Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Sheilbh]

I don't see many parallels to Syria.

The Russians are going to be likely to maintain their entrenched defenses for quite a while, but who knows how long that will be. There is genuine pressure and damage being done to Russia every day of this war.

Yeah I saw the strategy described (I think by the Chief of the Defence Staff here, but I'm not sure) as starve, stretch, strike. Starve through hitting logistics points and making re-supply more difficult, stretch through this attritional warfare while holding forces (including a lot of the mechanised) in reserve to strike when there are possibilities.

That feels sensible and I've no doubt there are huge challenges for Ukraine in basically learning a new type of warfare on the go - but I think they've proven very adaptable before and arguably mastered the new drone angle of war more than the West. I suspect our defence academiees will be studying that side of the war.

[crazy canuck]

seems like the time for 'advisors' is drawing nearer

Doubtful. Way too dangerous.

A number of nations already have them there, including Canada, the UK, France, and Lithuania.

It's a no go politically for the US. But the recent report that other countries have special forces training and supporting Ukraine within the Ukraine has gone with barely a notice everywhere else.

[Tamas]

seems like the time for 'advisors' is drawing nearer

Doubtful. Way too dangerous.

I am pretty sure Ivan didn't mean advisors as in the one training locals hundreds of kilometers behind the frontline, but "advisors" in the Vietnam War kind of way. Which I agree is a no-go.

While a stalemate is horrible for Ukrainians of course, I am not sure it is that unacceptable for the West. It's not the ideal outcome, obviously, but bleeding the Russian economy and military dry is still happening, and thanks to the West's help, time is on Ukraine's side.
A number of nations already have them there, including Canada, the UK, France, and Lithuania.

It's a no go politically for the US. But the recent report that other countries have special forces training and supporting Ukraine within the Ukraine has gone with barely a notice everywhere else.

[Sheilbh]

While a stalemate is horrible for Ukrainians of course, I am not sure it is that unacceptable for the West. It's not the ideal outcome, obviously, but bleeding the Russian economy and military dry is still happening, and thanks to the West's help, time is on Ukraine's side.

Yes, with 2-3 big caveats. The US loses interest/Trump wins - or China does something which causes the US to re-focus.

And that Western/European support is maintained. At a high level I think that's happening but I'm not really sure there's much evidence of long-term commitments like procurement orders to replenish equipment or material. Even separate from providing some of it to Ukraine, I'm not sure much is happening on that front.

[OttoVonBismarck]

A few of the ancillary political benefits I have started to see from this conflict:

1. There is reportedly serious strain between the Erdogan-Putin relationship, and this was before Putin ended the grain deal--which Erdo was very keen to see continue. While this of course doesn't mean Erdo is going to suddenly become a flag waving pro-American leader, I think it effectively halted Turkey's drift towards the Russian orbit--and likely even reversed it. I think at least part of the reason Erdo eventually caved on Sweden into NATO (and I think he had multiple factors at play) is he realizes Russia is no real "alternative" to its relationship with the US and NATO. The S-400 mistake he made, which is politically binding on him now, has to also rest in his mind. Note that Turkey has a grand total of 0 of those systems in operational use, because when they were delivered they found they didn't work very well. They are using the ones they have to engineer Turkish made alternatives (which who knows how well those will work.)

2. There are also reports that all of this mess has significantly raised Xi's personal skepticism toward Putin. Now, China's interest are too directly opposed to the West for this to be the start of any kind of thaw or improvement in that front, but Xi clearly now realizes Putin/Russia--while a great source of natural resources (which they will always be), is not actually a very reliable partner for much else. Anything that gives Xi a second thought about things is a net positive, one of the bigger risks to world peace right now is Xi gets too high on his own supply of Wolf Warrior shit and decides it is time to crack off war with Taiwan, and I think this conflict has actually helped reduce the likelihood of that.

[Jacob]

A few of the ancillary political benefits I have started to see from this conflict:

Yeah I hope you're right about this...

1. There is reportedly serious strain between the Erdogan-Putin relationship, and this was before Putin ended the grain deal--which Erdo was very keen to see continue. While this of course doesn't mean Erdo is going to suddenly become a flag waving pro-American leader, I think it effectively halted Turkey's drift towards the Russian orbit--and likely even reversed it. I think at least part of the reason Erdo eventually caved on Sweden into NATO (and I think he had multiple factors at play) is he realizes Russia is no real "alternative" to its relationship with the US and NATO. The S-400 mistake he made, which is politically binding on him now, has to also rest in his mind. Note that Turkey has a grand total of 0 of those systems in operational use, because when they were delivered they found they didn't work very well. They are using the ones they have to engineer Turkish made alternatives (which who knows how well those will work.)

Yeah... I'd think that Erdogan and his people are seeing the following:

1. That Russian commitments are less solid than average in the world of diplomacy.

2. That Russian kit and strength is lower than thought previously.

3. That Russia doesn't have that much to offer that can't be gotten in purely transactional exchanges.

2. There are also reports that all of this mess has significantly raised Xi's personal skepticism toward Putin. Now, China's interest are too directly opposed to the West for this to be the start of any kind of thaw or improvement in that front, but Xi clearly now realizes Putin/Russia--while a great source of natural resources (which they will always be), is not actually a very reliable partner for much else. Anything that gives Xi a second thought about things is a net positive, one of the bigger risks to world peace right now is Xi gets too high on his own supply of Wolf Warrior shit and decides it is time to crack off war with Taiwan, and I think this conflict has actually helped reduce the likelihood of that.

Yeah, I think prior to this war the general view in China is that Russia was a strong piece in the game against the West. I think their perception - and everyone's perception - is that the Russian piece was always weaker than it appeared, and additionally that it is much degraded.

As for cracking off a war with Taiwan... I think the main factors are going to be Xi's ego (and the degree to which it is fed by an internal machinery designed to feedit, much like Putin's revanchist ideologues) and internal Chinese conditions. While I think the failure of Russian strength, and the suprising effectiveness of the Western response is giving more sober Chinese analysts pause, I expect the trigger will come if/when the more sober analysts are pushed aside rather than because they like their chances.

[Sheilbh]

I don't think Erdogan was ever drifting towards Russia. I think he's a balancing leader who sees Turkey as at least as much a MENA state as a European and has seen Turkey's role and power increase in that area. Turkey and Russia have been on opposite sides in both Syria and Libya. The UKrainians are very positive towards Turkey and use them as their channel when they want to engage Russia's leadership. In terms of foreign policy I think Erdogan's basically an Ottoman-ish de Gaulle, rather than a useful idiot like Orban. I think that's still the case. As the situation changes he'll balance in other directions sometimes with one foot more clearly in Europe, or on the Atlantic alliance and others towards Russia or Central Asia or MENA depending on the circumstances.

On China - one other thought is about how Russia's performed. I think China gets that Russia is a very different system, but I think the failure of Russian forces and just how rotten the military seems to have been will give pause. In particular there's been a lot of talk about logistical failures and supply shortfalls and the military being a bit of a paper tiger - underpinning all of that is pervasive corruption at every level of the Russian military. I suspect that is something that's caught the eye of the Chinese leadership. Because it's long been a problem in their military (as in the rest of the Chinese state), but has clearly had an impact on Russia's ability to fight. I almost feel like an early warning sign of something being planned by China would be another round of anti-corruption crackdowns in the PLA.

[crazy canuck]

@Tamas

Do you know where the advisers are? do you know exactly what they're doing? Because it seems that many other people actually do know the answer those questions.

[The Minsky Moment]

I don't think Erdogan was ever drifting towards Russia. I think he's a balancing leader who sees Turkey as at least as much a MENA state as a European and has seen Turkey's role and power increase in that area. T

Agreed.
A seemingly dangerous Russia can be useful to Turkey by enhancing its value to the West; witness the leverage Erdogan was able to assert over NATO enlargement.  But a truly dangerous Russia is a danger to Turkish regional interests and indeed to Turkey itself.  Erdogan does not want to see an emboldened neo-imperial Russia rolling over Ukraine. A would be neo-Ottoman cannot feel too easy and comfortable with the would be heirs to the Tsars.

[Jacob]

Yeah, if you've ever played Diplomacy you know that Turkey and Russia are not natural allies.

[PJL]

Yeah, if you've ever played Diplomacy you know that Turkey and Russia are not natural allies.

Indeed, I think there is a real chance of them bouncing in the Black Sea quite soon.

[Jacob]

If this infographic is to be believed, then China is the single biggest importer from the grain deal

[mongers]

If this infographic is to be believed, then China is the single biggest importer from the grain deal

Believable and I know Turkey has received around 10% of the grain shipped, which that info graphic shows.

Also the surprisingly small quantities shipped to the third world is about right, those countries benefit indirectly from the grain deal, because it's noticeably reduced some world food commodity prices.

I think at the height of the invasion reaction wheat was hitting $17+ (per US bushel??) and it had declined to near pre-war levels of about $6.5, but in the last few days there's been an uptick to $7 and higher.

[Richard Hakluyt]

I don't think Erdogan was ever drifting towards Russia. I think he's a balancing leader who sees Turkey as at least as much a MENA state as a European and has seen Turkey's role and power increase in that area. T

Agreed.
A seemingly dangerous Russia can be useful to Turkey by enhancing its value to the West; witness the leverage Erdogan was able to assert over NATO enlargement.  But a truly dangerous Russia is a danger to Turkish regional interests and indeed to Turkey itself.  Erdogan does not want to see an emboldened neo-imperial Russia rolling over Ukraine. A would be neo-Ottoman cannot feel too easy and comfortable with the would be heirs to the Tsars.

I would also concur.

It seems to me that Erdogan has successfully enhanced Turkey's status as a key player with their actions of the past year or two; but a resurgent Russian Empire/Soviet Union has to be one of Turkey's worst nightmares, so realpolitik starts to take over.

[Hamilcar]

I don't think Erdogan was ever drifting towards Russia. I think he's a balancing leader who sees Turkey as at least as much a MENA state as a European and has seen Turkey's role and power increase in that area. T

Agreed.
A seemingly dangerous Russia can be useful to Turkey by enhancing its value to the West; witness the leverage Erdogan was able to assert over NATO enlargement.  But a truly dangerous Russia is a danger to Turkish regional interests and indeed to Turkey itself.  Erdogan does not want to see an emboldened neo-imperial Russia rolling over Ukraine. A would be neo-Ottoman cannot feel too easy and comfortable with the would be heirs to the Tsars.

I would add that the risk of a Western-sponsored Kurdish state on the Turkish border has receded far enough that Erdogan can afford to pivot to the West.