Brexit and the waning days of the United Kingdom

[alfred russel]

Acceptance of gays is left wing?

I don't see that at all, it is a long-term cultural change that is fairly independent of political affiliation.

That's what it is now. However before that happened, pushing for acceptance of gays was definitely a left-wing cause.

It begins as not an issue, becomes a left wing issue, and goes back to being not an issue.

I guess in some ways Tyr's analysis "the center constantly moves leftwards" is somewhat true, but trivially so, if we are to define the left as "not conservative" and "conservative" as "in favor of tradition and the status quo". Society is always changing, which means that the conservative cause is always losing, at least to some extent. When a new idea is taken up by society, such as gay marriage, it is the conservative impulse to oppose it.

[garbon]

Acceptance of gays is left wing?

I don't see that at all, it is a long-term cultural change that is fairly independent of political affiliation.

That's what it is now. However before that happened, pushing for acceptance of gays was definitely a left-wing cause.

Indeed. I don't know why we would re-write history for that not to be the case.

[Jacob]

It begins as not an issue, becomes a left wing issue, and goes back to being not an issue.

I guess in some ways Tyr's analysis "the center constantly moves leftwards" is somewhat true, but trivially so, if we are to define the left as "not conservative" and "conservative" as "in favor of tradition and the status quo". Society is always changing, which means that the conservative cause is always losing, at least to some extent. When a new idea is taken up by society, such as gay marriage, it is the conservative impulse to oppose it.

I'm not particularly interested in defending Tyr's greater theory of constant leftward motion, but gay rights were definitely a left wing cause for the duration of the gay rights movement.

[Zanza]

Considering the trend towards alienation from mainstream parties and politics in much of the Western world, I would argue that Tyr's analysis is wrong and we'll see more of these isolationist-nationalist decisions by voters in the next decade or so. I don't think that's a left-right issue either.

[alfred russel]

It begins as not an issue, becomes a left wing issue, and goes back to being not an issue.

I guess in some ways Tyr's analysis "the center constantly moves leftwards" is somewhat true, but trivially so, if we are to define the left as "not conservative" and "conservative" as "in favor of tradition and the status quo". Society is always changing, which means that the conservative cause is always losing, at least to some extent. When a new idea is taken up by society, such as gay marriage, it is the conservative impulse to oppose it.

I'm not particularly interested in defending Tyr's greater theory of constant leftward motion, but gay rights were definitely a left wing cause for the duration of the gay rights movement.

I agree. Hence my point -> first not an issue, then when they become an issue, it is a left wing issue.

We may not be on the same wavelength here.

[Agelastus]

You're being the irrational one here.
The old idea of being a socialist in youth and becoming a conservative in old age... Its just not true. Its misreading what is really happening; that is that the centre is constantly moving leftwards. Where you'd be hardpressed to find a under 18 opposed to gay people these days, go back a few decades and it would be the norm.
The key relevant part of this is that the next generation just fundamentally are far more accepting and aware of the world outside England than their grandparents are.

Changing your opinion of the EU does not automatically equate to "Socialist in youth, Conservative in old age"; I'd argue pro- and anti- European stances are actually fairly bipartisan across the spectrum, fundamentally irrelevant to the left-right split.

For example...as previously noted, my solicitor cousin, about seven years older than me, voted for remain. Her daughter, who looks even more likely to get in to Oxford than I did (I tried to get into probably the smallest College in Oxford and, if what my teachers were told was true, missed getting in by only one place - admittedly something I take with a pinch of salt) voted for leave.

Plus if, as you would argue, each succeeding generation is more "leftwards" (and thus by your implication more pro-European) than the previous ones then how do you explain the swing against Europe since 1975? By your own argument either we should have had a near 100% vote for remain as the 33% who voted out in 1975 should have mostly died off or you're forced to disappear down your own rabbit hole by arguing that the generations born post EU entry are somehow "unique".

Instead, as I said, a good proportion of the people who voted "in" in 1975 voted "out" in 2016 - the longer they've had to see the EU directly affecting the country the less they've liked it. Given the EU's future course seems fundamentally set I fail to see a good reason why this trend would change in the future.

As for the current generation being "more accepting and aware of the world outside England" I'd be very surprised if that was the fact; partly because of the sheer ignorance displayed by most of the youth you see on television, partly because of the way we've entered the age of single issue media.

When you had to buy a newspaper or watch the TV news you couldn't avoid coming across stories outside your interests; now you just click on the relevant link and can happily ignore anything else.

Besides, didn't overseas holidays take off in the Fifties and Sixties? Before EEC membership and decades before free movement in other words?

[dps]

I'd argue pro- and anti- European stances are actually fairly bipartisan across the spectrum, fundamentally irrelevant to the left-right split.

I would guess that you're correct on this point.  While I can't say for certain about Britain, I know that in the US, there are isolationist and protectionist elements on both the left and the right.

[garbon]

I just learned I have a Welsh friend in London who voted Leave.

[Zanza]

The Economist had an article about the new line of division, that isn't between left and right anymore, but between open and closed to the world.

Globalisation and politics
The new political divide

Farewell, left versus right. The contest that matters now is open against closed

AS POLITICAL theatre, America's party conventions have no parallel. Activists from right and left converge to choose their nominees and celebrate conservatism (Republicans) and progressivism (Democrats). But this year was different, and not just because Hillary Clinton became the first woman to be nominated for president by a major party. The conventions highlighted a new political faultline: not between left and right, but between open and closed (see article). Donald Trump, the Republican nominee, summed up one side of this divide with his usual pithiness. "Americanism, not globalism, will be our credo," he declared. His anti-trade tirades were echoed by the Bernie Sanders wing of the Democratic Party.

America is not alone. Across Europe, the politicians with momentum are those who argue that the world is a nasty, threatening place, and that wise nations should build walls to keep it out. Such arguments have helped elect an ultranationalist government in Hungary and a Polish one that offers a Trumpian mix of xenophobia and disregard for constitutional norms. Populist, authoritarian European parties of the right or left now enjoy nearly twice as much support as they did in 2000, and are in government or in a ruling coalition in nine countries. So far, Britain's decision to leave the European Union has been the anti-globalists' biggest prize: the vote in June to abandon the world's most successful free-trade club was won by cynically pandering to voters' insular instincts, splitting mainstream parties down the middle.

News that strengthens the anti-globalisers' appeal comes almost daily. On July 26th two men claiming allegiance to Islamic State slit the throat of an 85-year-old Catholic priest in a church near Rouen. It was the latest in a string of terrorist atrocities in France and Germany. The danger is that a rising sense of insecurity will lead to more electoral victories for closed-world types. This is the gravest risk to the free world since communism. Nothing matters more than countering it.

Higher walls, lower living standards
Start by remembering what is at stake. The multilateral system of institutions, rules and alliances, led by America, has underpinned global prosperity for seven decades. It enabled the rebuilding of post-war Europe, saw off the closed world of Soviet communism and, by connecting China to the global economy, brought about the greatest poverty reduction in history.

A world of wall-builders would be poorer and more dangerous. If Europe splits into squabbling pieces and America retreats into an isolationist crouch, less benign powers will fill the vacuum. Mr Trump's revelation that he might not defend America's Baltic allies if they are menaced by Russia was unfathomably irresponsible (see article). America has sworn to treat an attack on any member of the NATO alliance as an attack on all. If Mr Trump can blithely dishonour a treaty, why would any ally trust America again? Without even being elected, he has emboldened the world's troublemakers. Small wonder Vladimir Putin backs him. Even so, for Mr Trump to urge Russia to keep hacking Democrats' e-mails is outrageous.

The wall-builders have already done great damage. Britain seems to be heading for a recession, thanks to the prospect of Brexit. The European Union is tottering: if France were to elect the nationalist Marine Le Pen as president next year and then follow Britain out of the door, the EU could collapse. Mr Trump has sucked confidence out of global institutions as his casinos suck cash out of punters' pockets. With a prospective president of the world's largest economy threatening to block new trade deals, scrap existing ones and stomp out of the World Trade Organisation if he doesn't get his way, no firm that trades abroad can approach 2017 with equanimity.

In defence of openness
Countering the wall-builders will require stronger rhetoric, bolder policies and smarter tactics. First, the rhetoric. Defenders of the open world order need to make their case more forthrightly. They must remind voters why NATO matters for America, why the EU matters for Europe, how free trade and openness to foreigners enrich societies, and why fighting terrorism effectively demands co-operation. Too many friends of globalisation are retreating, mumbling about "responsible nationalism". Only a handful of politicians—Justin Trudeau in Canada, Emmanuel Macron in France—are brave enough to stand up for openness. Those who believe in it must fight for it.

They must also acknowledge, however, where globalisation needs work. Trade creates many losers, and rapid immigration can disrupt communities. But the best way to address these problems is not to throw up barriers. It is to devise bold policies that preserve the benefits of openness while alleviating its side-effects. Let goods and investment flow freely, but strengthen the social safety-net to offer support and new opportunities for those whose jobs are destroyed. To manage immigration flows better, invest in public infrastructure, ensure that immigrants work and allow for rules that limit surges of people (just as global trade rules allow countries to limit surges in imports). But don't equate managing globalisation with abandoning it.

As for tactics, the question for pro-open types, who are found on both sides of the traditional left-right party divide, is how to win. The best approach will differ by country. In the Netherlands and Sweden, centrist parties have banded together to keep out nationalists. A similar alliance defeated the National Front's Jean-Marie Le Pen in the run-off for France's presidency in 2002, and may be needed again to beat his daughter in 2017. Britain may yet need a new party of the centre.

In America, where most is at stake, the answer must come from within the existing party structure. Republicans who are serious about resisting the anti-globalists should hold their noses and support Mrs Clinton. And Mrs Clinton herself, now that she has won the nomination, must champion openness clearly, rather than equivocating. Her choice of Tim Kaine, a Spanish-speaking globalist, as her running-mate is a good sign. But the polls are worryingly close. The future of the liberal world order depends on whether she succeeds.

[Josquius]

Changing your opinion of the EU does not automatically equate to "Socialist in youth, Conservative in old age"; I'd argue pro- and anti- European stances are actually fairly bipartisan across the spectrum, fundamentally irrelevant to the left-right split.

For example...as previously noted, my solicitor cousin, about seven years older than me, voted for remain. Her daughter, who looks even more likely to get in to Oxford than I did (I tried to get into probably the smallest College in Oxford and, if what my teachers were told was true, missed getting in by only one place - admittedly something I take with a pinch of salt) voted for leave.

Plus if, as you would argue, each succeeding generation is more "leftwards" (and thus by your implication more pro-European) than the previous ones then how do you explain the swing against Europe since 1975? By your own argument either we should have had a near 100% vote for remain as the 33% who voted out in 1975 should have mostly died off or you're forced to disappear down your own rabbit hole by arguing that the generations born post EU entry are somehow "unique".

Instead, as I said, a good proportion of the people who voted "in" in 1975 voted "out" in 2016 - the longer they've had to see the EU directly affecting the country the less they've liked it. Given the EU's future course seems fundamentally set I fail to see a good reason why this trend would change in the future.

As for the current generation being "more accepting and aware of the world outside England" I'd be very surprised if that was the fact; partly because of the sheer ignorance displayed by most of the youth you see on television, partly because of the way we've entered the age of single issue media.

When you had to buy a newspaper or watch the TV news you couldn't avoid coming across stories outside your interests; now you just click on the relevant link and can happily ignore anything else.

Besides, didn't overseas holidays take off in the Fifties and Sixties? Before EEC membership and decades before free movement in other words?

We are speaking about broad trends, percentages and possibilities.
Of course you get super educated, well informed, very worldly people who nonetheless voted leave.
However the general pattern was one of hose factors tending to contribute towards support for remain.
(Plus your example is around Oxford....the source of the modern UK's problems...)

I don't think comparing to 1975 is a particularly useful exercise. It draws close to the fallicy that kippers always brought out about "If the referendum was about whether to join would you change your mind?". Our position vis-a-vis Europe in 75 after just a short spell of membership in a very undeveloped EU just doesn't compare to the current situation where we're long standing members of an established EU.

I also disagree with your correlation as causation for living with the EU meaning you dislike it. A lot has happened since 75. The 80s were a particularly horrific time for much of the country. They don't like how the country has changed since 75, but the EU is pretty much nothing to do with this- just look at polling from before the referendum was announced for what issues people care about, the EU barely cracked 10%.

Overseas holidays...I think they began in the 60s but didn't really become mainstream until the late 70s/80s. Spain's democratisation was the catalyst IMO.
But there's a bit of a difference between traditional 2 weeks at a British colony in Spain holidays and the modern trend for city breaks and actually travelling and seeing different countries.

It begins as not an issue, becomes a left wing issue, and goes back to being not an issue.

I guess in some ways Tyr's analysis "the center constantly moves leftwards" is somewhat true, but trivially so, if we are to define the left as "not conservative" and "conservative" as "in favor of tradition and the status quo". Society is always changing, which means that the conservative cause is always losing, at least to some extent. When a new idea is taken up by society, such as gay marriage, it is the conservative impulse to oppose it.

Which is true. Conservatism is always losing, by definition it is fighting a rearguard action.
It need not necessarily be a negative thing that it is doing this; often the argument isn't that change is bad per-say but rather than it is easier for people to handle if it goes at a slower pace. But generally it is about trying to keep things how they are.

[crazy canuck]

I think we need to remember that Churchhill's quip about being a socialist in youth etc was made during a time when there were socialists.  Now there are mainly social democrats on the left.  So the left has definitely come right and the right has imploded.

[Richard Hakluyt]

It is more a matter of radicals vs conservatives rather than left vs right. It is perfectly possible for radical ideas to come from either the left or the right. The conservatively-minded will generally resist these new ideas. If an idea succeeds in getting mass support it can become the new norm.

[Sheilbh]

It is more a matter of radicals vs conservatives rather than left vs right. It is perfectly possible for radical ideas to come from either the left or the right. The conservatively-minded will generally resist these new ideas. If an idea succeeds in getting mass support it can become the new norm.

Also I've posted about it for years but I think the normally unspoken ideological dividing line (as is often the case) is between liberals and non-liberals, or now post-liberals. The last forty years have been a period of liberalism on the left and the right. I don't think that the post-liberal view is hostile to individualism and rights which is what's emerged over the last forty years but it values other things that have been seen as less important: stability, continuity, community, the claim of the particular over the universal.

I think to an extent the second post-war consensus (if you believe any of them) has been a liberal one that what matters most is the universal, individual, rights based understanding of policy and perhaps that's now breaking down sufficiently that it will face challenges and changes.

Also it is striking that the North-East voted against it. Clem and other Labour leaders never wanted anything to do with European communities for various reasons, but Herbert Morrison's was 'the Durham miners won't wear it.' I'm not convinced that pro-European politics is inevitable when it turns out 65 years down the line that they won't. There may be something deepr.

And I think there's something to the argument that very few people would vote to join the EU as it currently is and on our current deal. Arguably we joined at a point of economic desperation, Britain was the sick man of Europe at that point. European growth was actually being helped by one-off factors like reconstruction after the war and in a lot of places like parts of Belgium (see Judt's Post-War) an effective jump in many areas from agriculture to industrial and service economies. We looked at that and thought Europe and efficient planning (hence Wilson's regular attempts to cloak himself as a technocrat) had a lot to do with it but it had as little to do with the trentes glorieuses as it has to do with not being able to recreate them in the last thirty years.

So we join in 1973 at the point that thirty year expansion ends. Since then generally speaking the UK has been catching up with or overtaking Italy, France, Germany and Belgium because since at least the mid-80s continental Europe's economies have been growing at a far slower rate. It was a period of relative European decline and success for 'Anglo-Saxon' economies. If you average out the whole post-war the UK, France and Germany are actually at very similar levels. In retrospect I think we probably would have been better off staying out in the 70s and maintaining EFTA.

[Zanza]

I'll give it another two months or so until your hesistant remain becomes a fully-blown UKIP stance. 

[Sheilbh]

It's over. We're leaving. I don't really think those labels are much use anymore. But it's hardly revolutionary to say no-one would vote to actively join the EU all things being equal and that we joined at the nadir of our post-war history and probably one of the peaks for continental Europe.

But I've no time for the large chunk of remain supporters who seem to want the UK to fail and collapse hideously. I think it's been pretty unimpressive how very conditional some people's attachments to the UK seems to be - and I don't mean the Scots Nats or Irish Republicans. As we're leaving I think we have to work to get the best deal and argue to build the best result from it and make a success of it.

We lost there's no point in us now re-litigating the result or seeming like we want to dissolve the people and elect a new one.