Discipline in American Civil War Armies

[Valmy]

There was an emancipation movement in the South--as a means to secure victory (not as a social justice issue). As early as the summer of 1861 General Ewell (a future confederate corps commander) told Jefferson Davis that the outcome of the war was very much in doubt and the slaves should be freed and armed. That was a fringe opinion at the time, but it wasn't by the war's conclusion (freed slaves were beginning training when the war ended--though a number of generals favored a more universal emancipation, the confederate congress only authorized slaves voluntarily freed to be eligible to serve).

The slaves were freed and armed...by the North.

And I guess I should point out that the mixed race troops Louisiana raised (because that had that wacky cast system) switched sides. Did the southerners calling for the slaves to be freed and armed think this through? They spent decades fretting about slave uprisings and they thought this population could be reliable in their war? I mean we all know General Ewell was a bad general but this almost makes me think he was a double agent of some sort.

[derspiess]

I think what is underestimated is the impact that the war had on southern opinion. Secession was a controversial topic, but support for independence gained quite significant support with invasion.

Agree.  Pushed a lot of them off the fence. 

[Valmy]

I think what is underestimated is the impact that the war had on southern opinion. Secession was a controversial topic, but support for independence gained quite significant support with invasion.

Agree.  Pushed a lot of them off the fence. 

Yeah and the ones that came down on the other side became even more radical in their Unionism. But that is what a crisis does.

[OttoVonBismarck]

By the time the South started arming slaves they were basically beaten, was pure desperation.

[alfred russel]

The slaves were freed and armed...by the North.

And I guess I should point out that the mixed race troops Louisiana raised (because that had that wacky cast system) switched sides. Did the southerners calling for the slaves to be freed and armed think this through? They spent decades fretting about slave uprisings and they thought this population could be reliable in their war? I mean we all know General Ewell was a bad general but this almost makes me think he was a double agent of some sort.

It is a long ass letter, but there was a well thought out proposal put on paper in January 1864.

https://www.battlefields.org/learn/primary-sources/patrick-cleburnes-proposal-arm-slaves

Presumably freed slaves wouldn't rebel as they were already free, and would be predisposed to the south because they were actually from the south, and in any event would be less inclined to assist the union effort.

[Oexmelin]

Did the southerners calling for the slaves to be freed and armed think this through? They spent decades fretting about slave uprisings and they thought this population could be reliable in their war? I mean we all know General Ewell was a bad general but this almost makes me think he was a double agent of some sort.

This happened in Haiti, in Martinique, in Guadeloupe: over and over again, slavers give weapons to slaves in the hopes that they will rise up to defend their beloved masters... Racist thinking means you never can fully believe that enslaved people can have the leadership necessary to win wars.

[viper37]

if the Confederacy gave up slavery, it had little reason to rebel.

States' rights.
   

[Malthus]

if the Confederacy gave up slavery, it had little reason to rebel.

States' rights.
   

Heh. The only "right" that appeared to matter was the right ... to choose slavery. But by your emojis, I guess you know that. 

[Malthus]

I think what is underestimated is the impact that the war had on southern opinion. Secession was a controversial topic, but support for independence gained quite significant support with invasion.

Certainly the war, as all wars do, gained a momentum of its own once it started.

The proposals by the South to free or arm slaves were all acts of desperation in response to the knowledge that unless the North chose to end the war unilaterally, the South was doomed to defeat; by the time any of these proposals were debated seriously, any hope that English intervention would save the South was basically lost - as the English were unlikely to join the visibly losing side.

What the South needed to do to win, or at least force some sort of negotiated settlement (which would have been a win), was get rid of slavery early, when a military victory still looked possible, and obtain English support then.

The South overestimated the immediacy of the economic impact of cotton on England, hoping self-interest would draw them into the war on their side; instead it drew them to ... looking for alternate suppliers; and to stockpiling cotton before the war even started. The South got lots of aid from blockade-running cotton, but not a pledge of military support. 

[mongers]

Damn it you guys, you're making a ACW thread rather interesting reading.     

[Berkut]

OK, so one thing that I keep forgetting to mention that annoys me.

The idea that the South could fight a war of attrition and "waiting out" ala Washington and the Revolutionary War.

Like, to say that you have to really not know very much about the Revolutionary War. That worked because the Brits weren't all that interested in the war to begin with - and it showed by how many men they were willing to send across the ocean to fight it - all told? About 50,000. Total. And nearly half of those were "local" loyalists. The entire British Army at the start of the war was only 40,000 men. The entire British Army in the field at the peak of the Revolutionary War was smaller than either side had at Gettysburg. At any one time, the British Army in the colonies had about 20-25,000 men in the field.

It was impossible for the Brits to "occupy" the colonies, and they never tried. They could move about and beat up anyone who stood up to them, but they could never possibly pacify the colonies because they never had anywhere near enough men to do so.

The Union Army ended up around 2.2 million men. It actually could in fact occupy the South, at least in the practical sense that they could take all the important communication lines and junctions and ports. The Union literally put more than 100 times the number of men into the fight than the British could ever manage at a time.

[Valmy]

The British sent their forces in assuming that it was just a minority of fanatics and that the majority of the colonial population was loyal. Sometimes the North had a similar fantasy, that once the Confederate Army was driven off thousands of Unionists would come out of the woodwork.

I mean lots of Loyalists and Unionists did come and join up with the British and the Union Army but never on the scale that was hoped and dreamed for. Fortunately for the Union, they were not counting on it like the British were.

[alfred russel]

Certainly the war, as all wars do, gained a momentum of its own once it started.

The proposals by the South to free or arm slaves were all acts of desperation in response to the knowledge that unless the North chose to end the war unilaterally, the South was doomed to defeat; by the time any of these proposals were debated seriously, any hope that English intervention would save the South was basically lost - as the English were unlikely to join the visibly losing side.

What the South needed to do to win, or at least force some sort of negotiated settlement (which would have been a win), was get rid of slavery early, when a military victory still looked possible, and obtain English support then.

The South overestimated the immediacy of the economic impact of cotton on England, hoping self-interest would draw them into the war on their side; instead it drew them to ... looking for alternate suppliers; and to stockpiling cotton before the war even started. The South got lots of aid from blockade-running cotton, but not a pledge of military support.

Agreed--though obviously the internal case for an abolition of slavery was very weak if the south thought it would win. However, that they would free slaves at war's end was more than idle speculation--it was discussed in the confederate military, it was discussed in southern newspapers, and the government was making moves in this direction. Sherman was apparently rather concerned about this, and while Freemantle (the british observer that appeared in Gettysburg and is ridiculed for predicting confederate victory in 1864) thought the south would win because he assumed that when push came to shove they would free the slaves and that the slaves would fight.

It is incredibly irrational from the outside that they didn't do this. Certainly in 1864-1865 there was a desire for independence, and in hindsight it is obvious that the south was about to lose and that would result in slavery ending and no independence. If slavery was going to end anyway, why not at least try to win? That perspective is even more clear for senior confederate leaders: sure they were generally significant slaveowners and would lose their slaves (not that slaves were worth anything by war's end--the price of slaves plummeted to almost nothing), but if the south got independence they would also be the leadership of a new country. If they lost, they could be hanged.

I think there were two factors:

1) In the years before the war the politics of the south was overwhelmed with legalism. They were very self conscious of being a minority region within the US government. As an example of this, Jefferson Davis was a military man--went to west point--and became a colonel in the Mexican American War. After the war, the president offered to make him a general with command of a militia brigade. Davis refused, because of his opinion that the president didn't have the authority to appoint an officer of a militia unit--that was reserved to the states. Fast forward to the civil war, and the CSA had a constitution that protected slavery. Slaves couldn't be legally freed without a constitutional amendment, and that couldn't be practically passed (both because there wasn't time and it couldn't be debated freely--you can't have all the political establishment openly acknowledge that they are losing the war and hope to keep up morale). I think that many outside observers thought the poltical leadership of the south would just cut through the legalism and as a wartime expedient begin freeing slaves willing to fight, but obviously that didn't happen.

2) I don't think that many recognized how dire the situation was. By war's end, there were papers advocating emancipating slaves that would fight. Others argued the situation wasn't that dire. I'm not sure the government even understood. In February 1865, just 3 months before the end of the war, there was a peace conference that offered the south some concessions, and the south walked away.

[Berkut]

It's not like freeing the slaves would have saved them by 1864 or 65 anyway.

And the assumption that the slaves would actually fight for their former masters in large enough numbers and with any significant ability is...well, kinda laughable.

[The Brain]

I have an ACW question and I thought I'd hijack this thread: I assume the Confederacy was at war during the ACW era, but was the Union at war?