Brexit and the waning days of the United Kingdom

[Richard Hakluyt]

In a wider European conflict with Russia I would hope that Britain would be blockading the White and Baltic seas so that their trade would be buggered. Need a good fleet for that. I expect the Germans to provide the panzers for the land war 

[Sheilbh]

See this is the kind of Paradox game thinking we can excel at.

Looking at how the naval war went in the Ukraine conflict is there a practical need for big surface ships? I mean I guess if you need to go down and defend the Falklands from Milei or something.

But mostly Europe's focus is defending its land border. Russia's navy is geographically easy to contain.

Basically what RH said Britain isn't on the Black Sea next to the vast Eurasian steppe.

I've mentioned before but three quarter's of the Northern Hemisphere's sub-sea cables go through Irish waters (which the British Navy helps protect). There's all the pipeline infrastructure from Norway (and Spain and North Africa) which is crucial for European energy, increasing competition in the Arctic.

I have no idea what different types of ships do but that all feels fairly naval. Also I feel like if Europe is confronting Russia then it makes the naval aspect more important because the routes in - and where Russia is likely to target as vulnerabilities - is exactly the Atlantic, Med, Red Sea, Baltic Sea etc. As we're seeing with the fairly regular sabotage of infrastructure in the Baltic Sea already.

FWIW, assuming the money is there to ramp up capacity, I think the best defence solution would be relatively coordinated mini-lateralism which we already see a little bit with France and the UK. Both work together on defence very closely but then have specific areas where they've developed formal relationships - the UK with the Netherlands, Nordics and Baltics in the JEF (the Defence Secretary today in Norway talking about how to increase support to Ukraine but also a new defence agreement between the UK and Norway) - and France with its very strong defence relationships with Romania and Greece especially. The current gap which I hope can be overcome is that Poland and Germany could either work together or find neighbouring partners.

[mongers]

See this is the kind of Paradox game thinking we can excel at.

Looking at how the naval war went in the Ukraine conflict is there a practical need for big surface ships? I mean I guess if you need to go down and defend the Falklands from Milei or something.

But mostly Europe's focus is defending its land border. Russia's navy is geographically easy to contain.

Basically what RH said Britain isn't on the Black Sea next to the vast Eurasian steppe.

I've mentioned before but three quarter's of the Northern Hemisphere's sub-sea cables go through Irish waters (which the British Navy helps protect). There's all the pipeline infrastructure from Norway (and Spain and North Africa) which is crucial for European energy, increasing competition in the Arctic.

I have no idea what different types of ships do but that all feels fairly naval. Also I feel like if Europe is confronting Russia then it makes the naval aspect more important because the routes in - and where Russia is likely to target as vulnerabilities - is exactly the Atlantic, Med, Red Sea, Baltic Sea etc. As we're seeing with the fairly regular sabotage of infrastructure in the Baltic Sea already.

FWIW, assuming the money is there to ramp up capacity, I think the best defence solution would be relatively coordinated mini-lateralism which we already see a little bit with France and the UK. Both work together on defence very closely but then have specific areas where they've developed formal relationships - the UK with the Netherlands, Nordics and Baltics in the JEF (the Defence Secretary today in Norway talking about how to increase support to Ukraine but also a new defence agreement between the UK and Norway) - and France with its very strong defence relationships with Romania and Greece especially. The current gap which I hope can be overcome is that Poland and Germany could either work together or find neighbouring partners.

These carriers were designed to be able to project power into the Far East and backup/partner the US. What now.

Large heavily manned carriers won't do be useful in protecting underwater intrastructure and be limited by not working in the open ocean.

Far better to deploy that manpower on many dozens of smaller ships to work close in european water protecting cables and hunting subs/sabotage vessels.

A good example of this was the RN in WW2 requistioning thousands of small ships and trawlers to operate in a wide range of roles including minesweeping and iirc even dedicated cable defence boats*.


* I may well have got that wrong, they could be tasked with defending harbour and inshore anti-submarine nets, also possible called boom defence ships.

[Jacob]

Protecting trade routes against American interference

 

Well let's defend Europe from Russia before we start challenging America's control of international sea trade

I think it may be less to defend against America (though who knows) and more about stepping in where America draws down.

[Valmy]

Protecting trade routes against American interference

 

Well let's defend Europe from Russia before we start challenging America's control of international sea trade

I think it may be less to defend against America (though who knows) and more about stepping in where America draws down.

There are some things we will never draw down from. Even back when our army was 12 guys in a fort on the Mexican Border we still had a big navy. The spice trade must flow. The business of America? Business.

[crazy canuck]

Protecting trade routes against American interference

 

Well let's defend Europe from Russia before we start challenging America's control of international sea trade

I think it may be less to defend against America (though who knows) and more about stepping in where America draws down.

Partly, but looking into the future two things are likely.

One, Trump is leading the US into a period of catastrophic decline.  And so to your point, the US navy has been the main reason sea lanes have been open to commerce since the end of the second world war.  The capacity of that force will decline as the US does.

But second, the Trumpist foreign policy is to try to exploit those that are perceived to be vulnerable.  So best not give that appearance.

[Jacob]

Partly, but looking into the future two things are likely.

One, Trump is leading the US into a period of catastrophic decline.  And so to your point, the US navy has been the main reason sea lanes have been open to commerce since the end of the second world war.  The capacity of that force will decline as the US does.

But second, the Trumpist foreign policy is to try to exploit those that are perceived to be vulnerable.  So best not give that appearance.

Yeah I can't really argue with that.

[Sheilbh]

I agree on the second bit - the first I think is open. The US economy is growing faster than anyone else in the G7.

I think the assumption that it would be eclipsed by China has (through a combination of trade war and industrial policy) now fallen away.

I think I posted the Gideon Rachman piece in the FT on what Trump's second term might look like - and far from the least alarming was that Trumpism works. And I still think that might be a risk (obviously it'll actually end up being a combination of the options he sketched out and some unpredicted, unpredictable outcomes). As Rachman framed it:

America First succeeds: Trump's faith in the irresistible nature of American power is vindicated. Investment is driven to the US, increasing America's lead in tech and finance. The Europeans and Japanese sharply increase spending on their own defence and this is enough to deter Russian and Chinese aggression. American tariffs dramatically reduce Chinese growth, sending the Chinese system into crisis. The Iranian regime is finally felled by some combination of military, economic and domestic pressure. Trump's prestige soars at home and abroad. American liberals are cowed into silence and some of Trump's enemies are jailed. The stock market hits a new high.

[Jacob]

Does Rachman propose this is likely?

[Sheilbh]

Does Rachman propose this is likely?

No - possible - and as he says likely to be a combination (with some unpredictable). But I'm certainly not convinced America's about to enter a period of catastrophic decline:

Given all the elements involved, there can be no certainties about how the new world order will evolve, only scenarios. So here are five possibilities.

A new great power bargain: Trump's transactional nature, his determination to avoid war and his contempt for democratic allies leads the US to strike a new grand bargain with Russia and China. The US tacitly grants Russia and China spheres of influence in their regions. America concentrates on asserting dominance in its own region — pushing around Mexico and Canada, and seeking to take back the Panama Canal and gain control over Greenland. Trump forces a peace deal on Ukraine without accompanying security guarantees. Sanctions against Russia are relaxed and Putin is welcomed to Thanksgiving dinner at Mar-a-Lago. A possible bargain with China would involve the easing of American tech restrictions and tariffs on Beijing, in return for Chinese purchases of American goods and sweetheart deals in China for US companies such as Tesla. Trump would also signal his lack of interest in fighting to defend Taiwan. US allies in Europe and Asia would be left scrambling to provide for their own defence in a new atmosphere of insecurity.

War by accident: The western allies have a trade war with each other. Political instability spreads in Europe, with the rise of populist forces sympathetic to both Trump and Putin. A ceasefire is agreed in Ukraine — but there is widespread fear in Europe that Russia will resume hostilities at some point. Trump himself repeatedly calls into question America's willingness to defend its allies. China, Russia or North Korea — or some combination of these powers — decide to take advantage of western disarray by launching military action in Asia and Europe. But they miscalculate. Asian and European democracies fight back, and eventually the US gets drawn into the conflict, as happened twice in the 20th century.

Anarchy in a leaderless world: The US, China, Russia and the EU avoid direct conflict. But Trump's America First policies on trade, security and international institutions create a leadership vacuum. Economic growth is depressed across the world by Trump's trade wars. Civil conflicts in countries such as Sudan and Myanmar intensify. The UN is debilitated by big power rivalry and is powerless to intervene. Instead conflicts are fuelled by competing regional powers that are seeking advantage and resources. More countries such as Haiti slide into violent anarchy. Refugee flows to the west increase. Populist parties, contemptuous of liberal democracy, flourish in an atmosphere of social and economic insecurity.

Globalisation without America: The US retreats behind tariff walls and leaves the World Trade Organization. Prices rise in America and goods get more shoddy. The rest of the world responds to American autarky by accelerating economic interdependence. The EU ratifies its new trade deal with Latin America and signs new agreements with India and China. Europe also opens its market to Chinese electric vehicles and green tech, in return for the Chinese setting up factories across the EU and restraining Russian aggression against Europe. The global south's integration with the Chinese economy deepens further and the Brics gain new members and influence. The use of the dollar as the global currency declines.

America First succeeds: Trump's faith in the irresistible nature of American power is vindicated. Investment is driven to the US, increasing America's lead in tech and finance. The Europeans and Japanese sharply increase spending on their own defence and this is enough to deter Russian and Chinese aggression. American tariffs dramatically reduce Chinese growth, sending the Chinese system into crisis. The Iranian regime is finally felled by some combination of military, economic and domestic pressure. Trump's prestige soars at home and abroad. American liberals are cowed into silence and some of Trump's enemies are jailed. The stock market hits a new high.

The reality of the next four years is likely to be some strange amalgam of all of the above scenarios, plus several other unforeseen developments. As the Italian philosopher Antonio Gramsci, writing during the late 1920s, famously put it: "The old is dying and the new cannot be born; in this interregnum a great variety of morbid symptoms appear."

[mongers]

I agree on the second bit - the first I think is open. The US economy is growing faster than anyone else in the G7.

I think the assumption that it would be eclipsed by China has (through a combination of trade war and industrial policy) now fallen away.

I think I posted the Gideon Rachman piece in the FT on what Trump's second term might look like - and far from the least alarming was that Trumpism works. And I still think that might be a risk (obviously it'll actually end up being a combination of the options he sketched out and some unpredicted, unpredictable outcomes). As Rachman framed it:

America First succeeds: Trump's faith in the irresistible nature of American power is vindicated. Investment is driven to the US, increasing America's lead in tech and finance. The Europeans and Japanese sharply increase spending on their own defence and this is enough to deter Russian and Chinese aggression. American tariffs dramatically reduce Chinese growth, sending the Chinese system into crisis. The Iranian regime is finally felled by some combination of military, economic and domestic pressure. Trump's prestige soars at home and abroad. American liberals are cowed into silence and some of Trump's enemies are jailed. The stock market hits a new high.

Shelf, how exactly does it work? That implies it has some internal structure or mechanisms?

Take a nice looking analogue wrist watch, take it apart, put all of the cogs into a carboard box, shake it up real good, then takes out most of them and cram as many as you can back into the case, screw the back on, attempt to wind it, then point to the loose hour and minute hands flopping around the dial and say "look, sometimes it works or shows the right time".

That'll be the end point of Trumpism.

Best not to spend four years rationalising it.

[Tonitrus]

See this is the kind of Paradox game thinking we can excel at.

Looking at how the naval war went in the Ukraine conflict is there a practical need for big surface ships? I mean I guess if you need to go down and defend the Falklands from Milei or something.

But mostly Europe's focus is defending its land border. Russia's navy is geographically easy to contain.

Basically what RH said Britain isn't on the Black Sea next to the vast Eurasian steppe.

I've mentioned before but three quarter's of the Northern Hemisphere's sub-sea cables go through Irish waters (which the British Navy helps protect). There's all the pipeline infrastructure from Norway (and Spain and North Africa) which is crucial for European energy, increasing competition in the Arctic.

I have no idea what different types of ships do but that all feels fairly naval. Also I feel like if Europe is confronting Russia then it makes the naval aspect more important because the routes in - and where Russia is likely to target as vulnerabilities - is exactly the Atlantic, Med, Red Sea, Baltic Sea etc. As we're seeing with the fairly regular sabotage of infrastructure in the Baltic Sea already.

FWIW, assuming the money is there to ramp up capacity, I think the best defence solution would be relatively coordinated mini-lateralism which we already see a little bit with France and the UK. Both work together on defence very closely but then have specific areas where they've developed formal relationships - the UK with the Netherlands, Nordics and Baltics in the JEF (the Defence Secretary today in Norway talking about how to increase support to Ukraine but also a new defence agreement between the UK and Norway) - and France with its very strong defence relationships with Romania and Greece especially. The current gap which I hope can be overcome is that Poland and Germany could either work together or find neighbouring partners.

These carriers were designed to be able to project power into the Far East and backup/partner the US. What now.

Large heavily manned carriers won't do be useful in protecting underwater intrastructure and be limited by not working in the open ocean.

Far better to deploy that manpower on many dozens of smaller ships to work close in european water protecting cables and hunting subs/sabotage vessels.

A good example of this was the RN in WW2 requistioning thousands of small ships and trawlers to operate in a wide range of roles including minesweeping and iirc even dedicated cable defence boats*.


* I may well have got that wrong, they could be tasked with defending harbour and inshore anti-submarine nets, also possible called boom defence ships.

Not even that.  Ukraine has shown that with enough well-supplied naval drones, it should be child's play for ya'll to make the Baltic Fleet fear ever leaving Kronstadt.

[Sheilbh]

Shelf, how exactly does it work? That implies it has some internal structure or mechanisms?

Take a nice looking analogue wrist watch, take it apart, put all of the cogs into a carboard box, shake it up real good, then takes out most of them and cram as many as you can back into the case, screw the back on, attempt to wind it, then point to the loose hour and minute hands flopping around the dial and say "look, sometimes it works or shows the right time".

That'll be the end point of Trumpism.

Best not to spend four years rationalising it.

Maybe Rachman's phrasing is better on that.

Finance and tech are on board with Trump, they're also areas of huge American competitive advantage already. The American economy has been, by some distance, the best performing developed economy for the last decade. There's a tonne of CHIPS and IRA funding and factory openings about to happen.

Lots of people here talk about the major challenges facing China's economy and regime. I see no reason at this point to think Europe will snap out of stagnation. Personally I'm far more bullish on China than most of Languish, but I think it's very possible that America pulls further ahead of potential rivals. Rachman's Iran point would be a random event - but I think that regime is in its most vulnerable position internationally.

The courts are on side - but even then I wouldn't be surprised if there was a confrontation. Trump will have further opportunity to reshape the judiciary. And I think there are structural problems in the Democrats.

That's the current position in many ways it doesn't seem like an impossible set of circumstances that those come together in a good way for Trump. I think how it works is basically how Trump's entire career from entering the primary has in terms of riding those waves - not of his making or because of a "plan", more Trump as world spirit in a golden elevator.

It's not about rationalising Trump - Trump has no content. There's no politics. The best I think you could do is say he's personalist and  a mob boss. I don't think there's anything there to rationalise - it's protection rackets, and bullying, and a nose for weakness. Writing about Trump as a political figures I think calls more for diagnosis (definitely Freudian) than rationalisation

But there are events and trends in the world that have made the conditions where he can succeed - we can try to understand them. And also there are people around Trump or the wider MAGA movement with fringe and alarming ideas that I think we need to understand - not all of them will happen, Trump is wedded to none of them (and even if he is that doesn't mean much), some will stay fringe. But I think looking at that stuff will at least give a sense of where this could go/what decisions could be made.

[Valmy]

Finance and tech are on board with Trump, they're also areas of huge American competitive advantage already.

We lead the world in industries of useless bullshit.

[Jacob]

Maybe Rachman's phrasing is better on that.

Finance and tech are on board with Trump, they're also areas of huge American competitive advantage already. The American economy has been, by some distance, the best performing developed economy for the last decade. There's a tonne of CHIPS and IRA funding and factory openings about to happen.

Lots of people here talk about the major challenges facing China's economy and regime. I see no reason at this point to think Europe will snap out of stagnation. Personally I'm far more bullish on China than most of Languish, but I think it's very possible that America pulls further ahead of potential rivals. Rachman's Iran point would be a random event - but I think that regime is in its most vulnerable position internationally.

The courts are on side - but even then I wouldn't be surprised if there was a confrontation. Trump will have further opportunity to reshape the judiciary. And I think there are structural problems in the Democrats.

That's the current position in many ways it doesn't seem like an impossible set of circumstances that those come together in a good way for Trump. I think how it works is basically how Trump's entire career from entering the primary has in terms of riding those waves - not of his making or because of a "plan", more Trump as world spirit in a golden elevator.

It's not about rationalising Trump - Trump has no content. There's no politics. The best I think you could do is say he's personalist and  a mob boss. I don't think there's anything there to rationalise - it's protection rackets, and bullying, and a nose for weakness. Writing about Trump as a political figures I think calls more for diagnosis (definitely Freudian) than rationalisation

But there are events and trends in the world that have made the conditions where he can succeed - we can try to understand them. And also there are people around Trump or the wider MAGA movement with fringe and alarming ideas that I think we need to understand - not all of them will happen, Trump is wedded to none of them (and even if he is that doesn't mean much), some will stay fringe. But I think looking at that stuff will at least give a sense of where this could go/what decisions could be made.

That sounds plausible. And I hate it.