Discipline in American Civil War Armies

[alfred russel]

At the risk of posting too much, I'm really not sure what grand strategy the south could have done differently--and expected much better results. I know the idea of defending everywhere is controversial today, but I'm not sure the alternative---should they have announced that certain states would not be defended?

If we start with the premise that the South would try to defend its territory, I can't think of a winning strategy. My take on the war is that the South basically got its ass kicked from the start everywhere except the Eastern Theater. Its supposed biggest victory in the west was Chickamagua, which I'd argue was a phyrric victory if there ever was one.

If that premise is accepted, the south couldn't refocus troops between western theaters because that would just leave other theaters in even worse positions. There weren't excess troops to play with. However, troops could have been diverted from the east, and this was a plan long championed by certain officers (most prominently Longstreet).

I don't see this as an option before the Gettysburg campaign. In 1862 the Peninsula Campaign obviously gravely threatened Richmond, and the South was outnumbered at 2nd Bull Run and very significantly at Fredericksburg (while Antietam was in between, With the size of the union army in the east I doubt it was really feasible to divert a significant portion of the army west). It was after Chancellorsville that this was seen as a real opportunity.

Rather than diverting troops west the south decided to gather the eastern forces in the hopes of forcing a decisive battle in the north at something close to parity. Obviously this worked out disasterously for them, but I think the pertinent point is the south was already collapsing at this point. It was too late to do anything other than swing for the fences. Was it wiser to do that with Lee attacking into Pennsylvania or with Bragg fighting with home field advantage in Tennessee? There are pros and cons; Lee favored Pennsylvania and Davis agreed, but my guess is that they were deciding between losing options.

[Barrister]

At the risk of posting too much, I'm really not sure what grand strategy the south could have done differently--and expected much better results. I know the idea of defending everywhere is controversial today, but I'm not sure the alternative---should they have announced that certain states would not be defended?

This maybe not politically possible, but I think the most likely "winning" strategy would just be to try and trade territory for time.  The South was still a very large place.  Don't attack, but make the Union fight and bleed for every bit of territory they capture.  Force them into a costly occupation.  Recapture any territory after the Union moves on.  Just make it so costly for the Union that they eventually just give up.

[The Minsky Moment]

Northern railways were not inferior to Prussia.

It is wikipedia, but there were almost 29,000 miles in 1860 in the US - a majority of which was in the east and new england.

The british had about 13,500 miles in 1870. I know that britain but i couldn't quickly find germany on google and i wouldn't expect germany to exceed britain by much (if at all) in the era (not to mention the problem that germany wasn't actually unified).

It is as you suspected.

See: http://ghdi.ghi-dc.org/sub_document.cfm?document_id=1744

"Germany" in 1860 had 11,000 km of track of which almost 6000 were in Prussia.  So quite a lot less than the 21,000 miles (34K km) of track in the northern US states alone.

The Union was also able to make very effective use of interior river networks during the war.

[Razgovory]

The South might have had a chance if it was able to convince Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland to join.  That would increased their manpower quite a bit and  give them some much needed industry.  Still...

[Valmy]

The South might have had a chance if it was able to convince Missouri, Kentucky, and Maryland to join.  That would increased their manpower quite a bit and  give them some much needed industry.  Still...

I mean they sort of did convince Missouri and Kentucky to join, they just lacked the military success in those states to make it stick.

[Valmy]

The north certainly wasn't Prussia, but the south certainly wasn't france. As you mention, the south was arming guys with pikes and if you want to attribute a weak political situation to austria...what would you say about the south?

Austria had just barely recovered from a massive political revolution and had Hungarians and Italians ready to revolt at the slightest set back. I don't see anything comparable to the South. That is absurd.

Northern railways were not inferior to Prussia.

It is wikipedia, but there were almost 29,000 miles in 1860 in the US - a majority of which was in the east and new england.

So not very useful in supporting troops in Arkansas, Mississippi, Tennessee then...

In any case I meant the way they used their railroads were mobilized and prepared for military use was superior. That is just a fact. In all of its wars Prussia had its armies fully operational and on the offensive in weeks if not days. The North was not capable of that, not even remotely.

[Malthus]

At the risk of posting too much, I'm really not sure what grand strategy the south could have done differently--and expected much better results. I know the idea of defending everywhere is controversial today, but I'm not sure the alternative---should they have announced that certain states would not be defended?

This maybe not politically possible, but I think the most likely "winning" strategy would just be to try and trade territory for time.  The South was still a very large place.  Don't attack, but make the Union fight and bleed for every bit of territory they capture.  Force them into a costly occupation.  Recapture any territory after the Union moves on.  Just make it so costly for the Union that they eventually just give up.

This was my "second option" above - problem being that it relies on a faltering of will on the part of the North to work, and as time progressed, the North would just get relatively stronger.

[Valmy]

At the risk of posting too much, I'm really not sure what grand strategy the south could have done differently--and expected much better results. I know the idea of defending everywhere is controversial today, but I'm not sure the alternative---should they have announced that certain states would not be defended?

The fact is they lost a series of battles, and massive amounts of territory, in the early stages of the war. They were not seriously outnumbered in those battles, and in at least one case had a large numerical superiority. Things could have easily gone better for them. And, as Raz states they could have had access to many more resources and manpower if they had not suffered those losses so quickly.

I just have a hard time accepting that losing Kentucky, Missouri, half of Arkansas, and half of Tennessee so quickly had zero impact on the course of the war because their defeat was inevitable anyway. I mean suppose Curtis' Army had been destroyed at Pea Ridge and the Confederacy is marching through Missouri and threatening St. Louis in 1862? Think of the recruits they could have attracted and the sorts of military and political pressure that would have put on the North. Instead they blew it and it was the North that was marching on Corinth and the Mississippi valley. Who knows what might have happened otherwise?

[PDH]

Van Dorn for the win! Huzzah!

[Habbaku]

Died with his boot on!

[alfred russel]

This maybe not politically possible, but I think the most likely "winning" strategy would just be to try and trade territory for time.  The South was still a very large place.  Don't attack, but make the Union fight and bleed for every bit of territory they capture.  Force them into a costly occupation.  Recapture any territory after the Union moves on.  Just make it so costly for the Union that they eventually just give up.

First the Mississippi River could be accessed by warship and only the North had a real Navy. The North was not ignorant of this and thus quickly moved to cut the confederacy in two by controlling the Mississippi. The vast territory west of the Mississippi became more or less irrelevant.

The second problem is that the most significant territories were often on the border. The largest city was New Orleans which was exposed to naval attack (and actually was captured early in 1862). The most significant state in terms of population and industry was Virginia, which was obviously on the border. Richmond was not only the political capital but also the the only portion of the Confederacy with any significant industry.

The third consideration--and I think that this is a crucial one--is that the North didn't need to conquer and occupy the South to topple the house of cards that was the southern economy. You have to keep in mind that the South had a population of about 9 million and of that almost 4 million were slaves waiting to be emancipated, and the South was trying to fight an industrialized war with an agrarian economy and just rudiments of industrialization. Sherman didn't conquer and occupy territory on his march to the sea. He started by abandoning Atlanta (and burning it on the way out). He destroyed the railroads, the cotton gins, freed the slaves, and had his army live off the land rather than supply lines. In the end, even though Lee's army in Virginia had dwindled to 30k, the country could no longer support it, and i've read estimates that soldiers were being fed about 1000 calories a day. The Union had a joke that the Confederacy had a new general: General Starvation. Lee proposed at one point evacuating all non essential civilians from the Richmond area to get more food to his army.

At the very least, once the North issued the Emancipation Proclamation, it wasn't enough to keep the North from controlling Southern territory--they needed to prevent Northern access to it. Which is a far more difficult proposition.

[The Brain]

A more interesting what-if I think is East vs West. The West has hardy frontiersmen and ornery 49ers, the East has enormous population and industry but is fiercely divided over slavery.

[dps]

At the risk of posting too much, I'm really not sure what grand strategy the south could have done differently--and expected much better results. I know the idea of defending everywhere is controversial today, but I'm not sure the alternative---should they have announced that certain states would not be defended?

This maybe not politically possible, but I think the most likely "winning" strategy would just be to try and trade territory for time.  The South was still a very large place.  Don't attack, but make the Union fight and bleed for every bit of territory they capture.  Force them into a costly occupation.  Recapture any territory after the Union moves on.  Just make it so costly for the Union that they eventually just give up.

If the Confederacy had defended New Orleans and Nashville as tenaciously as they defended Richmond, and it had cost the Union as much to take those cities as the Petersburg campaign cost them, I suspect that there would have been a real danger of Lincoln being defeated by a peace candidate in 1864.

A tenacious defense of Nashville would have been a tough proposition, and I'm not sure that it could have been done, but there's no good reason for letting New Orleans fall as easily as it did.

[Admiral Yi]

The one thing you wanted to do in Victory Games ACW (best strategic simulation of ACW ever) as the Confederate side was hold New Orleans.

[Eddie Teach]

A more interesting what-if I think is East vs West. The West has hardy frontiersmen and ornery 49ers, the East has enormous population and industry but is fiercely divided over slavery.

That requires a lot of alt history backstory. There's no plausible scenario for that historically.