Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Tonitrus]

Putin can still die.  He's been terminally ill since February 2022, surely he can't have much time left?

I don't think that will be much help...whatever succession plan there might be (and if there is, a well kept secret indeed), any plausible successor would still be mostly tied to the same policy in order to secure their position. 

And has a strong potential to be worse/even more reckless.

[Jacob]

On China the interesting thing to watch there is the emerging backlash in Russia over it.

What do you mean? There's a backlash in Russia against China?

[Jacob]

Putin can still die.  He's been terminally ill since February 2022, surely he can't have much time left?

I don't think that will be much help...whatever succession plan there might be (and if there is, a well kept secret indeed), any plausible successor would still be mostly tied to the same policy in order to secure their position. 

And has a strong potential to be worse/even more reckless.

I think the hope is that the a messy succession would result in general chaos, resulting in fewer resources to the front and a general lack of focus.

If there's serious contention for the throne - or even just a desire to maintain a position as a serious stakeholder - it may make sense to pull resources from the front to a more internal facing disposition?

I don't know, one can hope.

[frunk]

In attrition scenarios like this countries tend to seem just fine until they collapse.  It's not clear to me how close either Ukraine or Russia are to reaching that point, but it's disappointing how Western countries aren't treating the risk to Ukraine with greater urgency.

[Josquius]

In attrition scenarios like this countries tend to seem just fine until they collapse.  It's not clear to me how close either Ukraine or Russia are to reaching that point, but it's disappointing how Western countries aren't treating the risk to Ukraine with greater urgency.

We have a pretty good idea with Ukraine.
We know it's economy is fucked but we also know it was a lot smaller than Russias and Europe has enough money to keep the country going.
There's also a lot of promise for what the future holds and rebuilding. A gamble given Russia might win but an opportunity nonetheless.

Russia on the other hand... Things are a bit hazier. But all we see does not paint a pretty picture. They're on their own and things are unravelling. Unless they're not on their own and China will keep the state finances from dropping below a certain level.

[Jacob]

My feeling is that Europe and China are reluctantly fighting a proxy war in Ukraine, and that Russia is trying their best to act like they're in charge and not a proxy. When China says they cannot let Russia lose, I take them at their word.

I think as Europe is currently constituted, it will continue to do what it must to keep Ukraine from losing; though if the push gets too hard too soon, it may not be able too. That is, if Ukraine reaches an attritional breaking point while Russia is able to take advantage of it and Europe has insufficient means to intervene).

As Europe is currently constituted, that is. I think a real risk is that Trump-like fellow travellers beholden to Putin will take power in any number of European countries, which could alter the balance significantly. This is a risk to Ukraine, but also to Europe itself.

On the other hand, I'm not sure China wants Russia to win either.

[HVC]

Russias been collapsing for decades (centuries?). they can go on, historically, for a surprisingly long time.

[Sheilbh]

On China the interesting thing to watch there is the emerging backlash in Russia over it.

What do you mean? There's a backlash in Russia against China?

Yeah for you and celed, there was a recent podcast by Mark Galeotti who's a Russia specialist.

It's early days but he said there was growing concern and commentary on it and the dangers of Russia's entanglement with China. It might not amount to much but it's something he was picking up on from reading Russia media and speaking to Russians (obviously avenues for a lot of engagement for Russia specialists are limited now so it's all a bit second hand). It's present in the media so is in elite commentary - his theory was that for Putin and that generation currently in power, Ukraine is kind of existential and the confrontation with the West (which they view as part of that) is paramount. There is basically no price too high for that even if it means increasing reliance on China.

His theory was that the generation below (so the 40-60s) who are going to take over is the source of the increased unease in elite circles because they realise that it's building in dependency.

Purely anecdotally on the more popular level he just noted that apparently there has in the last year or so been a significant uptick in interest in fiction and history about the Tatar yoke, and Russia fighting from it. So if Russia always has that ability to look East and West with different sets of hopes and anxieties it seems like some of the anxieties about the East are rising again.

As I say may be nothing but I think an interesting trend to keep an eye on - especially if China does move against Taiwan. I think a rising, friendly China as your largest land neighbour may be different than a more assertive, militarily confident China.

My feeling is that Europe and China are reluctantly fighting a proxy war in Ukraine, and that Russia is trying their best to act like they're in charge and not a proxy. When China says they cannot let Russia lose, I take them at their word.

I slightly disagree - I don't think China's fighting a proxy war. I think Europe is.

I think European countries (based on their current leaders) have repeatedly said they want Ukraine to win and I think they do. Their levels of support are not at that level yet but I think that's because it's downstream of European defence spending and domestic politics (it should be a mark of shame for recent leaders that what prompted the bigger increase in European spending on defence was not a Russian invasion of Europe but Trump and Vance).

I think China is more simply that it doesn't want Russia to lose. I suspect in any negotiations they will have a role to play in putting pressure on Russia. As it is, I think they're perfectly happy to let Russia and Europe (and more intermittently) focus their money, material and attention on Ukraine leaving the rest of the field a bit more open. We've slightly seen this in Africa (where Chinese investment is already huge) but also other bits of the "Russian" sphere, like Cuba, where Russian interest is becoming a way of China getting into a country and then rapidly usurping it.

[crazy canuck]

Putin can still die.  He's been terminally ill since February 2022, surely he can't have much time left?

I don't think that will be much help...whatever succession plan there might be (and if there is, a well kept secret indeed), any plausible successor would still be mostly tied to the same policy in order to secure their position. 

And has a strong potential to be worse/even more reckless.

I think the hope is that the a messy succession would result in general chaos, resulting in fewer resources to the front and a general lack of focus.

If there's serious contention for the throne - or even just a desire to maintain a position as a serious stakeholder - it may make sense to pull resources from the front to a more internal facing disposition?

I don't know, one can hope.

Yes, and perhaps even a civil war.

[Jacob]

I slightly disagree - I don't think China's fighting a proxy war. I think Europe is.

If they're letting tens of thousands of North Korean soldiers fight in Ukraine, they're absolutely fighting a proxy war.

I mean, they may be doing it by proxy, so it's a proxy proxy war if you will. But there's no way North Korea is committing at that level without some level of Chinese approval.

That said, the Chinese perspective may well be more of a "weakening two rivals by enabling them to fight each other as long as possible" than a straight up proxy war. I'm sure that strategy has several pithy four character idioms in Chinese.

[Tonitrus]

Putin can still die.  He's been terminally ill since February 2022, surely he can't have much time left?

I don't think that will be much help...whatever succession plan there might be (and if there is, a well kept secret indeed), any plausible successor would still be mostly tied to the same policy in order to secure their position. 

And has a strong potential to be worse/even more reckless.

I think the hope is that the a messy succession would result in general chaos, resulting in fewer resources to the front and a general lack of focus.

If there's serious contention for the throne - or even just a desire to maintain a position as a serious stakeholder - it may make sense to pull resources from the front to a more internal facing disposition?

I don't know, one can hope.

Yes, and perhaps even a civil war.

The possibility of civil war in Russian, I think, is extremely remote.  And thank H0d for that...we should probably consider what a miracle it was that the fall of the Soviet Union was relatively bloodless compared to the fall of other great empires. There might be some potential be in Chechnya/the Caucuses, but that is more likely to just be the Chechens being one of many powerbrokers awaiting to see/establish who their new patron will be.

A "messy succession" I doubt would have much more chaos than the Wagner uprising, and probably be ended just as quickly.  It doesn't take long to fall from a window.

And again, I think any new leader, in order to cement their legitimacy, likely will feel a lot of internal pressure to press the war even harder...not retreat from it.  And then we have to hope it is not someone of the Solovyov/Simonyan-bent.  If you listen to their rhetoric (I know, likely mostly cynical attempts to scare/intimidate the West)...it arguably goes beyond apocalyptic extremism of the deeper ends of Islam.   

[crazy canuck]

Why would a Russian civil war be a bad thing for anyone other than the Russians?

[Sheilbh]

Why would a Russian civil war be a bad thing for anyone other than the Russians?

This is North American privilege Russia has almost 6,000 nuclear warheads, one tenth of the world's energy supply and about 150 million people. It's tough to see a positive from a state like that collapsing into civil war.

I mean just look at Syria which is a far less significant and populated country, but their civil war had very significant regional impacts on Europe and the Middle East (rise of ISIS, destabilisation of Iraq, refugee crises).

And civil wars are always particularly brutal and bad for civilian populations and by the Russians, we do mean that almost 150 million people.

[grumbler]

That said, the Chinese perspective may well be more of a "weakening two rivals by enabling them to fight each other as long as possible" than a straight up proxy war. I'm sure that strategy has several pithy four character idioms in Chinese.

I think that you are likely right. I've said before that China's position in this war is that of the USSR in the Molotov-Ribbentrop Treaty. No matter which of their rivals loses, China (USSR in the analogy) wins.  But a complete victory by either side is much worse than a slow and draining one.

[Tonitrus]

Why would a Russian civil war be a bad thing for anyone other than the Russians?

As Jacob said, the nukes.  But also, while a Russian civil war would mostly hurt Russians...I would expect the likely victors would be the most ruthless, extreme and militaristic elements.  Not good for everyone else when that is done.