Postmodernism is destroying our brains, culture and civilization

[CountDeMoney]

Then I guess you wouldn't be interested in my piece, Fidel Castro: Bogart in a Blocked Cap...

[The Minsky Moment]

Can you give an example or fifteen of shoddy papers that have impacted policy Joan?

Jude Winniski's paper in 1978 setting forth Laffer curve; picked up and adopted by Reagan's team to give us "voodoo economics" and the 1980s deficits.

I hate to single out the Reinhart-Rogoff debt paper, because I greatly respect both economists and they usually do good work.  However, that particular paper was not their best work and unfortunately incorporated data compilation errors.  It was used and cited as a basis for the pro-austerity side during the sequester debacle.

Milton Friedman's unfortunate k% monetary growth rule is another example; the Thatcher government plunged the UK into recession by trying to follow it before giving up and righting course.

It's true however for the most part the shoddy papers are done by lower rep economists without a clear direct impact on policy.  But  of crappy work does get recycled by the more dubious thinks tanks out there for policy positions - the Winniski piece was in that vein.

[The Minsky Moment]

Oh and then there is the Alesina Ardagna paper on "expansionary austerity" that was debuked by the IMF.

[Sheilbh]

Postmodernism has been great for the arts. I'm fine with it.

Postmodern architecture needs to be burned to the ground and the earth salted.

Agreed on the rest.

We're way past post-modernism now anyway.

[MadImmortalMan]

I hate to single out the Reinhart-Rogoff debt paper, because I greatly respect both economists and they usually do good work.  However, that particular paper was not their best work and unfortunately incorporated data compilation errors.  It was used and cited as a basis for the pro-austerity side during the sequester debacle.

Even though that paper itself suggested no policy.

[The Minsky Moment]

I hate to single out the Reinhart-Rogoff debt paper, because I greatly respect both economists and they usually do good work.  However, that particular paper was not their best work and unfortunately incorporated data compilation errors.  It was used and cited as a basis for the pro-austerity side during the sequester debacle.

Even though that paper itself suggested no policy.

Correct, I still stand by my characterization.

[Admiral Yi]

Did the Wanninski paper specify the point on the Laffer curve the US was pre-Reagan?  There's nothing wrong with the basic logic of the Laffer curve.

I had never heard of the Reinhart-Rogoff paper until Jake linked it here to further the argument that austerity wasn't needed.

Did the Thatcher recession kill inflation?

[MadImmortalMan]

I had never heard of the Reinhart-Rogoff paper until Jake linked it here to further the argument that austerity wasn't needed.

The product itself was just a big data dump. Yes, lots of people later used that data to try to justify stupid policy, but that can hardly be the fault of the data. Maybe Joan would rather have that data go unpublished, but when he says its not good work, it's pretty much just a reaction to the subsequent ill usage of it. There isn't really any value judgement to be made about a work that is simply a recitation of facts.

[Archy]

Seems if I see the thread title that postmodernism is a lot like immigrants or Manga.

[mongers]

Well something destroyed my brain, so I might was well blame post-modelism/airfix glue.   

[Valmy]

Postmodernism has been great for the arts. I'm fine with it.

Postmodern architecture needs to be burned to the ground and the earth salted.

Agreed on the rest.

We're way past post-modernism now anyway.

Sheilbh!

[The Minsky Moment]

Did the Wanninski paper specify the point on the Laffer curve the US was pre-Reagan?  There's nothing wrong with the basic logic of the Laffer curve.

The article itself said the point would vary substantial based on public willingness to be taxed, based on a series of anecdotes without any empirical analysis or grounding.  The text stated that it would not necessarily be 50% but the accompanying prominently displayed graphic very clearly showed a inflection point at the halfway point between 0 and 100%.  It was basically an attempt to say things that literally could be justifiable or at least not falsified, all while giving the impression that the present tax regime was well beyond the curve and thus a free lunch was available.  Which is exactly how it was used in the public arena to unfortunate effect.

I had never heard of the Reinhart-Rogoff paper until Jake linked it here to further the argument that austerity wasn't needed.

It was a big deal in macroecon world at the time.

Did the Thatcher recession kill inflation?

The immediate impact of the adoption of the Friedman rule was that inflation went up.  The problem is that the monetary authorities can't actually control money supply in the way required under a k% rule  (this isn't a keynsian critique BTW but another application of the Lucas critique).  And Thatcher couldn't - in late 79 the M3 target was growing to fast, and government reacted by sharply reducing the base.  It failed: M3 growth continued and even accelerated and inflation along with it.  The government then abandoned the strict monetary supply target (rhetorically it remained but the start point kept being recalibrated.).  By 1981, M3 growth and inflation began to decline in response to this more flexible approach.

[The Minsky Moment]

I had never heard of the Reinhart-Rogoff paper until Jake linked it here to further the argument that austerity wasn't needed.

Maybe Joan would rather have that data go unpublished, but when he says its not good work, it's pretty much just a reaction to the subsequent ill usage of it.

Also to the fact that there were significant errors in the data that required correction.

[mongers]

Did the Wanninski paper specify the point on the Laffer curve the US was pre-Reagan?  There's nothing wrong with the basic logic of the Laffer curve.

The article itself said the point would vary substantial based on public willingness to be taxed, based on a series of anecdotes without any empirical analysis or grounding.  The text stated that it would not necessarily be 50% but the accompanying prominently displayed graphic very clearly showed a inflection point at the halfway point between 0 and 100%.  It was basically an attempt to say things that literally could be justifiable or at least not falsified, all while giving the impression that the present tax regime was well beyond the curve and thus a free lunch was available.  Which is exactly how it was used in the public arena to unfortunate effect.

I had never heard of the Reinhart-Rogoff paper until Jake linked it here to further the argument that austerity wasn't needed.

It was a big deal in macroecon world at the time.

Did the Thatcher recession kill inflation?

The immediate impact of the adoption of the Friedman rule was that inflation went up.  The problem is that the monetary authorities can't actually control money supply in the way required under a k% rule  (this isn't a keynsian critique BTW but another application of the Lucas critique).  And Thatcher couldn't - in late 79 the M3 target was growing to fast, and government reacted by sharply reducing the base.  It failed: M3 growth continued and even accelerated and inflation along with it.  The government then abandoned the strict monetary supply target (rhetorically it remained but the start point kept being recalibrated.).  By 1981, M3 growth and inflation began to decline in response to this more flexible approach.

As a teenager I lived through this, many people at the time thought it silly and the experiment showed itself to be wrong-headed; talking of which she was heading for election defeat and was only saved by the Falklands. 

Some of the subsequently right of centre myths that grew up are partly underpinned by an implied economic triumph in the early 80s, that there never existed. That had to wait for the Lawson years. 

[The Minsky Moment]

Friedman himself was called to testify before the Commons and concluded that "only a modest reduction in output and employment will be a side effect of reducing inflation to single figures by 1982."  It's important to keep in mind that the monetarist view at the time was to deny an inflation-unemployment tradeoff and thus its was not a matter of taking the Volkerite view that the pain of high unemployment over the short run was worth enduring to re-set inflationary expectations.  Also that unlike in the US, unemployment in the UK didn't start to subside until 1986 and even by the late 80s was still well above the pre-Thatcher levels.  So separate and apart from the k-percent rule fiasco, the overall policy never really fulfilled its objectives.