Foreign intervention would require much more than freeing slaves to serve in the military, it would require ending slavery altogether, even for those NOT in the military. That is an entirely different proposition.

And how would it reduce northern recruiting?

Or black support for the war effort? You think blacks in the north would suddenly be all "Oh, I guess the South is super awesome now, they freed some slaves to fight so they could keep the other ones enslaved!" By the time the war was on, there was no way anything the south could do politically to effect the northern will to fight, except actually giving up.

I think the proposals often went to universal emancipation rather than just those willing to fight, but to the larger point about food production....

How many slaves were picking cotton that was under an export embargo? My understanding is that there was a tremendous waste of labor on this front.

Also, except at a few moments (I think there were issues just before the Maryland campaign), my understanding was that the army stayed relatively well fed until 1864. There were food riots in places such as Richmond in 1863--the same can not be said for civilian populations, especially near the war zone.

The decision to keep cotton production going was not made because there was a bunch of idle military age black men sitting around with nothing better to do, it was made because the South didn't have iron control over their cotton producers and they still wanted to make money, and the South needed the income. That doesn't change if they put a bunch of slaves into the military. You are bringing up a separate, non-dependent issue. That problems exists (or does not exist) irrespective of this claim.

Your understanding of Southern logistics is incorrect, and it isn't about just the army being fed anyway, it is about everyone being fed. Putting more men into the army rather than in production means less food is created period, and less is moved around.

But I think this debate has run its course. Putting slaves into the army, even as early as 1863/63 doesn't change the basic calculus that meant that the South was doomed, nor is there any reason to even believe it actually would make the South more capable of resistance. Their inability to resist the Union was based in a lot more than just simple number of men able to be put into uniform, and increasing that number at the expense of their logistical vulnerability (which was historically fatal already) doesn't seem to have much evidence that it would make any difference at all.

""Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 07:40:50 AM

""Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."

Obviously incorrect, to such as an extent that I think it invalidates your other points. Everyone in this discussion is an amateur, and I don't think any of us have been discussing tactics.  :P

Quote from: Valmy on July 04, 2019, 11:24:58 PM
Why not speculate if the Confederacy had nuclear bombs or battle droids?

I'd buy that novel!  :P

Quote from: The Brain on July 05, 2019, 01:11:06 AM

I'm asking because I don't know. My impression is that many legally recognized definitions of various kinds existed in the 1860s.

As I recall, and I am not an expert at all concerning this, if the Union were to formally declare war (which did indeed exist in the 1860s) that would open a can of worms - you can only declare war on a legitimate state.  The stance was always to treat this as an attempt at armed rebellion being put down by federal authority.  That made it an internal issue and potentially made it harder for outsiders to recognize the Confederacy unless they were clearly winning and they were a sustainable entity.  From what I recall, the Union protested at every opportunity when foreign governments received Confederate diplomats - they were not diplomats in the eyes of the Union.

Quote from: alfred russel on July 05, 2019, 06:28:05 AM

Quote from: Valmy on July 04, 2019, 11:24:58 PM
How exactly could they do that? Each state would have to vote to free their slaves individually. None of them would have done so. So what is this shit? Some kind of fantasy? Why not speculate if the Confederacy had nuclear bombs or battle droids?

Slavery was constitutionally protected in the CSA. Probably nothing could be done by the book (until it was too late probably nothing could be done at all).

I've linked you to the Cleburne proposal. If you want I can dig up newspaper editorials. Bobby Lee was apparently in favor of it by war's end--though i'm not sure if that was universal emancipation or just those willing to fight. If you can find a similar amount of proposals during the war to deploy nuclear bombs or battle droids I'll agree with you.

Valmy is not debating that some individuals were in favor of that.  He is not even debating that it was discussed in the government.  He is debating that it was a technical impossibility.  Legally impossible, by the constitution, so all States would need to approve it.  Technically impossible, because of all the conditions... They were slaves, fighting for their former masters?  That did not often happen.  You need to arm them, train them, feed them.  By 1864, realistically, how much training can you give them before sending them to the front?

Even if they freed and armed slaves in december 1864, even if a significant number agreed to fight for the South in exchange of their freedom, it wouldn't change much.

As was said in Gettysburg, they should have freed the slaves first, then declare independance.
That's about the only way I can think of why the South would receive significant foreign help from the United Kingdom.  And even there, it is a big stretch.  It's not like the UK could realistically field 500k-1M soldiers to send them to the US in support of the Confederacy.  There are all kinds of logistical and political constraints.

Now, however, once the issue of slavery is gone, even with the long list of grievances by the South, would there still be a popular will to secede from the North?  I doubt it, but I'm no expert.

Quote from: alfred russel on July 05, 2019, 09:13:59 AM

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 07:40:50 AM

""Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."

Obviously incorrect, to such as an extent that I think it invalidates your other points. Everyone in this discussion is an amateur, and I don't think any of us have been discussing tactics.  :P

IT's a quote, I don't get to change it so it applies perfectly.

But I thought you were clever enough to understand the intent behind it anyway. I still think you are in fact. :P

Quote from: viper37 on July 05, 2019, 10:15:04 AM


Valmy is not debating that some individuals were in favor of that.  He is not even debating that it was discussed in the government.  He is debating that it was a technical impossibility.  Legally impossible, by the constitution, so all States would need to approve it.  Technically impossible, because of all the conditions... They were slaves, fighting for their former masters?  That did not often happen.  You need to arm them, train them, feed them.  By 1864, realistically, how much training can you give them before sending them to the front?

Even if they freed and armed slaves in december 1864, even if a significant number agreed to fight for the South in exchange of their freedom, it wouldn't change much.

As was said in Gettysburg, they should have freed the slaves first, then declare independance.
That's about the only way I can think of why the South would receive significant foreign help from the United Kingdom.  And even there, it is a big stretch.  It's not like the UK could realistically field 500k-1M soldiers to send them to the US in support of the Confederacy.  There are all kinds of logistical and political constraints.

Now, however, once the issue of slavery is gone, even with the long list of grievances by the South, would there still be a popular will to secede from the North?  I doubt it, but I'm no expert.

Pretty well my take on it too. Slavery as an issue was a difficult stumbling block for gaining vital UK support. Though how much that support would have been worth is debatable - would the Royal Navy have been willing to break the US blockade? Commit UK troops?

The whole point of secession was to preserve slavery, so the only way freeing slaves to fight could be seriously considered would be when matters were in extremis  By that date the logistical difficulties alone of mobilizing any significant numbers of freedmen would been insurmountable, for all the reasons Berkut mentioned. 

Quote from: Malthus on July 05, 2019, 10:23:20 AM
Pretty well my take on it too. Slavery as an issue was a difficult stumbling block for gaining vital UK support. Though how much that support would have been worth is debatable - would the Royal Navy have been willing to break the US blockade? Commit UK troops?

That is one thing I never really understood about the "International recognition" thing. It is stated commonly that it was absolutely critical to the South. And I can see why they would think so, and why they would imagine this scenario where the UK is cominig to their rescue.

But I would say that a reasonable and objective analysis doesn't really lead to the conclusion that international recognition is the war winning event that is imagined.

I don't see it - lets say France AND the UK both recognize the legitimacy of the Confederacy. They send ambassadors, and offer to mediate a solution.

So what? Lincoln tells them "Thanks for the mediation offer, but we are not interested". Or sends some negotiating team to Paris to meet with some Confederate reps, with the instructions to not make any deal other than an immediate re-unification (ie just stall).

What is France and the UK going to do? Send an army over? Invade from Canada? Why? What would they stand to gain by doing anything so risky? The North is still the dominate power, and still the dominant trading partner for both of them.

And France was a mess at the time, and the UK while not a mess certainly didn't have any significant number of troops at the ACW scale to send. They sent what, 60 or 70 thousand troops to the Americas in the War of 1812? The Union was putting half a million to a million men in the field by any point that we could imagine intervention, and could have put more in if they had the threat of foreign invasion to work with - hell, Seward actually *tried* to start a war just to drum up more Northern support for the fight (Yes, that was really stupid, but still).

I think "foreign intervention" would never have mattered in the long run, and I don't think any European power had any illusions about their ability to intercede militarily.

Quote from: viper37 on July 05, 2019, 10:15:04 AM
Valmy is not debating that some individuals were in favor of that.  He is not even debating that it was discussed in the government.  He is debating that it was a technical impossibility.  Legally impossible, by the constitution, so all States would need to approve it.  Technically impossible, because of all the conditions... They were slaves, fighting for their former masters?  That did not often happen.  You need to arm them, train them, feed them.  By 1864, realistically, how much training can you give them before sending them to the front?

Even if they freed and armed slaves in december 1864, even if a significant number agreed to fight for the South in exchange of their freedom, it wouldn't change much.

As was said in Gettysburg, they should have freed the slaves first, then declare independance.
That's about the only way I can think of why the South would receive significant foreign help from the United Kingdom.  And even there, it is a big stretch.  It's not like the UK could realistically field 500k-1M soldiers to send them to the US in support of the Confederacy.  There are all kinds of logistical and political constraints.

They did have freed slaves in training as the war ended. I also think you may overestimate the amount of training received by soldiers in the civil war. It varied, but a lot didn't receive more than a week or so.

Also emergency wartime measures don't always follow the constitution. See several actions in the north for example.

QuoteNow, however, once the issue of slavery is gone, even with the long list of grievances by the South, would there still be a popular will to secede from the North?  I doubt it, but I'm no expert.

There is no chance the south would have seceded if included in secession was an abolition of slavery. Lincoln actually gave support to a pre war amendment to protect slavery if it would reverse the secession crisis. It is absurd: "So we can keep our slaves in the union, or we can form our own country without slavery..." Why would they do the latter?

In 1865 the calculus was fundamentally changed, however. At least I think the question is at what point did that calculus shift enough so that it could have actually changed government policy (if it ever did), and at the earliest point could it have been decisive?

I think UK involvement never was anticipated to go beyond naval and material support. I could be mistaken but I don't think anyone hoped for/feared british infantry units roaming the battlefield.

Quote from: viper37 on July 05, 2019, 10:15:04 AM
Now, however, once the issue of slavery is gone, even with the long list of grievances by the South, would there still be a popular will to secede from the North?  I doubt it, but I'm no expert.

Yeah,agree with you there.

I posted this on facebook once arguing with the Lost Cause mythologists about "states rights" or tariffs or other such nonsense being the reason for the war.

If you list the top ten reasons the civil war happened, you would have a list like this:

1. Slavery
2-10. A bunch of other stuff.

If you could solve items 2-10 with a magic wand, while not touching item #1 at all, we still have a civil war.
If you could solve item #1 with a magic wand, while not touching items 2-10, we have no war.

There were not any other problems that could not be solved via the in place at the time political processes.

Quote from: alfred russel on July 05, 2019, 10:37:10 AM
I could be mistaken but I don't think anyone hoped for/feared british infantry units roaming the battlefield.

People were more concerned with them roaming the air, given the experience of an earlier conflict.

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 10:16:50 AM

Quote from: alfred russel on July 05, 2019, 09:13:59 AM

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 07:40:50 AM

""Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."

Obviously incorrect, to such as an extent that I think it invalidates your other points. Everyone in this discussion is an amateur, and I don't think any of us have been discussing tactics.  :P

IT's a quote, I don't get to change it so it applies perfectly.

But I thought you were clever enough to understand the intent behind it anyway. I still think you are in fact. :P

I think we can agree there is an optimum balance between using the available men to work and to fight. I find it hard to believe that:

a) the optimum balance just happened to be all the military age white men fight, and all the military age black men work.
b) if we agree that the optimum balance was not a), the question is whether the south used too many men to fight or too many men to work. I've read a lot of stuff on the civil war, and I've yet to read any contemporary opinion that the south would be better off disarming a division or two so the soldiers could be farmers.

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 10:32:59 AM

Quote from: Malthus on July 05, 2019, 10:23:20 AM
Pretty well my take on it too. Slavery as an issue was a difficult stumbling block for gaining vital UK support. Though how much that support would have been worth is debatable - would the Royal Navy have been willing to break the US blockade? Commit UK troops?

That is one thing I never really understood about the "International recognition" thing. It is stated commonly that it was absolutely critical to the South. And I can see why they would think so, and why they would imagine this scenario where the UK is cominig to their rescue.

But I would say that a reasonable and objective analysis doesn't really lead to the conclusion that international recognition is the war winning event that is imagined.

I don't see it - lets say France AND the UK both recognize the legitimacy of the Confederacy. They send ambassadors, and offer to mediate a solution.

So what? Lincoln tells them "Thanks for the mediation offer, but we are not interested". Or sends some negotiating team to Paris to meet with some Confederate reps, with the instructions to not make any deal other than an immediate re-unification (ie just stall).

What is France and the UK going to do? Send an army over? Invade from Canada? Why? What would they stand to gain by doing anything so risky? The North is still the dominate power, and still the dominant trading partner for both of them.

And France was a mess at the time, and the UK while not a mess certainly didn't have any significant number of troops at the ACW scale to send. They sent what, 60 or 70 thousand troops to the Americas in the War of 1812? The Union was putting half a million to a million men in the field by any point that we could imagine intervention, and could have put more in if they had the threat of foreign invasion to work with - hell, Seward actually *tried* to start a war just to drum up more Northern support for the fight (Yes, that was really stupid, but still).

I think "foreign intervention" would never have mattered in the long run, and I don't think any European power had any illusions about their ability to intercede militarily.

Even if the US acts like an absolute cock and kicks off a full war with the UK its still unlikely they'd recognise the CSA. This would not be a popular political move: lest we forget the UK was far more anti slavery than the US.

This theoretical US-UK war would help the CSA for sure. The UK may well send money their way so they can die in British peoples place. But even the Soviet Union and the western allies in ww2 is a bit too tight an analogy.

I'd amend Berkut's list to:

1. Slavery
2-10. Various laws or practices all directly relating to slavery

Take the South Carolina secession declaration, the reasons given for leaving are:
1) The northern states are frustrating enforcement of the fugitive slave act
2) The northern states are frustrating the ability to transit through their territory with slaves
3) The northern states "have denounced as sinful the institution of slavery"
4) The northern states permitted the establishment of anti-slavery societies
5) The northern states have encouraged slaves to escape or mount insurrection.
6) The northern states elected a President hostile to slavery as an institution.
7) The northern states have elevated free black men to citizenship

Literally every complaint in the secession declaration is directly related to slavery.

Quote from: alfred russel on July 05, 2019, 10:43:03 AM

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 10:16:50 AM

Quote from: alfred russel on July 05, 2019, 09:13:59 AM

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 07:40:50 AM

""Amateurs talk about tactics, but professionals study logistics."

Obviously incorrect, to such as an extent that I think it invalidates your other points. Everyone in this discussion is an amateur, and I don't think any of us have been discussing tactics.  :P

IT's a quote, I don't get to change it so it applies perfectly.

But I thought you were clever enough to understand the intent behind it anyway. I still think you are in fact. :P

I think we can agree there is an optimum balance between using the available men to work and to fight. I find it hard to believe that:

a) the optimum balance just happened to be all the military age white men fight, and all the military age black men work.
b) if we agree that the optimum balance was not a), the question is whether the south used too many men to fight or too many men to work. I've read a lot of stuff on the civil war, and I've yet to read any contemporary opinion that the south would be better off disarming a division or two so the soldiers could be farmers.

I think that is nearly impossible to say, really.

But I take your point.

I would frame it however, that you are claiming that the optimum balance was that there should have been more men fighting, and less men working (or this does not make any sense at all).

Hence my quote - it seems a rather shallow analysis, even amateurish, to just assume that more men fighting is *necessarily* more optimal. My reading (and yes, it is amateur reading as well, of course) is that that is not clear at all, and there is ample evidence that in fact the number of men the South had in the field was practically constrained by their ability to support those men, and their ability to produce the needs of their society (both military and civilian) with the labor resources left behind. I don't think military historians look at it in the way you are asking though - should the south have sent some men home instead of having them fight, because that is a nearly impossible hypothetical to measure.

You are making the positive claim however that they should have in fact sent more men to fight, and left fewer at home, that the optimal balance was not reached, and in fact, was so far out of balance that the addition of tens of thousands of troops (and the reduction in available labor of tens of thousands of laborers) would have made a significant impact.

I think if that were true, the indirect evidence would show that the South, by and large, did not suffer from nearly fatal shortages of food, munitions, and supplies throughout the war because they had more than enough labor to produce those things, and in fact that labor was being wasted. That is clearly not the case.

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 10:32:59 AM

Quote from: Malthus on July 05, 2019, 10:23:20 AM
Pretty well my take on it too. Slavery as an issue was a difficult stumbling block for gaining vital UK support. Though how much that support would have been worth is debatable - would the Royal Navy have been willing to break the US blockade? Commit UK troops?

That is one thing I never really understood about the "International recognition" thing. It is stated commonly that it was absolutely critical to the South. And I can see why they would think so, and why they would imagine this scenario where the UK is cominig to their rescue.

But I would say that a reasonable and objective analysis doesn't really lead to the conclusion that international recognition is the war winning event that is imagined.

I don't see it - lets say France AND the UK both recognize the legitimacy of the Confederacy. They send ambassadors, and offer to mediate a solution.

So what? Lincoln tells them "Thanks for the mediation offer, but we are not interested". Or sends some negotiating team to Paris to meet with some Confederate reps, with the instructions to not make any deal other than an immediate re-unification (ie just stall).

What is France and the UK going to do? Send an army over? Invade from Canada? Why? What would they stand to gain by doing anything so risky? The North is still the dominate power, and still the dominant trading partner for both of them.

And France was a mess at the time, and the UK while not a mess certainly didn't have any significant number of troops at the ACW scale to send. They sent what, 60 or 70 thousand troops to the Americas in the War of 1812? The Union was putting half a million to a million men in the field by any point that we could imagine intervention, and could have put more in if they had the threat of foreign invasion to work with - hell, Seward actually *tried* to start a war just to drum up more Northern support for the fight (Yes, that was really stupid, but still).

I think "foreign intervention" would never have mattered in the long run, and I don't think any European power had any illusions about their ability to intercede militarily.

I suppose a plausible scenario would have been something like this:

- UK offers recognition to the South. 
- UK asserts the right to unrestricted trade with the South, now a recognized nation. Cotton for the UK, weapons for the South. 
- UK dares the US to interfere with that trade, or risk naval war with the UK - turnabout for the US' own grievances in 1812!

Why would the UK do this? Access to cotton is one big motivator, as is the profits to be made from  selling to a desperate South; plus, if all goes "well", a US stripped of the South is less of a potential future great-power rival.   

Would the North have still won? Certainly, if they fought it out to the end. The UK was never I think going to send an army to the South, which remained absolutely poorer in men and material.

However, the victory would have been a lot more costly if the Northern blockade was broken, making it more plausible that the North would decide the price was just not worth it.

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 10:54:07 AM

I think that is nearly impossible to say, really.

But I take your point.

I would frame it however, that you are claiming that the optimum balance was that there should have been more men fighting, and less men working (or this does not make any sense at all).

Hence my quote - it seems a rather shallow analysis, even amateurish, to just assume that more men fighting is *necessarily* more optimal. My reading (and yes, it is amateur reading as well, of course) is that that is not clear at all, and there is ample evidence that in fact the number of men the South had in the field was practically constrained by their ability to support those men, and their ability to produce the needs of their society (both military and civilian) with the labor resources left behind. I don't think military historians look at it in the way you are asking though - should the south have sent some men home instead of having them fight, because that is a nearly impossible hypothetical to measure.

My point here is not that the south mobilized as many as 1 million men, and they could have tried to squeeze the black population to produce another 600k. For obvious reasons, much of the black population would probably be less than effective on a battlefield, and mass mobilization would present logistic problems (both of a production and consumption variety).

But there were 3.5m slaves. While some would be too old or too young to work, my understanding of slavery is that there weren't that many idle people. Removing 50k (hypothetically) of the black population into direct military service would not collapse production, but would dramatically increase the number of men under arms (the army apparently peaked in size at around 300k). 10s of thousands of laborers is not a big number compared to the number of people working.

QuoteI think if that were true, the indirect evidence would show that the South, by and large, did not suffer from nearly fatal shortages of food, munitions, and supplies throughout the war because they had more than enough labor to produce those things, and in fact that labor was being wasted. That is clearly not the case.

To be clear the south suffered from severe shortages of food, munitions, and supplies throughout the war. My point was that until 1864 they kept their army reasonably well fed.

I don't however think that labor was the primary cause of the shortages. A lack of salt, the effect of military campaigns, the blockade, and a deficient transportation network was probably the bigger contributor to the food problems than simply a lack of labor.

Quote from: Malthus on July 05, 2019, 10:55:19 AM

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 10:32:59 AM

Quote from: Malthus on July 05, 2019, 10:23:20 AM
Pretty well my take on it too. Slavery as an issue was a difficult stumbling block for gaining vital UK support. Though how much that support would have been worth is debatable - would the Royal Navy have been willing to break the US blockade? Commit UK troops?

That is one thing I never really understood about the "International recognition" thing. It is stated commonly that it was absolutely critical to the South. And I can see why they would think so, and why they would imagine this scenario where the UK is cominig to their rescue.

But I would say that a reasonable and objective analysis doesn't really lead to the conclusion that international recognition is the war winning event that is imagined.

I don't see it - lets say France AND the UK both recognize the legitimacy of the Confederacy. They send ambassadors, and offer to mediate a solution.

So what? Lincoln tells them "Thanks for the mediation offer, but we are not interested". Or sends some negotiating team to Paris to meet with some Confederate reps, with the instructions to not make any deal other than an immediate re-unification (ie just stall).

What is France and the UK going to do? Send an army over? Invade from Canada? Why? What would they stand to gain by doing anything so risky? The North is still the dominate power, and still the dominant trading partner for both of them.

And France was a mess at the time, and the UK while not a mess certainly didn't have any significant number of troops at the ACW scale to send. They sent what, 60 or 70 thousand troops to the Americas in the War of 1812? The Union was putting half a million to a million men in the field by any point that we could imagine intervention, and could have put more in if they had the threat of foreign invasion to work with - hell, Seward actually *tried* to start a war just to drum up more Northern support for the fight (Yes, that was really stupid, but still).

I think "foreign intervention" would never have mattered in the long run, and I don't think any European power had any illusions about their ability to intercede militarily.

I suppose a plausible scenario would have been something like this:

- UK offers recognition to the South. 
- UK asserts the right to unrestricted trade with the South, now a recognized nation. Cotton for the UK, weapons for the South. 
- UK dares the US to interfere with that trade, or risk naval war with the UK - turnabout for the US' own grievances in 1812!

BUt the UK would make no such claim, seeing as they just fought a long war and established themselves the right of blockade of belligerents, assuming you can effect it. This isn't something they can just "demand" that the US not enforce, there is international law here, and the US had a declared blockade. Indeed, the fact that the South was NOT officially recognized as a legal entity was somewhat problematic to the legal justification for a blockade.

Recognizing the Confederacy as a actual belligerent and sovereign nation radically *strenthens* the legal argument that the blockade was legitimate, not the other way around!

This is a legal precedent that existed prior to the ACW (Napoleonic Wars most recently), and well after it (WW1 and WW2).

Quote

Why would the UK do this? Access to cotton is one big motivator, as is the profits to be made from  selling to a desperate South; plus, if all goes "well", a US stripped of the South is less of a potential future great-power rival.   

Would the North have still won? Certainly, if they fought it out to the end. The UK was never I think going to send an army to the South, which remained absolutely poorer in men and material.

However, the victory would have been a lot more costly if the Northern blockade was broken, making it more plausible that the North would decide the price was just not worth it.

Yeah, if the blockage is your entire justification, that is a non-starter, especially as far as England is concerned. They were the singular global power MOST invested in maintaining the legal precedent that a power can in fact impose a blockade against belligerents.

The issue, btw, in the war of 1812 wasn't so much the blockade of France (which did piss the US off, but not really enough to consider war) but rather impressment of American sailors, and just the general feeling in the US that England did not take them seriously or treat them as a sovereign nation. Hell, I think the UK hadn't even, at the point, fulfilled all the terms of the Paris Peace treaty.

Quote from: The Brain on July 05, 2019, 01:26:38 AM

Quote from: Razgovory on July 04, 2019, 07:24:57 PM
I think rebels are like pirates in that they are lawbreakers that are stopped by a military force.  I don't know when the ideas regarding who is and who is not a legal combatant were accepted by the people in the Western World.

The US has not declared war on anyone for 70 years.  The US has been at war a whole bunch of times since then.  I think a formal declaration of war would result in certain powers moving from the Executive to the Congress, and all the US presidents in that time have wanted to avoid that.

I wouldn't be surprised if there were some legal things in the 1860s that depended on whether or not the US was at war. For instance, was the crime of treason possible without a state of war? IIRC selling defense secrets to the Russians during the Cold War wasn't treason in the US (note: I don't know this but I seem to remember something along those lines). I don't know if treason was possible in a vernacular war.

Treason is only crime defined in the US Constitution.  I don't know exactly how it worked in the 19th century because there are occasions of people being convicted of treason against states.  John Brown was convicted of treason against the State of Virginia, a state he would have no loyalty to to begin with.  I know that people were convicted of treason for rebellions that did not include a declared war.

Quote from: The Brain on July 05, 2019, 01:26:38 AM
I wouldn't be surprised if there were some legal things in the 1860s that depended on whether or not the US was at war. For instance, was the crime of treason possible without a state of war? IIRC selling defense secrets to the Russians during the Cold War wasn't treason in the US (note: I don't know this but I seem to remember something along those lines). I don't know if treason was possible in a vernacular war.

Treason is specifically defined in the US Constitution.  While it requires either confession or two witnesses to the same act, it does not require a war.

Quote from: Article III, Section IIITreason against the United States, shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason, but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during the life of the person attainted.

Quote from: Razgovory on July 05, 2019, 12:38:47 PM
[Treason is only crime defined in the US Constitution.  I don't know exactly how it worked in the 19th century because there are occasions of people being convicted of treason against states.  John Brown was convicted of treason against the State of Virginia, a state he would have no loyalty to to begin with.  I know that people were convicted of treason for rebellions that did not include a declared war.

Virginia has a similar definition to the US at this point.

Quote from: VA Code§ 18.2-481. Treason defined; how proved and punished.
Treason shall consist only in:

(1) Levying war against the Commonwealth;

(2) Adhering to its enemies, giving them aid and comfort;

(3) Establishing, without authority of the legislature, any government within its limits separate from the existing government;

(4) Holding or executing, in such usurped government, any office, or professing allegiance or fidelity to it; or

(5) Resisting the execution of the laws under color of its authority.

Such treason, if proved by the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or by confession in court, shall be punishable as a Class 2 felony.

Easy to prosecute John Brown under that standard.

What does the US constitution mean by "enemies" if they are not at war with the US? Is that like the NY Times and such?

Edit: For clarity, your reading that it doesn't require a war seems odd to me. But I'm not a native speaker.

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 11:38:29 AM

BUt the UK would make no such claim, seeing as they just fought a long war and established themselves the right of blockade of belligerents, assuming you can effect it. This isn't something they can just "demand" that the US not enforce, there is international law here, and the US had a declared blockade. Indeed, the fact that the South was NOT officially recognized as a legal entity was somewhat problematic to the legal justification for a blockade.

Recognizing the Confederacy as a actual belligerent and sovereign nation radically *strenthens* the legal argument that the blockade was legitimate, not the other way around!

This is a legal precedent that existed prior to the ACW (Napoleonic Wars most recently), and well after it (WW1 and WW2).

Actually - the Union's position at law was super shaky. If the UK had wanted, it could have declared the Blockade illegal - because it was illegal in a couple of ways!

First, the legality of the blockade rested on a treaty, the Declaration of Paris, that the US had never ratified.

Second, for a blockade to be "legal" under this treaty, it had to be "effective" from the outset ... the Union Blockade was not, as at the outset, the Union lacked ships.

If the blockade wasn't "legal", why did the UK honour it anyway? Basically, out of self-interest: the UK, as the leading navel power, wanted to firmly establish the precedent for its own use:

QuoteWhile Northerners were angered when Britain defined the Confederacy as a belligerent, Southerners were dismayed at Britain's interpretation of the blockade's legal status. This was important because an illegal blockade need not be honored. Importantly, the Declaration outlawed "paper blockades." Nation "A" could not require signatories to honor its blockade of nation "B" if it did not deploy the ships required to block harbor traffic. In terms of the Declaration's language, a blockade could only be legal if it was "effective."

Since the Union initially had few ships to intercept traffic, Lincoln's blockade was undeniably not "effective" for the first year or two. Nonetheless, Great Britain treated it as though it were effective. The reasons for the perplexing interpretation became evident in the ensuing decades.

Great Britain chiefly wanted to establish an international precedent that would benefit her in hypothetical future wars with European powers. Since she intended to maintain a large navy she realized that she was most likely to be the initiator of a future blockade. If so, she wanted to insure that neutrals would honor it. Thus, during the American Civil War Great Britain redefined the concept of an effective blockade.

https://civilwarchat.wordpress.com/2019/04/19/british-reaction-to-lincolns-blockade/comment-page-1/

The point is this: the UK was not compelled by existing legalities to honour the Union blockade. It chose to do so.

Had the calculus of self-interest been different, there was literally nothing stopping the UK from making the above two points ("you aren't a signatory and your blockade isn't effective") and ignoring the blockade -- if the value to the UK of supporting the South outweighed the value to the UK of securing the precedent.

Quote

Why would the UK do this? Access to cotton is one big motivator, as is the profits to be made from  selling to a desperate South; plus, if all goes "well", a US stripped of the South is less of a potential future great-power rival.   

Would the North have still won? Certainly, if they fought it out to the end. The UK was never I think going to send an army to the South, which remained absolutely poorer in men and material.

However, the victory would have been a lot more costly if the Northern blockade was broken, making it more plausible that the North would decide the price was just not worth it.

Quote
Yeah, if the blockage is your entire justification, that is a non-starter, especially as far as England is concerned. They were the singular global power MOST invested in maintaining the legal precedent that a power can in fact impose a blockade against belligerents.

The value of the precedent to the UK was real enough, but the issue is just how valuable that was to the UK ...

Quote from: Malthus on July 05, 2019, 10:23:20 AM
Though how much that support would have been worth is debatable - would the Royal Navy have been willing to break the US blockade? Commit UK troops?

The UK would commit troops if they thought they could gain some States and territory for themselves.  Like any colonial power, basically.  They wouldn't fight for the pretty eyes of the Confederate ladies, nor would they for the cotton when there was a much more affordable opportunity elsewhere.  They wouldn't even fight just to get "even" with the US.

Fear of a US invasion of Canada was a real possibility (it kinda did happen too) and it certainly led to the creation of Canada, because the UK made it clear they couldn't afford to send any significant support over here.

If they couldn't defend their colonies, could they realistically invade the US?  Doubtful, even if they wanted it.  It's not like they had hundreds of thousands of elite troops just sitting idle in England waiting to be shipped out at a moment's notice.

And I don't even know of how the populace and the parliament might have reacted to that thought.

Had they freed their slaves and won at Gettysburg, yeah, maybe the UK would have given some thought to it, but this is all ALT+history as Valmy pointed out. :)

Would make some interesting novel for sure ;)  The Confederacy evolving into a bastion of liberalism while the North descens into anarchy?  I think I remember something like that :P

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 10:32:59 AM

Quote from: Malthus on July 05, 2019, 10:23:20 AM
Pretty well my take on it too. Slavery as an issue was a difficult stumbling block for gaining vital UK support. Though how much that support would have been worth is debatable - would the Royal Navy have been willing to break the US blockade? Commit UK troops?

That is one thing I never really understood about the "International recognition" thing. It is stated commonly that it was absolutely critical to the South. And I can see why they would think so, and why they would imagine this scenario where the UK is cominig to their rescue.

They imagined the UK would support them as they were their main cotton trading partner (possibly tobacco too?  IDK).  They also imagined the UK would still be bitter about losing their colonies and would welcome a chance to bruise the US.  That is I believe their line of thought.  Not how the UK saw things, but as any superpower, they would certainly keep an eye on everything affecting nations close to their empire's possessions.

Quote
But I would say that a reasonable and objective analysis doesn't really lead to the conclusion that international recognition is the war winning event that is imagined.

If you make a reasonable and objective analysis of the situation in 1861, do you fire on Fort Sumter? ;)

Quote
I don't see it - lets say France AND the UK both recognize the legitimacy of the Confederacy. They send ambassadors, and offer to mediate a solution.

So what? Lincoln tells them "Thanks for the mediation offer, but we are not interested". Or sends some negotiating team to Paris to meet with some Confederate reps, with the instructions to not make any deal other than an immediate re-unification (ie just stall).

What is France and the UK going to do? Send an army over? Invade from Canada? Why? What would they stand to gain by doing anything so risky? The North is still the dominate power, and still the dominant trading partner for both of them.

AFAIK, France did not even discuss with the Confederates.  They had friends over there, but no official government contact, like, say the 13 Colonies in 1776.

Quote
And France was a mess at the time, and the UK while not a mess certainly didn't have any significant number of troops at the ACW scale to send. They sent what, 60 or 70 thousand troops to the Americas in the War of 1812? The Union was putting half a million to a million men in the field by any point that we could imagine intervention, and could have put more in if they had the threat of foreign invasion to work with - hell, Seward actually *tried* to start a war just to drum up more Northern support for the fight (Yes, that was really stupid, but still).

As for 1812, make it close to half of that.
Official figures put it close to 50k at the end of the war, but they never fielded that much soldiers in a battle.  Lots of troops in garrisons, possibly lots of sailors in the navy, but as much as a fighting force on the ground, it was outnumbered 10:1 by the total number of US troops including the militia.  And I'm couting the 10-15k Indians defending Canada.

Quote
I think "foreign intervention" would never have mattered in the long run, and I don't think any European power had any illusions about their ability to intercede militarily.

Yeah, France had no reason to fight the United States and the UK had no capacity to even defend Canada.

Looking at Wikipedia, peak numbers for Unions were close to 700k men and half of that for the Confederacy.  Total manpower for all army branches and support personal was 2,2M and 1M respectively (higher estimate for the Confederacy).

Assuming the US and the UK were roughly at the same technological level (equipment&training), If the UK wanted to intervene, they'd need to mobilize 1M soldiers.  Maybe 5-600k in the field, the rest in support and sailors to fight the US navy.

That force needs to be shipped to Virginia or Canada to make a two prong attack.  Or invade from the Mississipi.  Either way, it meant fighting the US Navy to protect the troop transports, bring enough artillery, gunpowder, replacement weapons & parts, etc...  The South was badly in need of industries to produce what they needed.  Was it a a myth or just an exageration that by the end of the War, i.e. Appomatox, they had no more bullets to fight?  How would they produce food&other supplies for 1M more people without any slaves, central to their economy?  If you want to buy something, you need money.  If your main source of revenue is cotton and you need slaves to extract it since you're not mechanized...  How the heck would it work?  Rehire the slaves?  I think most of them would flee for the Noth in hopes of a better live.  Slaves were worked to death in the fields. It wouldn't change much if they were paid for it.

Quote from: Tyr on July 05, 2019, 10:48:59 AM
The UK may well send money their way so they can die in British peoples place.

they did send and loan money to the Confederacy, and help them export their cotton.

There is a natural tendency to focus on cotton, but there was another big development in transatlantic trade in the early 1860s - there was an enormous increase in British imports of grain from the northern and western US states.  Europe suffered through some poor harvests in the early 1860s and Britain was both the largest importing nation by far and also the center of the global grain trade.  This was not a temporarily blip either - US grain exports to and through London would be a major feature of the late 19th century trading system.  The other major source of grain imports for Britain was Russia, obviously a problematic source given British foreign policy and interests. 

So at the same time:
1) The CSA shoots itself in the foot with a counter-productive embargo that exposes itself as an unreliable supplier.
2) The UK discovers it is not quite as dependent on southern cotton as believed, b/c of a combination of stockpiled reserves and alternative sources of supply
3)  The USA (North) suddenly emerges as a critical and reliable supplier of a essential commodity for survival.

Impressively the Lancashire cotton workers (often only a meal or two from starving) supported the Union and were against slavery :

https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-21057494

"At a mass meeting in Manchester's Free Trade Hall, on New Year's Eve 1862, attended by a mixture of cotton workers, and the Manchester middle class, they passed a motion urging Lincoln to prosecute the war, abolish slavery and supporting the blockade - despite the fact that it was by now causing them to starve. The meeting convened despite an editorial in the Manchester Guardian advising people not to attend.

Mr Lincoln, in a letter dated 19 January 1863, 150 years ago on Saturday, replied with the words that are inscribed on his statue:

"I cannot but regard your decisive utterances on the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country.

"It is indeed an energetic and re-inspiring assurance of the inherent truth and of the ultimate and universal triumph of justice, humanity and freedom... Whatever misfortune may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship which now exists between the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual." "

The Civil War and the Japanese jumping into WW2 strike me the exact same way the more I learned about the details behind the economics involved.

WTF were they thinking?

Which them leads me to a very sobering conclusion: Countries, nations, people - they go to war, even *existential* war for often ridiculous reasons that don't make any rational sense.

Someone above asked me if I would rationally fire on Ft. Sumter. Hell no. It was stupid, but that kind of misses the point. The stupid came long before Sumter, just like the Japanese stupid came long before Pearl Harbor.

The stupid starts and puts nations on roads that lead inexorably to disaster long before it is so clear that the only possible end is in fact disaster. By the time that Captain fired the mortar at Ft. Sumter, I don't think anyone could have stopped the war.

Just like by the time the decision was made to attack the US fleet, anyone on the Japanese side could have stopped the war, or chosen some other course. The moment for those decisions had come and gone, and almost certainly at a time when there was no appreciation for what it meant.

Supporting the confederacy really made no sense for the UK. No matter what happened, the US (North) would still survive and still thrive as growing industrial power.  What is the upside of causing anger and resentment in such a country, where you also happen to share a long an indefensible land border?  The only sensible policy is the one it actually followed: keep open the threat of recognition to keep the North honest without any real sincere intention of following through.  And it worked - Lincoln was careful not to offend Britain and after the war ended, American elites became increasingly Anglophilic over the following decades.

Quote from: viper37 on July 05, 2019, 02:54:51 PM
[

AFAIK, France did not even discuss with the Confederates.  They had friends over there, but no official government contact, like, say the 13 Colonies in 1776.

Quote
And France was a mess at the time, and the UK while not a mess certainly didn't have any significant number of troops at the ACW scale to send.

France was busy at the time propping up Maximilian in Mexico, precisely thanks to the Guerre de Sécession, ACW in French. ;)

Hard to believe that the presence of an airport (since the revolution) has not been mentioned as a significant factor

Quote from: crazy canuck on July 05, 2019, 06:21:01 PM
Hard to believe that the presence of an airport (since the revolution) has not been mentioned as a significant factor

Without planes it's just a building and a road.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on July 05, 2019, 03:55:26 PM
Supporting the confederacy really made no sense for the UK. No matter what happened, the US (North) would still survive and still thrive as growing industrial power.  What is the upside of causing anger and resentment in such a country, where you also happen to share a long an indefensible land border? The only sensible policy is the one it actually followed: keep open the threat of recognition to keep the North honest without any real sincere intention of following through.  And it worked - Lincoln was careful not to offend Britain and after the war ended, American elites became increasingly Anglophilic over the following decades.

Could you imagine our next PM being able to follow such a carefully balanced foreign policy?  :bowler:

Or the current US president?

Quote from: PDH on July 05, 2019, 07:34:25 PM
Or the current US president?

Indeed.

Sorry times we live in.  :(

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 03:34:16 PM
The Civil War and the Japanese jumping into WW2 strike me the exact same way the more I learned about the details behind the economics involved.

WTF were they thinking?

Which them leads me to a very sobering conclusion: Countries, nations, people - they go to war, even *existential* war for often ridiculous reasons that don't make any rational sense.

Someone above asked me if I would rationally fire on Ft. Sumter. Hell no. It was stupid, but that kind of misses the point. The stupid came long before Sumter, just like the Japanese stupid came long before Pearl Harbor.

The stupid starts and puts nations on roads that lead inexorably to disaster long before it is so clear that the only possible end is in fact disaster. By the time that Captain fired the mortar at Ft. Sumter, I don't think anyone could have stopped the war.

Just like by the time the decision was made to attack the US fleet, anyone on the Japanese side could have stopped the war, or chosen some other course. The moment for those decisions had come and gone, and almost certainly at a time when there was no appreciation for what it meant.

The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The Northern states were growing far faster in populace and economic might than Southern states, in large part because the Southern aristocracy didn't WANT the South to have more people and an industrial bourgeoisie.   The landed aristocracy wanted to keep running things themselves.   Wealth generation in the South was dominated by slave owners, and the high price of slaves meant that the only practical way to become a planter was to inherit the slaves needed to run a plantation.  Industrialization opened the door to the creation of an upper class which consisted of people with new money.  The landed elites provided a huge percentage of the educated classes as well, but their kids would, if industrialization took hold, have to compete with kids from the industrial elites, and they didn't like that at all.  The only way to avoid that was to leave the Union so they could control themselves how and where industrialization occurred, and by whom.

The Japanese saw a similar dim future for themselves.  They reckoned that they stood a reasonable chance of matching the US in a war at sea when the total fleets were on a ration of 10:7 USN:IJN.  The US could have built their fleet to the treaty level of 10:6, but, until WW2 started, did not.  When WW2 started, the US expanded its fleet to the treaty limit, which was bad for Japan.  Worse, the fall of France led the US to decide to double their fleet, which the Japanese couldn't hope to come close to matching.  The Japanese were looking at a 1945 situation where fleet ratios would be about 21:8; i.e. hopeless.  That would be as devastating to the Japanese elites as industrialization was for the US Southern elites, because the "disappointment" among the lower-level Japanese officers would lead to another round of "2-26 Incident"-type round of assassinations and forced retirements.

The elites of both the would-be CSA and Japanese Empire realized that they had to fight soon or never.  Now, one could argue that either would have been better-off starting the war even sooner, but they weren't at the crisis point sooner.  They both started their wars at about the last point where they had any hope of winning at all.  It wasn't much hope, and Binky is on the Side of the Big Battalions, so it turned out to be a disaster for both, but in both countries the elites were willing to sacrifice a lot of their masses in even the hope of remaining on top when the war was over.

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 03:34:16 PM
The Civil War and the Japanese jumping into WW2 strike me the exact same way the more I learned about the details behind the economics involved.

WTF were they thinking?

Which them leads me to a very sobering conclusion: Countries, nations, people - they go to war, even *existential* war for often ridiculous reasons that don't make any rational sense.

Someone above asked me if I would rationally fire on Ft. Sumter. Hell no. It was stupid, but that kind of misses the point. The stupid came long before Sumter, just like the Japanese stupid came long before Pearl Harbor.

The stupid starts and puts nations on roads that lead inexorably to disaster long before it is so clear that the only possible end is in fact disaster. By the time that Captain fired the mortar at Ft. Sumter, I don't think anyone could have stopped the war.

Just like by the time the decision was made to attack the US fleet, anyone on the Japanese side could have stopped the war, or chosen some other course. The moment for those decisions had come and gone, and almost certainly at a time when there was no appreciation for what it meant.

Quote from: ShermanYou people of the South don't know what you are doing. This country will be drenched in blood, and God only knows how it will end. It is all folly, madness, a crime against civilization! You people speak so lightly of war; you don't know what you're talking about. War is a terrible thing! You mistake, too, the people of the North. They are a peaceable people but an earnest people, and they will fight, too. They are not going to let this country be destroyed without a mighty effort to save it... Besides, where are your men and appliances of war to contend against them? The North can make a steam engine, locomotive, or railway car; hardly a yard of cloth or pair of shoes can you make. You are rushing into war with one of the most powerful, ingeniously mechanical, and determined people on Earth—right at your doors. You are bound to fail. Only in your spirit and determination are you prepared for war. In all else you are totally unprepared, with a bad cause to start with. At first you will make headway, but as your limited resources begin to fail, shut out from the markets of Europe as you will be, your cause will begin to wane. If your people will but stop and think, they must see in the end that you will surely fail.

That said, I'm not sure. I don't think the people on either side were willing to go through the hardships of the war, had they understood what they were getting into. I think both sides were led by hardliners. The south could look at the north and think they wouldn't be so determined--absent the emancipation proclamation - which wasn't issued until well over a year after the war started and was probably politically impossible when the south left - i'm not really sure the purpose of the war justified a grueling war of attrition.

For whatever it is worth, european observers didn't see the southern cause as hopeless.

Quote from: PDH on July 05, 2019, 07:34:25 PM
Or the current US president?

It would take more than the threat of war with the UK to keep Trump honest.  For one thing, he would have to become honest first.

Quote from: grumbler on July 05, 2019, 08:37:43 PM
The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The difference is that the South's position really was hopeless, even if the elites committed to change and industrialization, they were still going to lag behind the North for generations given the realities of geography, climate, infrastructure, and education.

Japan on the other hand had another path - while they couldn't establish primacy in the Pacific or seize control of resources, they could accommodate themselves to a US-led trading system.  We know this could have worked because it is what Japan was forced to accept by default postwar, with the result that the country succeeded well beyond its most optimistic prewar hopes.  Unlike the South, Japan as a nation was not dysfunctional, just its politics and civil-military relations.

The South's position was hopeless in a world that was to be dominated by the North. As always, the gamble was to change that future before that future could be one that doomed them.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on July 06, 2019, 04:45:41 PM

Quote from: grumbler on July 05, 2019, 08:37:43 PM
The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The difference is that the South's position really was hopeless, even if the elites committed to change and industrialization, they were still going to lag behind the North for generations given the realities of geography, climate, infrastructure, and education.

Japan on the other hand had another path - while they couldn't establish primacy in the Pacific or seize control of resources, they could accommodate themselves to a US-led trading system.  We know this could have worked because it is what Japan was forced to accept by default postwar, with the result that the country succeeded well beyond its most optimistic prewar hopes.  Unlike the South, Japan as a nation was not dysfunctional, just its politics and civil-military relations.

You are mistaking what is good for Japan with what is good for the people running Japan.  Japan could and did eventually prosper under a peaceful US-led treaty system, but that means the militarists in Japan would be sidelined and the military gains they made would eventually be lost.  The South is the same way,  the South prospers today, prosperity that could not exist under the old system.  The downside is that the people running the South in 1860 would lose their political power to the  "greasy mechanics".

In the case of both Japan and the South the elites were willing to sacrifice large numbers of people in a quixotic effort to keep themselves in power. 

Quote from: Razgovory on July 06, 2019, 06:03:02 PM

You are mistaking what is good for Japan with what is good for the people running Japan.  Japan could and did eventually prosper under a peaceful US-led treaty system, but that means the militarists in Japan would be sidelined and the military gains they made would eventually be lost. 

Without a war with America I don't see that as definitely being true. I think they certainly would have been able to hold onto Taiwan and the southern half of Sakhalin.
Maybe Korea as well, there were a lot of collaborators in the upper and middle classes.

Quote from: grumbler on July 05, 2019, 08:37:43 PM
The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The Northern states were growing far faster in populace and economic might than Southern states, in large part because the Southern aristocracy didn't WANT the South to have more people and an industrial bourgeoisie.   The landed aristocracy wanted to keep running things themselves.   Wealth generation in the South was dominated by slave owners, and the high price of slaves meant that the only practical way to become a planter was to inherit the slaves needed to run a plantation.  Industrialization opened the door to the creation of an upper class which consisted of people with new money.  The landed elites provided a huge percentage of the educated classes as well, but their kids would, if industrialization took hold, have to compete with kids from the industrial elites, and they didn't like that at all.  The only way to avoid that was to leave the Union so they could control themselves how and where industrialization occurred, and by whom.

The Japanese saw a similar dim future for themselves.  They reckoned that they stood a reasonable chance of matching the US in a war at sea when the total fleets were on a ration of 10:7 USN:IJN.  The US could have built their fleet to the treaty level of 10:6, but, until WW2 started, did not.  When WW2 started, the US expanded its fleet to the treaty limit, which was bad for Japan.  Worse, the fall of France led the US to decide to double their fleet, which the Japanese couldn't hope to come close to matching.  The Japanese were looking at a 1945 situation where fleet ratios would be about 21:8; i.e. hopeless.  That would be as devastating to the Japanese elites as industrialization was for the US Southern elites, because the "disappointment" among the lower-level Japanese officers would lead to another round of "2-26 Incident"-type round of assassinations and forced retirements.

The elites of both the would-be CSA and Japanese Empire realized that they had to fight soon or never.  Now, one could argue that either would have been better-off starting the war even sooner, but they weren't at the crisis point sooner.  They both started their wars at about the last point where they had any hope of winning at all.  It wasn't much hope, and Binky is on the Side of the Big Battalions, so it turned out to be a disaster for both, but in both countries the elites were willing to sacrifice a lot of their masses in even the hope of remaining on top when the war was over.

:thumbsup:  Very nice breakdown, sir.

Quote from: Oexmelin on July 06, 2019, 05:34:05 PM
The South's position was hopeless in a world that was to be dominated by the North. As always, the gamble was to change that future before that future could be one that doomed them.

Two generations of chronic underinvestment in human and physical capital; two generations of mobilizing an entire society around a repressive and archaic means of economic exploitation could not be simply unwound on any reasonable time scale no matter what gambles Southern leadership made.  There was no scenario where the North would simply disappear. If by some miracle, the South achieved political independence, it would not reverse - and in fact might well exacerbate - economic dependence.

The latter half of the 19th century was going to be a series of lost decades for the South no matter what.  Committing to Jim Crow meant prolonging the matter a few additional generations beyond that.

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on July 05, 2019, 03:55:26 PM
Supporting the confederacy really made no sense for the UK. No matter what happened, the US (North) would still survive and still thrive as growing industrial power.  What is the upside of causing anger and resentment in such a country, where you also happen to share a long an indefensible land border?  The only sensible policy is the one it actually followed: keep open the threat of recognition to keep the North honest without any real sincere intention of following through.  And it worked - Lincoln was careful not to offend Britain and after the war ended, American elites became increasingly Anglophilic over the following decades.

The potential upside of a Confederate win for the UK was real enough - create what would amount to a new state that was both a major supplier of a vital commodity and virtually beholden to the UK; cut a growing potential great power rival down to size before it became a major threat. Sure the North would be angry, but it would hardly be likely to start a war with the UK over that undefended border, having just lost a major civil war.

Of course all of this may not weigh in the balance against the downside - anger the provider of another vital commodity, grain; and of course no guarantee that the South would win, even with overt UK support.

All of which though would be predicated on supporting the South being politically possible - I suspect that could only have been the case if the South gave up slavery, which was impossible for it to do, as that was what it was fighting to preserve. 

Quote from: Razgovory on July 06, 2019, 06:03:02 PM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on July 06, 2019, 04:45:41 PM

Quote from: grumbler on July 05, 2019, 08:37:43 PM
The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The difference is that the South's position really was hopeless, even if the elites committed to change and industrialization, they were still going to lag behind the North for generations given the realities of geography, climate, infrastructure, and education.

Japan on the other hand had another path - while they couldn't establish primacy in the Pacific or seize control of resources, they could accommodate themselves to a US-led trading system.  We know this could have worked because it is what Japan was forced to accept by default postwar, with the result that the country succeeded well beyond its most optimistic prewar hopes.  Unlike the South, Japan as a nation was not dysfunctional, just its politics and civil-military relations.

You are mistaking what is good for Japan with what is good for the people running Japan.  Japan could and did eventually prosper under a peaceful US-led treaty system, but that means the militarists in Japan would be sidelined and the military gains they made would eventually be lost.  The South is the same way,  the South prospers today, prosperity that could not exist under the old system.  The downside is that the people running the South in 1860 would lose their political power to the  "greasy mechanics".

In the case of both Japan and the South the elites were willing to sacrifice large numbers of people in a quixotic effort to keep themselves in power.

The Japanese trap had a more personal element to it - members of the military and political elites not seen as militant enough were likely going to be assassinated by "double patriot" junior officers or forced out of office.

Even if they wanted to, they could not avoid war, because any sensible compromising was personally impossible - the persons responsible for the compromise would be killed or replaced, and the new leaders would be those against any compromise.

Quote from: Benedict Arnold on July 07, 2019, 02:04:30 AM

Quote from: grumbler on July 05, 2019, 08:37:43 PM
The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The Northern states were growing far faster in populace and economic might than Southern states, in large part because the Southern aristocracy didn't WANT the South to have more people and an industrial bourgeoisie.   The landed aristocracy wanted to keep running things themselves.   Wealth generation in the South was dominated by slave owners, and the high price of slaves meant that the only practical way to become a planter was to inherit the slaves needed to run a plantation.  Industrialization opened the door to the creation of an upper class which consisted of people with new money.  The landed elites provided a huge percentage of the educated classes as well, but their kids would, if industrialization took hold, have to compete with kids from the industrial elites, and they didn't like that at all.  The only way to avoid that was to leave the Union so they could control themselves how and where industrialization occurred, and by whom.

The Japanese saw a similar dim future for themselves.  They reckoned that they stood a reasonable chance of matching the US in a war at sea when the total fleets were on a ration of 10:7 USN:IJN.  The US could have built their fleet to the treaty level of 10:6, but, until WW2 started, did not.  When WW2 started, the US expanded its fleet to the treaty limit, which was bad for Japan.  Worse, the fall of France led the US to decide to double their fleet, which the Japanese couldn't hope to come close to matching.  The Japanese were looking at a 1945 situation where fleet ratios would be about 21:8; i.e. hopeless.  That would be as devastating to the Japanese elites as industrialization was for the US Southern elites, because the "disappointment" among the lower-level Japanese officers would lead to another round of "2-26 Incident"-type round of assassinations and forced retirements.

The elites of both the would-be CSA and Japanese Empire realized that they had to fight soon or never.  Now, one could argue that either would have been better-off starting the war even sooner, but they weren't at the crisis point sooner.  They both started their wars at about the last point where they had any hope of winning at all.  It wasn't much hope, and Binky is on the Side of the Big Battalions, so it turned out to be a disaster for both, but in both countries the elites were willing to sacrifice a lot of their masses in even the hope of remaining on top when the war was over.

:thumbsup:  Very nice breakdown, sir.

I don't think this is really correct though. There were of course exceptions, but I think the southerners in support of secession more or less believed they would win the war (should it come, which wasn't guaranteed).

I also don't think there was a total appreciation for the consequences of defeat: even in hindsight, what would have happened had the north won a decisive victory at the first bull run and marched into Richmond in the summer of 61? An enduring union with slavery intact?

Quote from: alfred russel on July 08, 2019, 11:02:32 AM
I also don't think there was a total appreciation for the consequences of defeat: even in hindsight, what would have happened had the north won a decisive victory at the first bull run and marched into Richmond in the summer of 61? An enduring union with slavery intact?

Even in 61 lots of slaves were already freed. Hard to know.

But even if they had done that I don't think the South would have just given up in 1861, especially against McDowell's small and green army. They couldn't really occupy Virginia or anything like that.

Quote from: Valmy on July 08, 2019, 11:12:08 AM
McDowell's small and green army.

:o  :area52: ?

Let's just say the US Government has been keeping the truth about UFOs from the world for a long time now.

Quote from: Malthus on July 08, 2019, 09:44:58 AM

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on July 05, 2019, 03:55:26 PM
Supporting the confederacy really made no sense for the UK. No matter what happened, the US (North) would still survive and still thrive as growing industrial power.  What is the upside of causing anger and resentment in such a country, where you also happen to share a long an indefensible land border?  The only sensible policy is the one it actually followed: keep open the threat of recognition to keep the North honest without any real sincere intention of following through.  And it worked - Lincoln was careful not to offend Britain and after the war ended, American elites became increasingly Anglophilic over the following decades.

The potential upside of a Confederate win for the UK was real enough - create what would amount to a new state that was both a major supplier of a vital commodity and virtually beholden to the UK; cut a growing potential great power rival down to size before it became a major threat. Sure the North would be angry, but it would hardly be likely to start a war with the UK over that undefended border, having just lost a major civil war.

Of course all of this may not weigh in the balance against the downside - anger the provider of another vital commodity, grain; and of course no guarantee that the South would win, even with overt UK support.

All of which though would be predicated on supporting the South being politically possible - I suspect that could only have been the case if the South gave up slavery, which was impossible for it to do, as that was what it was fighting to preserve.

Agreed with Minsky all the way through on this one.  If the CSA hadn't been totally pro-slavery, the UK could have supported it with significant possible benefits.  But if the CSA hadn't been totally pro-slavery, it would have just stayed in the USA...

Quote from: Berkut on July 05, 2019, 03:34:16 PM
The stupid starts and puts nations on roads that lead inexorably to disaster long before it is so clear that the only possible end is in fact disaster. By the time that Captain fired the mortar at Ft. Sumter, I don't think anyone could have stopped the war.

It was very late, but it could still have been stopped.  It was a catalyst of anti-southern sentiment rising in the North.  Most people wouldn't have fought willingly to keep the South in the Union only for the sake of keeping the South in the Union, but once "they" were attacked, it all changed, imho.  The issue of slavery was the same: most were willing to help the slaves flee and relocate, they were certainly against slavery, but fighting a war just for that?  Not enough volunteers.  But once they declared secession and fired on Fort Sumter, everything changed. There was enough of a momentum to recruit volunteers for a few months, then extend it with a war going on.

Southerners seemed way more eager to fight to keep their independance than the Northerners were willing to fight simply to keep the Union.  I don't think Lincoln could have mustered support to invade the South without the Fort Sumter - or any openly agressive action by the South.

Again, not an expert of the general feelings, just my feeling of the situation.  I could be wrong.

Quote from: viper37 on July 10, 2019, 10:55:00 AM
I don't think Lincoln could have mustered support to invade the South without the Fort Sumter - or any openly agressive action by the South.

I think you're probably correct.  IIRC, Lincoln didn't even call for volunteers until Fort Sumter was fired on.  OTOH, even if Fort Sumter hadn't been fired on, there would have probably been another incident that would have galvanized public opinion in the North, probably sooner rather than later.

Quote from: dps on July 10, 2019, 11:16:54 AM

Quote from: viper37 on July 10, 2019, 10:55:00 AM
I don't think Lincoln could have mustered support to invade the South without the Fort Sumter - or any openly agressive action by the South.

I think you're probably correct.  IIRC, Lincoln didn't even call for volunteers until Fort Sumter was fired on.  OTOH, even if Fort Sumter hadn't been fired on, there would have probably been another incident that would have galvanized public opinion in the North, probably sooner rather than later.

Though arguable, the flip side that rarely gets discussed is the confederacy needed a crisis sooner rather than later. Tennessee, Arkansas, Virginia, and North Carolina only seceded after Lincoln's call for troops. Those states represented half the Confederacy's population and more than half the industrial capacity.

Had the precipitating event not happened for 6 months, that would have given Lincoln time to frustrate secessionists in the slave states that were still with the union. it would have also given the south time to organize, but the south was barely viable as it was constituted--at half the size it certainly was doomed.