Quo Vadis, Democrats?

[Jacob]

Yeah this is where I fundamentally disagree. The "rules based liberal order" was built on American victory in the second world war and the Cold War, providing a security framework for its allies (and an offensive base for containing the Soviets)...

Interesting lens, Sheilbh.

I think the points I agree with are:

1) That without the US, "the West" lacks sufficient cultural, political, and military power to ensure that a rules-based international order is the default method of international organization (even if it's often honoured in the breach), and that democratic ideals are seen as an aspirational goal globally. They become more of "these are our particular local systems, and we'll stick to them at least until we're pressured to water them down somehow).

2) That the reactionary right broadly is currently on track to be the prevailing international ideology. This will result in a certain reorganization of the "World Order" (though the extent perhaps depends on how much the "liberal rules based order" lived up to it's ideals vs how much it was just rhetoric to justify the exercise of naked self-interested power by the US and its Western allies).

2.1) Similarly, the reactionary right is on track to reorder the US domestically. Exactly how it settles into exercising power and governing day to day, and how it does so* will have repercussions for US' erstwhile allies. (*i.e. exactly how extractive will the oligarchs and new political class be allowed to be? How are resources distributed to various constituencies? To what degree will the rules be predictable, so innovation and business can operate?)

3) That the human instinct for liberty and self-governance is universal, not limited to the post-Enlightenment West; and that it will be interesting (and hopefully encouraging) to see it reassert itself - whether as a resurgence of Western ideals (maybe the American population will recommit in a few decades), or non-Western traditions.

I also agree that there's a bit of an end-of-an-era vibe going on - whatever parallels are appealing (end of Roman empire, Weimar Germany, collapse of the Qing, or the examples you gave, or something else). That said, I'm slightly less convinced than you appear to be that liberal democracy and Europe are done to the extent that Austro-Hungary or the Lithuanian Commonwealth were - but it's certainly a distinct possibility.

In the medium to long term I'm confident that some sort of ideology built on the popular franchise and against bigotry will reassert itself, even if those ideals are in their back foot now. In the short term, however, it's much more fraught.

[Sheilbh]

Have you heard of Richard Nixon?

Yes. If ever a movement had an odd one out.

It really depended (and depends) on the issue and the matter.  It is much harder to be cordial and friendly when the matter is understood as existential. The debates around Quebec separation, for instance, did not foster a lot of friendly banter. Likewise on issues about women's rights. And perhaps also that a debate around free trade allows such friendly relationship, because someone like Sheila Cops or John Crosbie will be fine regardless of the outcome.

Yeah - this is interesting because I don't know where I sit on that friendliness of people on opposing sides.

I think there was a marked shift in the first half of the 2010s - but I think a really key one was the Scottish independence referendum. There were SNP politicians who got on quite well with MPs from unionist parties but a lot didn't. I think it was less because it was seen as an "existential" issue than becase that "chumminess" was seen as part of Westminster culture which was what they were there to reject - the Scottish Parliament, for example, has always had a reputation for being far more partisan outside of the chamber.

And I think your point on women's rights is true. The example that springs to mind here is Tony Benn who was the leader of the hard-left in this country for twenty but got on very well with Enoch Powell who was a racist MP. Part of that ability to overcome political differences, I suspect, reflects Tony Benn's identity and background.

I understand very profoundly the necessity not to treat all politics as schmittian. But populism is also a reaction against this vague sense that politicans are in their own boys-girls club, and can afford to treat some issues very lightly.

Yeah I don't know how I feel about it because I think this is absolutely true. I think it is a driver.

But then I also wonder about that because I think in the UK it's more observed on the left. One of the parts of Labour (either Young Labour or LGBT+ Labour) have their "never kissed a Tory" slogan and T-shirts which they were (and get cabinet ministers) into at party conference. And I always slightly wonder if that just comes across as mad to most people who are not actually very political. There's been some polling here on not being friendly with someone because of their politics and it's one of those issues were basically only the left agree with that - and you need to get pretty far left before it becomes a mainstream opinion. So I slightly wonder if, to normal people who aren't engaged in politics, it looks weird.

But then obviously very different in the US where you have people proclaiming the other side are demonic.

[Jacob]

As a side note, it interesting to see how the issue of free trade has been transformed over the last 40 years.  In Canada the lack of it is now viewed as the big threat.

Yeah for sure.

I think it's that the benefits of free trade has more or less materialized as its proponents argued, while the downsides that its opponents feared have not. So basically that debate has been settled by lived experience.

Other downsides have materialized, of which the biggest IMO is that free trade has introduced massive dependencies which leaves countries vulnerable to the deterioration in the relationship with partners. This is more pronounced where the relationship is unequal, but still significant in relations between more-or-less equals.

[crazy canuck]

As a side note, it interesting to see how the issue of free trade has been transformed over the last 40 years.  In Canada the lack of it is now viewed as the big threat.

Yeah for sure.

I think it's that the benefits of free trade has more or less materialized as its proponents argued, while the downsides that its opponents feared have not. So basically that debate has been settled by lived experience.

Other downsides have materialized, of which the biggest IMO is that free trade has introduced massive dependencies which leaves countries vulnerable to the deterioration in the relationship with partners. This is more pronounced where the relationship is unequal, but still significant in relations between more-or-less equals.

Perhaps, but I wonder whether it has more to do with people getting used to the new way of things. The collapse of our branch plant economy did occur as predicted.  I agree with you about the vulnerabilities created.  Something that we were about to do was create wider free trade with Asia but that collapsed.  Europe was always tough nut to crack.

Now it looks like we are headed to free trade with everyone except the US.  And that might end up being the best result for us.

[Sheilbh]

I also agree that there's a bit of an end-of-an-era vibe going on - whatever parallels are appealing (end of Roman empire, Weimar Germany, collapse of the Qing, or the examples you gave, or something else). That said, I'm slightly less convinced than you appear to be that liberal democracy and Europe are done to the extent that Austro-Hungary or the Lithuanian Commonwealth were - but it's certainly a distinct possibility.

In the medium to long term I'm confident that some sort of ideology built on the popular franchise and against bigotry will reassert itself, even if those ideals are in their back foot now. In the short term, however, it's much more fraught.

Yeah to be clear I'm not saying any of this is going to happen.

On liberal democracy I don't think it's going to end or we're in a global "light that failed" situation. I think the order that sustained it ideologically is ending - and I've no idea what comes next. That presents an external challenge but not necessarily fatal. I think there is also an internal challenge, which is that liberalism triumphed - politics exited and was replaced with (admirable) checks and balances and mechanisms designed to thwart quick decisions, decisive actions, exercise of power resulting in a degree of sclerosis. I think the internal challenge is to swing the pendulum back the other way so that liberal democracies can preside (as they have in the past) over active, responsive states and not just states that can't. (This was, in my wildly bad historical analogies, Venice ).

With Austria-Hungary/Poland-Lithuania it's less about Europe and more about "the West". Not least because 20th century America was hugely enriched by the refugees from Central Europe and now, in significant part, the institutions in especially in higher education and culture that they built are being destroyed. But I think that we are, likely, in an age when that "Western" horizon is starting to close - I think you see this even in the extent to which we are now just each other's dystopias. While I would emphasise that this is perhaps happening, I think the language of "going quietly mouldy" is true. Less a sharp break than a decline in health or decay.

On Europe I don't think much of what I was saying I meant to be necessarily specific to Europe. I'm not sure - I think Merz's plans on spending would be transformative and I think Germany is key. I think the interesting thing with Europe is actually the extent to which our "order" doesn't die - it just gets re-purposesd. It is a set of politically neutral tools. I don't think there are any intrinsic values in these instruments so they could be used by other powers in different ways. I don't think China, for example, is particularly revisionist (probably less so than America right now) and arguably in terms of the global distribution of power it might even be more democratic even if it becomes less democratic- the global south is likely to have a bigger say and it should.

And I suppose there is the last point that all of what we're seeing may just be the surface political waves of far deeper and stronger economic shifts. And as I say I think the order is dying but I'm not sure what will replace - and we may not even be able to see it - in further wild historical analogies, the conclusion of a really good Perry Anderson essay in the LRB:

Does that mean that until a coherent set of economic and political ideas, comparable to Keynesian or Hayekian paradigms of old, has taken shape as an alternative way of running contemporary societies, no serious change in the existing mode of production can be expected? Not necessarily. Outside the core zones of capitalism, at least two alterations of great moment occurred without any systematic doctrine imagining or proposing them in advance. One was the transformation of Brazil with the revolution that brought Getúlio Vargas to power in 1930, when the coffee exports on which its economy relied collapsed in the Slump and recovery was pragmatically stumbled on by import substitution, without the benefit of any advocacy in advance. The other, still more far-reaching, was the transformation after the death of Mao of the command economy in China in the Reform Era presided over by Deng Xiaoping, with the arrival of the household responsibility system in agriculture and the ignition by township and village enterprises of the most spectacular sustained burst of economic growth in recorded history – this too was improvised and experimental, without pre-existent theories of any kind. Are such cases too exotic to have any bearing on the heartland of advanced capitalism? What made them possible was the magnitude of the shock and depth of the crisis each society had suffered: the Slump in Brazil, the Cultural Revolution in China – tropical and oriental equivalents of the blows to occidental self-assurance in the Second World War. If disbelief that any alternative is possible were ever to lapse in the West, the probability is that something comparable will be the occasion of it.

What comes next may be exprimental, unimagined and theorised in hindsight.

I think it's that the benefits of free trade has more or less materialized as its proponents argued, while the downsides that its opponents feared have not. So basically that debate has been settled by lived experience.

Other downsides have materialized, of which the biggest IMO is that free trade has introduced massive dependencies which leaves countries vulnerable to the deterioration in the relationship with partners. This is more pronounced where the relationship is unequal, but still significant in relations between more-or-less equals.

Perhaps - I think this will vary by country.

I think de-industrialisation happened as was argued by critics and has been intensified because of free trade. In my view I think that has had pretty disastrous results for politics. It's an area I've changed my views quite strongly from a third way perspective that there will be losers from trade but that's fine as long as overall growth is good - you mitigate the loss with redistribution. I'm not sure that's enough. I think I underestimated the "producerist"/"bullshit jobs" angle that really mattered. And in all honesty we said that for 40+ years - I can't think of any economy that actually followed through of replacing lost industrial jobs with new jobs for an upskilled workforce. I think the best they got was an arts centre for regeneration and benefits.

[Josquius]

There's a big problem with the "post war order pushing liberal democracy is faltering, we are going back to how things were before the war when it was aa local decision" way of things.
That is that historically though you may have had autocracies in one country and democracies next door, they tended not to be so bothered about regime change.
MAGA is clearly seriously interested in destroying democracy abroad as well.
The only thing remotely close that comes to mind are historic Marxists.

[Admiral Yi]

Have you heard of Richard Nixon?

Nice one, but a lapsed Quaker sort of proves my point, doesn't it?

[Savonarola]

Have you heard of Richard Nixon?

Nice one, but a lapsed Quaker sort of proves my point, doesn't it?

I think Joan Baez is still a Quaker.

That being said, I don't think Quakerism would be a representative religious philosophy of the Midwest.  Their concerns with pacifism and Inward Light don't fit Midwestern stereotypes.  I would consider Lutheranism a better fit; so if Democrats want to retake the Midwest they should run on a platform of hard work and beer.   



Edit:  Assuming that the arguments posted in Josq's link are valid, of course, although I think it's still a good platform.

[Admiral Yi]

Bob Dole and Daniel Inouye were two of the most powerful US senators during the 70s and 80s.  Very different ideologies and opposite sides on the aisle.  But far more important was the connection of sharing the same hospital room during WW2.

Did Dole and Inouye literally share the same hospital room?

[Oexmelin]

Have you heard of Richard Nixon?

Nice one, but a lapsed Quaker sort of proves my point, doesn't it?

I don't know. Does it?

[Admiral Yi]

I don't know. Does it?

Since you ask, yes it does.

[Oexmelin]

Ok. I mean, I thought your argument was that Quakers didn't exist anymore. They existed long enough to produce Nixon, which I submitted in jest, as well as other Quakers, some of whom I definitely met. But perhaps there was some other argument buried underneath that I missed.

[The Minsky Moment]

Bob Dole and Daniel Inouye were two of the most powerful US senators during the 70s and 80s.  Very different ideologies and opposite sides on the aisle.  But far more important was the connection of sharing the same hospital room during WW2.

Did Dole and Inouye literally share the same hospital room?

That I don't know.  But they definitely met while recovering in the same hospital.

See photo here:  https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bob_Dole_and_Daniel_Inouye_at_Percy_Jones_Army_Hospital.jpg

[Josquius]

Nice one, but a lapsed Quaker sort of proves my point, doesn't it?

Ok. I mean, I thought your argument was that Quakers didn't exist anymore. They existed long enough to produce Nixon, which I submitted in jest, as well as other Quakers, some of whom I definitely met. But perhaps there was some other argument buried underneath that I missed.

I think the point in that interesting but kind of wacky theory was more that these groups laid the cultural foundation for these parts of the US rather than they make up the entire population of those areas to this day.
Whether Quakers still exist or not (they obviously do. Here's the website of their UK branch https://www.quaker.org.uk/) is neither here nor there.

[Admiral Yi]

I think the point in that interesting but kind of wacky theory was more that these groups laid the cultural foundation for these parts of the US rather than they make up the entire population of those areas to this day.
Whether Quakers still exist or not (they obviously do. Here's the website of their UK branch https://www.quaker.org.uk/) is neither here nor there.

Along with Sav, I have difficulty seeing the cultural influence of Quakers in the midwest.  Hell, I have trouble seeing it in Philadelphia.

The culture of the midwest is immigrant German farmers and immigrant Slavic steel workers.

It's been a while since I read Albion's Seed (on Tricky's recommendation) but I recall the fourth foundational group as being the Hudson valley Dutch, not the Quakers.