Discipline in American Civil War Armies

[alfred russel]

That would be very advantageous.

Advantageous in terms of more successful than normal. But the Maryland Campaign was an elective attack of Lee. From an attritional point of view, was 2:1 enough for the South?

Edit: Yeah they were all paroled, 12,000 of them. Many of those garrison troops from Harper's Ferry would have eventually returned to service.

But exchanged for Southerners. Which was probably more valuable for the South than actual Northern casualties.

[The Minsky Moment]

One of the more remarkable things about the US civil war is that junior officers were set up to command entire armies.  Grant retired from the army as a captain,  So did Sherman.  Custer went for 2nd LT to Major General in only a few years.  I think the only man in the entire hemisphere who had commanded more than 20,000 men in battle was Winfield Scott. 

Same was probably true for the US army in WW1.  The commander of the US 1st division had been an aide in the Spanish-American war, the commander of the 1st Brigade had led a cavalry regiment in that war.  And it's not like fighting Spanish soldiers in Cuba in the 1890s necessarily prepared one to right the c1918 German army in France. Even Pershing didn't have a lot meaningful large-scale command experience beyond the punitive expedition in Mexico - again, hardly ideal preparation for commanding up to 1 million men on the  Western Front.

As a general matter, I don't think it's true that the most successful generals in a given war are always the ones with the most command experience entering into the war.  Anecdotally it seems a case could be made for the opposite.

[derspiess]

Advantageous in terms of more successful than normal. But the Maryland Campaign was an elective attack of Lee. From an attritional point of view, was 2:1 enough for the South?

But to continue on that line of thinking, was any realistic ratio enough for the South, given their extreme disadvantage in numbers?  I think their only hope was to continue scoring victories that would continue to demoralize the North.  A victory for Lee in Maryland would have certainly been demoralizing.

[derspiess]

As a general matter, I don't think it's true that the most successful generals in a given war are always the ones with the most command experience entering into the war.  Anecdotally it seems a case could be made for the opposite.

Also, it's not as if junior officers didn't receive instruction as to how to command larger scale units.  It's what many of them were being groomed for.

[Malthus]

One of the more remarkable things about the US civil war is that junior officers were set up to command entire armies.  Grant retired from the army as a captain,  So did Sherman.  Custer went for 2nd LT to Major General in only a few years.  I think the only man in the entire hemisphere who had commanded more than 20,000 men in battle was Winfield Scott. 

Same was probably true for the US army in WW1.  The commander of the US 1st division had been an aide in the Spanish-American war, the commander of the 1st Brigade had led a cavalry regiment in that war.  And it's not like fighting Spanish soldiers in Cuba in the 1890s necessarily prepared one to right the c1918 German army in France. Even Pershing didn't have a lot meaningful large-scale command experience beyond the punitive expedition in Mexico - again, hardly ideal preparation for commanding up to 1 million men on the  Western Front.

As a general matter, I don't think it's true that the most successful generals in a given war are always the ones with the most command experience entering into the war.  Anecdotally it seems a case could be made for the opposite.

It's a commonly recurring problem that the skills necessary to advance up the ladder of promotion in peacetime are not necessarily the same skills necessary to win battles in war; also, that many generals do not age well - could have been great as young men, not so great as old duffers facing radically changed circumstances.

But how to select young men of command ability, without some sort of "Ender's Game"-like process? 

[alfred russel]

But to continue on that line of thinking, was any realistic ratio enough for the South, given their extreme disadvantage in numbers?  I think their only hope was to continue scoring victories that would continue to demoralize the North.  A victory for Lee in Maryland would have certainly been demoralizing.

They were probably outnumbered something like 2.5:1. so from an attritional point of view I think that is the breakeven line--2:1 in the Maryland campaign was reasonably close. Though the south probably needed a bigger number than that since it more fully mobilized.

There were probably 3 scenarios that theoretically could have resulted in a victory for the South:
1) ring up a massive number of victories (and body count) to demoralize the north,
2) win a massive victory to demoralize the north (such as destroying the army of the Potomac),
3) remaining viable into 1865 with Lincoln losing the election

Attrition was never going to work. The Maryland Campaign really didn't contribute to any of these.

Lee obviously wanted to win through #2.

[Valmy]

One of the advantages the South had, really what could have been its decisive advantage, was its vast size and the fact its infrastructure was all pointed seawards. It was a pretty difficult area to invade. The South needed to aggressively raid nearby northern territory and hold strong points and threaten supply lines. They had a series of costly failures in 1861 and 1862 in the west that hindered their ability to do those things. I think if they had not lost so badly in Missouri and Kentucky and on the Mississippi early on they might have had a pretty good chance of winning. But who knows?

Early on the southern strategy was defensive and passive (granted they had an army to train and organize so that was mostly by necessity) and they stretched their armies out in a thin line to guard the border, which was absolutely not what they should have done and it cost them.

[derspiess]

But to continue on that line of thinking, was any realistic ratio enough for the South, given their extreme disadvantage in numbers?  I think their only hope was to continue scoring victories that would continue to demoralize the North.  A victory for Lee in Maryland would have certainly been demoralizing.

They were probably outnumbered something like 2.5:1. so from an attritional point of view I think that is the breakeven line--2:1 in the Maryland campaign was reasonably close. Though the south probably needed a bigger number than that since it more fully mobilized.

There were probably 3 scenarios that theoretically could have resulted in a victory for the South:
1) ring up a massive number of victories (and body count) to demoralize the north,
2) win a massive victory to demoralize the north (such as destroying the army of the Potomac),
3) remaining viable into 1865 with Lincoln losing the election

Attrition was never going to work. The Maryland Campaign really didn't contribute to any of these.

Lee obviously wanted to win through #2.

Agree.  I do think that a Maryland Campaign could have worked for Lee, just not the way he planned it.

[Razgovory]

One of the more remarkable things about the US civil war is that junior officers were set up to command entire armies.  Grant retired from the army as a captain,  So did Sherman.  Custer went for 2nd LT to Major General in only a few years.  I think the only man in the entire hemisphere who had commanded more than 20,000 men in battle was Winfield Scott. 

Same was probably true for the US army in WW1.  The commander of the US 1st division had been an aide in the Spanish-American war, the commander of the 1st Brigade had led a cavalry regiment in that war.  And it's not like fighting Spanish soldiers in Cuba in the 1890s necessarily prepared one to right the c1918 German army in France. Even Pershing didn't have a lot meaningful large-scale command experience beyond the punitive expedition in Mexico - again, hardly ideal preparation for commanding up to 1 million men on the  Western Front.

As a general matter, I don't think it's true that the most successful generals in a given war are always the ones with the most command experience entering into the war.  Anecdotally it seems a case could be made for the opposite.

The US army didn't preform that well in WW1 either...

[Josquius]

Interesting stuff.

Not getting the bayonet tossing though. A way of making it so their commanders couldn't order bayonet charges?

[Threviel]

Did Johnston have the right idea with his fabianish defence against Sherman?

[Valmy]

Did Johnston have the right idea with his fabianish defence against Sherman?

Yes, though it needed to be complemented by raids and attacks on Sherman's rear areas and supply lines. Granted that was not really an option for Johnson in those circumstances. I think he did the best he could with what he had.

The Confederacy needed an active defense, I think.

But that is just, like, my opinion man. I am no military expert.

[mongers]

I got the impression that parliamentary forces were relatively undisciplined until Cromwell professionalised his NMA and that influence spread. 

[Valmy]

Interesting stuff.

Not getting the bayonet tossing though. A way of making it so their commanders couldn't order bayonet charges?

Supposedly there was a pattern where soldiers who were making a bayonet attack tended to stop short and just start firing into the opposing force at point blank range. For whatever reason (psychology?) they very rarely managed to actually get into that sort of contact.

Early in the war Texas had a force of lancers, complete with little Texas flags on their lances. When they were ordered to charge the enemy they did something similar, coming very close to the Union line but ultimately stopping short and falling back (because, being lancers, they had no guns).

The soldiers had almost suicidal bravery when it came to fire fights but for whatever reason they had a hard time applying shock tactics.

[Threviel]

The argument from my latest book was that Lee, however well he fought his battles, was not going to get a positive casualty ratio enough to win the war. Even his greatest victories weakened the Confederacy more than the Union. Sure, he might do it with a huge victory ending with the destruction of the army of the Potomac, but that was realistically not going to happen.

A defence based on making the Union assault prepared defences while their rear was harassed would have been optimal, but that's not what the Confederacy did.