Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[alfred russel]

Vietnam, Korea and the soviet adventures in Afghanistan were less stand alone wars and more hot flashes in the global struggle between the west and soviet bloc to bring/keep countries in their sphere of influence.

I still think that the current invasion of Ukraine is in that same mindset. Putin and lots of Russians look at the collapse of the soviet union as a catastrophe and the alignment of former warsaw pact countries plus the baltics/georgia with the west as both a betrayal by the west and a disaster for russia. Ukraine is not only the most important part of the old soviet empire left in russia's theoretical sphere, if it is allowed to join the west without paying a steep price it also sets an ominous example for others.

It is like the mafia--yeah you want your guys to stay loyal, but if they don't you kill them, as an example to the others. That is not only a purpose of continuing to push in Ukraine, but also a reason Putin needs a way to get out. Places like Uzbekistan are making some anti russian noises, and Kazakhstan has created some noticeable distance between itself and Moscow. Belarus is obviously being propped up by Russia.

[The Minsky Moment]

Question for the armchair generals:

We've seen Ukraine's forces being successful in stalling - and in some places pushing back - Russia's advance. In response, Russia has settled into their more regular strategy of artillery and rocket barrages against Ukrainian population centres from afar. What are Ukraine's tactical and strategic options to respond to that?

Continue to attack the supply lines that supply the food, ammunition, and fuel of the forces employed to bombard those centers.

Attack them directly in harassing attacks where possible.

Employ drones to attack the assets directly where they can be located and identified via a variety of intel means.

Which gets back to yet another reason why the drive on Kyiv was so ill-advised.  In the south and east, the Russian supply lines are more secure but in the north they have left themselves badly vulnerable.

[The Minsky Moment]

So can someone smarter than I explain this one to me?

What is the significance of being paid in rubles or in euros?  I would have thought Putin would want the more convertible euros, though clearly I am missing something.

I *think* what's going on is he wants gas importers to buy rubles on the open market, raising the ruble exchange rate.  Since his foreign reserves are frozen he can't intervene directly to prop it up.

You'd think he could achieve the same thing by accepting payment in hard currency, but then he'd have to turn around and sell forex for rubles to prop up the exchange rate, and maybe the central bank sanctions preclude that.

My guess.

Mine too. They use Euros they would have to find banks willing to deal with large Russian counterparties in Euro transactions.  Even Chinese banks have been shying away from the risk.

[Barrister]

Which gets back to yet another reason why the drive on Kyiv was so ill-advised.  In the south and east, the Russian supply lines are more secure but in the north they have left themselves badly vulnerable.

RF forces in the north also have to be supplied through Belarus, and there are reports of sabotage along Belarussian rail lines.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Interesting development:

Twelve Russian special police officers within the country's national guard, or Rosgvardia, refused an order from their superiors to go fight in Ukraine and were dismissed from service, according to human rights lawyers now representing them in court.

In early February, officers in the force's Krasnodar region were sent to Crimea, which Russia annexed from Ukraine in 2014, to take part in what their commanders told them was a military exercise. Later, they received orders to go to Ukraine, which they deemed illegal.

"None of them had a foreign passport with them, nor any intention to leave Russia as their direct official duties are limited to Russian territory," Pavel Chikov, chair of Agora International Human Rights Group, said in a statement published on his Telegram channel Thursday.

Crossing the Russian-Ukrainian border without a document would have been illegal under Russian law. Doing that as part of an armed group would violate Ukrainian laws, Chikov clarified.

"None of the plaintiffs were informed about a business trip to Ukraine to participate in a special military operation or its tasks and conditions," he added. "As a result, they did not give consent to it."

Russia's national guard is an internal military force generally tasked with protecting public order and guarding critical state facilities. Since the invasion, some of its units have been operating in Ukraine and were seen holding ground around nuclear power plants Russian forces have overtaken.

After their refusal to participate in the invasion, the officers were taken back to Krasnodar, subjected to a disciplinary probe and then fired. They are now suing their unit for wrongful termination.

"They decided not to go to Ukraine independently and on their own," their lawyer Mikhail Benyash said. "There are quite a lot of such 'refuseniks' throughout Russia, but only these have gathered enough courage to sue. The rest gave up without a fight, which says a lot about them as fighters."

According to Benyash, the group consisted of 11 officers and one platoon commander from the "Plastun" unit. Chikov identified the platoon leader as Capt. Farid Chitav.

"Personally to me, it seems that taking part in such events where people shoot and could be killed should be made exclusively on a voluntary basis," Benyash said. "As long as the Russian authorities think otherwise, we will have to argue with them."

[Berkut]

Question for the armchair generals:

We've seen Ukraine's forces being successful in stalling - and in some places pushing back - Russia's advance. In response, Russia has settled into their more regular strategy of artillery and rocket barrages against Ukrainian population centres from afar. What are Ukraine's tactical and strategic options to respond to that?

Continue to attack the supply lines that supply the food, ammunition, and fuel of the forces employed to bombard those centers.

Attack them directly in harassing attacks where possible.

Employ drones to attack the assets directly where they can be located and identified via a variety of intel means.

Which gets back to yet another reason why the drive on Kyiv was so ill-advised.  In the south and east, the Russian supply lines are more secure but in the north they have left themselves badly vulnerable.

I don't think you can probably even really measure accurately the value of US intell quietly being fed into Ukrainian ops cycles.

We are really, really good at that stuff, and I am certain we are happy to share any and all of it with our Ukranian friends.

You don't have to put US boots on the ground in Ukraine to play all the various SIGINT games we are good at (and apparently Russia is really, really, REALLY bad at).

[Josquius]

Interesting angle on it all. Illegal business trip.

[Barrister]

Slightly amusing, but mostly very, very sad:

Ukrainians aren't sure what to do with increasing number of Russian dead bodies, as Russia shows little interest in retrieving them and weather is starting to heat up.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/23/europe/ukraine-war-russian-soldiers-deaths-cmd-intl/index.html

[Berkut]

Slightly amusing, but mostly very, very sad:

Ukrainians aren't sure what to do with increasing number of Russian dead bodies, as Russia shows little interest in retrieving them and weather is starting to heat up.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/23/europe/ukraine-war-russian-soldiers-deaths-cmd-intl/index.html

Bury them, mark the graves, not the positions via GPS if possible.

[Jacob]

On the last point: There were estimates that stopping Russian energy imports would cause a 3.5% hit to the German economy. A bit less than a Brexit or a 2008 financial crisis, so costly, but not unheard of. Germany is preparing for this case now by defining a ranking order for consumers. Main consumption is industrial processes and heating, not electricity generation.

Same study claimed that stopping all energy exports to the West would cause a 30% or so contraction in Russia...

A 3.5% contraction is nothing to sneeze at. It'll be very uncomfortable. But a 30% contraction is pretty intense. On a high level strategic perspective it seems like it'd be a worthwhile trade. I guess the question is how the German people's resolve would hold up in face of such a contraction.

[Barrister]

Slightly amusing, but mostly very, very sad:

Ukrainians aren't sure what to do with increasing number of Russian dead bodies, as Russia shows little interest in retrieving them and weather is starting to heat up.

https://edition.cnn.com/2022/03/23/europe/ukraine-war-russian-soldiers-deaths-cmd-intl/index.html

Bury them, mark the graves, not the positions via GPS if possible.

I dunno I like what they're doing now - putting them up on a website to try and get Russian mothers to identify them.

[PDH]

Mark the graves with sunflowers.

[Admiral Yi]

Do Germany et al have any old coal generated plants sitting around idle they could fire up?  As a stop gap until a permanent solution comes along.

[Sheilbh]

On the last point: There were estimates that stopping Russian energy imports would cause a 3.5% hit to the German economy. A bit less than a Brexit or a 2008 financial crisis, so costly, but not unheard of. Germany is preparing for this case now by defining a ranking order for consumers. Main consumption is industrial processes and heating, not electricity generation.

Same study claimed that stopping all energy exports to the West would cause a 30% or so contraction in Russia...

Yeah - and I've already read about companies in Europe shutting down production due to gas prices (which is at a level that'd be the equivalent of $600 per barrel in oil). Add that sort of impact in manufacturing that relies on gas to all the direct economic impacts of this war on food, energy and fertiliser and there's going to be a huge impact on economies and cost of living. And it's worth noting the 4% hit for Brexit is a forecast on the cumulative impact on GDP in the long run rather than a sudden shock like this would be.

It's why I think - and hope - that the EU will move to some form of common debt to help alleviate the issue. But more generally for these sanctions to be durable western politicians need to be thinking about how to mitigte the cost of living impact on their citizens.

The other thing I find slightly interesting is what the Economist wrote about this week around the lack of asking citizens to make adjustments. I think it's really interesting because everywhere in Europe there is huge public opinion on the side of supporting Ukraine and sanctioning Russia. We've also just had the experience of incredibly sweeping and intrusive adjustments to everyone's life to deal with covid - which had very broad voluntary compliance (and would be impossible to enforce otherwise). I'm surprised politicians across Europe haven't asked for their citizens to, for example, turn down their thermostat by 1.5 to help reduce reliance on Russian gas. Given that people want to do something it feels plausible that many would and it would cut the need for Russian gas by more than 10% which is not nothing when the EU is aiming to end 2/3s of the Russian gas by year end. It's basically the equivalent of the LNG imports the EU announced today with Biden:
https://www.economist.com/europe/2022/03/26/weaning-europe-off-russian-energy-will-mean-making-changes

I think part of it is no-one wants to be a 21st century Jimmy Carter - but I think one of the things I learned from covid (in relation to Europe at least) was that people are genuinely civic minded and will respond to calls to change their behaviour for a wider good. I think that's something we should use here and with climate - while still trying to fix things at a system level. And I think the response of individuals from charitable donations to support for or hosting refugees shows people really want to do something and help somehow.

And this is also the reality that it is easy for the UK, Canada and the US to push for bigger and more macro-economic sanctions but it's Europe that faces the impact. But I think there is public support and demand for it.

Do Germany et al have any old coal generated plants sitting around idle they could fire up?  As a stop gap until a permanent solution comes along.

What Zanza said for Germany basically goes for most of Europe. About 40% of European gas consumption is by households for heating, cooking etc and another 30% in industrial production. If it was just an energy issue I think it'd be easier to solve.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Vietnam, Korea and the soviet adventures in Afghanistan were less stand alone wars and more hot flashes in the global struggle between the west and soviet bloc to bring/keep countries in their sphere of influence.

I still think that the current invasion of Ukraine is in that same mindset. Putin and lots of Russians look at the collapse of the soviet union as a catastrophe and the alignment of former warsaw pact countries plus the baltics/georgia with the west as both a betrayal by the west and a disaster for russia. Ukraine is not only the most important part of the old soviet empire left in russia's theoretical sphere, if it is allowed to join the west without paying a steep price it also sets an ominous example for others.

It is like the mafia--yeah you want your guys to stay loyal, but if they don't you kill them, as an example to the others. That is not only a purpose of continuing to push in Ukraine, but also a reason Putin needs a way to get out. Places like Uzbekistan are making some anti russian noises, and Kazakhstan has created some noticeable distance between itself and Moscow. Belarus is obviously being propped up by Russia.

I think the biggest flaw in Putin's strategic thinking, is he's looking at the board and valuing things that aren't actually that valuable. He is likewise not even trying to do things that would likely return far greater return on investment. China has become the world's clear second power through economic reforms, education, a growing middle class, and steadily diversifying competence in a range of important industries and technologies. This has been fueled by a market based economic system where the Communist Party puts its fingers on the scale here and there to boost domestic companies, and a robust effort to increase China's middle class which directly relates to more Chinese educated people which equates to more leadership in 21st century technologies of strategic importance.

China went from having a small economy and being relatively weak compared to its vast population and geographic size, to being the world's biggest economy, the charts have been posted--Chinese vs Russian GDP growth the last 30 years have been insanely divergent, Russia's has barely moved in comparison.

Putin thinks he can make Russia strong by "bolting on territory" to accrue more control of natural resources, but that will never deliver the sort of exponential growth China attained, it will just make Russia bigger, but not all that more powerful, that's in the best-case scenario where he is able to bolt on new land to Russia that is relatively passive at being part of Russia. When the bolted-on land gains you with it what might prove to be interminable independence and resistance movements...it becomes even more difficult for whatever natural resource extraction you can get from it to make up for the cost of perpetual pacification efforts.

He's essentially dreaming of a world where you can be a Great Power solely with extractive industries and virtually no systemic reforms to the country. It just simply doesn't make sense, and there is little evidence it can actually work. It certainly isn't a bad thing to control lots of natural resources, but to meaningfully get benefit from them, you have to sell them abroad, and when the value add that more advanced economies create from your natural resources is huge, you're really existing at the very bottom of the "food chain" in terms of realizing value from your resources.

The Gulf State model doesn't really scale up to Russian-sized countries, part of what makes that model a viable development path for the Gulf States is how tiny they are relative to the vast oil wealth they control, it lets them funnel a lot of money (relative to the size of their country) into modernization and development. Russia is so big that I just don't see that working, and it hasn't worked for 20 years--Putin has made Russia wealthier than it was, but it has been massively outgrown by China which largely isn't a pre-dominant exporter of a lot of natural resources (it produces plenty, but it also uses so many domestically that it isn't a huge net exporter.) Putin just really wants the world to work one way, and it doesn't. Even in a fantasy world where Putin could re-assert the USSR, I think it would be a rapidly shrinking power because his conception of how you make a country grow stronger doesn't produce results, and just increasing its acreage isn't going to be a game changer.