Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[alfred russel]

Why does he want to absorb any of the land that he is now?

Some of that might be strategic - like a land bridge to Crimea. Some might be to appease nationalists and/or theoretically liberate the russian speaking eastern portions of the country (which are probably really populated with people less than fond of russia). All of it is probably low cost because it is probably ruined wasteland that isn't so densely populated anymore.

Annexing places like Lviv would be a disaster. I would assume russian leadership would recognize that but i can't say that with certainty.

[OttoVonBismarck]

The Cold War was not based on respecting spheres of influence, in fact that entire phrase is something that mostly comes out of the Putinist ideology of the 21st century. The Cold War was based on the premise of upholding the legality of the post war order by not blatantly violating it, aside from a few exceptions, and in avoiding direct military conflict for fear of escalation. Basically everything beyond that was fully on the table. If we "respected spheres of influence" in the Cold War, the Soviets would have never gone into Cuba or South America. The United States would not have been involved in Vietnam, nor would the Soviets have for that matter, and the United States certainly would not be funding to a massive degree the Afghan mujahideen. Spheres of influence were never a thing in the Cold War, what was a thing was competition that avoided direct head on head military conflict and a general avoidance of overt wars of territorial aggression.

[alfred russel]

The Cold War was not based on respecting spheres of influence, in fact that entire phrase is something that mostly comes out of the Putinist ideology of the 21st century. The Cold War was based on the premise of upholding the legality of the post war order by not blatantly violating it, aside from a few exceptions, and in avoiding direct military conflict for fear of escalation. Basically everything beyond that was fully on the table. If we "respected spheres of influence" in the Cold War, the Soviets would have never gone into Cuba or South America. The United States would not have been involved in Vietnam, nor would the Soviets have for that matter, and the United States certainly would not be funding to a massive degree the Afghan mujahideen. Spheres of influence were never a thing in the Cold War, what was a thing was competition that avoided direct head on head military conflict and a general avoidance of overt wars of territorial aggression.

The wikipedia article on "sphere of influence" has a section on the cold war and another on contemporary russia:

Cold War (1947–91)


During the Cold War, the Soviet sphere of influence was said to include: the Baltic states, Central Europe, some countries in Eastern Europe, Cuba, Laos, Vietnam, North Korea, and—until the Sino-Soviet split and Tito–Stalin split—the People's Republic of China and the People's Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, among other countries at various times. Meanwhile, United States was considered to have a sphere of influence over Western Europe, Oceania, Japan, and South Korea, among other places.[citation needed]

However, the level of control exerted in these spheres varied and was not absolute. For instance, France and the United Kingdom were able to act independently to invade (with Israel) the Suez Canal (they were later forced to withdraw by joint U.S. and Soviet pressure). Later, France was also able to withdraw from the military arm of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Cuba, as another example, often took positions that put it at odds with its Soviet ally, including momentary alliances with China, economic reorganizations, and providing support for insurgencies in Africa and the Americas without prior approval from the Soviet Union.[citation needed]

With the end of the Cold War, the Eastern Bloc fell apart, effectively ending the Soviet sphere of influence. Then in 1991, the Soviet Union ceased to exist, replaced by the Russian Federation and several other ex-Soviet Republics who became independent states.

Contemporary Russia (1990s–present)

After the fall of the Soviet Union, the countries of Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia that became independent were often portrayed as part of the Russian Federation's 'sphere of influence'. According to Ulrich Speck, writing for Carnegie Europe, "After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the West's focus was on Russia. Western nations implicitly treated the post-Soviet countries (besides the Baltic states) as Russia's sphere of influence."[30]

In 1997, NATO and Russia signed the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security, stating the "aim of creating in Europe a common space of security and stability, without dividing lines or spheres of influence limiting the sovereignty of any state."[31]

On August 31, 2008, Russian president Dmitri Medvedev stated five principles of foreign policy, including the claim of a privileged sphere of influence that comprised "the border region, but not only".[32] In 2009, Russia asserted that the European Union desires a sphere of influence and that the Eastern Partnership is "an attempt to extend" it.[33] In March that year, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt stated that the "Eastern Partnership is not about spheres of influence. The difference is that these countries themselves opted to join."[33]

Following the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, Václav Havel and other former central and eastern European leaders signed an open letter stating that Russia had "violated the core principles of the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris ... all in the name of defending a sphere of influence on its borders."[34] In April 2014, NATO stated that, contrary to the Founding Act,

Russia now appears to be attempting to recreate a sphere of influence by seizing a part of Ukraine, maintaining large numbers of forces on its borders, and demanding, as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov recently stated, that "Ukraine cannot be part of any bloc."[35]

Criticising Russia in November 2014, German Chancellor Angela Merkel said that "old thinking about spheres of influence, which runs roughshod over international law" put the "entire European peace order into question."[36] In January 2017, British Prime Minister Theresa May said, "We should not jeopardise the freedoms that President Reagan and Mrs Thatcher brought to Eastern Europe by accepting President Putin's claim that it is now in his sphere of influence."[37]

[Barrister]

Was there a certain degree of de facto spheres of influence during the cold war?  Sure.

But neither the US or USSR ever claimed to have a sphere of influence, and never justified their actions because of a sphere of influence.  Soviets went into Czechoslovakia at the supposed request of the government.  US troops went to Vietnam at the request of the South Vietnamese government.  Attempts to overthrow governments were done through local rebels, not uniformed military of the western powers.

The USSR would always deny it had any special control over eastern europe, saying that the warsaw bloc was just a fraternal grouping of nations (or some such language).

[Crazy_Ivan80]

I mean he is not wrong and it was totally a dick move from Germany,

Poland did not mind enough to not buy the gas that streamed through Nordstream 1, even after Februarythis year. I guess political grandstanding stops when it comes to cold hard cash.

practicality has no bearing on dickishness of moves though

[crazy canuck]

Was there a certain degree of de facto spheres of influence during the cold war?  Sure.

But neither the US or USSR ever claimed to have a sphere of influence, and never justified their actions because of a sphere of influence.  Soviets went into Czechoslovakia at the supposed request of the government.  US troops went to Vietnam at the request of the South Vietnamese government.  Attempts to overthrow governments were done through local rebels, not uniformed military of the western powers.

The USSR would always deny it had any special control over eastern europe, saying that the warsaw bloc was just a fraternal grouping of nations (or some such language).

The US didn't claim the Western Hemisphere as their sphere of influence?

[Barrister]

Was there a certain degree of de facto spheres of influence during the cold war?  Sure.

But neither the US or USSR ever claimed to have a sphere of influence, and never justified their actions because of a sphere of influence.  Soviets went into Czechoslovakia at the supposed request of the government.  US troops went to Vietnam at the request of the South Vietnamese government.  Attempts to overthrow governments were done through local rebels, not uniformed military of the western powers.

The USSR would always deny it had any special control over eastern europe, saying that the warsaw bloc was just a fraternal grouping of nations (or some such language).

The US didn't claim the Western Hemisphere as their sphere of influence?

Yes and no.

I think you're referring to the Monroe Doctrine, which was more anti-colonial than anything else.  It didn't say "US has control over the western hemisphere", but rather said "European colonial powers will not interfere with newly independent states in the western hemisphere".  It was a guarantee of their independence, not a claim of a "sphere of influence".

Now did the US interfere themselves in those countries in the 19th and first half of the 20th century?  Sure. 

But by the close of WWII US relations with Latin America was pretty much governed by the same principles as the rest of the world and the Monroe doctrine largely laid in abeyance (until Obama fully said it was over).  After all the US didn't feel it could just invade Cuba - citing the Monroe doctrine.

[Admiral Yi]

Regarding the USSR's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, I can't remember exactly what the formal agreement was at Yalta, but I do remember that Churchill was very upset about the treatment of Poland, as the reason the UK had entered the war in the first place was to guarantee Poland's sovereignty.

[Barrister]

Regarding the USSR's sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, I can't remember exactly what the formal agreement was at Yalta, but I do remember that Churchill was very upset about the treatment of Poland, as the reason the UK had entered the war in the first place was to guarantee Poland's sovereignty.

Well of course that's because the western allies had just agreed to granting the USSR huge chunks of formerly Polish territory (and Poland to be compensated with German land).  Since the whole war started to defend Polish territorial integrity that didn't sit very well.

When it came to the Polish government Yalta agreements spoke of free and fair democratic elections to be held.  Of course the elections were neither.

[crazy canuck]

Was there a certain degree of de facto spheres of influence during the cold war?  Sure.

But neither the US or USSR ever claimed to have a sphere of influence, and never justified their actions because of a sphere of influence.  Soviets went into Czechoslovakia at the supposed request of the government.  US troops went to Vietnam at the request of the South Vietnamese government.  Attempts to overthrow governments were done through local rebels, not uniformed military of the western powers.

The USSR would always deny it had any special control over eastern europe, saying that the warsaw bloc was just a fraternal grouping of nations (or some such language).

The US didn't claim the Western Hemisphere as their sphere of influence?

Yes and no.

I think you're referring to the Monroe Doctrine, which was more anti-colonial than anything else.  It didn't say "US has control over the western hemisphere", but rather said "European colonial powers will not interfere with newly independent states in the western hemisphere".  It was a guarantee of their independence, not a claim of a "sphere of influence".

Now did the US interfere themselves in those countries in the 19th and first half of the 20th century?  Sure. 

But by the close of WWII US relations with Latin America was pretty much governed by the same principles as the rest of the world and the Monroe doctrine largely laid in abeyance (until Obama fully said it was over).  After all the US didn't feel it could just invade Cuba - citing the Monroe doctrine.

No, I was not thinking about that.  As you correctly point out that is a different concept.  After WW II the Soviets and Americans had clearly declared spheres of influence.  That changed and degraded over time though.  When I was in undergrad in the mid 80s one of the topics of debate was whether it was useful to talk about spheres of influence by that point.  But that reinforces the point of their existence during the earlier period.

Thinking about it more - it has to do with the end of the Good Neighbour Policy (nonintervention) to an interventionist US policy in the Hemisphere.  At the same time the USSR was given tacit control over Eastern Europe. 

[Admiral Yi]

Well of course that's because the western allies had just agreed to granting the USSR huge chunks of formerly Polish territory (and Poland to be compensated with German land).  Since the whole war started to defend Polish territorial integrity that didn't sit very well.

When it came to the Polish government Yalta agreements spoke of free and fair democratic elections to be held.  Of course the elections were neither.

I thought it had something to do with the USSR's role in the formulation of the Polish government rather than the borders, but I'll have to do some back reading before I say any more.

[Barrister]

No, I was not thinking about that.  As you correctly point out that is a different concept.  After WW II the Soviets and Americans had clearly declared spheres of influence.  That changed and degraded over time though.  When I was in undergrad in the mid 80s one of the topics of debate was whether it was useful to talk about spheres of influence by that point.  But that reinforces the point of their existence during the earlier period.

Was there a de facto sphere of influence for both powers?  Sure.

But the US never "declared" a sphere of influence.  Neither did the USSR.  All of their public diplomacy was about recognizing the sovereignty and freedom of individual nations.

Remember when Gerald Ford was mocked for saying there was no Soviet domination of eastern europe?  He was rightly mocked because on the ground that was true.  But that was certainly always US policy.  They didn't let the Soviets get away with literal murder 'because it's their sphere of influence'.

[Barrister]

Well of course that's because the western allies had just agreed to granting the USSR huge chunks of formerly Polish territory (and Poland to be compensated with German land).  Since the whole war started to defend Polish territorial integrity that didn't sit very well.

When it came to the Polish government Yalta agreements spoke of free and fair democratic elections to be held.  Of course the elections were neither.

I thought it had something to do with the USSR's role in the formulation of the Polish government rather than the borders, but I'll have to do some back reading before I say any more.

UK had always recognized the Polish government in exile.  As the Red Army entered Poland they formed their own provisional government.  Yalta stipulated that a national unity government be formed with representatives of both until elections could be held.  It wasn't ideal, but best the West could negotiate given the reality of the Red Army being there.

Soviets formed a national unity government, but arrested members of the government-in-exile when they returned.

[Crazy_Ivan80]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xNkz6AJbEww&ab_channel=ReportingfromUkraine

if correct the Russians are in the process of being dealt another kick in the nuts.

[The Minsky Moment]

IMO Ford was treated a little unfairly.

The underlying issue was the wisdom of the Helsinki Accords, an issue on which Carter took a politically driven public position in opposition (rather ironically given his subsequent political evolution and career).  The point I think that Ford was trying to make is that the there was no de jure Soviet domination and the Helsinki framework was trying to reinforce those de jure norms, although obviously it came out in poor way the way he said it.  History suggests that the Ford side of the larger argument had substantial merit, as the Helsinki/CSCE process arguably played a meaningful role in successful conclusion of the Cold War.