Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[celedhring]

I'm also not quite sure how useful a tactical nuclear strike would be in Ukraine.  Ukrainian forces seem somewhat dispersed and largely avoiding any pitched battles, so it seems unlikely there are any military targets susceptible to such an attack.

They could bomb Kyiv or another city left standing that hasn't fallen as they retreat.

But I do not believe this to be a serious possibility.  Chemical weapons on the other hand...

Nuking a city it's not "tactical" bombing.

[Barrister]

I'm also not quite sure how useful a tactical nuclear strike would be in Ukraine.  Ukrainian forces seem somewhat dispersed and largely avoiding any pitched battles, so it seems unlikely there are any military targets susceptible to such an attack.

They could bomb Kyiv or another city left standing that hasn't fallen as they retreat.

But I do not believe this to be a serious possibility.  Chemical weapons on the other hand...

Bombing Kyiv is not a tactical nuclear strike.  I suspect that would necessitate an even more serious response from NATO.

Edit: Celed beat me to it.

[Jacob]

I'm seeing reports that Ukraine has retaken Irpin.

As is often the case when I see such reports I google them to find them on the map... it's sobering to see the pictures that google maps show (in this case, some kid in a swimsuit playing in a fountain) and the hotel recommendations and so on.

From a bygone area, obviously.

[Berkut]

That kind of illustrates the silliness, in many ways, of the "tactical versus strategic" distinction.

What was the old Cold War joke about the definition of a tactical nuclear weapon? One that goes off in Germany!

I guess my basic question was really whether the US has changed our Defcon status, even if we haven't actually changed our defcon status.

I don't think OvB is right about it being a binary thing. I think keeping track of Russian assets takes resources, and involves risk. I suspect that there is a lot we could do (and likely are (quietly) doing) to ramp up our intelligence and capabilities around this kind of conflict.

At least, I sure as hell hope we are....

I also hope Biden can refrain from ad libbing it onto the end of his next speech.

[crazy canuck]

I'm seeing reports that Ukraine has retaken Irpin.

As is often the case when I see such reports I google them to find them on the map... it's sobering to see the pictures that google maps show (in this case, some kid in a swimsuit playing in a fountain) and the hotel recommendations and so on.

From a bygone area, obviously.

Yeah, saw the story in the Globe but they have a sentence at the end of it saying they cannot confirm yet.

[Barrister]

I don't think OvB is right about it being a binary thing. I think keeping track of Russian assets takes resources, and involves risk. I suspect that there is a lot we could do (and likely are (quietly) doing) to ramp up our intelligence and capabilities around this kind of conflict.

I'm pretty sure the US is gathering a hell of a lot of intelligence about Russian activity in the region - and passing a lot of it on to the Ukrainians.

[Berkut]

I don't think OvB is right about it being a binary thing. I think keeping track of Russian assets takes resources, and involves risk. I suspect that there is a lot we could do (and likely are (quietly) doing) to ramp up our intelligence and capabilities around this kind of conflict.

I'm pretty sure the US is gathering a hell of a lot of intelligence about Russian activity in the region - and passing a lot of it on to the Ukrainians.

I was talking, in that context, about US tracking of Russian strategic assets - ie, SLBM armed subs, ICBMs, bombers, etc., etc.

[Barrister]

I don't think OvB is right about it being a binary thing. I think keeping track of Russian assets takes resources, and involves risk. I suspect that there is a lot we could do (and likely are (quietly) doing) to ramp up our intelligence and capabilities around this kind of conflict.

I'm pretty sure the US is gathering a hell of a lot of intelligence about Russian activity in the region - and passing a lot of it on to the Ukrainians.

I was talking, in that context, about US tracking of Russian strategic assets - ie, SLBM armed subs, ICBMs, bombers, etc., etc.

Surely they've long been doing such things?

[Berkut]

I don't think OvB is right about it being a binary thing. I think keeping track of Russian assets takes resources, and involves risk. I suspect that there is a lot we could do (and likely are (quietly) doing) to ramp up our intelligence and capabilities around this kind of conflict.

I'm pretty sure the US is gathering a hell of a lot of intelligence about Russian activity in the region - and passing a lot of it on to the Ukrainians.

I was talking, in that context, about US tracking of Russian strategic assets - ie, SLBM armed subs, ICBMs, bombers, etc., etc.

Surely they've long been doing such things?

One would certainly hope so.

But I would expect there is a somewhat heightened sense of urgency around that now.

[Jacob]

Re: the social media reports that Putin has appointed Kadyrov to be a Lt. General in the Russian forces (Rosgvardia, apparently).

If true that's such an indication of so many things rotten in Russian military infrastructure. What skills does Kadyrov have to turn the war in Ukraine around? Is he good with operations? Strategy? Does he understand how to fight a war? Is he good at logistics?

My impression is that the answer to those questions are no. What Kadyrov has is professed loyatly to Putin and a well earned reputation for cruel brutality and terror to force compliance. I mean, I understand how that is a key skill to operate successfully at a high level in Putin's Russia, but I find it hard to believe that that is what it's going to take to turn the war in Ukraine around for Russia.

[celedhring]

Re: the social media reports that Putin has appointed Kadyrov to be a Lt. General in the Russian forces (Rosgvardia, apparently).

If true that's such an indication of so many things rotten in Russian military infrastructure. What skills does Kadyrov have to turn the war in Ukraine around? Is he good with operations? Strategy? Does he understand how to fight a war? Is he good at logistics?

My impression is that the answer to those questions are no. What Kadyrov has is professed loyatly to Putin and a well earned reputation for cruel brutality and terror to force compliance. I mean, I understand how that is a key skill to operate successfully at a high level in Putin's Russia, but I find it hard to believe that that is what it's going to take to turn the war in Ukraine around for Russia.

I read that he was already Maj. General, so this probably changes nothing. I presume he'll just remain in charge of the chechen units.

Apparently he also has the Russian equivalent of the MoH 

[Jacob]

Sinopec pauses investments in Russian gas and oil:

March 25 (Reuters) - (March 25, story corrects to show that Novatek did not respond to requests for comment, not that it declined to comment)

China's state-run Sinopec Group has suspended talks for a major petrochemical investment and a gas marketing venture in Russia, sources told Reuters, heeding a government call for caution as sanctions mount over the invasion of Ukraine.

The move by Asia's biggest oil refiner to hit the brakes on a potentially half-billion-dollar investment in a gas chemical plant and a venture to market Russian gas in China highlights the risks, even to Russia's most important diplomatic partner, of unexpectedly heavy Western-led sanctions.

Beijing has repeatedly voiced opposition to the sanctions, insisting it will maintain normal economic and trade exchanges with Russia, and has refused to condemn Moscow's actions in Ukraine or call them an invasion. read more

But behind the scenes, the government is wary of Chinese companies running afoul of sanctions - it is pressing companies to tread carefully with investments in Russia, its second-largest oil supplier and third-largest gas provider.

Since Russia invaded a month ago, China's three state energy giants - Sinopec , China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) and China National Offshore Oil Corp (CNOOC) (0883.HK) - have been assessing the impact of the sanctions on their multi-billion dollar investments in Russia, sources with direct knowledge of the matter said. read more

"Companies will rigidly follow Beijing's foreign policy in this crisis," said an executive at a state oil company. "There's no room whatsoever for companies to take any initiatives in terms of new investment."

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs this month summoned officials from the three energy companies to review their business ties with Russian partners and local operations, two sources with knowledge of the meeting said. One said the ministry urged them not to make any rash moves buying Russian assets.

The companies have set up task forces on Russia-related matters and are working on contingency plans for business disruptions and in case of secondary sanctions, sources said.

The sources asked not to be named, given the sensitivity of the matter. Sinopec and the other companies declined to comment.

The ministry said there is no need for China to report to other parties about "whether there are internal meetings or not".

"China is a big, independent country. We have the right to carry out normal economic and trade cooperation in various fields with other countries across the world," it said in a faxed statement.

U.S. President Joe Biden said on Thursday that China knows its economic future is tied to the West, after warning Chinese leader Xi Jinping that Beijing could regret siding with Russia's invasion of Ukraine. read more

Global oil majors Shell (SHEL.L) and BP (BP.L), and Norway's Equinor pledged to exit their Russian operations shortly after Russia's Feb. 24 invasion. Moscow says its "special operation" aims not to occupy territory but to destroy Ukraine's military capabilities and capture what it calls dangerous nationalists. read more

TALKS ON HOLD

Sinopec, formally China Petroleum and Chemical Corp, has suspended the discussions to invest up to $500 million in the new gas chemical plant in Russia, one of the sources said.

The plan has been to team up with Sibur, Russia's largest petrochemical producer, for a project similar to the $10 billion Amur Gas Chemical Complex in East Siberia, 40% owned by Sinopec and 60% by Sibur, set to come online in 2024.

"The companies wanted to replicate the Amur venture by building another one and were in the middle of site selection," said the source.

Sinopec hit pause after realising that Sibur minority shareholder and board member Gennady Timchenko had been sanctioned by the West, the source said. The European Union and Britain last month imposed sanctions on Timchenko, a long-time ally of Russian President Vladimir Putin, and other billionaires with ties to Putin. read more

Timchenko's spokesman declined to comment on sanctions.

The Amur project itself faces funding snags, said two of the sources, as sanctions threaten to choke financing from key lenders, including Russia's state-controlled Sberbank (SBER.MM) and European credit agencies. read more

"It's an existing investment. Sinopec is trying to overcome the difficulties in financing," said a Beijing-based industry executive with direct knowledge of the matter.

Sibur said it continues to cooperate with Sinopec including working jointly on implementing the Amur plant. It denied that there was a plan to team up with Sinopec for a project similar to the Amur Gas Chemical Complex in east Siberia.

"Sinopec is actively participating in the issues of the project's construction management, including equipment supplies, work with suppliers and contractors. We are also jointly working on the issues of project financing," Sibur told Reuters by email.

Sinopec also suspended talks over the gas marketing venture with Russian gas producer Novatek (NVTK.MM) over concerns that Sberbank, one of Novatek's shareholders, is on the latest U.S. sanctions list, said one source with direct knowledge of the matter. read more

Timchenko resigned from Novatek's board on Monday in the wake of the sanctions. read more

Novatek, Russia's largest independent gas producer, entered a preliminary deal in 2019 with Sinopec and Gazprombank to create a joint venture marketing liquefied natural gas to China as well as distributing natural gas in China.

Novatek did not respond to Reuters' requests for comment on the agreement with Sinopec.

Beyond Sinopec's planned Amur plant, CNPC and CNOOC were among the latest investors into Russia's natural gas sector, taking minority stakes in major export project Arctic LNG 2 in 2019 and Yamal LNG in 2014. read more

https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/exclusive-chinas-sinopec-pauses-russia-projects-beijing-wary-sanctions-sources-2022-03-25/

[Habbaku]

[OttoVonBismarck]

That kind of illustrates the silliness, in many ways, of the "tactical versus strategic" distinction.

What was the old Cold War joke about the definition of a tactical nuclear weapon? One that goes off in Germany!

I guess my basic question was really whether the US has changed our Defcon status, even if we haven't actually changed our defcon status.

I don't think OvB is right about it being a binary thing. I think keeping track of Russian assets takes resources, and involves risk. I suspect that there is a lot we could do (and likely are (quietly) doing) to ramp up our intelligence and capabilities around this kind of conflict.

At least, I sure as hell hope we are....

I also hope Biden can refrain from ad libbing it onto the end of his next speech.

I mean I didn't invent the tactical vs strategic distinction, it is as old as the Cold War, there were policymakers both in the US and USSR that believed there was a tactical, battlefield application for nuclear weapons. Sometimes their views held prominence and even lead to the development of specific weapon systems. Meanwhile there was another faction that held that there is no such thing as a tactical nuke. As Jim Mattis said when asked about it "any use of a nuclear weapon has strategic implications." One can handwave away the idea of a tactical nuclear weapon all they want, but because it has driven policy decisions both in the US and Russia--and more importantly weapon system developments, it is important to recognize that some decision makers buy into the idea of tactical nukes. If Putin is one of them then there is a non-zero possibility he could use a low yield nuclear weapon in the belief (whether correct or not) that it would not be seen as likely to escalate beyond the level you'd see from using a few really big conventional bombs.

As for the strategic readiness stuff, I think you're honestly confused about how the U.S. nuclear forces work. Our nuclear strategic readiness and the various stages of it are primarily how actively prepared we are to launch nuclear weapons, it is an offensive, not defensive, system. The idea you're proposing that we have some "extra vigilance" mode where we really pay hard attention to Russian nuclear movements is, IMO, not supported by any unclassified reporting we've ever seen on the issue. Everything that's ever been told to the public says we have missile launch detection systems, track the flights of every Russian nuclear capable bomber, and we try to follow every Russian SLBM we can (how successful we are at that is highly unknown, since our sub activities are classified.) There are definitely American submarines whose job is to try and find the Russian missile subs, and to shadow them when they do. I've never seen that we have a "try harder" mode, or what that would even mean.

Again--the conventional conception of American strategic readiness is about us being ready to launch nuclear weapons, it isn't about defensive moves. I also think it is outdated because the reality of the nuclear arsenal changed.

In the 1960s and into the 1970s, the bomber nuclear fleet was still very large and theoretically important. So the highest levels of strategic readiness (only reached during the Cuban Missile Crisis) meant a certain, fairly large amount of American bombers would be continuously in the skies 24/7 loaded with nuclear weapons, flying relatively close to Russian airspace. This posture gave the President "hair trigger" ability to give the order, at which those planes would immediately turn toward Russia and began a large scale nuclear attack.

The famous B-61 nuclear bombs that we "entrusted" to several important NATO allies were a somewhat political part of this process, in that they were kept stored in vaults in normal times, but could be loaded into bombers during the highest levels of nuclear readiness.

The reality is once bomber fleets lost most of their relevance in the nuclear deterrent, and it shifted primarily to submarines and ICBM silos, the whole conception kinda breaks down. The reality is our ICBM silos and our ballistic subs are set up entirely by design to be able to launch within a couple minutes of receiving the order. That isn't something that requires special readiness as it did for Strategic Air Command, because there's different logistics to it. The ballistic subs are perpetually at sea, and can launch at almost any time, the missile silos are continuously manned and ready. Now we certainly still have a staged readiness system, but it's a lot different in practical effect to what it was during the 60s/70s when it had major implications on SAC operations.

Note that even for SAC, going down to DEFCON2 and the highest level of nuclear readiness we ever hit wasn't as massive a difference from the norm as the casual observer might think. From 1960-1968 SAC had about 75 planes in the air at all times with nuclear weapons, intended to basically be "survivors" if the Soviets nuked America, who could get a final vengeance strike in. During the Cuban Missile Crisis this increased to like 135 continuous planes in the air, so realistically it was a difference in scale not in response-time capability.

[Sheilbh]

My impression is that the answer to those questions are no. What Kadyrov has is professed loyatly to Putin and a well earned reputation for cruel brutality and terror to force compliance. I mean, I understand how that is a key skill to operate successfully at a high level in Putin's Russia, but I find it hard to believe that that is what it's going to take to turn the war in Ukraine around for Russia.

Same - my understanding was that Kadyrov's thing was just that he is a "footsoldier for Putin". Very loyal (on a transactional basis), but basically a warlord.

My guess would be either Kadyrov's getting itchy and so needs to be rewarded/bought off with higher positions (and Zolotov plus Kadyrov is a very violent and pretty charmless combo), or perhaps Putin is getting nervy and wants to incorporate another force that owes him only for their power into the National Guard structure. Again they would be first in line to repress any discontent - possibly preparing for spring conscription season?