Discipline in American Civil War Armies

[grumbler]

The Civil War and the Japanese jumping into WW2 strike me the exact same way the more I learned about the details behind the economics involved.

WTF were they thinking?

Which them leads me to a very sobering conclusion: Countries, nations, people - they go to war, even *existential* war for often ridiculous reasons that don't make any rational sense.

Someone above asked me if I would rationally fire on Ft. Sumter. Hell no. It was stupid, but that kind of misses the point. The stupid came long before Sumter, just like the Japanese stupid came long before Pearl Harbor.

The stupid starts and puts nations on roads that lead inexorably to disaster long before it is so clear that the only possible end is in fact disaster. By the time that Captain fired the mortar at Ft. Sumter, I don't think anyone could have stopped the war.

Just like by the time the decision was made to attack the US fleet, anyone on the Japanese side could have stopped the war, or chosen some other course. The moment for those decisions had come and gone, and almost certainly at a time when there was no appreciation for what it meant.

The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The Northern states were growing far faster in populace and economic might than Southern states, in large part because the Southern aristocracy didn't WANT the South to have more people and an industrial bourgeoisie.   The landed aristocracy wanted to keep running things themselves.   Wealth generation in the South was dominated by slave owners, and the high price of slaves meant that the only practical way to become a planter was to inherit the slaves needed to run a plantation.  Industrialization opened the door to the creation of an upper class which consisted of people with new money.  The landed elites provided a huge percentage of the educated classes as well, but their kids would, if industrialization took hold, have to compete with kids from the industrial elites, and they didn't like that at all.  The only way to avoid that was to leave the Union so they could control themselves how and where industrialization occurred, and by whom.

The Japanese saw a similar dim future for themselves.  They reckoned that they stood a reasonable chance of matching the US in a war at sea when the total fleets were on a ration of 10:7 USN:IJN.  The US could have built their fleet to the treaty level of 10:6, but, until WW2 started, did not.  When WW2 started, the US expanded its fleet to the treaty limit, which was bad for Japan.  Worse, the fall of France led the US to decide to double their fleet, which the Japanese couldn't hope to come close to matching.  The Japanese were looking at a 1945 situation where fleet ratios would be about 21:8; i.e. hopeless.  That would be as devastating to the Japanese elites as industrialization was for the US Southern elites, because the "disappointment" among the lower-level Japanese officers would lead to another round of "2-26 Incident"-type round of assassinations and forced retirements.

The elites of both the would-be CSA and Japanese Empire realized that they had to fight soon or never.  Now, one could argue that either would have been better-off starting the war even sooner, but they weren't at the crisis point sooner.  They both started their wars at about the last point where they had any hope of winning at all.  It wasn't much hope, and Binky is on the Side of the Big Battalions, so it turned out to be a disaster for both, but in both countries the elites were willing to sacrifice a lot of their masses in even the hope of remaining on top when the war was over.

[alfred russel]

The Civil War and the Japanese jumping into WW2 strike me the exact same way the more I learned about the details behind the economics involved.

WTF were they thinking?

Which them leads me to a very sobering conclusion: Countries, nations, people - they go to war, even *existential* war for often ridiculous reasons that don't make any rational sense.

Someone above asked me if I would rationally fire on Ft. Sumter. Hell no. It was stupid, but that kind of misses the point. The stupid came long before Sumter, just like the Japanese stupid came long before Pearl Harbor.

The stupid starts and puts nations on roads that lead inexorably to disaster long before it is so clear that the only possible end is in fact disaster. By the time that Captain fired the mortar at Ft. Sumter, I don't think anyone could have stopped the war.

Just like by the time the decision was made to attack the US fleet, anyone on the Japanese side could have stopped the war, or chosen some other course. The moment for those decisions had come and gone, and almost certainly at a time when there was no appreciation for what it meant.

You people of the South don't know what you are doing. This country will be drenched in blood, and God only knows how it will end. It is all folly, madness, a crime against civilization! You people speak so lightly of war; you don't know what you're talking about. War is a terrible thing! You mistake, too, the people of the North. They are a peaceable people but an earnest people, and they will fight, too. They are not going to let this country be destroyed without a mighty effort to save it... Besides, where are your men and appliances of war to contend against them? The North can make a steam engine, locomotive, or railway car; hardly a yard of cloth or pair of shoes can you make. You are rushing into war with one of the most powerful, ingeniously mechanical, and determined people on Earth—right at your doors. You are bound to fail. Only in your spirit and determination are you prepared for war. In all else you are totally unprepared, with a bad cause to start with. At first you will make headway, but as your limited resources begin to fail, shut out from the markets of Europe as you will be, your cause will begin to wane. If your people will but stop and think, they must see in the end that you will surely fail.

That said, I'm not sure. I don't think the people on either side were willing to go through the hardships of the war, had they understood what they were getting into. I think both sides were led by hardliners. The south could look at the north and think they wouldn't be so determined--absent the emancipation proclamation - which wasn't issued until well over a year after the war started and was probably politically impossible when the south left - i'm not really sure the purpose of the war justified a grueling war of attrition.

For whatever it is worth, european observers didn't see the southern cause as hopeless.

[dps]

Or the current US president?

It would take more than the threat of war with the UK to keep Trump honest.  For one thing, he would have to become honest first.

[The Minsky Moment]

The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The difference is that the South's position really was hopeless, even if the elites committed to change and industrialization, they were still going to lag behind the North for generations given the realities of geography, climate, infrastructure, and education.

Japan on the other hand had another path - while they couldn't establish primacy in the Pacific or seize control of resources, they could accommodate themselves to a US-led trading system.  We know this could have worked because it is what Japan was forced to accept by default postwar, with the result that the country succeeded well beyond its most optimistic prewar hopes.  Unlike the South, Japan as a nation was not dysfunctional, just its politics and civil-military relations.

[Oexmelin]

The South's position was hopeless in a world that was to be dominated by the North. As always, the gamble was to change that future before that future could be one that doomed them.

[Razgovory]

The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The difference is that the South's position really was hopeless, even if the elites committed to change and industrialization, they were still going to lag behind the North for generations given the realities of geography, climate, infrastructure, and education.

Japan on the other hand had another path - while they couldn't establish primacy in the Pacific or seize control of resources, they could accommodate themselves to a US-led trading system.  We know this could have worked because it is what Japan was forced to accept by default postwar, with the result that the country succeeded well beyond its most optimistic prewar hopes.  Unlike the South, Japan as a nation was not dysfunctional, just its politics and civil-military relations.

You are mistaking what is good for Japan with what is good for the people running Japan.  Japan could and did eventually prosper under a peaceful US-led treaty system, but that means the militarists in Japan would be sidelined and the military gains they made would eventually be lost.  The South is the same way,  the South prospers today, prosperity that could not exist under the old system.  The downside is that the people running the South in 1860 would lose their political power to the  "greasy mechanics".

In the case of both Japan and the South the elites were willing to sacrifice large numbers of people in a quixotic effort to keep themselves in power. 

[jimmy olsen]

You are mistaking what is good for Japan with what is good for the people running Japan.  Japan could and did eventually prosper under a peaceful US-led treaty system, but that means the militarists in Japan would be sidelined and the military gains they made would eventually be lost. 

Without a war with America I don't see that as definitely being true. I think they certainly would have been able to hold onto Taiwan and the southern half of Sakhalin.
Maybe Korea as well, there were a lot of collaborators in the upper and middle classes.

[Sophie Scholl]

The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The Northern states were growing far faster in populace and economic might than Southern states, in large part because the Southern aristocracy didn't WANT the South to have more people and an industrial bourgeoisie.   The landed aristocracy wanted to keep running things themselves.   Wealth generation in the South was dominated by slave owners, and the high price of slaves meant that the only practical way to become a planter was to inherit the slaves needed to run a plantation.  Industrialization opened the door to the creation of an upper class which consisted of people with new money.  The landed elites provided a huge percentage of the educated classes as well, but their kids would, if industrialization took hold, have to compete with kids from the industrial elites, and they didn't like that at all.  The only way to avoid that was to leave the Union so they could control themselves how and where industrialization occurred, and by whom.

The Japanese saw a similar dim future for themselves.  They reckoned that they stood a reasonable chance of matching the US in a war at sea when the total fleets were on a ration of 10:7 USN:IJN.  The US could have built their fleet to the treaty level of 10:6, but, until WW2 started, did not.  When WW2 started, the US expanded its fleet to the treaty limit, which was bad for Japan.  Worse, the fall of France led the US to decide to double their fleet, which the Japanese couldn't hope to come close to matching.  The Japanese were looking at a 1945 situation where fleet ratios would be about 21:8; i.e. hopeless.  That would be as devastating to the Japanese elites as industrialization was for the US Southern elites, because the "disappointment" among the lower-level Japanese officers would lead to another round of "2-26 Incident"-type round of assassinations and forced retirements.

The elites of both the would-be CSA and Japanese Empire realized that they had to fight soon or never.  Now, one could argue that either would have been better-off starting the war even sooner, but they weren't at the crisis point sooner.  They both started their wars at about the last point where they had any hope of winning at all.  It wasn't much hope, and Binky is on the Side of the Big Battalions, so it turned out to be a disaster for both, but in both countries the elites were willing to sacrifice a lot of their masses in even the hope of remaining on top when the war was over.

  Very nice breakdown, sir.

[The Minsky Moment]

The South's position was hopeless in a world that was to be dominated by the North. As always, the gamble was to change that future before that future could be one that doomed them.

Two generations of chronic underinvestment in human and physical capital; two generations of mobilizing an entire society around a repressive and archaic means of economic exploitation could not be simply unwound on any reasonable time scale no matter what gambles Southern leadership made.  There was no scenario where the North would simply disappear. If by some miracle, the South achieved political independence, it would not reverse - and in fact might well exacerbate - economic dependence.

The latter half of the 19th century was going to be a series of lost decades for the South no matter what.  Committing to Jim Crow meant prolonging the matter a few additional generations beyond that.

[Malthus]

Supporting the confederacy really made no sense for the UK. No matter what happened, the US (North) would still survive and still thrive as growing industrial power.  What is the upside of causing anger and resentment in such a country, where you also happen to share a long an indefensible land border?  The only sensible policy is the one it actually followed: keep open the threat of recognition to keep the North honest without any real sincere intention of following through.  And it worked - Lincoln was careful not to offend Britain and after the war ended, American elites became increasingly Anglophilic over the following decades.

The potential upside of a Confederate win for the UK was real enough - create what would amount to a new state that was both a major supplier of a vital commodity and virtually beholden to the UK; cut a growing potential great power rival down to size before it became a major threat. Sure the North would be angry, but it would hardly be likely to start a war with the UK over that undefended border, having just lost a major civil war.

Of course all of this may not weigh in the balance against the downside - anger the provider of another vital commodity, grain; and of course no guarantee that the South would win, even with overt UK support.

All of which though would be predicated on supporting the South being politically possible - I suspect that could only have been the case if the South gave up slavery, which was impossible for it to do, as that was what it was fighting to preserve. 

[Malthus]

The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The difference is that the South's position really was hopeless, even if the elites committed to change and industrialization, they were still going to lag behind the North for generations given the realities of geography, climate, infrastructure, and education.

Japan on the other hand had another path - while they couldn't establish primacy in the Pacific or seize control of resources, they could accommodate themselves to a US-led trading system.  We know this could have worked because it is what Japan was forced to accept by default postwar, with the result that the country succeeded well beyond its most optimistic prewar hopes.  Unlike the South, Japan as a nation was not dysfunctional, just its politics and civil-military relations.

You are mistaking what is good for Japan with what is good for the people running Japan.  Japan could and did eventually prosper under a peaceful US-led treaty system, but that means the militarists in Japan would be sidelined and the military gains they made would eventually be lost.  The South is the same way,  the South prospers today, prosperity that could not exist under the old system.  The downside is that the people running the South in 1860 would lose their political power to the  "greasy mechanics".

In the case of both Japan and the South the elites were willing to sacrifice large numbers of people in a quixotic effort to keep themselves in power.

The Japanese trap had a more personal element to it - members of the military and political elites not seen as militant enough were likely going to be assassinated by "double patriot" junior officers or forced out of office.

Even if they wanted to, they could not avoid war, because any sensible compromising was personally impossible - the persons responsible for the compromise would be killed or replaced, and the new leaders would be those against any compromise.

[alfred russel]

The situations were similar in that both the would-be Confederacy and Imperial Japan started a war that they didn't believe that they would probably win, because the alternative was to wait until they were irrelevant. 

The Northern states were growing far faster in populace and economic might than Southern states, in large part because the Southern aristocracy didn't WANT the South to have more people and an industrial bourgeoisie.   The landed aristocracy wanted to keep running things themselves.   Wealth generation in the South was dominated by slave owners, and the high price of slaves meant that the only practical way to become a planter was to inherit the slaves needed to run a plantation.  Industrialization opened the door to the creation of an upper class which consisted of people with new money.  The landed elites provided a huge percentage of the educated classes as well, but their kids would, if industrialization took hold, have to compete with kids from the industrial elites, and they didn't like that at all.  The only way to avoid that was to leave the Union so they could control themselves how and where industrialization occurred, and by whom.

The Japanese saw a similar dim future for themselves.  They reckoned that they stood a reasonable chance of matching the US in a war at sea when the total fleets were on a ration of 10:7 USN:IJN.  The US could have built their fleet to the treaty level of 10:6, but, until WW2 started, did not.  When WW2 started, the US expanded its fleet to the treaty limit, which was bad for Japan.  Worse, the fall of France led the US to decide to double their fleet, which the Japanese couldn't hope to come close to matching.  The Japanese were looking at a 1945 situation where fleet ratios would be about 21:8; i.e. hopeless.  That would be as devastating to the Japanese elites as industrialization was for the US Southern elites, because the "disappointment" among the lower-level Japanese officers would lead to another round of "2-26 Incident"-type round of assassinations and forced retirements.

The elites of both the would-be CSA and Japanese Empire realized that they had to fight soon or never.  Now, one could argue that either would have been better-off starting the war even sooner, but they weren't at the crisis point sooner.  They both started their wars at about the last point where they had any hope of winning at all.  It wasn't much hope, and Binky is on the Side of the Big Battalions, so it turned out to be a disaster for both, but in both countries the elites were willing to sacrifice a lot of their masses in even the hope of remaining on top when the war was over.

  Very nice breakdown, sir.

I don't think this is really correct though. There were of course exceptions, but I think the southerners in support of secession more or less believed they would win the war (should it come, which wasn't guaranteed).

I also don't think there was a total appreciation for the consequences of defeat: even in hindsight, what would have happened had the north won a decisive victory at the first bull run and marched into Richmond in the summer of 61? An enduring union with slavery intact?

[Valmy]

I also don't think there was a total appreciation for the consequences of defeat: even in hindsight, what would have happened had the north won a decisive victory at the first bull run and marched into Richmond in the summer of 61? An enduring union with slavery intact?

Even in 61 lots of slaves were already freed. Hard to know.

But even if they had done that I don't think the South would have just given up in 1861, especially against McDowell's small and green army. They couldn't really occupy Virginia or anything like that.

[The Brain]

McDowell's small and green army.

  ?

[Valmy]

Let's just say the US Government has been keeping the truth about UFOs from the world for a long time now.