Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[OttoVonBismarck]

I think WW2 and Korea taught us some bad lessons about how the Vietnam War would go, almost entirely because we didn't do the intellectual ground work of really digging into the realities of Vietnam's people and culture. We expected overwhelming victories over the North Vietnamese in the field (which were rapidly achieved) would result in a cease fire and a more or less stable situation like existed in South Korea by the mid-1960s. There was just not a proper understanding that the unified Vietnamese people really didn't want Western troops in their fucking country.

[crazy canuck]

I wrote a post saying you should add Vietnam in, but deleted it when I started listing the exceptions for why it didn't.  But the one that fits well is the futility - largely caused by leadership not accepting the reality that they could not win that war.

The statement made in his book by Harold Moore that when he saw the determination of the soldiers he fought against early on in the war, he realized (and tried to communicate to his superiors) that the war could not be won.

Unlike WW1, WW2 and even Korea to a degree after the demobilization--conflicts where the US warfighting capability and organizational competency actually improved over time--the US military started off strong in Vietnam.  Those first units that saw the first major ground combat in the 18 months from '65 to '67 were arguably the best this nation had ever deployed to that point, and had the results to prove it before the pendulum began to swing. 

I don't disagree with that at all.  And is something Moore also stresses in his book iirc.  That is what makes his comment that even then, with his elite troops and superior tactics, he realized it was an unwinnable war, so on point with what is happening in Ukraine today.  The significant difference of course is that the Russians are no where near the equivalent of the US troops (as you pointed out).  The equivalence is the actions of leadership feeding troops and resources into an unwinnable war.

[The Brain]

Why isn't this an ACW hijack?

[crazy canuck]

Get with the times, we have moved on.

[Sheilbh]

Ukrainian propaganda video (little bit graphic so you may not want to watch) - which I found incredibly effective:
https://twitter.com/Ukraine/status/1506972098195038215?s=20&t=F_owoySrm8-PakFO6deJpQ

Again their use of social and traditional media has been outstanding - it's really extraordinary not just on their internal messaging to unify the people of Ukraine, but also internationally to build feelings for Ukraine and above all a sense of solidarity.

Definitely adds to my view though that I think the success or not of propaganda is mainly a function of innovations in form or technology - in previous eras things like radio, movies, TV and this feels like the first example of it in social media on this scale and for a cause this serious.

[viper37]

Why isn't this an ACW hijack?

Patience grasshopper, patience.  All things in due time.

[The Larch]

Apparently Germany is going to refuse to pay Russian gas in roubles, as Putin recently announced, given that the isgned contracts state that payment must be in either euros or dollars.

[Barrister]

Apparently Germany is going to refuse to pay Russian gas in roubles, as Putin recently announced, given that the isgned contracts state that payment must be in either euros or dollars.

So can someone smarter than I explain this one to me?

What is the significance of being paid in rubles or in euros?  I would have thought Putin would want the more convertible euros, though clearly I am missing something.

[Jacob]

Question for the armchair generals:

We've seen Ukraine's forces being successful in stalling - and in some places pushing back - Russia's advance. In response, Russia has settled into their more regular strategy of artillery and rocket barrages against Ukrainian population centres from afar. What are Ukraine's tactical and strategic options to respond to that?

[Berkut]

Question for the armchair generals:

We've seen Ukraine's forces being successful in stalling - and in some places pushing back - Russia's advance. In response, Russia has settled into their more regular strategy of artillery and rocket barrages against Ukrainian population centres from afar. What are Ukraine's tactical and strategic options to respond to that?

Continue to attack the supply lines that supply the food, ammunition, and fuel of the forces employed to bombard those centers.

Attack them directly in harassing attacks where possible.

Employ drones to attack the assets directly where they can be located and identified via a variety of intel means.

[Josephus]

Her'es a good article in the Washington Post about the ineffectiveness of Russia's military

https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2022/03/17/russia-military-failing-dangerous/

[The Brain]

Question for the armchair generals:

We've seen Ukraine's forces being successful in stalling - and in some places pushing back - Russia's advance. In response, Russia has settled into their more regular strategy of artillery and rocket barrages against Ukrainian population centres from afar. What are Ukraine's tactical and strategic options to respond to that?

Retake territory and surround and annihilate Russian forces foolish enough to stick around.

[Admiral Yi]

So can someone smarter than I explain this one to me?

What is the significance of being paid in rubles or in euros?  I would have thought Putin would want the more convertible euros, though clearly I am missing something.

I *think* what's going on is he wants gas importers to buy rubles on the open market, raising the ruble exchange rate.  Since his foreign reserves are frozen he can't intervene directly to prop it up.

You'd think he could achieve the same thing by accepting payment in hard currency, but then he'd have to turn around and sell forex for rubles to prop up the exchange rate, and maybe the central bank sanctions preclude that.

My guess.

[Sheilbh]

So can someone smarter than I explain this one to me?

What is the significance of being paid in rubles or in euros?  I would have thought Putin would want the more convertible euros, though clearly I am missing something.

Adam Posen, of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, said it basically means nothing in terms of economics - it's just all politics:

Adam Posen
@AdamPosen
Rubles for oil is simply a gambit by Putin ahead of EUCO/Biden to split the alliance.
If GER and ITL play along, sanctions alliance erodes greatly. If GER/ITL (are pressured to) decline, later on the econ costs of oil embargo get resented when Putin offered an out. [1/4]
The mechanics financial or economic of how this might work, how the money if paid would affect fx value of Ruble, would it go to the CBR or the war effort, etc., do not matter. They are moot. 
The point is Putin's pressure on the GER/ITL weak links in the alliance [2/4]
Putinologists can better assess whether this is an error, a desperate act, or what this indicates.
My guess is that this is a costless move for Putin ahead of EuCo/NATO/Biden meetings, perhaps prompted by his assessment that GER/ITL might agree to stop oil imports anyway [3/4]
So, serious economists, stop taking this seriously.  Don't focus on what are the steps and implications of how EU members paying in rubles would work.
Instead, focus on the analyses of how much less foregoing Russian energy might cost GER/ITL than feared, w/ fiscal response [4/4]

[Zanza]

On the last point: There were estimates that stopping Russian energy imports would cause a 3.5% hit to the German economy. A bit less than a Brexit or a 2008 financial crisis, so costly, but not unheard of. Germany is preparing for this case now by defining a ranking order for consumers. Main consumption is industrial processes and heating, not electricity generation.

Same study claimed that stopping all energy exports to the West would cause a 30% or so contraction in Russia...