Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Legbiter]

Are we already in the Ardennes offensive phase of the war?    Enjoy those cluster munitions vatniks.

[Barrister]

I was at the store.  The checkout clerk had a slavic accent and a Ukraine pin on her shirt.  After paying for my goods I asked if she was from Ukraine.  "Yes" she said.

I said "slava ukraini".

Big smile as she responded "Heroyam slava".

Made my day.

[Josquius]

I'm cautiously optimistic about what I'm hearing.
The Ukrainians have learned from early mistakes and each "defeated attack" today leads to more losses for Russia whilst Ukraine grinds forward.
The only concerns are
1: a ukrainian loss is difficult to replace. They've used up their willing manpower and many of these guys are experienced soldiers. A lot of the Russian manpower are random kids they've no issue with throwing on the front line.
2: time. The campaigning season has a finite end and Ukraines economy and western will demand success. On the other hand fighter jets will come with time.

I do expect Russia will break somewhere at some point.

[Tamas]

Are we already in the Ardennes offensive phase of the war?    Enjoy those cluster munitions vatniks.

I hope it is true they are preparing to attack and that the Ukrainians are withholding their reserves to deal with it. Should be a good way to get rid of a lot of Russian soldiers and equipment outside of their trenches. Plus I expect the weaker Russian morale will have a bigger effect when they are driven to attack.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

From what I heard the uaf hasn't committed the bulk of the forces reserved for the liberation yet. So there are probably some reserves around

[Zoupa]

A sobering/depressing read:

https://threadreaderapp.com/thread/1681240456754077697.html

New🧵: @konrad_muzyka , @RALee85 , @KofmanMichael,& I spent some time this month visiting the frontlines in Ukraine to gain new insights into the ongoing counteroffensive & the war overall. Here are some general observations. (Note: More detailed analysis will be coming out by all of us in the coming weeks.)

First off, we spoke to NCOs, officers, a number of brigade commanders (national guard & regular army) in the field plus senior intel & defense officials in Kyiv (alongside @DAlperovitch).
Counteroffensive:

1.) By and large this is an infantryman's fight (squad, platoon & company level) supported by artillery along most of the frontline. This has several implications: 1st: Progress is measured by yards/meters and not km/miles given reduced mobility.
2nd: Mechanized formations are rarely deployed due to lack of enablers for maneuver. This includes insufficient quantities of de-mining equipment, air defenses, ATGMs etc.

2.) Ukrainian forces have still not mastered combined arms operations at scale. Operations are more sequential than synchronized. This creates various problems for the offense & IMO is the main cause for slow progress.

3.) 🇺🇦 forces by default have switched to a strategy of attrition relying on sequential fires rather than maneuver. This is the reason why cluster munitions are critical to extend current fire rates into the fall: weakening Russian defenses to a degree that enables maneuver.

4.) Minefields are a problem as most observers know. They confine maneuver space & slow advances. But much more impactful than the minefields per se on Ukraine's ability to break through Russian defenses is 🇺🇦s inability to conduct complex combined arms operations at scale.
Lack of a comprehensive combined arms approach at scale makes Ukrainian forces more vulnerable to Russian ATGMs, artillery etc. while advancing. So it's not just about equipment. There's simply no systematic pulling apart of the Russian defensive system that I could observe.

5.) The character of this offensive will only likely change if there is a more systematic approach to breaking through Russian defenses, perhaps paired with or causing a severe degradation of Russian morale, that will lead to a sudden or gradual collapse of Russian defenses.
Absent a sudden collapse of Russian defenses, I suspect this will remain a bloody attritional fight with reserve units being fed in incrementally in the coming weeks & months.

6.) There is limited evidence of a systematic deep battle that methodically degrades Russian C2/munitions. Despite rationing on the Russian side, ammunition is available and Russians appear to have fairly good battlefield ISR coverage.
Russians also had no need to deploy operational reserves yet to fend off Ukrainian attacks. There is also evidence of reduced impact of HIMARS strikes due to effective Russian countermeasures. (This is important to keep in mind re. any potential tac. impact of delivery of ATACMs.)
Russian forces, even if severely degraded & lacking ammo, are likely capable of delaying, containing or repulsing individual platoon- or company-sized Ukrainian advances unless these attacks are better coordinated & synchronized along the broader frontline.

7.) Quality of Russian forces varies. Attrition is hitting them hard but they are defending their positions well, according to Ukrainians we spoke to. They have been quite adaptable at the tactical level and are broadly defending according to Soviet/Russian doctrine.

8.) Russian artillery rationing is real & happening. Ukraine has established fire superiority in tube artillery while Russia retains superiority in MRLSs in the South. Localized fire superiority in some calibers alone does not suffice, however, to break through Russian defenses.

9.) An additional influx of weapons systems (e.g., ATACMs, air defense systems, MBTs, IFVs etc.) while important to sustain the war effort, will likely not have a decisive tactical impact without adaptation and more effective integration.
Ukraine will have to better synchronize & adapt current tactics, without which western equipment will not prove tac. decisive in the long run. This is happening but it is slow work in progress. (Most NATO-style militaries would struggle with this even more than the 🇺🇦s IMO).

10.) The above is also true for breaching operations. Additional mine clearing equipment is needed & will be helpful (especially man-portable mine-clearing systems) but not decisive without better integration of fire & maneuver at scale.
(Again, I cannot emphasize enough how difficult this is to pull off in wartime.)
Monocausal explanations for failure (like lack of de-mining equipment) do not reflect reality. E.g., some Ukrainian assaults were stopped by Russian ATGMs even before reaching the 1st 🇷🇺 minefield.

11.) There is a dearth of artillery barrels that is difficult to address given production rates and delivery timelines.

12.) So far Ukraine's approach in this counteroffensive has been first and foremost direct assaults on Russian positions supported by a rudimentary deep battle approach. And no, these direct assaults are not mere probing attacks.

13.) There is evidence of tactical cyber operations supporting closing of kinetic kill-chains. That is cyber ISR contributing to identifying & tracking targets on the battlefield. Starlink remains absolutely key for Ukrainian C2.

14.) Quality of Ukrainian officers and NCOs we met appears excellent & morale remains high. However, there are some force quality issues emerging with less able bodied & older men called up for service now.

15.) The narrative that Ukrainian progress thus far is slow just because of a lack of weapons deliveries and support is monocausal & is not shared by those we spoke to actually fighting & exercising command on the frontline.

16.) It goes without saying that in a war of attrition, more artillery ammunition & hardware is always needed and needs to be steadily supplied. (Western support of Ukraine certainly should continue as there is still the prospect that the counteroffensive will make gains.)
But soldiers fighting on the frontline we spoke to are all too aware that lack of progress is often more due to force employment, poor tactics, lack of coordination btw. units, bureaucratic red tape/infighting, Soviet style thinking etc. & ...Russians putting up stiff resistance.

[crazy canuck]

I was at the store.  The checkout clerk had a slavic accent and a Ukraine pin on her shirt.  After paying for my goods I asked if she was from Ukraine.  "Yes" she said.

I said "slava ukraini".

Big smile as she responded "Heroyam slava".

Made my day.

 

[crazy canuck]

@Zoupa, all of that rings true, our forces, and the US in particular, spend a lot of time and resources training their troops.  Ukraine has significantly less time and resources.  My guess is that the troops are being trained in modified tactics given the limitations.

[Valmy]

Goddamn.

I hope this isn't another Syria.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

seems like the time for 'advisors' is drawing nearer

[Valmy]

seems like the time for 'advisors' is drawing nearer

Doubtful. Way too dangerous.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I don't see many parallels to Syria.

The Russians are going to be likely to maintain their entrenched defenses for quite a while, but who knows how long that will be. There is genuine pressure and damage being done to Russia every day of this war.

I take heart that the Ukrainians have reportedly shifted tactics significantly since the early weeks of the offensive--they are being much more cautious in committing soldiers, which is a good recognition that as the smaller country they cannot afford to give up lives asymmetrically to Russians at scale.

One of the wildest things to me is how stupid the Russians continue to be--so Putin desperately wants to maintain tourism in Crimea, because a collapse of Crimean tourism would be an admission his war is not going well. He has continued to encourage tourism, to the point that tourists traveling to Crimea have actually blocked up roads used for military logistics, and slowed down military re-supply. Additionally, with the recent strike on the Kerch bridge, Putin ordered military resources be used to ferry tourists across as a stop gap measure, and is also encouraging tourists to travel to Crimea via occupied roads in southern Ukraine--which has also reportedly interfered with military logistics.

Literally hurting his actual war effort to maintain the facade that "everything is fine."

But the thing is, it's not even irrational, it is more a product of the core irrationality of Putin's rule. His rule is built on lies and falsehoods, so if he lets some of those lies and falsehoods get exposed it is a threat to his rule--maybe even more serious a threat than anything else.

[DGuller]

I don't see many parallels to Syria.

The Russians are going to be likely to maintain their entrenched defenses for quite a while, but who knows how long that will be. There is genuine pressure and damage being done to Russia every day of this war.

I take heart that the Ukrainians have reportedly shifted tactics significantly since the early weeks of the offensive--they are being much more cautious in committing soldiers, which is a good recognition that as the smaller country they cannot afford to give up lives asymmetrically to Russians at scale.

One of the wildest things to me is how stupid the Russians continue to be--so Putin desperately wants to maintain tourism in Crimea, because a collapse of Crimean tourism would be an admission his war is not going well. He has continued to encourage tourism, to the point that tourists traveling to Crimea have actually blocked up roads used for military logistics, and slowed down military re-supply. Additionally, with the recent strike on the Kerch bridge, Putin ordered military resources be used to ferry tourists across as a stop gap measure, and is also encouraging tourists to travel to Crimea via occupied roads in southern Ukraine--which has also reportedly interfered with military logistics.

Literally hurting his actual war effort to maintain the facade that "everything is fine."

But the thing is, it's not even irrational, it is more a product of the core irrationality of Putin's rule. His rule is built on lies and falsehoods, so if he lets some of those lies and falsehoods get exposed it is a threat to his rule--maybe even more serious a threat than anything else.

I think having his lies exposed is the least of Putin's concerns.  Only Donald Trump cares less about having his lies exposed.  Both of them understand that making people not care about the truth is the ultimate goal of propaganda, and if you achieve it, there is no need to craft elaborate lies. 

During the run-up to the war, one of the arguments in the support of theory that it was a bluff was that the Russian population was not fed war propaganda.  Russians, many of whom have relatives in Ukraine, would surely not support Putin when he would decide to invade out of the blue.  In reality, Russians didn't need such preparation, the moment they invaded, they were on Putin's side, and those with relatives in Ukraine told them to stop making up shit about how their cities are bombed.

I think what Putin fears a great deal is something that every autocrat fears worse than death:  looking weak and not in control.  Treating Russian territory, of which Crimea is obviously that, as a war zone, is conceding that he lost control of the situation.

[grumbler]

seems like the time for 'advisors' is drawing nearer

The Gurkhas aren't doing anything right now, so maybe them?

[Sheilbh]

seems like the time for 'advisors' is drawing nearer

The Gurkhas aren't doing anything right now, so maybe them?

According to those Pentagon leaks there's up to 50 British special forces (SAS and SBS mentioned but maybe others) advisors in Ukraine.

I think it speaks to public attitudes to Ukraine here that the story broke and everyone shrugged their shoulders/has no issue with it