In wake of teen deaths, Israel vows to crush Hamas

[Malthus]

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ali-a-rizvi/post_8056_b_5602701.html

It is incredible how hard it is to find any actual nuance at all.

You are either a jew hating anti-semite terrorist supporter, or a baby killing warmonger.

This is the best piece I've read on it. Not least because it sums up my views:

Liberal Zionism After Gaza
Jonathan Freedland

Never do liberal Zionists feel more torn than when Israel is at war. Days after I'd filed my essay for The New York Review on Ari Shavit and his fellow liberal Zionists, the perennial tension between Israel and the Palestinians had flared into violent confrontation and, eventually, a war in Gaza—the third such military clash in five years. For liberal Zionists these are times when the dual nature of their position is tested, some would say to destruction. What the Israel Defense Forces called Operation Protective Edge—a large-scale mobilization that by the time a twelve-hour "humanitarian truce" was agreed on July 26 had reached its nineteenth day—was no different.

Even during the grim chain of events that led to this episode, liberal Zionists found themselves facing both ways, switching direction day-by-day, even hour-by-hour. Of course, they, like everyone else, condemned the brutal June kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers on the West Bank, an act immediately blamed on the Hamas leadership (falsely so, it later turned out: the kidnapping was, in fact, the work of a local "lone cell," acting without authorization). But some felt queasy during the subsequent two-week Israeli operation to root out Hamas militants there, referred to as "mowing the lawn," not least because several Palestinian civilians were killed in the process. Still, it was hard to criticize too loudly, because that effort was conducted under the cover of a search for the three missing teens and, by then, the three were the object of a campaign that encompassed the global Jewish diaspora: #BringBackOurBoys.

Few of these campaigners knew that the Israeli authorities had, in fact, established from the start that the boys were dead and apparently withheld that information from the public. Naturally, liberal Zionists condemned the Hamas response to the West Bank lawn mowing—the resumption of rocket fire from Gaza into southern Israel—but they hoped Benjamin Netanyahu's government would react with restraint. And of course the eventual discovery of the teenagers' corpses had liberal Zionists standing in solidarity with Israel during its hour of national grief. But when that led to the revenge kidnapping and murder by Jewish extremists of a Palestinian teenager from East Jerusalem, forced by his abductors to drink gasoline and then set alight, they were appalled at what furies had been unleashed.

This constantly dual posture—defense of Israel paired with horror at the violation of liberal values—only became more pronounced as the military operation gathered steam. The Israeli novelist and veteran peacenik, Amos Oz, likes to say Zionism is a surname, a family name that can sit alongside a wide range of different first names: socialist, religious, revisionist, and so on. In this sense, liberal Zionists remain part of the Israel-supporting family and, when the family is under assault, they feel their place is at Israel's side. Accordingly, they cannot help but sympathize with and echo the key elements of the case for Israel's defense.

So they asked—genuinely, not just as a hasbara talking point—what any other country would do in a similar position. As Shavit wrote in Haaretz, "Barack Obama's United States would never accept al-Qaeda rocket fire on Miami Beach, Washington, D.C. or New York City. David Cameron's Britain would never accept a terror attack in Manchester, Birmingham, or London." They insisted that when Israel mounted air strikes against Gaza it was no more than a straightforward act of self-defense.

But the first week of Protective Edge produced awkward statistics. The Palestinian death toll kept climbing while Israel's remained stubbornly at zero. (Israel's first casualty came on July 15.) Liberal Zionists were ready with the reply that Israel too would be suffering casualties in serious numbers were it not for the Iron Dome defense system: if Hamas was not succeeding in killing civilians, it was not through lack of trying.

Similar lines of argument were readily deployed, even as the violence escalated and Palestinian civilians began dying in greater numbers. Hamas fighters were ultimately responsible, it was said, because of their willingness to embed themselves among Gaza's most vulnerable people, using them as human shields. Hamas commanders had spent millions on bunkers for themselves and on cement-lined tunnels to attack Israel, rather than on bomb shelters for their own people. If the TV pictures looked horrific, that was partly because of the media's application of different rules when it comes to covering Israeli wars. US bombs had wrought similar havoc in Iraq and Afghanistan—orphaning children and wiping out whole families—it was just the world's media were not gathered on the spot, and in a small, concentrated space, to cover it.

For Zionists of the right, repeating these arguments came easily. But liberal Zionists felt conflicted. A death rate that saw civilians account for four out of every five Palestinians killed—and that by July 25, according to the UN, included nearly 200 children—was hard to defend. Earlier this week, the former editor-in-chief of Haaretz, David Landau, wrote that it was no longer good enough to rely on the traditional hasbara sound bite that, while Hamas deliberately targets civilians, Israel only ever kills civilians by accident. Citing halacha, Landau argued that when it's certain that civilians will die as a result of one's actions, the distinction between intended and unintended becomes meaningless and is "nullified." (Landau added that a ground operation was more morally defensible, because it allowed for greater precision.)

Others have not been so specific in their dissent, but they share the sense that it will no longer do simply to trot out the familiar lines. Partly it's because some of the consequences of the Israeli bombardment have been so hard to stomach: hospitals, schools, and homes battered by shells, with instantly lethal consequences. It requires a special steel, perhaps lacking in some liberal Zionists, to speak up for Israel when the country's air force has just hit a home for the disabled.

And partly it's that the way some Israelis themselves have reacted is difficult to defend. Liberal Israelis are mocked for the habit known as yorim u'vochim, literally shooting and crying—indulging their guilt even as they continue to oppress Palestinians—but shooting and laughing is surely worse. Reports that Israelis were sitting on garden chairs on a hilltop by the Gaza border, munching popcorn as they watched the shelling of Gaza, as if witnessing a fireworks display, wrongfooted many usually reliable defenders of Israel. I have heard one rabbi, an avowed Zionist, describe these developments as nothing less than "a failure of Judaism."

In continental Europe there is another dimension. Defending Israel when Israel is killing civilians by the hundred now exacts a very direct price. In Paris, protests against the war in Gaza spilled over into anti-Jewish violence, with chants of "Death to the Jews" and the attempted storming of two synagogues. In Berlin, an Israeli tourist was attacked during a Gaza-related demonstration. Few Jews or Israel-supporters would ever want to back down in the face of such intimidation: indeed, for many it strengthens their resolve, seeing in such overt anti-Semitism confirmation of the Zionist necessity for Jews to have a place of their own. But it is naïve to pretend everyone reacts to such hostility that way.

So there is a weariness in the liberal Zionist fraternity. Privately, people admit to growing tired of defending Israeli military action when it comes at such a heavy cost in civilian life, its futility confirmed by the frequency with which it has to be repeated. Operation Cast Lead was in 2008-2009. Operation Pillar of Defense followed in 2012. And here we are again in 2014.

But underlying this fatigue might be a deeper anxiety. For nearly three decades, the hope of an eventual two state solution provided a kind of comfort zone for liberal Zionists, if not comfort blanket. The two-state solution expressed the liberal Zionist position perfectly: Jews could have a state of their own, without depriving Palestinians of their legitimate national aspirations. Even if it was not about to be realized any time soon, it was a goal that allowed one to be both a Zionist and a liberal at the same time.

But the two-state solution does not offer much comfort if it becomes a chimera, a mythical notion as out of reach as the holy grail or Atlantis. The failure of Oslo, the failure at Camp David, the failure of Annapolis, the failure most recently of John Kerry's indefatigable nine-month effort has prompted the unwelcome thought: what if it keeps failing not because the leaders did not try hard enough, but because the plan cannot work? What if the two-state solution is impossible?

That prospect frightens liberal Zionists to their core. For the alternatives to two states are unpalatable, either for liberal reasons or for Zionist reasons. A single state in all of historic Palestine, dominated by Jews but in which Palestinians are deprived of the vote, might be Zionist but it certainly would not be liberal. A binational state offering full equality between Jew and Arab would be admirably liberal, but it would seem to thwart Jewish self-determination, at least as it has traditionally been conceived, and therefore could not easily be described as Zionist.

When Israelis and Palestinians appear fated to fight more frequently and with ever-bloodier consequences, and when peace initiatives seem to be utopian pipe-dreams doomed to fail, the liberal Zionist faces something like an existential crisis. For if there is no prospect of two states, then liberal Zionists will have to do something they resist with all their might. They will have to decide which of their political identities matters more, whether they are first a liberal or first a Zionist. And that is a choice they don't want to make.

July 26, 2014, 11 a.m.

Jon Chait and Roger Cohen have made similar points here (with more indictment of Netanyahu over the failure of Kerry):
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2014/07/why-i-have-become-less-pro-israel.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/30/opinion/roger-cohen-zionism-and-israels-war-with-hamas-in-gaza.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=c-column-top-span-region&region=c-column-top-span-region&WT.nav=c-column-top-span-region&_r=0

I disagree. I think the ground operation was a mistake - it is bound to vastly increase the number of civilian casualties, purely for the purpose of *appearing* to do something.

I agree but think it's worse. I think the ground operation is purely political. Bibi's been on the far left of his own government the past few weeks (he had to fire Danny Danon from the Defence Ministry after he was accused of not doing enough to protect Israel). The ground operation, I don't think, has any goals, even appearing to do something, beyond placating his own cabinet.

Edit: Incidentally I thought this piece was interesting:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/gaming-israel-and-palestine#axzz38r5V2UJx

The problem I have with the Freedman article is that it is really a description of an appeal to emotions, not reason. Berkut may smear me again with the "callous and tribal" label if he likes (  ), but to my mind, the best way to approach such questions is not with "halacha", but with traditional "just war" analysis.

Simply put, either the military acts of the Israeli government make sense, or they do not. It is inevitable, given the location of the fighting, that civilian casualties will result; that has to factor into the equation as to whether the military actions undertaken are "worth it" - that is, whether the goals they seek to obtain are worth risking the casualties (hence my position that the counter-battery fire campaign was 'worth it' but the ground campaign probably is not - as the former had a defensible military goal while the latter does not).

Also, the notion that Israeli civilians behaving badly - such as by cheering Israeli bombing - are somehow undermining the correctness of the military actions. How does that follow? People are people everywhere - some are good and some are bad. The notion that Israelis must at all times be "good" or their cause is suspect strikes me as bizzare and absurd. Also, context: these are the very people who have been living for months or years under the constant threat of rocket attacks; it is not surprising to see them react badly.

[Sheilbh]

Oh, you may have missed this, Salam Fayyad got fired for creating a modern state with modern institutions which worked for the state and the people rather than the leader and his clique.

Last year in fact. My point is that the Palestinians did spend the last 7-8 years building up a state as Valmy wanted during which time Fayyad repeatedly pleaded for some concessions by Israel to support his project and show that this approach was the way to win statehood.

My view is that Israel could have done a lot more to build up and support the moderates over the past five years at the same time as tightening the noose around Gaza. I always thought the best strategy was to reward peace and security in the West Bank with concessions while meeting Gaza with restrictions until Hamas either changed or were removed. Unfortunately I think Israel's only done the latter so far.

I guess my question is why did the two state solution ultimately fail?

On this, my view is that the last best chance failed because Israeli politics has changed. I don't think her current leadership - Bibi, Bennett, Lieberman - believe in a two state solution on ideological (the latter two) or pragmatic (Bibi) grounds. As I say we're now at the point where Bibi is at the far left of his own party. In short last times the Israelis took the opportunity to miss an opportunity.

I think prior to that Olmert could never have achieved it in the later part of his premiership because of the scandals that were consuming him. Before that I'd broadly say it was the Palestinians saying 'no'.

I generally agree with the position of Chait which is the second link

[Viking]

Oh, you may have missed this, Salam Fayyad got fired for creating a modern state with modern institutions which worked for the state and the people rather than the leader and his clique.

Last year in fact. My point is that the Palestinians did spend the last 7-8 years building up a state as Valmy wanted during which time Fayyad repeatedly pleaded for some concessions by Israel to support his project and show that this approach was the way to win statehood.

Oh, No you didn't! You didn't just blame Israel for Abu Mazen disposing of Salam Fayad as a rival? WTF?

[derspiess]

Also, the notion that Israeli civilians behaving badly - such as by cheering Israeli bombing - are somehow undermining the correctness of the military actions. How does that follow? People are people everywhere - some are good and some are bad. The notion that Israelis must at all times be "good" or their cause is suspect strikes me as bizzare and absurd. Also, context: these are the very people who have been living for months or years under the constant threat of rocket attacks; it is not surprising to see them react badly.

I don't see how it's a big deal at all.  So people gathered to watch the shelling from a safe vantage point.  And they happened to bring some snacks along.  I'd do it in that situation if I didn't have anything else going on.

[Malthus]

Last year in fact. My point is that the Palestinians did spend the last 7-8 years building up a state as Valmy wanted during which time Fayyad repeatedly pleaded for some concessions by Israel to support his project and show that this approach was the way to win statehood.

My view is that Israel could have done a lot more to build up and support the moderates over the past five years at the same time as tightening the noose around Gaza. I always thought the best strategy was to reward peace and security in the West Bank with concessions while meeting Gaza with restrictions until Hamas either changed or were removed. Unfortunately I think Israel's only done the latter so far.

On this, my view is that the last best chance failed because Israeli politics has changed. I don't think her current leadership - Bibi, Bennett, Lieberman - believe in a two state solution on ideological (the latter two) or pragmatic (Bibi) grounds. As I say we're now at the point where Bibi is at the far left of his own party. In short last times the Israelis took the opportunity to miss an opportunity.

I think prior to that Olmert could never have achieved it in the later part of his premiership because of the scandals that were consuming him. Before that I'd broadly say it was the Palestinians saying 'no'.

This, unfortunately, strikes me as likely true.

The problem is that the political left in Israel has been undermined by failure and scandal, and the political right appears only interested in stealing as much land as it can while the stealing is good.

The Palestinians are now more isolated than they have ever been. All of Israel's traditional enemies are in disarray and consumed with their own problems. Unfortunately, Israel is saddled with a right-wing government seemingly incapable of taking the high road.

[Sheilbh]

The problem I have with the Freedman article is that it is really a description of an appeal to emotions, not reason. Berkut may smear me again with the "callous and tribal" label if he likes (  ), but to my mind, the best way to approach such questions is not with "halacha", but with traditional "just war" analysis.

Isn't the reason most people identify as 'pro-Israeli', 'pro-Palestinian', 'Zionist' or whatever else emotional?

Certainly the reason I would describe myself as pro-Israeli and someone who believes in a Zionist state is emotional (and also factual as I'm more that way inclined than 99% of the people I know).

Simply put, either the military acts of the Israeli government make sense, or they do not. It is inevitable, given the location of the fighting, that civilian casualties will result; that has to factor into the equation as to whether the military actions undertaken are "worth it" - that is, whether the goals they seek to obtain are worth risking the casualties (hence my position that the counter-battery fire campaign was 'worth it' but the ground campaign probably is not - as the former had a defensible military goal while the latter does not).

Yeah. And broadly I agree. I lean with Bibi on this. I think if you're going to make this sort of attack to neutralise this sort of threat an air and special forces campaign is probably more suited to it.

The problem I have is that we know what Hamas do (and awful though it is, isn't it natural given their military position and goals to do that?) and so does Israel. I wonder what level of work has been done by the IDF to work out alternative tactics and strategies that could more effectively minimise civilian casualties - which is their job. Because I think the damage this does to Israel's support abroad is important - which I'll come back to in a minute.

And for me the real question of proportionality is cost and benefit. As I've said before it is difficult for me to imagine a high value enough target to be proportionate to bombing a care home for the disabled. Similarly that story of the four kids bombed on the beach. Israel thought they were straggling fighters. Given the lack of ID and the range of possibilities, I'm not sure the benefit of killing four straggling fighters is worth the cost of killing four civilians whether they're children or adults.

On the decline of foreign support, I've noticed a lot more unease and unhappiness about this operation among Americans and diaspora Jews than any other I can remember - more than Cast Lead or Lebanon for example. I also think that one of the side effects of Bibi's cack-handed diplomacy is that Israel seems to be slightly more culture war tinged in the US than I previously remember. If the extent of the effect of Israel's actions was Europe and Latin America it wouldn't be a worry, but I think opinions are shifting in communities that really matter to Israel.

Also, the notion that Israeli civilians behaving badly - such as by cheering Israeli bombing - are somehow undermining the correctness of the military actions. How does that follow? People are people everywhere - some are good and some are bad. The notion that Israelis must at all times be "good" or their cause is suspect strikes me as bizzare and absurd. Also, context: these are the very people who have been living for months or years under the constant threat of rocket attacks; it is not surprising to see them react badly.

Don't we often dispute this argument about Palestinian civilians cheering on attacks against Jews? Say we can contextualise people sitting on a deckchair to watch and cheer bombings that so far seem to be killing over 50% civilians based on a constant, though given the extraordinary success of Iron Dome, distant threat of rocket attacks. Surely it follows that we can contextualise people suffering successful attacks that kill over 50% civilians then cheering attacks against their source?

To an extent though I agree. The story of the Palestinian boy who was incinerated by Israeli extremists is horrifying. But I found the beating up of his (fortuitously American) cousin by Israeli police worse. Both sides have extremists who'll do evil things, but the police are agents of the Israeli state which is more serious.

[Sheilbh]

Oh, No you didn't! You didn't just blame Israel for Abu Mazen disposing of Salam Fayad as a rival? WTF?

No, I didn't.

The problem is that the political left in Israel has been undermined by failure and scandal, and the political right appears only interested in stealing as much land as it can while the stealing is good.

The Palestinians are now more isolated than they have ever been. All of Israel's traditional enemies are in disarray and consumed with their own problems. Unfortunately, Israel is saddled with a right-wing government seemingly incapable of taking the high road.

Yeah, this is what the Stratfor piece says. Hezbollah are distracted in Syria. Syria is in a state of collapse. Egypt and Jordan are supportive. Iran is, largely, distracted closer to home. Hamas is more isolated than they've been in a very long time. It is difficult to imagine a stronger position for Israel to be in and if there's ever a time to negotiate surely that'd be it.

It's equally easy to imagine jihadis in Gaza and the Golan. Hezbollah and Iran importing tactics learned in Syria and Iraq. Jordan and Egypt in a state of chaos.

I think it's a worry that Israel seem to be wasting the most moderate leader the Palestinians have ever had or may ever have.

[Razgovory]

Also, the notion that Israeli civilians behaving badly - such as by cheering Israeli bombing - are somehow undermining the correctness of the military actions. How does that follow? People are people everywhere - some are good and some are bad. The notion that Israelis must at all times be "good" or their cause is suspect strikes me as bizzare and absurd. Also, context: these are the very people who have been living for months or years under the constant threat of rocket attacks; it is not surprising to see them react badly.

I don't see how it's a big deal at all.  So people gathered to watch the shelling from a safe vantage point.  And they happened to bring some snacks along.  I'd do it in that situation if I didn't have anything else going on.

I'd do it.  If those fuckers had been launching rockets at me I'd sit out and watch them get the shit kicked out of them.

[Razgovory]

The problem I have with the Freedman article is that it is really a description of an appeal to emotions, not reason. Berkut may smear me again with the "callous and tribal" label if he likes (  ), but to my mind, the best way to approach such questions is not with "halacha", but with traditional "just war" analysis.

Simply put, either the military acts of the Israeli government make sense, or they do not. It is inevitable, given the location of the fighting, that civilian casualties will result; that has to factor into the equation as to whether the military actions undertaken are "worth it" - that is, whether the goals they seek to obtain are worth risking the casualties (hence my position that the counter-battery fire campaign was 'worth it' but the ground campaign probably is not - as the former had a defensible military goal while the latter does not).

Also, the notion that Israeli civilians behaving badly - such as by cheering Israeli bombing - are somehow undermining the correctness of the military actions. How does that follow? People are people everywhere - some are good and some are bad. The notion that Israelis must at all times be "good" or their cause is suspect strikes me as bizzare and absurd. Also, context: these are the very people who have been living for months or years under the constant threat of rocket attacks; it is not surprising to see them react badly.

I think he has something about the cause of this (well the immediate cause).  I do not think the Israeli government responded wisely to the the kidnapping and murder of three kids.  The evidence that Hamas was involved was weak, and do not think military action was appropriate.  It certainly did nothing to save the lives the kidnapped has endangered many more Israeli citizens.

[The Minsky Moment]

but to my mind, the best way to approach such questions is not with "halacha", but with traditional "just war" analysis. 

Another way of saying the same thing:

but to my mind, the best way to approach such questions is not with theory derived from traditional Jewish theology but theory derived from traditional Christian theology

.

This is mostly tongue and cheek but there is a sort-of-serious point here - the rabbinic Judaism that developed after the Hasmoneans, the Great Revolt and Bar Kochba is more hostile to war than either the earlier tradition or the parallel Christian or Muslim traditions.  So there is this tension for modern Zionist Jews of balancing the secularized pacifist version of the rabbinic tradition with the more balanced secularized version of the Christian "just war" tradition, with the nominally "Jewish" government basing itself on the supposedly alien tradition. Of course this gets to the more general tension between Zionism and Judaism as a religion that we usually prefer to sweep under the rug.

(excuses for use of the Timmy "we")

[Malthus]

Isn't the reason most people identify as 'pro-Israeli', 'pro-Palestinian', 'Zionist' or whatever else emotional?

Well, I would have thought that most people who side with the Israeli state do so because it is, in the last resort, a Western democracy which is run with respect for the rule of law, while its current enemy - the Hamas regime - is an organization whose very charter commits it to Islamic extremism, genocide against its enemies, and rejection of any notion of peace. 

Yeah. And broadly I agree. I lean with Bibi on this. I think if you're going to make this sort of attack to neutralise this sort of threat an air and special forces campaign is probably more suited to it.

The problem I have is that we know what Hamas do (and awful though it is, isn't it natural given their military position and goals to do that?) and so does Israel. I wonder what level of work has been done by the IDF to work out alternative tactics and strategies that could more effectively minimise civilian casualties - which is their job. Because I think the damage this does to Israel's support abroad is important - which I'll come back to in a minute.

And for me the real question of proportionality is cost and benefit. As I've said before it is difficult for me to imagine a high value enough target to be proportionate to bombing a care home for the disabled. Similarly that story of the four kids bombed on the beach. Israel thought they were straggling fighters. Given the lack of ID and the range of possibilities, I'm not sure the benefit of killing four straggling fighters is worth the cost of killing four civilians whether they're children or adults.

The issue is one of risk. There may be no target worth deliberately killiing disabled kids or whatever. However, it may be the case - and in fact, I think it arguably is - that any military action undertaken in a highly populated area risks killing the most sympathetic possible civilians - babies, disabled kids, nuns, or whatever. Military actions are not "exact" and screw-ups in undertaking them are proverbial. Soldiers are fallible and are working under high stress conditions. 

Given that fact, one has to assume any military action will, in point of fact, kill a certain number of highly sympathetic civilains - and then decide in advance whether or not the military objective is "worth it". If the answer is that you are unwilling to risk such an outcome - then don't undertake any military actions.

Of course, that presupposes that doing nothing (or nothing military) is an option.

On the decline of foreign support, I've noticed a lot more unease and unhappiness about this operation among Americans and diaspora Jews than any other I can remember - more than Cast Lead or Lebanon for example. I also think that one of the side effects of Bibi's cack-handed diplomacy is that Israel seems to be slightly more culture war tinged in the US than I previously remember. If the extent of the effect of Israel's actions was Europe and Latin America it wouldn't be a worry, but I think opinions are shifting in communities that really matter to Israel.

I have no idea how opinions are shifting, or not.

Don't we often dispute this argument about Palestinian civilians cheering on attacks against Jews? Say we can contextualise people sitting on a deckchair to watch and cheer bombings that so far seem to be killing over 50% civilians based on a constant, though given the extraordinary success of Iron Dome, distant threat of rocket attacks. Surely it follows that we can contextualise people suffering successful attacks that kill over 50% civilians then cheering attacks against their source?

I don't understand this. If the point is that we should not judge the Hamas operations based on Palestinian cheering - well then, I don't. I judge them based on their own merits.

To an extent though I agree. The story of the Palestinian boy who was incinerated by Israeli extremists is horrifying. But I found the beating up of his (fortuitously American) cousin by Israeli police worse. Both sides have extremists who'll do evil things, but the police are agents of the Israeli state which is more serious.

Certainly - though it is worth pointing out that the Israelis who killed that boy were arrested, and will presumably be tried, by the Israeli authorities, and the cop who beat the other kid (masked, during a riot) was suspended pending an investigation as to whether charges will be laid.

[Malthus]

but to my mind, the best way to approach such questions is not with "halacha", but with traditional "just war" analysis. 

Another way of saying the same thing:

but to my mind, the best way to approach such questions is not with theory derived from traditional Jewish theology but theory derived from traditional Christian theology

.

This is mostly tongue and cheek but there is a sort-of-serious point here - the rabbinic Judaism that developed after the Hasmoneans, the Great Revolt and Bar Kochba is more hostile to war than either the earlier tradition or the parallel Christian or Muslim traditions.  So there is this tension for modern Zionist Jews of balancing the secularized pacifist version of the rabbinic tradition with the more balanced secularized version of the Christian "just war" tradition, with the nominally "Jewish" government basing itself on the supposedly alien tradition. Of course this gets to the more general tension between Zionism and Judaism as a religion that we usually prefer to sweep under the rug.

(excuses for use of the Timmy "we")

Absolutely, Zionism - really, any form of nationalism, whether ethnic nationalism or not - is incompatible with traditional Jewish theology as it has developed. That should be no surprise, as traditional Jewish theology developed in the context of a stateless people living as an alien minority, on sufferance. 

The difference between halacha and "just war" analysis is that the latter creates a mechanism whereby states as we know them can operate.

[Sheilbh]

Well, I would have thought that most people who side with the Israeli state do so because it is, in the last resort, a Western democracy which is run with respect for the rule of law, while its current enemy - the Hamas regime - is an organization whose very charter commits it to Islamic extremism, genocide against its enemies, and rejection of any notion of peace.

Honestly I think that'd be naive. It'd certainly be inaccurate for me - though it's a part of it.

The issue is one of risk. There may be no target worth deliberately killiing disabled kids or whatever. However, it may be the case - and in fact, I think it arguably is - that any military action undertaken in a highly populated area risks killing the most sympathetic possible civilians - babies, disabled kids, nuns, or whatever. Military actions are not "exact" and screw-ups in undertaking them are proverbial. Soldiers are fallible and are working under high stress conditions. 

Given that fact, one has to assume any military action will, in point of fact, kill a certain number of highly sympathetic civilains - and then decide in advance whether or not the military objective is "worth it". If the answer is that you are unwilling to risk such an outcome - then don't undertake any military actions.

Of course, that presupposes that doing nothing (or nothing military) is an option.

I agree, I just disagree with the Israeli balancing of risk here. I cannot think of potential targets that are high value enough to potentially end up bombing a care home for the disabled.

Doing nothing seems to me to be a decent option for Israel at the start of this. To begin with their response to the murdered kids wasn't justified by the intelligence they allegedly had - that it was a lone group of Hamas sympathisers not a Hamas operation. But also when Hamas started firing rockets they'd never been so isolated. With the exception of Qatar they had no support from Arab regimes and the signs were that Turkey was a little more dubious given what's happening in Syria and, initially, the theory was that Hamas was lobbing rockets to try and get back in Iran's good books.

Given the success of Iron Dome I think the best strategy would've been for Israel to sit it out; try and split the Hamas leadership further; and also try and isolate them further. Obviously that would've been different without Iron Dome.

I don't understand this. If the point is that we should not judge the Hamas operations based on Palestinian cheering - well then, I don't. I judge them based on their own merits.

The point is we shouldn't excuse or contextualise Israeli civilians cheering on the deaths of Arab civilians unless we're willing to do the same for Palestinian civilians cheering on the deaths of Israeli civilians.

[Malthus]

Well, I would have thought that most people who side with the Israeli state do so because it is, in the last resort, a Western democracy which is run with respect for the rule of law, while its current enemy - the Hamas regime - is an organization whose very charter commits it to Islamic extremism, genocide against its enemies, and rejection of any notion of peace.

Honestly I think that'd be naive. It'd certainly be inaccurate for me - though it's a part of it.

The issue is one of risk. There may be no target worth deliberately killiing disabled kids or whatever. However, it may be the case - and in fact, I think it arguably is - that any military action undertaken in a highly populated area risks killing the most sympathetic possible civilians - babies, disabled kids, nuns, or whatever. Military actions are not "exact" and screw-ups in undertaking them are proverbial. Soldiers are fallible and are working under high stress conditions. 

Given that fact, one has to assume any military action will, in point of fact, kill a certain number of highly sympathetic civilains - and then decide in advance whether or not the military objective is "worth it". If the answer is that you are unwilling to risk such an outcome - then don't undertake any military actions.

Of course, that presupposes that doing nothing (or nothing military) is an option.

I agree, I just disagree with the Israeli balancing of risk here. I cannot think of potential targets that are high value enough to potentially end up bombing a care home for the disabled.

Doing nothing seems to me to be a decent option for Israel at the start of this. To begin with their response to the murdered kids wasn't justified by the intelligence they allegedly had - that it was a lone group of Hamas sympathisers not a Hamas operation. But also when Hamas started firing rockets they'd never been so isolated. With the exception of Qatar they had no support from Arab regimes and the signs were that Turkey was a little more dubious given what's happening in Syria and, initially, the theory was that Hamas was lobbing rockets to try and get back in Iran's good books.

Given the success of Iron Dome I think the best strategy would've been for Israel to sit it out; try and split the Hamas leadership further; and also try and isolate them further. Obviously that would've been different without Iron Dome.

Depends on what is meant by a "best strategy". Best for winning world opinion, certainly. But Israel as a state hasn't cared about that much for a long time.

Also, I've read that the Iron Dome mostly doesn't work, and the main reason for low Israeli casualties is that Israel has a very impressive civil defence system of early warnings and shelters.

http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/07/25/israels-iron-dome-is-more-like-an-iron-sieve/

Assuming this is true, does that change the equation?

[Sheilbh]

Best for weakening their opponents, in this case Hamas. Currently they're very much rekindling their relationship with Iran, strengthening it with Turkey and Qatar, and instead of the pressure of the Arab world being on an isolated Hamas (strengthening the PA and Israel) the opposite's the case.

Also, I've read that the Iron Dome mostly doesn't work, and the main reason for low Israeli casualties is that Israel has a very impressive civil defence system of early warnings and shelters.

Interesting. How have Israeli civil defences changed from 2006 when there were far higher Israeli civilian casualties and injuries?

I was under the impression that Hamas and Hezbollah both use the same rockets and are both firing at roughly the same rate and that the big difference since then is Iron Dome.

Edit: Also while I'm sure the guy is rigorous as sourcing goes this seems a bit dubious:

Postol based his conclusion on a careful analysis of amateur videos and photos of Iron Dome interceptions over the past three years. He admitted that most of his data is from a previous round of fighting in 2012. "The data we have collected so far [for 2014], however, indicate the performance of Iron Dome has not markedly improved," Postol wrote on the website of the nonprofit Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

I can see why he wants the IDF to release their data on Iron Dome, also why they don't want.