The EU thread

[Zanza]

Russia is barely able to advance against Ukraine, which has great spirit and experience, but scarce resources.

Europe has already ramped up e.g. artillery shell production massively. We should do the same on anti air missiles and drones. Especially on the latter I fear our militaries are too old school.

But Europe has air forces, navies, etc. that are far more capable and bigger than anything Ukraine ever fielded. If it can even muster half the will Ukraine has shown the last years, Russia will not beat Europe. Far from it.

[Valmy]

Europe seems to be moving slowly here. How can Italy and Germany have zero troops to spare to defend the gateway to Europe? What other threat are they saving their troops for?

Those advanced Aztecs sailing in from the West?

[Zanza]

In Germany such a debate has not even started as far as I am aware. It's outside the debatable policy space to deploy ground troops to Ukraine. Not because there are no troops, but due to WW2.

[Josquius]

Apparently the new British microwave anti drone weapons being used in Ukraine are working very well.

[crazy canuck]

Europe seems to be moving slowly here. How can Italy and Germany have zero troops to spare to defend the gateway to Europe? What other threat are they saving their troops for?

Those advanced Aztecs sailing in from the West?

The American threat

[Valmy]

Well ok send a few panzers to Greenland.

[Jacob]

Russia is barely able to advance against Ukraine, which has great spirit and experience, but scarce resources.

Europe has already ramped up e.g. artillery shell production massively. We should do the same on anti air missiles and drones. Especially on the latter I fear our militaries are too old school.

But Europe has air forces, navies, etc. that are far more capable and bigger than anything Ukraine ever fielded. If it can even muster half the will Ukraine has shown the last years, Russia will not beat Europe. Far from it.

You might be right, but I don't think it's certain.

The three biggest uncertainties from my point of view are:

1. Manpower - to take and hold land you need infantry in numbers. If Russia gains ground during an initial offensive, will Europe be able to deploy sufficient boots on the relevant ground in a timely fashion to take it back?

2. Experience with the changing nature of war - Russia has direct practical experience with war as it's being fought today; the EU + UK does not. Obviously the EU + UK has different materiel than Ukraine does, so the war will take a different shape - but experience matters, I think, especially at the opening stages.

3. Willingness to suffer casualties for the war - as long as Putin is in charge and there's no Russian collapse, Russia is going to be ready to feed meat into the grinder. Will Europe be willing to do so for whatever stakes the war is being fought over (say the Baltics)? I hope so, but it's not a given in my eyes, given Russian influence ops, various local populist factions, etc.

Obviously the EU has a technological advantage over Russia, and significantly more materiel than Ukraine - though that materiel is deployed all over the map and redeployment and concentration in theatre is not necessarily trivial (especially without the US). Is it sufficient to make the uncertainties above marginal? I don't know.

I'm not saying Russia will win, but I think the outcome is more uncertain than I'd like (depending, of course, and what the win conditions are for the involved parties). I think that Russia will think they have a chance. And I also think that the internal logic of Russia's politics and economy is driving it towards continued conflict, unless one of the counter scenarios I outlined upthread applies and dissuades them.

Actually, I think there are two more scenarios that could counter the drive towards the EU + UK vs Russia conflict:

• The US remains committed to supporting Europe vs Russia.
• China uses its political and economical capital to rein Russia in.

[Zanza]

Ukraine has fought Russia into a battle of attrition with minor change of the frontline over the last two years.

Ukraine has like 7% of the EU+UK population and like 2% of the GDP of EU+UK.

If Ukraine is able to basically stop Russian advance, so is Europe.

The only question is political will, but I think that in case of a Russian attack on EU/NATO, Europe will rally. More than it did with Ukraine.

[Josquius]

That's the trouble though. Russia knows this too.
They won't come storming over the border announcing they're going to conquer all of Europe. They'll do something really small, spread the word its actually a very valid and local concern - the link to Kalingrad for instance-and nobody else has anything else to worry about.
There will be many in Europe looking to avoid involvement.

[Jacob]

Interesting and in depth video on the French way of war, potentially of interest to military nerds and people interested
in geopolitics.

Near the end he addresses the scenario of a potential war against Russia. I haven't gotten this far, so I don't know what the conclusion is yet. But what I've watched so far is quite interesting.

[Sheilbh]

I agree with Jake - I'd add that I think the enablers bit provided by the US is really important. My understanding is that there is basically not a single deployment of any European force that does not rely on US logistical support - whether that's their strategic air lift for NATO forces in the Baltics or Romania, or for French troops in Sahel. It is all provided by the US at the minute and from what I understand very few European militaries have alternatives.

Or to provide another example (which is why I think Merz's move on infrastructure is as important as the rearming stuff), via Adam Tooze - Germany is the linchpin for European defence. It's the key hub for logistics and staging:


In a heavily redacted report from last year by the Inspector General of the US Department of Defence, the US military basically had to abandon using the German railway network for delivering arms to Ukraine and instead rely charter barges. The US commander in Europe at the time commented "we do not have enough transport capacity or infrastructure that enables the rapid movement of NATO forces across Europe [...] German railway Deutsche Bahn has enough rail cars to move one and a half armoured brigades simultaneously at one time." As Tooze explains:

One armoured brigade - the basic operational unit of modern warfare - comprises roughly 4,000 soldiers, 90 main battle tanks, 15 self-propelled howitzers, 150 Infantry Fighting Vehicles, 500 tracked vehicles and 600 wheeled vehicles and other equipment.

Being able to move no more than one and a half brigades means that you are not in a position to conduct any scale of military operations.

I posted it before but the estimate from Bruegel, based on published European intelligence agency assessments is that Europe probably needs 30-50 brigades to deter Russia. It also needs the logistics and infrastructure to deploy that force.

I don't think it exists now - absent the US - I don't think it can be conjured in a crisis, so I don't think there's any reason to be sanguine about Europe's ability to defend the Baltics or fight in a wider regional conflict - because, leaving aside political or morale will to fight, despite all of Russia's problems this war demonstrates those sinews of state power are still functioning. I don't think anything is inevitable but we need to see significant spending on infrastructure, building up logistical alternatives to the US, actual significant recruitment and rearmament and the sooner the better.

[Razgovory]

30-50 combat brigades seems like a lot.  That's the entire US army plus the national guard.

[Sheilbh]

I know nothing - from the Bruegel/Kiel Institute report the meat of that estimate:

A significantly more challenging scenario for Europe would be an unlikely peace deal accepted by Ukraine. In such a scenario, Russia is likely to continue its military build-up, creating a formidable military challenge to all of the EU in a very short period, given current Russian production. The EU and allies including the UK and Norway would need to accelerate their military build-ups immediately and massively.

The question of what capacities would be needed to secure a peace deal in Ukraine is at some level secondary. While there are estimates that Ukraine would need around 150,000 European troops to effectively deter Russia 6 , these troops would need to be ready to be deployed rapidly to wherever Russia might decide to attack the EU.

The current assumption of NATO military planners (RAND, 2024) is that in case of a Russian attack on a European NATO country, 100,000 US troops stationed in Europe would be rapidly augmented by up to 200,000 additional US troops, concentrated in US armoured units best suited for the East European battlefield.

A realistic estimate may therefore be that an increase in European capacities equivalent to the fighting capacity of 300,000 US troops is needed, with a focus on mechanised and armoured forces to replace US army heavy units. This translates to roughly 50 new European brigades.

Military coordination

The combat power of 300,000 US troops is substantially greater than the equivalent number of European troops distributed over 29 national armies. US troops would come in large, cohesive, corps-sized units with a unified command and control tighter even than NATO joint command. Furthermore, US troops are backed by the full might of American strategic enablers, including strategic aviation and space assets, which European militaries lack.

Europe, including the UK, currently has 1.47 million active-duty military personnel (SIPRI, 2024) but effectiveness is hampered by the lack of a unified command. NATO works under the assumption that the Supreme Allied Commander Europe is a top US general – but that can only function if the US takes a leadership role and provides strategic enablers.

Therefore, Europe faces a choice: either increase troop numbers significantly by more than 300,000 to make up for the fragmented nature of national militaries, or find ways to rapidly enhance military coordination. Failure to coordinate means much higher costs and individual efforts will likely be insufficient to deter the Russian military. Yet collective insurance means moral hazard and coordination problems need to be credibly solved.

Equipment and production

Rapidly generating such increases requires an extraordinary effort, though experience shows market economies can do it. For instance, under Chancellor Schmidt (1974-1982), West Germany rapidly modernised the Bundeswehr in response to the threat of modernised Soviet mechanised forces.

Taking the US Army III Corps as a reference point, credible European deterrence – for instance, to prevent a rapid Russian breakthrough in the Baltics – would require a minimum of 1,400 tanks, 2,000 infantry fighting vehicles and 700 artillery pieces (155mm howitzers and multiple rocket launchers). This is more combat power than currently exists in the French, German, Italian and British land forces combined. Providing these forces with sufficient munitions will be essential, beyond the barebones stockpiles currently available. For instance, one million 155mm shells would be the minimum for a large enough stockpile for 90 days of high-intensity combat.

Europe would also need to generate aviation and transport capacities, and missile, drone warfare and communication and intelligence capacities. This includes scaling up drone production to match Russia – to a level of about 2,000 long-range loitering munitions per year. Meanwhile, 300,000 new personnel would have to be recruited and trained.

[Tonitrus]

Ukraine has fought Russia into a battle of attrition with minor change of the frontline over the last two years.

Ukraine has like 7% of the EU+UK population and like 2% of the GDP of EU+UK.

If Ukraine is able to basically stop Russian advance, so is Europe.

The only question is political will, but I think that in case of a Russian attack on EU/NATO, Europe will rally. More than it did with Ukraine.

Europe certainly has the advantage in numbers/resources...but how "ready/deployable" is it?  Ukraine is much smaller, but has its military established, battle-hardened, and active. 

I don't doubt Europe winning in a long/protracted war, but in a near-term fight against Russia and Belarus (because I assume in this scenario...they'll be along for the ride)...it will be a very rough initial few/several months for the Baltic states, Poland, and Finland.

[Josquius]

The Lithuanian Defence Minister is absolutely right - and I fully get why the Poles (who have increased defence spending to close to 5% and are aiming for an army of 500,000) and other border states are unwilling to make commitments.

I don't.
We aren't talking about an actual force to fight Russia here. Just a tripwire force. Boots and flags on the ground.
The Baltics as such big supporters of Ukraine should offer 100 or so soldiers. This won't impact them and will make a point.
Poland really should be sending a decent number.