The EU thread

[Admiral Yi]

I disagree.

[Zoupa]

Good to know.

[Neil]

Is the issue people being made more radical by opposition, or is it just that sometimes the most vocal supporters of political movements create purity tests for things that they absolutely believe in, but where the majority of public sentiment is on the other side?  It's not that people are becoming more radical (or at least most people, there's always people who react to any kind of opposition with violent defiance), but it makes people less likely to support a party, because they've been told that they're either monsters or traitors.  And it's not like the left is unique for that.  I know that I face difficulties in conservative circles because I don't think that the answer to every problem is a tax cut, or that regulation is always onerous.  I think that's a mechanism that's at least partly responsible for a lot of the broad disgust that people have with politics.

[Zoupa]

I think we've reached a point in a lot of our democracies where polarization is so extreme that a large number of folks on the right are literally nazis. It's not hyperbole or overuse of the term fascist. These folks are embracing eugenics, ultranationalism, direct action/violence, and trad-sexism or whatever you want to call it.

At this point, I don't think dialogue and understanding works.

[Neil]

I'm not hip with the lingo that the kids these days are throwing down.  What's trad-sexism?

[Zoupa]

It's the trend of the "tradwife". Quite popular with the alt-right, incel, redpill etc communities.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tradwife

[Neil]

It's the trend of the "tradwife". Quite popular with the alt-right, incel, redpill etc communities.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tradwife

Huh.  On the one hand, I've seen great results in my in-laws with my late wife's sisters being stay-at-home wives raising children.  But then again, they weren't doing this for internet clout, and it was less 'submission' and more 'division of labour'.  On the other hand, I've seen a couple or two that I wonder if this is what they're shooting for, and it requires a man to be pretty mature to actually work.  I don't have a lot of faith in internet 'alpha males' being able to make this work. 

[Crazy_Ivan80]

the funny thing is of course that these women doing the trad-wives thing are choosing their own course, and are thus empowered (since being an influencer is job in today's world, and something that can pay the bills and is subject to taxes). Something, I assume, progressives are in favour of.

[Sheilbh]

Incidentally there was very good European news on defence in Germany.

But I read a piece in the Times on the Franco-British attempts to form a "coalition of the willing" to commit up to 30,000 troops to Ukraine. I posted earlier a piece by a defence think-tanker on what that would look like.

But the article said that "about half a dozen countries including the UK, France, Turkey, Canada and Australia are discussing" these plans - if that's right, that's five of the "about half a dozen" and only one of them is in the EU (the presence of Australia and Canada is also why I'm reluctant to say we just ignore the Pacific and Atlantic and focus purely on Europe). It goes on that "other countries are prepared to help with weapons and logistics".

As I say I'm a little dubious about the plan and I'm struck that the Baltics and Poland have ruled out participation and basically the countries most exposed to Russia seem least enthused by this plan. But on this sort of thing I can't help but think the French are basically right in thinking an EU foreign and defence policy should basically be run by them because they are willing to try to do things.

[Iormlund]

What would these troops do in Ukraine?

Going from not sending enough weapons to sending ground troops is a weird change.

[Sheilbh]

I think in large part, like the ceasefire push, an attempt to diplomatically shape what's happening (and developed in very close coordination with Kyiv). From the Kofman and Watling piece I posted on what a force might look like (and given the talks among defence chiefs is looking at around 30,000 this sounds close):

Bounding the Mission

NATO is more secure with Russia facing an independent Ukraine with a credible military. Attacking NATO under these circumstances would leave Ukraine on Russia's flank, while reducing the frontage over which Russia poses a threat. The first vital mission is therefore to partner with the armed forces of Ukraine to train and support their reconstitution, including the regeneration of a reserve and mobilization system in circumstances where many veterans have left the force.

The size of Ukraine, and the extensive front line, spanning over 750 miles (1200 kilometers) can lead one to presume that the requirements for a force are beyond the means of NATO's European militaries. Yet what Ukraine needs is not a traditional peacekeeping or separation force which has to be stretched along the line of contact. As such, it's not about the size of the front. Although European leaders may call it a "peacekeeping" force, this is not going to be a traditional U.N. peacekeeping mission. The force would serve two functions. First, assure Ukraine. With Western backing, Ukraine should be able to maintain a force sufficient to man, or patrol, key sectors of the front line. Second, enhance deterrence against future aggression from Russia through both the capability deployed and the inherent risk of directly engaging Western forces.

The multinational task force envisioned does not need to be everywhere in Ukraine. It needs to have a presence on three directions, and with sufficient mobility to redeploy as necessary along the front. Any future Russian attack would invariably be along several predictable directions. Today, most of the fighting is concentrated typically along three to four sectors of the front at a time. Hence, a relatively small force package can be sufficient for introducing risk into Russian calculus. The most obvious directions would be Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Donetsk. Western formations would deploy to these regions not as frontline troops, but as supporting echelons backing Ukrainian forces.

A European commitment would also help avoid a worst-case scenario after any ceasefire, in which Ukraine sees itself as abandoned without any security commitment or Western military presence. The army will demobilize and many of the men may then leave abroad, which would shrink the force significantly. Essentially, this is also about Ukrainians seeing that they have a future and that, in the event of another Russian invasion, they also have a chance.

Deploying Forces

Given the significant degradation in Russian force quality over the course of the last three years of fighting, the initial force deployed could be as few as three combat brigades, or their equivalents. The force may need to grow over time as Russia reconstitutes. This would amount to perhaps 15,000 to 20,000 personnel in country, with another 30,000 to 40,000 required for sustained rotation, for a total of 45,000 to 60,000 troops. A notional force structure would include a divisional headquarters, three maneuver brigades, a logistics brigade, and a fires brigade. Conversely, nations could set up their own national support elements in place of a logistics brigade.

This effort should also envision moving the multinational INTERFLEX training mission for Ukrainian troops, currently running in the United Kingdom, into Ukraine. Britain's 11 Security Force Assistance Brigade, which is the unit at the core of that effort, should also be deployed. This would address Ukraine's longtime request for greater in-country training of its forces, and adaptation of its basic training regimen. Keeping the force size manageable will be a challenge. Multinational formations tend to be larger than the mission requirements, because of duplication of functions between units, separate support elements for individual nation's unique logistical requirements, and everyone wanting a seat at the table in the headquarters.

European leaders may worry what will happen if this force is engaged by Russian strike capabilities. There is a somewhat fraught discussion at present about the need for robust air defenses. Yet the war has shown that dispersal is highly effective, as is entrenchment, and Ukrainian air defense (much of it Western systems) intercepts a significant percentage of Russian strikes. If anything, the experience has illustrated that air and missile defenses are more effective than expected, while a force that is properly dispersed is a very unattractive target for prestige strike systems. A multinational force could manage its footprint in country to make itself a hard target, in much the same way as hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian troops do every day. Indeed, mass casualty events are rare, even relatively close to the front line. If losses take place from skirmishes, or incidents, there's no reason they would lead to a war with Russia, and in many similar cases have not in the past.

Sustaining this presence in Ukraine would mean that European nations would have to revisit existing commitments to rapid reaction forces, and those made under NATO regional defense plans. But Europe has the capacity to do this and given the recently made pledges to increase defense spending, could certainly increase it sufficiently to meet both a sustained deployment in Ukraine and other commitments over time.

The force as conceived would be a multinational division, operating under its own command. Units in the rear could help train Ukrainian forces, conduct joint exercises, and support other activities while learning from Ukrainian experience. Western forces could also be backed by their own airpower, based within the territory of bordering NATO members. This is a comparative advantage for countries like the United Kingdom and France, which have significant airpower available that's largely uncommitted to other missions. This would provide a visible force multiplier, and additional air protection for units in-country. However, the mission would be under European, rather than Ukrainian command. Such a force would be additive given existing Ukrainian military capability. It would backstop Ukrainian forces manning the line of contact, rather than serving as the principal deterrent in the theatre.

The current British and French plan being discussed to deploy a force of up to 30,000 personnel suggest that while such a commitment is beyond the existing resource envelope of European NATO members, it is not beyond what is envisaged by European leaders. The question is whether they are prepared to underwrite the costs. So far European leaders have not been prepared to match their rhetorical commitments with resources. Notably, some nations with significant military capability, like Poland, appear to be reticent to be security providers. The majority contributors should not be frontline states, who have their own significant defense requirements. Therefore, Western Europe should take the leading role, ideally with Turkish participation.

There is a degree of fretting about the impact of such a deployment on NATO's deterrence posture. However, frontline states should avoid engaging in beggar-thy-neighbor politics when it comes to European security. A European mission in Ukraine need not come at their expense. Furthermore, if European nations are incapable of collectively deploying one multinational division, then this should raise broader questions about European commitment to European security. The risk of inaction is much greater for Europe than the risk inherent in deploying a force into theatre that could be attacked, or otherwise challenged.