Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Sheilbh]

I will ask you as well, why do you think the Ukraine can hold if Trump is elected president?

In part because Europe has stepped up and is significantly contributing (I think the view on this has remained stuck in the first half of 2022). It is worth noting, particularly Germany.

There is vastly more we can and should do, I don't think it is sufficient for Ukraine to re-take swathes of its territory, but I think it is more than enough to hold. Not only that but the European military aid has also been in the form of multi-year commitments. This also undercounts Europe because France is massively under-reported in these stats and focused on military aid:


Is that enough to win? I'd very much doubt it even if Europe keeps increasing, but I think it's definitely enough to hold on and stop Russia from winning.

Additionally there's the US angle and I think there's two questions there of what Trump can do (in theory) and what he will be able to do. My understanding is that a lot of current US aid to Ukraine has been passed through Congress - unlike a lot of policy making in the US over recent years it's not a creature of the executive or judiciary. There may be degrees of discretion and he may be able to block new tranches, but I think fundamentally there's a legislative basis to US support. Obviously that depends on who is elected with Trump.

But that gets to the what can he get away with point - because I think foreign policy was the area where Trump had least substantive impact as President. The major shift was increased focus on China, there were also some trade wars - both of those have been intensified under Biden. I think there's an argument that Trump shifted the dial in 2016 (that's my view), but I think you could equally argue that his most disruptive views were, ultimately, a product of and assimilated into an emerging bipartisan consensus on China and trade.

But, despite loudly talking about it and trying to do it, he didn't manage to significantly reduce US commitments anywhere - not Iraq, Afghanistan or Syria or anywhere else. To a large extent the foreign policy "Blob" or, perhaps, deep state held. It's not unlike the limited impact of Obama who was another transformative policy. I'm not sure I see any reason to think Trump will have a different impact in another term v the Blob, while I think there are more reasons to worry on the domestic (and democratic) front.

The big risk is if there's an escalation - where I think we just don't know how Trump would respond. If, for example, Russia invades a NATO state (but France exists - and all likely candidates are in the EU too) - or if China invades Taiwan. I've no idea how Trump will respond to that new situation is the risk, or if Trump domestically provokes a crisis severe enough to put US commitments overseas in doubt (both, I think, possible) - but I think his record on unwinding existing US commitments is very limited.

Also, fundamentally, away from Europe and the US - I think Ukraine sees itself as fighting an existential war for its national independence from the old empire. I do not know that Putin's Russia has the capacity (in practice) to effectively win that war - or even to fight that war and survive. But I think even without US support, they need more mobilisation - military, economic, morale/social - (more as in at a higher level, not more of the same) than currently to "win" even a limited few oblasts to form a land bridge. And I think there's a reason Putin is reluctant to push that.

[Jacob]

Why do you think Ukraine can hold if Trump is elected?

Because I think the Ukrainians have agency. I don't think they'll stop fighitng. I expect they'll still get help from Europe - though that remains to be seen.

Certainly they'll be in a much tougher position, but I don't think they'd just give up and I don't think defeat is inevitable.

[Josquius]

Worth remembering what we talked about a few pages back.
Europe promised Ukraine a million artillery shells this year.
It has only been able to pull together 300,000.
For comparison during WW1 Britain was producing tens of millions of shells per year. The end product little different to today. But without modern manufacturing technology.
We are too stuck in the pre covid ultra privatised  limited contracts and bidding way of doing things.

From this...i say us support is necessary.
Not because on paper Europe can't beat Russia or hasn't promised to support Ukraine. Nor because the US is especially great.
Rather when Ukraines supporters are all failing to gear up meet Ukraines requirements then you need the excess potential that having the US and Europe brings. Two supporters failing to get enough support beats one supporter failing to get enough support


Also unrelated. But I hadn't heard of this   Bashkor group before. Checking up elsewhere they are a big thing. And right on the border too with the tatars just next door in Russia . Fingers crossed for them.

UKRAINIAN VICTORY WILL END RUSSIA

A couple of weeks ago at a CIS meeting in Kazakhstan, attended by much of the Russian leadership including Putin, the Kazakh President who speaks fluent Russian - which they all knew - opened his remarks in Kazakh. The Russian faces were something to behold as they all rummaged around looking both shocked and surprised, for the ear piece so they could hear the translation. It may seem minor but the point was clear - yet again- that Kazakhstan is deliberately making efforts to move away from making life easy for the Kremlin.
To the north of Kazakhstan lies the Russian Federation Republic of Bashkortostan. Its capital is the city of Ufa. A Turkic people who are Sunni Muslims, post 1991 they managed an autonomous republic with oil and gas, along with refining, propping up the state government and generating a stable surplus that improved the lives of many.
Then came Putin and in 2005 Rosneft, the state oil giant took over all of the  Bashkortostan oil fields and refineries. The money no longer flowed to Ufa but to Moscow and the Oligarchs. The country was stopped from having its own President.
Studying anything other than Russian in schools was abolished and learning the language of the Bashkorti was stopped.
In 2019 the construction of a new mosque began but since the war with Ukraine its has been frozen and no work has been done.
At the same time a huge new Russian Orthodox cathedral was started, soon revealing a major archaeological site of the ancient Bashkorti people who settled here over 1200 years ago. Unlike the mosque the cathedral is continuing - state funds seem oddly available - and the archaeological site that represents a huge cultural treasure for the Bashkorti is buried underneath it.
Locals are regularly rounded up by Russian police for service in the army to fight Ukraine.
They are not happy units. There is a sizeable Bashkorti unit operating in the Ukrainian army, fighting Russia.
The Bashkorti independence movement is said to enjoy quiet but widespread support. When the Prighozhin mutiny occurred earlier this year the resistance urged people to leave the cities - if Prighozhin had have succeeded some kind of uprising was near certain.
Russian attempts to fascistify the federation republics, crush their individual identities, culture and heritage is widely resented. It happens everywhere.
And the one thing those that want their freedom the most will tell you is that Ukraine winning the war is what will make them free. Ukraine entering  Crimea 'would be the end of the Russian regime as we know it'.
Ukraine is not ignoring these ambitions. It's in regular contact with opposition forces and is looking at widespread recognition of several independence movements inside Russia - Bashkortostan among them.
So when you hear of derailments, and mysterious pipeline explosions and factory fires, sabotage and so on, know that there are very many people in Russia who see their freedom and their future is invested in a Ukrainian victory too.

Slava Ukraine 🇺🇦!

[Tonitrus]

The big risk is if there's an escalation - where I think we just don't know how Trump would respond. If, for example, Russia invades a NATO state...

Alas there is probably a non-zero chance Trump would try to jettison NATO.  I am not even sure if the POTUS can do that unilaterally...and even the North Atlantic treaty itself is written in such a way that the US has a primary position, which would be odd if we tried to leave it.

That would likely push the EU back to looking more at its own collective security without the US, and might push it more to assisting Ukraine than it already does...so long as Hungary cannot sabotage that effort.

[Zoupa]

Putin is just one US presidential election away from obtaining victory.

I don't think a Trump presidency guarantees Putin's victory, but it certainly makes his life significantly easier.

Why do you think Ukraine can hold if Trump is elected?

Because they held in Feb2022 with close to no western help. Whether the US helps or not, Ukrainians will keep on fighting.

[viper37]

Because they held in Feb2022 with close to no western help. Whether the US helps or not, Ukrainians will keep on fighting.

The situation is totally different Zoup.

They held in Feb2022 with the ammunition they had.  Those stockpiles are gone, and they've burn through everything the West has sent them.

They are low on artillery ammo too.

Russians have numbers.  Discipline beats number 9 times out of 10.  But this is a Walking Dead type of situation.  Eventually, the zombies will overwhelm you if you can't shoot back because there are too many of them.

[The Minsky Moment]

Numbers are Russia's most glaring weakness.  This is not the 10 million strong force of 1945.

If Ukraine's formal military formations vanished overnight, leaving Russia solely with the task of organizing an occupation across the breadth of Ukraine and conducting counterinsurgency operations against partisans, they would need about 850,000 men.  That's about the entire personnel size of the Russian armed forces.  They don't have it. Instead they've spent the last year granting amnesties to hardened criminals and paying big signing bonuses to 3rd world foreigners.  The bottom of the barrel has been scraped, the barrel reudced to compost and now they are scooping up the sludge.

Of course, Ukraine's formal military formations have not vanished overnight, and are not about to, even if all foreign military aid disappeared.  An end to Western support would hurt a lot but it wouldn't change the reality  for Russia that even small movements on the map involve a heavy cost in blood.

[Sheilbh]

The situation is totally different Zoup.

They held in Feb2022 with the ammunition they had.  Those stockpiles are gone, and they've burn through everything the West has sent them.

They are low on artillery ammo too.

Russians have numbers.  Discipline beats number 9 times out of 10.  But this is a Walking Dead type of situation.  Eventually, the zombies will overwhelm you if you can't shoot back because there are too many of them.

Although in 2022 Ukraine had been fighting a low level war with thousands of casualties for eight years. It was not a conflict that attacted attention in the West but I think it's a mistake to think they were sitting on huge Soviet era stockpiles in February 2022 - they'd been burning through them fighting a constant war.

I'd also add that from everything I've read the stockpiles are gone point applies almost more to Western militaries which is why we're not sending any more. The need to ramp up production, especially in Europe, is as much about our own forces as Ukraine's - so far only Poland seems to have grasped the nettle and actually started expanding capacity.

I think Ukraine's shortages, especially in artillery, is more of an issue for them advancing. And I agree, I think without US support, unless European support dramatically increases, it's difficult to see Ukraine winning back swathes of territory (absent a Russian collapse, which is a possibility). I'd also add the other bit of supply is Western companies opening arms factories in Ukraine which aren't online yet but will be (I believe BAE and Rheinmetall are both establishing there - and in Poland). But I don't necessarily think those shortages necessarily mean Ukraine would be unable to hold territory.

Not least because we need to flip the question of it's not just the Ukrainian forces. There's a question of whether they can hold, but that also depends on who is going to beat them. On the numbers I think Ukraine's got a military of around 800,000 now (obviously not all on the front). Russia has also been burning through its equipment as well as skilled and experience men at a faster rate than Ukraine. They have more manpower and they have a bigger military industrial complex to rely on, but we know they're struggling with both. With their current levels of mobilisation I don't think they'd be able to breakthrough. In part because, I think for political/stability reasons, they're not really doing mass mobilisation or a war economy and also there doesn't seem to be an effective, widespread morale mobilisation on the "why we fight bit" which is important. Russia absolutely could mobilise more to win - they haven't so far and I think that's because of fears about politics and stability. I don't think that's shifted at all in the last year.

I think there's a bit of pre-2022 thinking about Russia's inevitability mixed with a little bit of the old stereotypes about the Russian military. Some of those preconceptions about the military might be true - but from everything I've read it looks a lot more like late Soviet Russia (but less fair/equitable) than anything else and certainly than anything like the full moblisation of the Russian people in the Russian military myth.

If anything I wonder if there's something about the nature of war in the twenty-first century here - that we're in a defence dominated world and I don't know what that means in a wider context but I think not just in Ukraine, attacking looks very difficult.

[HVC]

Numbers are Russia's most glaring weakness.  This is not the 10 million strong force of 1945.

If Ukraine's formal military formations vanished overnight, leaving Russia solely with the task of organizing an occupation across the breadth of Ukraine and conducting counterinsurgency operations against partisans, they would need about 850,000 men.  That's about the entire personnel size of the Russian armed forces.  They don't have it. Instead they've spent the last year granting amnesties to hardened criminals and paying big signing bonuses to 3rd world foreigners.  The bottom of the barrel has been scraped, the barrel reudced to compost and now they are scooping up the sludge.

Of course, Ukraine's formal military formations have not vanished overnight, and are not about to, even if all foreign military aid disappeared.  An end to Western support would hurt a lot but it wouldn't change the reality  for Russia that even small movements on the map involve a heavy cost in blood.

Still need bullets to shoot the dregs. Can Europe supply them on their own? And by can I mean are they willing to.

[OttoVonBismarck]

If Ukraine's formal military formations vanished overnight, leaving Russia solely with the task of organizing an occupation across the breadth of Ukraine and conducting counterinsurgency operations against partisans, they would need about 850,000 men.  That's about the entire personnel size of the Russian armed forces.  They don't have it. Instead they've spent the last year granting amnesties to hardened criminals and paying big signing bonuses to 3rd world foreigners.  The bottom of the barrel has been scraped, the barrel reudced to compost and now they are scooping up the sludge.

This is something I mentioned way back before Putin invaded--I said however he fared in the invasion, he simply doesn't have the resources to conquer Ukraine. That's why I always said if he had an end game it was either a limited seizure of land (I speculated to create a land bridge to Crimea--and remember with his two "breakaway Republics" he already had created in East Ukraine, he was partially down that road anyway), or his "stretch goal" of ensconcing a Lukashenko style vassal in Kyiv. Direct Russian rule of most of Ukraine just isn't realistic, and is probably even less realistic in 2023 than it was in February of 2022.

Edit to add--Not that I think I was any kind of high level prognosticator, there was just a simple math to it. I'll note the Russians couldn't even suppress the Chechens with an outright occupation, right? The winning strategy they ultimately used there was to create an autonomous Chechen vassal who gets to rule Chechnya as a fiefdom, and he has kept discipline.

[Jacob]

Agreed.

That said, installing a compliant regime in Kyiv would count as a full victory for Putin, I think (especially if he hangs on to currently conquered territory).

Seems like he's far from installing such a regime, though, and I'm not sure how much closer Trump in the White House would put him

[Josquius]

The puppet regime in Kyiv stuff - this is where even 2014 was a huge error for Russia.
Sure crimea is valuable... But in carving off crimea and the donbass, not to mention kickstarting a sense of Ukrainian nationhood in opposition to Russia, he guaranteed the traditional 50-50 Russia/West leaning balance in ukraine was gone forever.



-----

Going into tinfoil hat time. Mutterings about, but only reported in the gutter press.... That AI experts (always a dubious thing to claim as a source) have found most of putins recent appearances have shown very little match up with how Putin himself looks. 50% similarity max.

They're claiming out of this they're doubles and one of these doubles even met the president of Kazakhstan, who has known Putin 20 years so spotted the fake easily. And that was before Putin mispronounced his name.

The natural conclusion of this tinfoil hatting is that Putin is dead and they're covering it up.

Putin dead is going way over the top. This seems unlikely.
But that he is heavily using body doubles? Sounds feasible.
 Which raises questions as to why. Simply afraid of assassination? Poor health? Bored of running Russia?

Also possible... If Putin doesn't look himself and is misprouncing things he should know.... There's long been rumours of parkinsons and other health issues..

Away from the wishful thinking conspiracy stuff one thing is certain - the Kazakh president recently when giving a speech to a Russian delegation decided to do it in Kazakh, causing shock amongst the Russians. A clear message being sent there.

[Sheilbh]

I agree on 2014. I think Putin is maybe the best example of a "great man" in our age. I'm really not sure Russia invades then and certainly not in 2022 without him inn charge. It's not reason or theories about gas reserves, but pscyhology.

There's always been lots of rumours around Putin's health and at some point they'll be true. He definitely has double(s) - I don't think Putin's done a single of the walkarounds with the public. But I think it is in those types of contexts where the double is used.

And yeah point made on Kazakhstan and not the first in Central Asia. They're all pivoting to China.

[HVC]

I figured they'd feel safer internally  with a weak Russia then a strong China, but I guess any new master seems like a better master.

[viper37]

Although in 2022 Ukraine had been fighting a low level war with thousands of casualties for eight years. It was not a conflict that attacted attention in the West but I think it's a mistake to think they were sitting on huge Soviet era stockpiles in February 2022 - they'd been burning through them fighting a constant war.

I'd also add that from everything I've read the stockpiles are gone point applies almost more to Western militaries which is why we're not sending any more. The need to ramp up production, especially in Europe, is as much about our own forces as Ukraine's - so far only Poland seems to have grasped the nettle and actually started expanding capacity.

I think Ukraine's shortages, especially in artillery, is more of an issue for them advancing. And I agree, I think without US support, unless European support dramatically increases, it's difficult to see Ukraine winning back swathes of territory (absent a Russian collapse, which is a possibility). I'd also add the other bit of supply is Western companies opening arms factories in Ukraine which aren't online yet but will be (I believe BAE and Rheinmetall are both establishing there - and in Poland). But I don't necessarily think those shortages necessarily mean Ukraine would be unable to hold territory.

Not least because we need to flip the question of it's not just the Ukrainian forces. There's a question of whether they can hold, but that also depends on who is going to beat them. On the numbers I think Ukraine's got a military of around 800,000 now (obviously not all on the front). Russia has also been burning through its equipment as well as skilled and experience men at a faster rate than Ukraine. They have more manpower and they have a bigger military industrial complex to rely on, but we know they're struggling with both. With their current levels of mobilisation I don't think they'd be able to breakthrough. In part because, I think for political/stability reasons, they're not really doing mass mobilisation or a war economy and also there doesn't seem to be an effective, widespread morale mobilisation on the "why we fight bit" which is important. Russia absolutely could mobilise more to win - they haven't so far and I think that's because of fears about politics and stability. I don't think that's shifted at all in the last year.

I think there's a bit of pre-2022 thinking about Russia's inevitability mixed with a little bit of the old stereotypes about the Russian military. Some of those preconceptions about the military might be true - but from everything I've read it looks a lot more like late Soviet Russia (but less fair/equitable) than anything else and certainly than anything like the full moblisation of the Russian people in the Russian military myth.

If anything I wonder if there's something about the nature of war in the twenty-first century here - that we're in a defence dominated world and I don't know what that means in a wider context but I think not just in Ukraine, attacking looks very difficult.

The thing about the low level war is that Ukraine was still able to make small purchase and build its own armaments, maybe?

I see it like flood vs regular rain.  The sewers will take regular rain with no problem, but there will be water in the streets if there's too much at the same time.

And there's too many Russians for Ukraine to fight alone right now.

Sure, Russia is depleted.  They don't have a war mobilization like in WW2.  They don't have allies with a huge industrial base shipping them military supplies on a regular basis, they can only count on a few countries to do that.

But they still have more numbers than Ukraine and can still outgun Ukraine in the very long run if Ukraine is left alone without US and Europe support.  I see cracks in Ukraine's support, not just in the US, but in Europe too, and that has me worried.

Ukraine is unable to produce the ammo it needs for the guns it now has (NATO) and if Europe can't ramp up production, even a stale-mate would be disastrous for Ukraine.  In the long run, they might be forced to a compromise with Russia.