Ukraine's European Revolution?

[Josquius]

Be careful not to envision 1990s Russia too much.
The Russian military still has problems and a lot of paper tigers but it does increasingly have a pretty decent modern military at its core.
Ukraine on the other hand is a smaller, weaker and with more decayed equipment, 1990s Russia from what I gather.

[PJL]

So the consensus is that Ukraine is the new Czechoslovakia and Poland is the new Poland? Let's hope Germany doesn't backstasb them this time (no invasion obviously, but last minute 'face saving for Russia' deals isn't out of the question).

In retrospect Ukraine should have acted more decisively firmer against Russia in the Crimea, though I understood why they didn't act then, as at least the geography meant it could be containable. However, they have no excuse now, Russian trap or not, it is better to resist the forces now or else be made to look like a failed state who can't control the situation, which is even worse. Otherwise if they themselves are appeasing, then why should anyone want to help them. A good example is Finland & Baltic States during World War 2. Finland resisted and remained an independent state, while the Baltics didn't and were incorporated into the USSR.

[Syt]

Meanwhile, Russia says that if this devolves into civil war it's the fault of Kiev and its western allies.

[Valmy]

Meanwhile, Russia says that if this devolves into civil war it's the fault of Kiev and its western allies.

Kiev has Western Allies?

[Syt]

Be careful not to envision 1990s Russia too much.
The Russian military still has problems and a lot of paper tigers but it does increasingly have a pretty decent modern military at its core.
Ukraine on the other hand is a smaller, weaker and with more decayed equipment, 1990s Russia from what I gather.

The BBC had something on this recently: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26940375

Keir Giles, director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre (CSRC), a group specialising in Russian military affairs, notes that "this is a very different Russian army from that seen during the Georgia war of 2008".

Despite the apparent easy victory in Georgia, serious deficiencies in Russia's military performance were obvious.

This "was a post-Soviet army, not much changed from the 1980s, and designed for a very different form of combat", he says.

"Serious lessons were learnt in terms of organisation, command and control, equipment, and especially inter-service co-operation.
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"In the last couple of years, there have been indications, even in military parades in Moscow, that this is a more Western-looking army"
- Keir Giles Director of the Conflict Studies Research Centre

"Communications between ground and air units were a major problem, due to a lack of effective forward air controllers properly embedded with ground units, and several of the Russian air losses were apparently shot down by their own side."

Plans for modernisation were under way before 2008. But the Georgia conflict confirmed the need for change and gave the necessary political impetus for fundamental military reform.

Roger McDermott, senior fellow in Eurasian military studies at the Jamestown Foundation in Washington DC, however, stresses the limits of the Russian reform programme.

"The failures of the campaign in Georgia were used as an excuse to launch a pre-planned reform and modernisation of the conventional armed forces. But the reform largely failed due to poor planning and internal corruption," he says.

Nonetheless, he notes that "efforts to change the structure of the military and modernise equipment continue".

Russia's ground forces "are largely unreformed in the sense that they moved to eliminate 'paper units' (many of which barely existed in practice) in 2008-09 and claimed to create a permanent readiness force based on brigades", according to Mr McDermott.

"In reality, this was ruined by too many 12-month conscripts and not enough contract personnel, while they also failed to develop a proper well-trained, non-commissioned officer cadre."

While stressing the limits of Russia's military reforms, it is clear that some significant improvements have been undertaken.

Some of these were visible in the units employed during the takeover of Crimea.

"In the last couple of years, there have been indications, even in military parades in Moscow, that this is a more Western-looking army," Mr Giles says.

"New load-carrying equipment for ordinary soldiers and a wider distribution of personal radios - until recently the preserve of platoon commanders at best - are simple and obvious indications of how the Russian army has invested in improving and modernising its equipment overall."

The CSRC says it has tracked many of the units involved in the Crimea operation.

"Any intervention in Ukraine must be resolved within days, Russia has no defence or economic capacity to go in for the long haul"
- Roger McDermott Senior fellow in Eurasian military studies, Jamestown Foundation

"They were drawn from a wide range of Russia's rapid reaction forces, not just the airborne units that are traditionally thought of in this role," says Mr Giles.

"There were elements from the special forces reconnaissance brigades and the marine infantry."

Whatever its shortcomings, Mr Giles says "today the Russian military is vastly more capable than it was in 2008 and much more capable than certainly the Ukrainians - and superior to the forces currently deployed on the territory of all of its Western neighbours".

He believes that Russia can sustain this military threat to Ukraine for some considerable time.

"The Russian units deployed on Ukraine's eastern border can probably remain in the field longer than many Western planners assume," he says.

"Russia is not much concerned at inconvenience or short-term financial costs if it makes long-term strategic gains.

"Many indicators and warnings of preparation for a possible invasion are in place, including logistics, food supplies, medical services, and interior troops which would be used for control of occupied areas," he says.

"But this is not necessarily an indication that Russia will invade, simply that Russia wishes to be prepared to do so given the opportunity or the perceived necessity. "

And he argues Moscow has gone to considerable lengths to be in a position to act.

"Prior to the crisis coming to a head, every major amphibious assault ship Russia had in Europe was pre-positioned in the Black Sea, with units moved thousands of miles from both the Baltic and the Northern Fleets."

Short war

While Russia may be able to keep its forces in the field for some weeks or even months, Mr McDermott notes that if Russia does make its move, any conflict will have to be over swiftly.

"Any intervention in Ukraine must be resolved within days, Russia has no defence or economic capacity to go in for the long haul," he says.

Ukraine is of huge strategic importance to Moscow; Mr McDermott underlines the importance of seeing this through Russia's eyes.

"This crisis seen from Moscow's perspective, is a 'Eurasian crisis', not a European crisis as such," he says.

"That means it is about Russia and its future role in Eurasia."

Russian President Vladimir Putin "learnt to play hard ball in this crisis by carefully observing how the US and Nato acted since 1999", Mr McDermott says.

"He saw Nato out-of-area operations as a threat to Russian interests, an alliance that expanded beyond its means, and a US that acted as a global hegemon, including promoting 'colour revolutions' close to Russia.

"The latest crisis was one step too far, and Putin relied on a Russian intelligence assessment that views the events of the Maidan [the popular protests in Kiev and other cities] in a very different way to the West's reading - and he made his move."

[Agelastus]

I thought this was a great piece:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/13/ukrainians-russians-fascists-putin-west-ukraine

Read to me like a typically empty Guardian article. I did enjoy the bit where the author described Moldova as a place "far away" from the Ukraine.

[jimmy olsen]

I thought this was a great piece:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/apr/13/ukrainians-russians-fascists-putin-west-ukraine

People in the west actually think the Ukrainians are Fascists?  Wild.

You have to remember who he's talking to, Guardian readers.

[Norgy]

And there are fascists among the Ukrainian nationalists

Indeed there are. But I'd wager the majority of them aren't. Svoboda is just one party. Of course, it's clearly authoritarian and with a positive view on collaborators like Stepan Bandera. But fascist? Not so sure. "Fascism" is a term bandied about on a regular basis and few if any seem to be able to say what it really is. Authoritarian rule isn't necessarily fascism.

[Tamas]

sooo, was this an other empty threat deadline from the Ukrainian government? Their ineptitude is shocking.

As for there being Nazis in the Ukrainian political life: OMG REALLY? de facto neo-nazis have been doing well in recent French elections. UKIP is rising in the UK, there are the Greeks, the Hungarians etc. If we accept Svoboda as a valid excuse, then Putin has free reign over all of Europe.

[Tamas]

A journalist or two are near being lynched by peace-loving Russians due to them speaking English:
https://twitter.com/ASLuhn

[Josquius]

I missed that one.
So it has improved since Georgia too? And here I thought that was the modernised version after the sterotypical version's showing in Chechnya...

[Tamas]

The only real test of the Russian military will be in a year or two when they clash with NATO in the Baltic States.

[Norgy]

sooo, was this an other empty threat deadline from the Ukrainian government? Their ineptitude is shocking.

As for there being Nazis in the Ukrainian political life: OMG REALLY? de facto neo-nazis have been doing well in recent French elections. UKIP is rising in the UK, there are the Greeks, the Hungarians etc. If we accept Svoboda as a valid excuse, then Putin has free reign over all of Europe.

Not to mention the rather menacing presence of Russian neo-nazis in, well, Russia.
UKIP is hardly worth mentioning along with Golden Dawn, though. They're right-wing populists, much like the ones we've seen in Denmark and Norway for decades. The FN, well, they like most right-wing populists have less than tasteful roots, but I still wouldn't label them fascists.

[Norgy]

I can't believe that it's back to referendums again. You can't hold those when bullies are demanding them, while having the electorate in a headgrip and doing power wedgies.

[Tamas]

sooo, was this an other empty threat deadline from the Ukrainian government? Their ineptitude is shocking.

As for there being Nazis in the Ukrainian political life: OMG REALLY? de facto neo-nazis have been doing well in recent French elections. UKIP is rising in the UK, there are the Greeks, the Hungarians etc. If we accept Svoboda as a valid excuse, then Putin has free reign over all of Europe.

Not to mention the rather menacing presence of Russian neo-nazis in, well, Russia.
UKIP is hardly worth mentioning along with Golden Dawn, though. They're right-wing populists, much like the ones we've seen in Denmark and Norway for decades. The FN, well, they like most right-wing populists have less than tasteful roots, but I still wouldn't label them fascists.

The thing about them, however, is right now it is beneficial for them to play by the rules. You will not discover their true faces (one way, or the other) until they get into power.

As such, if a party/movement appears to be fascist-like minus the fact that they play along with the democratic system, I will go ahead and still consider them fascist, to be on the safe side of things.