Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[Josquius]

Are Russias nuclear subs such a massive concern?
As mentioned they're quite few in number.
Don't they have huge numbers of land based silos.

[grumbler]

Are Russias nuclear subs such a massive concern?
As mentioned they're quite few in number.
Don't they have huge numbers of land based silos.

What we are discussing here is what steps the US/NATO could take to heighten strategic readiness.  One of those measures had to do with tracking Russian SSBNs.  Not because they are "such a massive concern," but because they are one of the things the US/NATO could do. 

[OttoVonBismarck]

In reality the land-based ICBM resources of Russia or the United States are large enough that in a meta level it probably doesn't matter, no. A lot of the design of our comparative nuclear forces derives right from the 1960s. Something not frequently mentioned in popular media/press is a lot of analysis that came out around and after the CMC highly suggested that given the typical delivery mechanisms and the number of warheads available via those mechanisms, if there had been a full nuclear exchange in '62, it's entirely possible that the USSR would have "lost" and lost badly. Meaning, we would have taken out a lot of their shit and probably only suffered a few strikes on our side.

Russia's move (which was already underway) to massive numbers of ICBMs and its development of submarine launched missiles was intended to rectify that situation. At the time of the CMC USSR may have had as few as a couple dozen true ICBMs, they had a larger stockpile of medium range missiles, but couldn't hit the United States with them--there was a big asymmetry at this point in the Cold War because we had such a large nuclear bomber fleet stationed right at Russia's doorstep and we had missiles in Turkey.

A really big ICBM fleet, which the USSR eventually deployed many thousands, gave them the ability to credibly say they could wipe our country off the face of the earth entirely from launch sites within the USSR--which we would not be able to hit or take out before they got their missiles launched. We of course presented a somewhat equivalent threat to them (and even more so in some respects because we maintained shorter range weapons much closer to Russia than they could their shorter/intermediate range weapons.)

The U.S. DOD has long promoted the idea of a Nuclear "triad", but there are credible reasons to believe our land based ICBM silos all by themselves could easily land a full force retaliatory strike on any country--remember our missileers have been on 24/7/365 since 1959, the silos themselves are hardened and deep underground and there is no realistically credible scenario where an adversary could knock all or even many of them out before we got a launch off. You could absolutely make an argument that the sea and air parts of the triad probably aren't necessary.

The air part of the triad is probably the least relevant these days in terms of strategic deterrence.

The big justification for maintaining nuclear ballistic subs is essentially "we can launch them from anywhere and our enemies won't know until it's too late", which frankly doesn't entirely jive with deterrence as much as it does with a potential gamed out first strike scenario, but while the U.S. has never formally ruled out a first strike scenario (Obama ruled it out in some circumstances), our PR and public facing arguments for maintaining the ballistic subs is "strategic deterrence." Also there has always been the concept of being able to launch missiles from them if somehow the homeland was "taken out" and the subs were all that was left, but that scenario is also fairly speculative--in a full exchange the nuclear subs would have launch orders and probably already be launching their missiles by then.

[Barrister]

"Russian vessel, go fuck yourself".

I'm sure you remember those words from the early days of the war by Ukrainian border guards stationed on Snake Island.  It was reported that the Ukrainians were likely killed, but then changed to say they were captured by Russia.

Turns out the Ukrainians were exchanged in a prisoner exchange.  The fellow who said those words, a soldier named Roman Gribov, was given a medal today.

https://twitter.com/bopanc/status/1508813217006501889

(Twitter user is a blue-check WSJ correspondent)

[celedhring]

Kadyrov is a character out of an unwritten "Lord of War" sequel.

https://twitter.com/KevinRothrock/status/1508852057318608909

[Berkut]

I would think tracking Russian SSBNs has to be priority #1 when it comes to any of this stuff, right?

I mean, they have ten of them. That's not that many. I imagine some are in port (and those ports are known and likely target #1 in any exchange). Getting a SSBN to sea is not something that can be done quickly, I imagine. IIRC, you can actually see the heatblooms by satellite when they power up their reactor in preparation to going to sea.

Say out of ten they have 6 at sea. I could imagine that in normal peacetime ops, there is a US or Brit attack sub basically assigned to every single one of them, to pick them up as they leave port and try to track them. But doing so is probably not that simple - we aren't typically, I suspect, going inside the 12 mile national zone, so that means that there is likely a possibility they can evade that pick up point.

Well, having two out there to pick up each one means that is more likely, right? I know subs don't coordinate with each other closely, for obvious reasons, but it would seem to me that if I was worried that a shooting war might start, I can't imagine too many more important jobs for US attack subs to be doing then sitting around trying to track those SSBNs.

I could certainly imagine a reasonable step to take now, and one pretty hard for Russia to notice or complain about, is to double the number of subs assigned to that mission. Or not - I am no expert of course. Maybe we are really good at keeping track of them and don't really need to assign more to that mission?

I don't think that one can tell via satellite-detectable heat signatures whether a sub has increased reactor output (remembering that those are always active), but you could tell that a sub is preparing for sea by the satellite images of them loading perishables.

I don't think it would be escalatory to be more aggressive in tracking the one or two (not six or so) Russian SSBNs at sea; in fact, it would provide a salutary lesson that the Russians do not, in fact, have a secure SLBM force, even for a first strike.  They couldn't be sure that their subs could get to launch depth, open the launch tubes, and launch before it got punched in the face by a CBASS.  Anything that adds to Russian planning uncertainty is a win for the West.

Is it reasonable to suppose though that under different circumstances, the aggressiveness (whether that be by engagement rules or by additional assets) we attempt to keep tabs on those 1-3 SSBNs could in fact vary greatly depending on the circumstances?

I mean, we have lots of other assets as well, right? SOSUS nets, etc., etc.

That has to be one hell of a game to play (and I am sure they are playing it as well, trying to keep track of our SSBNs). So much complexity, so many different systems and variables at play.

If I was the Russians, and I know that American/Brit SSNs are out there trying to find my SSBNs, then obviously one thing I can do is "escort" them with my own SSNs, at least broadly speaking. I doubt they would operate together directly, but if I know that SSBN X is going to have a patrol area of some defined grid space, then certainly I would want to park a couple of my own SSNs in that same area.

And knowing that, if I am the Americans, I am going to want really more then just 1 SSN to track the SSBN - I want several, if I can get them, to deal with the other enemy SSNs, and provide backup. 

It really is a fascinating game.

[Berkut]

I think OvB is largely correct in the analysis of the ICBM/aircraft part of the deterrent.

The point of SSBNs is just that you can imagine a scenario where one side gets the drop on the other, and manages to deliver an effective first strike without the target getting a chance to fire back before the first strike hits. That is not at all an unlikely reality, and both sides know it. The ability to *actually* respond and fire back in a matter of 15-25 minutes is very speculative, and both sides know that in reality, it is quite likely that what you will have to respond with will be only those forces that survived that first strike.

This is why the US has put a lot of work into developing very high precision, lower yield strategic MIRVs. We believe that we can, in fact, degrade appreciably the counter strike capability of Russian nuclear forces. Taking out a hardened missile silo is a matter of getting the nuclear bomb close enough, more then the power of the bomb. Doubling the yield is not nearly as useful as halving the CEP of the impact point.

SSBNs, however, make a lot of that moot. Even if you manage to take out the entire ICBM and bomber force, two SSBNs alone have enough firepower to effectively wipe out American society.

The USA has worked to create (regardless of what they say) a nuclear force with what they think is the accuracy necessary to go after the nuclear war making capability of the enemy. Russia has not, to my knowledge, ever managed to achieve that level of sophistication in their missiles, so they are more targeted at population centers and military bases, rather then individual silos - or rather, they probably target both, but don't actually expect that they can reliably take out the silos. Of course, a MIRV that has a CEP of a few hundred meters is pointless if your target is just retribution strikes on population centers.

That is why our ability to threaten their SSBNs is so critical. And kind of terrifying. It is their ultimate deterrent - no matter what happens, you will lose because our SSBNs will nuke your country in even the best case scenario. If that is not certain to be true, it makes for a very different calculus.

[The Minsky Moment]

Counterforce vs countervalue targeting- feels like the 80s again.

[Berkut]

Counterforce vs countervalue targeting- feels like the 80s again.

I know, it's crazy.

Hell, both sides weapons have not been tested in decades. God knows what even actually works anymore. It's not like a nuclear weapon can just sit in storage for decades. I mean, all that shit degrades over time.

[PDH]

Well, the Russians have set a standard for missile reliability.

[The Larch]

I've seen several articles talking about EU countries kicking out Russian diplomats because of espionage, and did a little compilation:

Just today:
- 21 from Belgium.
- 17 from the Netherlands.
- 4 from Ireland
- 1 from the Czech Republic.

Earlier this week:
- 10 from Bulgaria.
- 4 from Lithuania.
- 3 from Latvia and Estonia.

Last week:
- 45 from Poland.

So, more than 100 in the last couple of weeks alone. At this point one has to wonder how many Russian diplomats *don't* engage in espionage. 

[crazy canuck]

You know a Russian is spying when they have diplomatic plates.

[Josquius]

I've seen several articles talking about EU countries kicking out Russian diplomats because of espionage, and did a little compilation:

Just today:
- 21 from Belgium.
- 17 from the Netherlands.
- 4 from Ireland
- 1 from the Czech Republic.

Earlier this week:
- 10 from Bulgaria.
- 4 from Lithuania.
- 3 from Latvia and Estonia.

Last week:
- 45 from Poland.

So, more than 100 in the last couple of weeks alone. At this point one has to wonder how many Russian diplomats *don't* engage in espionage. 

I think they call the ones who don't indulge in espionage spies.
That's just how Russia rolls.

[Duque de Bragança]

I've seen several articles talking about EU countries kicking out Russian diplomats because of espionage, and did a little compilation:

Just today:
- 21 from Belgium.
- 17 from the Netherlands.
- 4 from Ireland
- 1 from the Czech Republic.

Earlier this week:
- 10 from Bulgaria.
- 4 from Lithuania.
- 3 from Latvia and Estonia.

Last week:
- 45 from Poland.

So, more than 100 in the last couple of weeks alone. At this point one has to wonder how many Russian diplomats *don't* engage in espionage. 

Those in Portugal even manage to do do, since the former corrupt PS Lisbon mayor, now Finance minister, gave adresses of Russian refugees/opponents, some even dual citizenship (Portugal-Russia), to the Russsian embassy.

[Malthus]

You know a Russian is spying when they have diplomatic plates.

That is, when they are not drunk driving. 😉