Iran War?

[mongers]

Yes nearly everyone BUT Bibi's Israel is bearing the cost of this war; he's happy for it to be a forever war, keeps him in power and out of jail.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Israel is certainly bearing the cost of the war in economic terms as can be easily discerned from looking at numerous economic reports on the ongoing cost of Israel's wars dating back to October 7th are well known.

[OttoVonBismarck]

The two major pipelines that allow KSA and UAE to bypass the Strait with a portion of their production are both fully operational BTW. The issue is neither is capable of carrying the entirety of either country's production (the KSA pipeline is far more significant), and of course they offer no transit for the other gulf states.

I thought the Iranians had hit Fujairah?

And as well as no transit for the rest I think all that infrastructure is for oil not gas?

So there's a few separate things at play:

1. Fujairah Port on the Gulf of Oman is a major oil export terminal for UAE, it is on the other side of the Strait of Hormuz. The UAE's pipeline system allows oil to go from the UAE's oil fields to Fujairah, bypassing the need to go through the Strait. However, even at full capacity of both the pipeline and Fujairah, this isn't enough to get UAE's full production to market. Some is simply stymied by the closure of the Strait.

Two days ago the port facilities in Fujairah were hit, resulting in a partial shut down. The pipeline as far as I know was not damaged.

2. The KSA East/West pipeline actually goes all the way to the Red Sea, not just bypassing the Strait of Hormuz but bypassing the entire eastern coastline of the Arabian peninsula. This pipeline carries 7m bpd, and as far as I know has not been interrupted at present.

The KSA pipeline has two main pipes, one of which sometimes is configured to carry natural gas instead of liquid petroleum, but due to the greater profitability and importance to KSA's economy of exporting crude oil vs natural gas, both pipes are currently moving crude oil.

3. The UAE's Shah gas field was directly struck, the full scope of the damage and impact on production is, AFAIK, not known at this time.

[Sheilbh]

Thanks - that's very interesting.

Hamidreza Azizi's latest update - I don't think I've posted a full one before. But three things seem particularly interesting to me: the domestic crackdown in Iran, what's happening in Iraq (and between Iraq and Syria) and the Houthis waiting for their moment (when the US commits to trying to re-open Hormuz? When tankers are diverted into the Red Sea?):

Hamidreza Azizi
@HamidRezaAz
#Iran War Update No. 18 (focus on Iranian strategic narrative):

🔹The maritime dimension of the war is moving toward a more dangerous phase. Reports suggest Israel may join the U.S. in expanding operations around the Strait of Hormuz, while Iranian discussions increasingly point to a possible shift from selective disruption to full closure, including the use of naval mines if pressure intensifies.

🔹At the same time, U.S. strikes are becoming more focused on degrading Iran's maritime disruption capabilities. CENTCOM confirmed the use of heavy bunker-busting munitions against Iranian anti-ship missile sites near the Strait of Hormuz, underscoring efforts to reopen the waterway by force if necessary.

🔹Iran continues signaling that escalation could extend to additional chokepoints. The Houthis remain a ready secondary front, with the potential to target shipping in the Bab el-Mandeb if pressure on Hormuz increases, forcing the U.S. to operate across multiple maritime theaters.

🔹Attacks on Gulf states continued, with the UAE facing one of the heaviest waves so far. Emirati officials report thousands of drone and missile strikes since the start of the war, raising the likelihood that Abu Dhabi may move toward a more active role in supporting the U.S. operation against Iran.

🔹This raises the risk of a sharper Iran-UAE confrontation. Iranian concerns about the UAE's role in the war and its potential ambitions regarding disputed islands in the Persian Gulf are resurfacing, suggesting that this front could escalate further.

🔹Iran has also expanded its warnings to additional regional actors. Statements directed at Jordan and Azerbaijan claimed that any country facilitating U.S. or Israeli operations could be treated as a legitimate target.

🔹Inside Iran, Israeli operations appear increasingly focused on internal security structures. Strikes on Basij forces and police units across Tehran suggest an effort to weaken the regime's domestic control apparatus rather than only its conventional military capabilities.

🔹This has heightened fears in Tehran of internal destabilization. Authorities are intensifying crackdowns, including arrests, asset seizures, and restrictions on communications such as Starlink, while also encouraging public mobilization – of their own support base – to deter unrest.

🔹The internal security dimension is becoming more acute following reports of targeted killings of senior figures, including Ali Larijani and Basij commander Gholamreza Soleimani.

🔹Meanwhile, tensions in Iraq continue to rise. Attacks on U.S. diplomatic and military sites are increasing, while U.S. strikes on Iran-aligned armed groups are fueling a cycle of escalation that is pulling Iraq deeper into the conflict.

🔹The Iraq-Syria nexus is becoming more volatile. A Reuters report about potential Syrian involvement against Hezbollah surfaced alongside intensified U.S. strikes on PMF positions in Anbar province, following earlier attacks near the al-Qaim border crossing, raising concerns about a broader effort to weaken Iran-aligned forces along this corridor.

🔹Nuclear risks are also entering the picture. A reported strike near the Bushehr nuclear facility has raised concerns about the potential consequences of any direct hit on nuclear infrastructure, including the risk of regional contamination.

🔹Iran continues to leverage the Strait of Hormuz selectively. While most shipping remains disrupted, Iranian oil exports – primarily to China – continue, with estimates suggesting around $140 million per day in revenue and sustained flows, highlighting a strategy of controlled economic pressure rather than total shutdown of the strait.

🔹At the same time, Tehran is increasingly explicit about its conditions for ending the war. Iranian officials state that reopening the strait would require not only a ceasefire, but also compensation, sanctions relief, and an end to operations against its regional allies, including Hezbollah.

🔹This approach is reinforced by emerging patterns of bilateral arrangements. Countries such as India and Turkey are reportedly negotiating access to the strait directly with Iran, suggesting the early contours of a more fragmented and transactional maritime order.

🔹Iranian media is also framing developments in U.S. domestic politics as part of the battlefield. Reports of internal disagreements in Washington and political pressure on Donald Trump are interpreted as signs that Iran's cost-imposition strategy is having an effect.

🔹Overall, Iran appears to be using control over the Strait of Hormuz as leverage, while signs are growing that the United States and Israel are preparing to challenge that strategy more directly. As Tehran continues disruption without fully shutting the strait, recent strikes on coastal missile sites and discussions about expanded operations suggest that Washington and its allies may be moving toward a more forceful effort to reopen maritime routes.

Edit: Also Qatar Energy confirming "extensive damage" to Ras Laffan Industrial City which is in Ed Conway's brilliant book Material World. It's not just really important for gas but also responsible for about a third of the world's helium production - helium is really important in loads of supply chains for medical equipment, semiconductors etc. Lots of other products too so a very signficant site and with "extensive damage" likely to be a big hit to supply chains even if Hormuz is re-opened.