Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-25

[grumbler]

There are certainly some possible ways in which the US could enhance its strategic stance that are not strictly offensive.  For one, it could take more risks in acquiring track on Russian SSBNs by going closer inshore to pick them up as they leave port.  One could p[potentially load software optimized for ABM into computers aboard Aegis-equipped ships (at the cost of some AAW capability).  One could potentially shift the loadout on deploying Aegis ships to embark more RIM-161 missiles at the expense of earlier varieties of Standard missile.  One could increase the readiness status of fighters assigned to NORAD, and the Looking Glass E-6Bs. 

[OttoVonBismarck]

There are certainly some possible ways in which the US could enhance its strategic stance that are not strictly offensive.  For one, it could take more risks in acquiring track on Russian SSBNs by going closer inshore to pick them up as they leave port.  One could p[potentially load software optimized for ABM into computers aboard Aegis-equipped ships (at the cost of some AAW capability).  One could potentially shift the loadout on deploying Aegis ships to embark more RIM-161 missiles at the expense of earlier varieties of Standard missile.  One could increase the readiness status of fighters assigned to NORAD, and the Looking Glass E-6Bs. 

I'd agree with that but I think the first two things--closer tracking of SSBNs and trading AAW capability for ABM capability are both things with downsides, the reason we don't already track their subs closer inshore is we want to avoid potential negative incidents (and there is an argument to be made that during a time of heightened conflict risk you want to be even more sure of avoiding those), and retasking the Aegis software could be of tactical dubious quality since despite all the talk there is a greater risk of conventional air attacks by Russia targeted at NATO forces in a pique of rage or what have you than there is of him deploying a nuclear weapon. I certainly don't know enough about the software on our Aegis systems to understand the implications of such retasking as weighted against the likely AAW vs ABM threat.

Beefing up NORAD flights would probably be a relatively painless and logical step, but even that would indicate we have some concern Russia is planning strategic nuclear or conventional strikes against North America which I think is a tad unrealistic.

[Solmyr]

I find it very curious that so much is said of Chechens and they've become Russia's go to thugs.
They've managed to spin Putin's Chechen war as the work of nasty outsiders?

No, but Kadyrov's thigs will murder you and your entire family if you mention it.

[celedhring]

No, but Kadyrov's thigs will murder you

Death by snu-snu?

[Berkut]

There are certainly some possible ways in which the US could enhance its strategic stance that are not strictly offensive.  For one, it could take more risks in acquiring track on Russian SSBNs by going closer inshore to pick them up as they leave port.  One could p[potentially load software optimized for ABM into computers aboard Aegis-equipped ships (at the cost of some AAW capability).  One could potentially shift the loadout on deploying Aegis ships to embark more RIM-161 missiles at the expense of earlier varieties of Standard missile.  One could increase the readiness status of fighters assigned to NORAD, and the Looking Glass E-6Bs. 

I'd agree with that but I think the first two things--closer tracking of SSBNs and trading AAW capability for ABM capability are both things with downsides, the reason we don't already track their subs closer inshore is we want to avoid potential negative incidents (and there is an argument to be made that during a time of heightened conflict risk you want to be even more sure of avoiding those), and retasking the Aegis software could be of tactical dubious quality since despite all the talk there is a greater risk of conventional air attacks by Russia targeted at NATO forces in a pique of rage or what have you than there is of him deploying a nuclear weapon. I certainly don't know enough about the software on our Aegis systems to understand the implications of such retasking as weighted against the likely AAW vs ABM threat.

Beefing up NORAD flights would probably be a relatively painless and logical step, but even that would indicate we have some concern Russia is planning strategic nuclear or conventional strikes against North America which I think is a tad unrealistic.

But this is my point - all these things do in fact have tradeoffs, so in fact there is a "try harder" mode, where those tradeoffs are evaluated differently depending on the threat level.

And yes, our subs have a certain number at sea, and a certain number in port refitting, provisioning, etc., etc.

But those numbers are not fixed, at least, they are not fixed absolutely. I am sure that if we can keep 50% of our attack subs at sea over a long period during peacetime, we could, if needed, put 60% at sea in an emergency, with some cost in long term readiness. Again, tradeoffs. Should we do that now? I don't know. *Could* we do that now? I am pretty sure we could. 

The idea that there is nothing to be done to prepare for a confict simply makes no sense. Peace time is not the same as war time, and there is an entire escalation level between the two.

And yes, one of the tradeoffs is that when you do those things, and Russia notices, that can definitely be seen as escalatory, especially when it comes to things that do or can target strategic assets.

That is why I think it is an interesting discussion, and why I thought the response that there was nothing to discuss because US strategic and counter-strategic forces are always in a fixed state of readiness that never adjusts to the circumstances was rather weirdly confrontational and obviously just plain wrong.

[Berkut]

There are certainly some possible ways in which the US could enhance its strategic stance that are not strictly offensive.  For one, it could take more risks in acquiring track on Russian SSBNs by going closer inshore to pick them up as they leave port.  One could p[potentially load software optimized for ABM into computers aboard Aegis-equipped ships (at the cost of some AAW capability).  One could potentially shift the loadout on deploying Aegis ships to embark more RIM-161 missiles at the expense of earlier varieties of Standard missile.  One could increase the readiness status of fighters assigned to NORAD, and the Looking Glass E-6Bs. 

I would think tracking Russian SSBNs has to be priority #1 when it comes to any of this stuff, right?

I mean, they have ten of them. That's not that many. I imagine some are in port (and those ports are known and likely target #1 in any exchange). Getting a SSBN to sea is not something that can be done quickly, I imagine. IIRC, you can actually see the heatblooms by satellite when they power up their reactor in preparation to going to sea.

Say out of ten they have 6 at sea. I could imagine that in normal peacetime ops, there is a US or Brit attack sub basically assigned to every single one of them, to pick them up as they leave port and try to track them. But doing so is probably not that simple - we aren't typically, I suspect, going inside the 12 mile national zone, so that means that there is likely a possibility they can evade that pick up point.

Well, having two out there to pick up each one means that is more likely, right? I know subs don't coordinate with each other closely, for obvious reasons, but it would seem to me that if I was worried that a shooting war might start, I can't imagine too many more important jobs for US attack subs to be doing then sitting around trying to track those SSBNs. 

I could certainly imagine a reasonable step to take now, and one pretty hard for Russia to notice or complain about, is to double the number of subs assigned to that mission. Or not - I am no expert of course. Maybe we are really good at keeping track of them and don't really need to assign more to that mission?

[Sheilbh]

It looks like (first?) battle of Kyiv is over - Russia has announced they're withdrawing, presumably to focus on the Donbas and Crimea. US intelligence has assessed that Russian forces do look like they're starting to pull out having briefly built defensive positions.

Reportedly Ukraine is not letting up on their engagement with Russian forces around Kyiv - which is entirely the right approach. Russia hasn't announced a general ceasefire in order to withdraw their troops, so I think it's absolutely the right decision that Ukraine makes them withdraw under fire. It now also seems unlikely that the Russians will attack or try to encircle Odessa. I suppose the challenge for Ukraine is to further block the connection of Russian forrces from the south with those around Kharkiv, but (and I might be wrong) it feels like that task's got easier now?

[Berkut]

When looking at the map, the very threat that Russia tried to create for Ukraine, that their forces could be cut off by those deep penetrations, opens up Russian forces to the exact same thing. 

Of course, that would require Ukraine to be capable of a larger scale offensive, which may be a lot easier said then done.

That "land bridge" looks really damn vulnerable to me....

[Josquius]

It looks like (first?) battle of Kyiv is over - Russia has announced they're withdrawing, presumably to focus on the Donbas and Crimea. US intelligence has assessed that Russian forces do look like they're starting to pull out having briefly built defensive positions.

Reportedly Ukraine is not letting up on their engagement with Russian forces around Kyiv - which is entirely the right approach. Russia hasn't announced a general ceasefire in order to withdraw their troops, so I think it's absolutely the right decision that Ukraine makes them withdraw under fire. It now also seems unlikely that the Russians will attack or try to encircle Odessa. I suppose the challenge for Ukraine is to further block the connection of Russian forrces from the south with those around Kharkiv, but (and I might be wrong) it feels like that task's got easier now?

Yeah, we all know what Russias word is worth and they haven't even given that. Letting them retreat in their own time is not the way. Hit them whilst they're down.

[Berkut]

But I will, again, re-iterate what I've been saying almost from the start.

Russia is fucked. They lost this war weeks ago. The longer they keep fighting, the worse it is going to get. Stalemate is not something that will last, not with their logistical and morale problems. 

The only thing Russia has at this point to negotiate with is Ukrainian civilian lives and general destruction. I don't think the Russian Army can hold the ground they have taken long term, as long as Ukraine is willing to keep fighting for it. The modern battlefield is too lethal. 

[The Brain]

Did they write "lol jk" with their dead so it can be read from space?

[OttoVonBismarck]

We've been hearing intel for a few days now that Russia was considering a strategic reposition, and that appears to be what is happening. The Russians are trying to sell it as a "deescalation" and linking it to the talks in Turkey, but I don't really buy that. However the positive I take from it is it is a physical representation of the fact Putin is accepting at least some strategic reality in Ukraine, that doesn't mean we are particularly close to a real peace agreement, but it's a good indicator that Putin isn't totally blind to reality.

[Berkut]

It looks like (first?) battle of Kyiv is over - Russia has announced they're withdrawing, presumably to focus on the Donbas and Crimea. US intelligence has assessed that Russian forces do look like they're starting to pull out having briefly built defensive positions.

Reportedly Ukraine is not letting up on their engagement with Russian forces around Kyiv - which is entirely the right approach. Russia hasn't announced a general ceasefire in order to withdraw their troops, so I think it's absolutely the right decision that Ukraine makes them withdraw under fire. It now also seems unlikely that the Russians will attack or try to encircle Odessa. I suppose the challenge for Ukraine is to further block the connection of Russian forrces from the south with those around Kharkiv, but (and I might be wrong) it feels like that task's got easier now?

Not only should they not stop engaging, they should do the most they can to bring in additional forces and push them hard. Turn that withdrawal into a rout.

Withdrawal under contact is one of the hardest military maneuvers to manage. It takes coordination and discipline.  I have seen no reason to believe the Russian Army has either of those things. Don't let them withdraw to a line of their choosing.

Of course, I have no idea if the Ukrainian Army has the capability to mount that kind of pressure. 

[Razgovory]

It looks like (first?) battle of Kyiv is over - Russia has announced they're withdrawing, presumably to focus on the Donbas and Crimea. US intelligence has assessed that Russian forces do look like they're starting to pull out having briefly built defensive positions.

Reportedly Ukraine is not letting up on their engagement with Russian forces around Kyiv - which is entirely the right approach. Russia hasn't announced a general ceasefire in order to withdraw their troops, so I think it's absolutely the right decision that Ukraine makes them withdraw under fire. It now also seems unlikely that the Russians will attack or try to encircle Odessa. I suppose the challenge for Ukraine is to further block the connection of Russian forrces from the south with those around Kharkiv, but (and I might be wrong) it feels like that task's got easier now?

I can't believe it.  The Ukrainians won.  This is not what I thought was going to happen a month ago.

[Berkut]

It looks like (first?) battle of Kyiv is over - Russia has announced they're withdrawing, presumably to focus on the Donbas and Crimea. US intelligence has assessed that Russian forces do look like they're starting to pull out having briefly built defensive positions.

Reportedly Ukraine is not letting up on their engagement with Russian forces around Kyiv - which is entirely the right approach. Russia hasn't announced a general ceasefire in order to withdraw their troops, so I think it's absolutely the right decision that Ukraine makes them withdraw under fire. It now also seems unlikely that the Russians will attack or try to encircle Odessa. I suppose the challenge for Ukraine is to further block the connection of Russian forrces from the south with those around Kharkiv, but (and I might be wrong) it feels like that task's got easier now?

I can't believe it.  The Ukrainians won.  This is not what I thought was going to happen a month ago.

I thought it would happen a month ago. Well...maybe not thought it would happen, but thought it was happening. Within a few days of the invasion, it was pretty clear this was not going to Russian plan at all.