Brexit and the waning days of the United Kingdom

[Agelastus]

Some grim polling for Labour. Tories 43%, Labour 27% which is what happened in 1983. In England, where most of the marginals are, Tories 47% and Labour 26%. In the full poll Labour and the Lib Dems are on 35% (Tories and UKIP on 56%). If that happened the Tories would have a majority of 108. Labour would lose a seat like Bishop Auckland which, with the exception of the National Liberals in 1931, has never been won by any other party since universal suffrage

It's a combination of honeymoon bounces - prime-minister and leader rolled up into one. I think this article on UK polling report is quite instructive; even though I've lived through two of these bounces it didn't register at the time just how extreme they were.

http://ukpollingreport.co.uk/blog/archives/9740

Wilson-Callaghan, 1976. When Harold Wilson announced his resignation in the middle of March the polls were showing a Conservative lead of between two and five points. The polls immediately following Wilson's resignation and during Callaghan's first month in office showed Labour leads of between one and seven points, before returning to a steady Tory lead in May.
•Thatcher-Major, 1990. Margaret Thatcher was famously removed by the Tory party in November 1990. In the month before the leadership election Labour had an average poll lead of thirteen points. In the month immediately following her resignation and replacement by John Major the Conservatives had an average lead of five points, peaking at 11 points. Over the next few months the polls settled down to an average Tory lead of four points or so.
•Blair-Brown, 2007. The Blair-Brown handover was a more drawn out affair: Blair announced his resignation at the start of May 2007, when the Conservatives had a poll lead of around six points, and actually handed over to Gordon Brown at the end of June. Through July and August Brown enjoyed an average Labour lead of around five points, peaking in double-digit leads during the Labour conference at the end of September... and their rapid collapse afterwards. The Conservatives were ahead again by October, and remained so for the rest of the Parliament.

The polls are still bad for Labour even factoring the bounce out, but they're not really worse than they were a month ago.

[Sheilbh]

Their own labour and the renumeration for that labour is the by far most important participation of most people in our economy. If you limit the single market to free trade of goods, services and free flow of capital, you exclude most economic actors and typically the poorer ones and make the single market one of corporations, not people.

I'd say every European citizen benefits from the single market in goods as a consumer which is the only other 'free movement' that's remotely complete.

But it was really prompted by the recent IMF paper basically pointing out the best and the brightest are leaving Eastern Europe (see Marti v Tamas ). They're helping Western Europe grow but it is hurting the East's economy and short of massive support to help them really catch up by the rest of Europe all of what RH described about the North and London will just be happening on a continental level.

The polls are still bad for Labour even factoring the bounce out, but they're not really worse than they were a month ago.

No. But a month ago they were about twelve points behind where Miliband was at this time last cycle (he was six points ahead in year one) so you factor that in and it shows you how much trouble they're in.

As I say I would be amazed if Corbyn did as well as 26-7%. Though I saw one Corbynite saying yesterday that they don't believe that poll because they know literally no-one who votes Tory

[Sheilbh]

Incidentally Michel Barnier appointed by the Commission to lead their bit of Brexit - which is probably trying to steal a march and secure a bigger role for themselves over the Council.

Immediate reaction was that it was awful. Lots of voices who know Brussels actually said they thought it was a good appointment with a few saying it looked like an olive branch from the Commission.

Edit: Interesting polling here:
http://www.britishfuture.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/Disbanding-the-tribes-report.July-2016.pdf

EU immigration debate upset more than half of voters, report finds
Poll carried out by British Future finds that even Ukip supporters were unhappy with tone of talk about the issue
Peter Walker Political correspondent
@peterwalker99
Wednesday 27 July 2016 16.35 BST Last modified on Wednesday 27 July 2016 19.04 BST

Almost two-thirds of voters disliked the tone of the immigration debate during the Brexit referendum campaign, a report has found, including a majority of leave voters and Ukip supporters.

A wide-ranging poll carried out for a study of post-Brexit opinions by the British Future thinktank found that only a quarter of leave supporters named immigration as the main reason for their vote, with 54% citing "taking power back from Brussels" as their main voting incentive.

The report, Disbanding the Tribes, purports to show a more nuanced picture of voters from the remain and leave camps, often characterised by their apparent polarised views over issues such as immigration.

The thinktank's polling of 2,400 voters carried out on the weekend after the 23 June vote found that 48% believed politicians were wary of talking about immigration in case they offended people. Of remain voters, 35% believed this to be the case, while 20% of backers for the leave campaign thought it talked too much about immigration.

There was some correlation in opinions about the way immigration was discussed before the EU vote. Remain voters, perhaps predictably, were unhappy with the tone of the immigration debate, with 80% believing it was "dangerously overheated". However, the poll found a small majority of leave supporters and Ukip voters – 52% and 53% – took the same view.

British Future, which focuses on issues of national identity and migration, argues in the report that the Brexit decision can be seen as "a public vote of no confidence in how governments have handled immigration over the last decade". The authors said: "It reflects a public perception that governments did not predict, or adequately prepare for, the scale and pace of immigration and proved they did not have a grip by making and breaking promises that were impossible to keep.

"But there is clear evidence in these post-referendum findings that such frustration with governments and politicians does not equate to a xenophobic anti-migrant majority vote."

The report found that more than a fifth of leave supporters had wanted to hear less about immigration during the campaign, with almost a third of remain supporters having hoped to hear more about the issue from their side. The authors said: "There is more common ground among voters, on both sides of the referendum debate, than people think."

There were some common findings on opinions about the two official campaigns. There was a near majority who believed both sides relied too heavily on "scare stories" – 63% felt this about remain; 49% for leave. Closer still were the 56% who believed remain "talked too much about unproven facts and figures", while 52% thought the same for leave.

The study found that for all the sound and fury of the debate, only 26% of voters made up their mind during the final four-week campaign and that this was split evenly between the two sides.

Sunder Katwala, the director of British Future, said the country needed to "disband the referendum's 48% and 52% tribes".

"Those on the losing side need to work through the grieving process to its final phase – acceptance – and become a strong voice in the debates we must now have about the kind of Britain we want to be after Brexit," he said. "Otherwise the 48% won't get a chance to influence the debate about how Britain engages with the rest of the world and its citizens – so we get the best Brexit we can, for all of Britain."

[Sheilbh]

Excellent long piece explaining the various deals required now:
http://www.cer.org.uk/insights/theresa-may-and-her-six-pack-difficult-deals

I broadly agree with Wolfgang Munchau's take on it:

July 29, 2016
How Brexit might happen

This is probably the most detailed informed analysis we have yet read on the Brexit process. Charles Grant unscrambles the various negotiations that lie ahead and comes up with a list of six:

Article 50 talks - the separation agreement;
the FTA with the EU;
an interim agreement;
accession to full membership of the WTO;
third-country FTAs;
agreement on foreign and security policy.
The last is of a different category than the first five - and we think it is possible to fold the negotiations on an interim agreement into the Article 50 process - for the simple reason that they logically have to be completed at the same time. Another advantage of folding the two is that an article 50 procedure does not require national ratification: QMV in the council, plus a vote in the European Parliament, will suffice.

Grant makes a couple of points we have not yet considered - that the EU27 wants the Art 50 process completed by June 2019 - the date of the next European elections. That would make sense. In any case, the entire two-year process needs to end well before the 2020 general elections in the UK. That leaves only a narrow window. Brexit by July 1 2019 would seem a sensible choice.

Secondly, he notes that the reason third countries cannot start FTA negotiations in parallel with the Art 50 procedure is that the former depends on the outcome of the latter. Trade negotiators will need to know the degree of the UK's market access and to which extent EU laws and regulations apply in the UK.

In terms of the deal that will be on offer, Grant offers a realistic set of expectations, with which we broadly agree - except on one point. Where we agree is that the UK will negotiate a Canada-style FTA with the EU, but this cannot be done within two years. In such an agreement, some limited trade-offs between the degree of market access and acceptance of free movement of labour are indeed possible - but the single passport is indeed gone.

Where we disagree with Grant is the assessment of the interim agreement. We don't think there can be bespoke deal as part of which the UK gradually extricates itself from EU laws, and starts to impose restrictions on the freedom of movement. While such a bespoke deal would be in the best interest of the UK government, we don't see a majority among EU member states for a soft transition - it would also create facts for the FTA. The only interim agreement the EU will offer is a plain vanilla EEA - with no rights on the restrictions of free movement. If that is not acceptable to the Brexiteers inside Theresa May's government, they will have to consider the hard Brexit option - something we would indeed not rule out.

The upside is that, from a position of a hard Brexit, an FTA can be agreed faster for the simple reason that countries like Germany have an interest to lock in their trade surpluses with the UK. It is true that Britain is much smaller than the EU, which could thus stomach the loss of a trading partner easier. But this argument ignores the political dynamics. Companies like BMW and Siemens are already exerting much pressure on the German government in favour of a soft trade deal. The long timetable for the Canada deal served as a useful Remain campaign scare story. Three things are different now: at the point of departure the UK already fulfils all EU regulations; the UK has a large trade deficit with important EU member states; and the ratification procedure can be short-circuited, since trade is a competence of the EU, not member states. We would agree with the timetable of Philip Hammond that this could be wrapped up in four years - after Brexit.

In our own analysis, the UK government faces two realistic interim choices: a hard Brexit or a time-limited EEA. The hard Brexit entails big economic risks, but has the important advantage that the entire procedure would conclude earlier, and thus reduce the uncertainty. This is important also from a political perspective. The risk with the EEA is that once the UK is inside, it might not be possible to agree an FTA with the EU, since the EU will have less of an incentive to speed up the negotiations. An EEA deal could produce a never-ending political nightmare for May and her government.

One could imagine an EEA with a strict ex-ante time limit, and no renewal, but if there is no agreed deal within the period, the hard Brexit option will be back on the table. The period of uncertainty will be longer, and the government may have spent much of its political capital. We think that Conservative Party strategists will therefore seriously consider the hard Brexit option especially if they believe that the economic shock of a hard Brexit would be over by 2020.

With a hat tip to Danny Blanchflower, here is a chart on the latest economic sentiment indicators, which shows that the UK economy may be falling off the cliff right now. If this translates into hard data, we think that May will have an incentive to make up her mind quickly. But for the reasons mentioned above, a hard recession does not necessarily imply a soft transition agreement.

The sentiment indicators are interesting because they do show a very sharp decline but other indicators don't point in that direction (see the BofE's agents report, reports from retailers etc). So it's still all a bit unclear and we're still waiting for data.

[Tamas]

Its ok then! Sure, they voted on the side employing the racist and unpleasant slurs, but they DISLIKED THOSE so they are washed of any guilt of making it the victorious side!

:p

[Jaron]

When we're all old and close to death, lets make sure we mark our exit from the world by voting for all the worst options in our last election.

[Sheilbh]

[Martinus]

I'm disappointed in Sheilbh going full Corbyn-crazy.

[Sheilbh]

...have you read any of my posts on Corbyn?

[garbon]

...have you read any of my posts on Corbyn?

You know he is just here to troll.

[Hamilcar]

I just spent a few days in the (north of the) UK after many years' absence. Holy crap, what happened? Poverty, poor infrastructure and Muslims everywhere. No wonder #Brexit won, and I think more is to come.

[Hamilcar]

Also, the security lady at Heathrow was in a full abbaya, including cloth gloves underneath the plastic ones for the job. The mind boggles. Foxes, henhouse etc.

[Josquius]

I did some of the very basic maths.
17.5 vs. 16 million was the problem (vs a bunch who didn't vote )
18-24 year olds were 73% for remain whilst older people tended to vote leave. Assuming 16-18s have the same pattern as 18-24s, I note that the population of the UK includes 800,000 17 year olds. So that's a net swing of 368,000 or so for remain every year.
The UK death rate is 602,000. I'm not checking the numbers there but clearly these will be majority tending to be in the leave population- these people being on average older and less healthy. I'm counting the gain for remain very minimally from this.
I'm also ignoring those people who have changed their mind or just meant their vote to be one of protest (a significant group)...
However.... in less than 3 years the kippers will be outnumbered.
Again, this was UKIP's one chance. And they sneaked it through

[garbon]

Also, the security lady at Heathrow was in a full abbaya, including cloth gloves underneath the plastic ones for the job. The mind boggles. Foxes, henhouse etc.

Thankfully your casual racism isn't enshrined in British law.

[Hamilcar]

Also, the security lady at Heathrow was in a full abbaya, including cloth gloves underneath the plastic ones for the job. The mind boggles. Foxes, henhouse etc.

Thankfully your casual racism isn't enshrined in British law.

I'll feel a little bit sad for you when they throw you off a building. A little bit.