What allies are supposed to do

[Jacob]

China has some real challenges ahead of them: demographic collapse, corruption, middle income trap (I think).

However, compared to several other actors they have the advantages of being a unified and large country, and having relatively competent leadership. There's some risk on the leadership falling into the trap of authoritarian regimes (making poor decisions), but it doesn't seem that high at the moment.

Previously, one of the risks to China was that the shine was beginning to wear off "the Chinese model", leading to a potential worsening relationships and opportunities for the Chinese globally, but thanks to Trump China seems pretty stable and attractive now.

[Josquius]

The destruction of American aid opens huge opportunities for China too.
They really did seem to have hit a wall and be in decline but now... The future is theirs again.

[The Minsky Moment]

European Defense is a great idea, if only you could get the Europeans to go for it.

The French idea is is a European system led by France; the UK idea is a European system where British influence is decisive; the small countries want a committee system; Italy wants to free ride; and the German idea is a European system led by Russia.

I'd stand by this c. 2021.

A lot of those issues may be resolved now or will be resolved. The smaller countries may be more willing to accept leadership from the bigger ones, Germany under Merz seems to have freed itself from its Russian delusions, Meloni may be willing to stump for a stronger defense, a Labour government may be more willing to shed the anti-European shibboleths that hobble the Tories.  France is still angling for the leadership role, but they may get it, or at least close enough to an almost primus inter pares if you squint real hard to keep them happy.

A lot of mays and ifs but the project looks a lot more feasible now.

[Jacob]

The foundation of French strategic autonomy puts France in a good position to take a leading role in the developing European security architecture, IMO.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

The foundation of French strategic autonomy puts France in a good position to take a leading role in the developing European security architecture, IMO.

and the Trumpnonsense has vindicated that stance.

[Jacob]

and the Trumpnonsense has vindicated that stance.

Exactly.

[Sheilbh]

European Defense is a great idea, if only you could get the Europeans to go for it.

The French idea is is a European system led by France; the UK idea is a European system where British influence is decisive; the small countries want a committee system; Italy wants to free ride; and the German idea is a European system led by Russia.

I'd stand by this c. 2021.

A lot of those issues may be resolved now or will be resolved. The smaller countries may be more willing to accept leadership from the bigger ones, Germany under Merz seems to have freed itself from its Russian delusions, Meloni may be willing to stump for a stronger defense, a Labour government may be more willing to shed the anti-European shibboleths that hobble the Tories.  France is still angling for the leadership role, but they may get it, or at least close enough to an almost primus inter pares if you squint real hard to keep them happy.

A lot of mays and ifs but the project looks a lot more feasible now.

Agree with this mostly.

I think the UK position was always that they do not want "European" defence (although the Tories made that move, or more accurately Putin clarified things - I really struggle to see any difference between Labour and the Tories on Ukraine or European defence). There's always been resistance to doing anything outside NATO structures or, more broadly, an Atlantic framework. I think that's still the case and I think it's striking that the country taking exactly the same position is Poland (although UK and Poland very often end up in a very similar place on foreign policy issues - just the Poles with a better performing economy and more willingness to put their money where their mouth is).

I think it's for basically the same reasons and I think Poland needs to be standalone not just a smaller country when looking at security in Europe. At this point, in the context of Russia - I think they're more significant than Germany or Italy on defence. I also think the Poles are also particularly alive to the Euro-level problems - I saw a German politician suggesting the EU working on intelligence gathering which is just not serious when the EU includes Hungary, Austria and Slovakia. I think that is one of Europe's big challenges that there are different levels of willingness and at a security level there are countries within the EU who cannot be trusted at all either because they're actively hostile (Hungary) or riddled with Russian intelligence (Austria). So I think any solution needs to be a little a la carte - though I think there is a real risk of some countries that can pay basically replicating the freeloading issue and causing resentment just within Europe.

I'm encouraged by Merz's direction. On Italy, my understanding is that they have more deployable forces than the UK or Germany and but that's basically entirely focused on the Med where they're very active.

As I've said before my suspicion is that it'll end up with more or less coordinated mini-lateral relations/coalitions of the willing in different parts of Europe. Britain building on existing security relationship with the Baltics, Netherlands and Nordics, France building on their relationships with Greece and Romania, Poland taking the lead in that area, with the Czechs, the Baltics and possibly contributions from other countries (like the UK and France) - each a slightly distinct set of relationships and capabilities, no single command structure (or even necessarily an institutional framework like the EU or NATO) but working together loosely. The challenge is how Germany fits in and, frankly, what it's willing to contribute.

I think the big shift is risk perception - I take your point on leadership but I think fundamentally the French and Poles, for example, did not perceive the same risks in the same way in 2021. Poland was entirely focused on Russia, I think France thought Russia could be managed and was worried about instability in the Sahel, North Africa and the Middle East. And I don't think either is wrong but both need to realise they're different angles of the European whole - a Europe that is genuinely serious about its own defence will need to be capable of looking in both direction. Though for now the obvious massive focus has to be Russia..