Massive use of chemical weapons in Syria, 1,429 killed including 426 children

[Admiral Yi]

Credibility is an argument for not making threats you don't intend to keep, not for keeping them when it would harm you to do so.

[Sheilbh]

Considering Cameron must have recalled Parliament thinking this would be a fairly straight forward matter it seems both sides did more damage to themselves than any possible other alternative.

Actually I think recalling Parliament was his first sign things were up. There was no need to do it, by convention he should have recalled Parliament if the UK go involved. There was a lot of pressure from MPs for Cameron to recall Parliament and for it to assert itself.

Credibility is an argument for not making threats you don't intend to keep, not for keeping them when it would harm you to do so.

That's fair enough, but it looks like Obama does intend to keep his threat.

My point is fears about your 'credibility' are absurd in foreign policy. The only relevance is for domestic politics.

Edit: Also UKIP is emerging as the anti-war party.

George Galloway also made the cui bono argument of 'we all know Assad is BAD enough but is he MAD enough' to use chemical weapons. Also that minorities live in fear of the rebels living. Needless to say both are better arguments than his original Israel gave the rebels chemical weapons as a false flag to prompt a Western attack on Syria

[DGuller]

Credibility is an argument for not making threats you don't intend to keep, not for keeping them when it would harm you to do so.

It's both, though.  If you know that the guy threatening you feels very strongly about following through on his threats regardless of how prudent the threat was in the first place, you kind of take any threat at face value.  You avoid the situation where the threatened guy can miscalculate and not take your threat seriously (which would lead to a lose-lose situation).

[Admiral Yi]

My point is fears about your 'credibility' are absurd in foreign policy. The only relevance is for domestic politics.

Exactly the opposite.  As you and I agreed earlier, the domestic constituency for maintaining credibility is six fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations and two staffers on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.  Foreign policy is where it is advantageous to deter action through a threat, avoiding the muss and fuss of acting on the threat.

[Sheilbh]

Exactly the opposite.  As you and I agreed earlier, the domestic constituency for maintaining credibility is six fellows at the Council on Foreign Relations and two staffers on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Or for candidates to moan vacuously about 'weakness' and the need for a 'strong' stance. Which is nonsense but that's the benefit.

Foreign policy is where it is advantageous to deter action through a threat, avoiding the muss and fuss of acting on the threat.

You can threaten without actually following through and your threats still have credibility - see the USSR.

[Admiral Yi]

Or for candidates to moan vacuously about 'weakness' and the need for a 'strong' stance. Which is nonsense but that's the benefit.

That has nothing to do with acting on your threats after you've made them.

You can threaten without actually following through and your threats still have credibility - see the USSR.

Please elaborate.

[Sheilbh]

That has nothing to do with acting on your threats after you've made them.

Which I've said is pointless in foreign policy. It only matters in domestic politics.

Please elaborate.

The Soviet Union constantly made threats - especially against Berlin. At times they certainly looked like acting on it. They never did but it was a constant worry for Western policy makers and caused them to change policy, in the Cuban Missile Crisis for example. The credibility of the threat didn't matter, the Soviet ability to carry it through did - I think this is also the difference with say, the USSR, making a threat and the North Koreans or the Syrians. Both are possible, both could be credible, the USSR one is considerably more serious because they're far more able to follow through.

[Admiral Yi]

I'm struggling to recall any threats the Soviets made about Berlin or Cuba.  They didn't threaten to build a wall, they built a wall.  They didn't threaten to blockade, they blockaded.  They didn't threaten to ship nukes to Cuba, they shipped nukes to Cuba.

[alfred russel]

Credibility is an argument for not making threats you don't intend to keep, not for keeping them when it would harm you to do so.

It's both, though.  If you know that the guy threatening you feels very strongly about following through on his threats regardless of how prudent the threat was in the first place, you kind of take any threat at face value.  You avoid the situation where the threatened guy can miscalculate and not take your threat seriously (which would lead to a lose-lose situation).

Credibility is also useful so you can bluff people into doing what you want. If a bluff is ineffective I don't think you should try to save credibility by going all in. Cut your losses and fold is a better strategy.

I don't know if Obama was trying to bluff Syria into not using chemical weapons. My guess is that when he decided not to intervene in the civil war was just trying to find a middle ground and throw a bone to the interventionists (as Obama tends to do). I would also guess that few would confuse statements on a low priority issue like Syria with a high priority issue (such as defense of Israel).

[Sheilbh]

I'm struggling to recall any threats the Soviets made about Berlin or Cuba.  They didn't threaten to build a wall, they built a wall.  They didn't threaten to blockade, they blockaded.  They didn't threaten to ship nukes to Cuba, they shipped nukes to Cuba.

They threatened Berlin during the Cuban Missile crisis. It was part of why JFK made the policy choices he did.

But as an example building the wall was preceded by at least three years of more or less constant public threats by Khrushchev.

[DGuller]

Credibility is also useful so you can bluff people into doing what you want. If a bluff is ineffective I don't think you should try to save credibility by going all in. Cut your losses and fold is a better strategy.

There is a fundamental game theory difference between diplomacy and (non-tournament) poker.  In poker, if someone calls your bluff, you can't really spite him.  If you go all-in to double down on your bluff, you just help your opponent even more.  You don't have a lose-lose spite option.  In diplomacy, you do have it, which changes the calculus rather dramatically.

[Admiral Yi]

They threatened Berlin during the Cuban Missile crisis. It was part of why JFK made the policy choices he did.

But as an example building the wall was preceded by at least three years of more or less constant public threats by Khrushchev.

IIRC the threat was that they would occupy Berlin if the US invaded Cuba, no?

[Sheilbh]

IIRC the threat was that they would occupy Berlin if the US invaded Cuba, no?

They threatened that if the US used force at all they'd occupy Berlin. It was taken very seriously in the White House despite, as I say, several years of Soviet bluff over Berlin.

[Admiral Yi]

They threatened that if the US used force at all they'd occupy Berlin. It was taken very seriously in the White House despite, as I say, several years of Soviet bluff over Berlin.

Not sure how you see that as a bluff.  Kennedy was presented with a variety of options involving use of force, and settled on an option short of violence, presumably at least in part because he took Kruschev's threat seriously.

[Sheilbh]

Not sure how you see that as a bluff.  Kennedy was presented with a variety of options involving use of force, and settled on an option short of violence, presumably at least in part because he took Kruschev's threat seriously.

As I say the Soviets had been threatening to occupy Berlin over various things since at least 58 - the Berlin ultimatum. Despite never following through that threat was still taken seriously during the Cuban missile crisis.