Russo-Ukrainian War 2014-23 and Invasion

[Jacob]

Is this Putin taking a swing at his own power base and aligning himself with zelynski?

No.

He's giving himself the tool to purge kleptocrats and oligarchs as necessary. He is also lashing out at likely centres of opposition and designated whipping posts.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Maybe. I think it's interesting he conflates cosmopolitan liberals with oligarchs who aren't sufficiently "patriotic" as part of the same "fifth column".

The "enemies within" narrative might be a sign that he's willing to compromise externally. My suspicion is the talks and any "breakthroughs" are designed to give Russia time to re-stock and reinforce its frontlines after which they will escalate and Putin's preparing the ground for more domestic repression and isolation - particularly from any oligarchs stupid enough to try to dabble in politics.

But who knows and it may well be that he's moving to a negotiated settlement.

Edit: Basically I think we are possibly facing something between Russia as a more developed and lethal North Korea and a return to full Brezhnevite isolation - does Putin have an Andropov who's actually interested in reality, or will they just keep pushing and believing what they choose to believe. And when does the reality of body bags and the wounded break through into widespread consciousness.

The problem is even Brezhnev and North Korea withdrew from bad military decisions when they had to do so. I think the thing that may not be sinking in with some people is there isn't an option where Russia "gets real mean and wins", wars don't work that way. Most military analysts also think the costs of escalation get massively worse for Russia in a few months, because Ukraine will have integrated a lot more of their foreign advanced weaponry. A longer war doesn't favor Russia.

Putin and Russia have the resources to keep going probably for many, many years, but it's not going to be some easy thing where he just regroups and tells his soldiers to slap down the evil Ukrainians. If he stays that long Russia will more or less cease to exist as a relevant military power for a generation, so it's not a choice where he's deciding "do I want the West to tolerate me again or not", he would be choosing to sacrifice Russia's future as any kind of power for a permanent war in Ukraine that would make Russia weaker every month it continued. And I don't mean weaker in terms of "PR", I mean weaker in terms of its economy and its military, weaker in ways that would leave it unable to assert itself in many other theaters etc.

[Legbiter]

Maybe. I think it's interesting he conflates cosmopolitan liberals with oligarchs who aren't sufficiently "patriotic" as part of the same "fifth column".

The "enemies within" narrative might be a sign that he's willing to compromise externally. My suspicion is the talks and any "breakthroughs" are designed to give Russia time to re-stock and reinforce its frontlines after which they will escalate and Putin's preparing the ground for more domestic repression and isolation - particularly from any oligarchs stupid enough to try to dabble in politics.

But who knows and it may well be that he's moving to a negotiated settlement.

Edit: Basically I think we are possibly facing something between Russia as a more developed and lethal North Korea and a return to full Brezhnevite isolation - does Putin have an Andropov who's actually interested in reality, or will they just keep pushing and believing what they choose to believe. And when does the reality of body bags and the wounded break through into widespread consciousness.

The Ukrainians don't seem to be in any great rush to sign any piece of paper with the Russians.   They seem more confident that they'll be able to hang on in the south while the Russians pretty much haven't budged now in 2 weeks.

[Jacob]

I suppose that's an interpretation

To be fair, it better be the end of the West treating the Russian state as anything other than the enemy. And in a sense that is the end of the previous Western led state of affairs.

[OttoVonBismarck]

I think the thing that may not be sinking in with some people is there isn't an option where Russia "gets real mean and wins", wars don't work that way.

To clarify myself--I'm not saying the conventional war is totally unwinnable by Russia, but I do think the overall "situation" is unwinnable. I don't really see any situation where Russia gets the sort of things he wanted going in because to get those requires a pliable, submissive Ukrainian population, and if anything, the Ukrainian population has become hyper-anti-Russian with no signs of that abating. Brezhnev would never have committed so much for so little, FWIW.

[Sheilbh]

Is this Putin taking a swing at his own power base and aligning himself with zelynski?

No.

This is partly why I've been dubious about the focus on oligarchs - it's worth doing to hurt people who've benefited from Putin's regime, but it will not have any impact on the politics of Putin's regime. I don't think they've had much sway over Russia since the early days of Putin. It's the hard men around him who came up through the KGB or St Petersburg who run things. The oligarchs are tolerated as long as they stay out of politics and do as they're told - I think he's now putting them on notice that it means no more French riviera or being "slaves" to Western consciousness.

[Jacob]

The problem is even Brezhnev and North Korea withdrew from bad military decisions when they had to do so. I think the thing that may not be sinking in with some people is there isn't an option where Russia "gets real mean and wins", wars don't work that way. Most military analysts also think the costs of escalation get massively worse for Russia in a few months, because Ukraine will have integrated a lot more of their foreign advanced weaponry. A longer war doesn't favor Russia.

Putin and Russia have the resources to keep going probably for many, many years, but it's not going to be some easy thing where he just regroups and tells his soldiers to slap down the evil Ukrainians. If he stays that long Russia will more or less cease to exist as a relevant military power for a generation, so it's not a choice where he's deciding "do I want the West to tolerate me again or not", he would be choosing to sacrifice Russia's future as any kind of power for a permanent war in Ukraine that would make Russia weaker every month it continued. And I don't mean weaker in terms of "PR", I mean weaker in terms of its economy and its military, weaker in ways that would leave it unable to assert itself in many other theaters etc.

What a delightful picture you're painting here. It fits my pre-war analysis, and it matches my current thoughts... but at the same time it's almost too good to hope for.

[Jacob]

This is partly why I've been dubious about the focus on oligarchs - it's worth doing to hurt people who've benefited from Putin's regime, but it will not have any impact on the politics of Putin's regime. I don't think they've had much sway over Russia since the early days of Putin. It's the hard men around him who came up through the KGB or St Petersburg who run things. The oligarchs are tolerated as long as they stay out of politics and do as they're told - I think he's now putting them on notice that it means no more French riviera or being "slaves" to Western consciousness.

The value on the focus on oligarchs is not that the oligarchs will move against Putin. It's to help cleanse our own Western society of the malign influence of Russian dark money and subversion.

[Berkut]

I think the thing that may not be sinking in with some people is there isn't an option where Russia "gets real mean and wins", wars don't work that way.

To clarify myself--I'm not saying the conventional war is totally unwinnable by Russia, but I do think the overall "situation" is unwinnable. I don't really see any situation where Russia gets the sort of things he wanted going in because to get those requires a pliable, submissive Ukrainian population, and if anything, the Ukrainian population has become hyper-anti-Russian with no signs of that abating. Brezhnev would never have committed so much for so little, FWIW.

I agree.

Russia has lost this war. I am going to come right out and say that. It might take years for that to sink in, but they have lost already. 

There is no plausible, conventional scenario were that changes. That doesn't mean it cannot be won by Russia, but the odds are low and getting lower each day. More troops, more artillery, more airpower isn't going to change that. They missed their chance (if it ever existed) when they failed in that first critical week to take Kyiv by storm and decapitate Ukraine's government.

I suspect that sober analysis will someday conclude that the war was lost before it even started, because the fundamental assessment of Ukrainian resolve was just grossly misjudged, and no 200,000 man strong army was going to be able to control the country in any way that means anything at all. 

Hell, I am not even sure Russia would win if they DID succeed in taking Kyiv in that first week, shooting Zelensky, and carting Lushenko back into power. I suspect that the war would still be going on even under that most optimistic scenario. We will never know of course.

[Sheilbh]

The problem is even Brezhnev and North Korea withdrew from bad military decisions when they had to do so. I think the thing that may not be sinking in with some people is there isn't an option where Russia "gets real mean and wins", wars don't work that way. Most military analysts also think the costs of escalation get massively worse for Russia in a few months, because Ukraine will have integrated a lot more of their foreign advanced weaponry. A longer war doesn't favor Russia.

Putin and Russia have the resources to keep going probably for many, many years, but it's not going to be some easy thing where he just regroups and tells his soldiers to slap down the evil Ukrainians. If he stays that long Russia will more or less cease to exist as a relevant military power for a generation, so it's not a choice where he's deciding "do I want the West to tolerate me again or not", he would be choosing to sacrifice Russia's future as any kind of power for a permanent war in Ukraine that would make Russia weaker every month it continued. And I don't mean weaker in terms of "PR", I mean weaker in terms of its economy and its military, weaker in ways that would leave it unable to assert itself in many other theaters etc.

I agree with a lot of that - by Brezhnev or North Korea I mean isolation. It seems to me that he is very much laying the groundwork for long-term and more or less total isolation with people who do not free themselves from Western consciousness as insufficiently patriotic and fifth columnists.

It may be that's because he knows it's going to last regardless of what happens, at least as long as he's in power. My thought would be the reason he's preparing the groundwork for that is because he's going to keep going.

I totally agree on the military situation, but that assumes that Putin - or someone around him - is getting and looking at real information. I mention Andropov because he insisted on getting real information about Afghanistan, as well as real (as much as you could) statistics on crime, the economy etc. His view was you could not address problems if you did not know them honestly. Andropov has been cited by Putin as a hero but I'm not sure if he's as ruthless with himself and suspect him and his circle are happy reading the repoprts they want to read.

I could be wrong but my suspicion is they know it's not going well and that there are big costs, but they're going to double down on this whatever the cost internationally, economically and politically domestically, which is what I think Putin's suggesting. And that this carries on - with greater emphasis on Russian-ness/Slavness etc - until there's a mutiny of some form, a popular revolt or a palace coup and in that time he may also destroy Ukraine as well as Russia.

I hope you're right but I think those lines are also ones Putin makes if he knows there's no way back.

[Jacob]

We've talked about Russia bringing in troops from more distant locations - and from clients - to potentially control the areas Russia already controls while the main force moves forward.

I don't think we've heard or seen much about Ukrainian partisans and military resistance in occupied Ukraine yet, have we?

I suspect that that just because the map is coloured in on various graphics, it doesn't mean Russia has perfect control. I kind of expect that if the war doesn't stop soon, we'll be hearing about more active resistance in Russian controlled areas.

[Sheilbh]

The value on the focus on oligarchs is not that the oligarchs will move against Putin. It's to help cleanse our own Western society of the malign influence of Russian dark money and subversion.

Yeah that's obviously important but if there's a choice in terms of focus and resource (and there is at the minute - I've no doubt they'll all be sanctioned in a few months), I'd deal with the oligarchs later and prioritise individually sanctioning every single person in the room during the Security Council, all the members of the Duma, all of the securocrats in and around Putin going to as junior a level as we know. Because I think they do have more power and sway.

They may have far less money and be less of a corrupting influence on us, but I think they have still been interested in enjoying the lifestyle overseas etc.

[OttoVonBismarck]

Is this Putin taking a swing at his own power base and aligning himself with zelynski?

No.

This is partly why I've been dubious about the focus on oligarchs - it's worth doing to hurt people who've benefited from Putin's regime, but it will not have any impact on the politics of Putin's regime. I don't think they've had much sway over Russia since the early days of Putin. It's the hard men around him who came up through the KGB or St Petersburg who run things. The oligarchs are tolerated as long as they stay out of politics and do as they're told - I think he's now putting them on notice that it means no more French riviera or being "slaves" to Western consciousness.

The proper analysis of the oligarchs is they are the "burgher" estate in EU4 terms. They are important because they run the economy, but they don't have any real hard power within Russia. The hard power in Russia is held by two entities--the chekists (aka the security services) and the military. Putin has probably done as much as he can to insulate himself from risk from either of those hard power factions. For the military, Putin has his very loyal security types regularly give him briefings on what top military leaders are doing, and has them embedded into the military in various ways to keep an eye on the top leaders.

Putin also keeps the military physically distant. The military forces near Moscow are part of the Rosgvardiya (National Guard) that are not part of the ordinary military command structure, and that are controlled by a Putin loyalist. This permanent deployment near Moscow almost certainly is so that this force can be used to protect Putin if there was ever a risk of a military mutiny from the regular military. It also could potentially be used against forces of the siloviki (Russian security community) if there was some sort of internal battle with different Chekist factions.

Putin has every signs of having thought quite a bit about hardening himself against a hard power coup. The Rogsvardiya protects him from the military, and his loyalists in the Secret Service in Moscow itself (which number 20,000 strong) are a sort of Praetorian Guard that would be expected to defend him from any other threat--be it a rogue Rogsvardiya or rogue elements within the siloviki.

All of this is to really say, to remove Putin would require a fast operation by the people who have the hard power to do it. The military is very ill positioned for this--it is heavily infested with Putin spies and etc and the military is too far from the heart of power to win a quick coup. The military in theory could start a civil war, if a large portion of the regular military denounced Putin and demanded he resign--the siloviki would be good protection against a quick Putsch but they couldn't actually beat the real Russian military in a protracted war because there simply aren't enough of them. The problem is there is no way for anyone within the military to form such a Russia-wide mutiny/rebellion of the armed forces, because all the military leadership is so tightly surveilled, and it is without a doubt many of them are Putin loyalists anyway.

The real threat to Putin would thus be a faction of Chekists decide he is no longer benefitting their project in controlling Russia. It would have to involve high ranking elements of his own Secret Service, because no one else has close enough physical access to Putin. It is reported that Putin receives daily intelligence briefings on his own siloviki upper echelons--he essentially has a group that spies on the top spies, and that isn't accidental, he knows they are the only ones who could conceivably remove him from power.

I think people though have always misunderstood the oligarchs. They serve a mutually beneficial economic purpose between themselves and the Putin regime, but the real power in Putin's Russia has always been the Chekist security forces, with Putin as the leader of that faction/school of thought. For them to turn on Putin would be fairly unthinkable, and even if a significant faction did, Putin has safeguards in place.

[KRonn]

Ukrainians claim to have killed a fourth Russian general. Man they go through them fast.

They're doing a pretty job, all told. Here's what I found on AP:

Maj. General Oleg Mityaev died Tuesday during the storming of Mariupol, said Ukrainian Interior Ministry adviser Anton Gerashchenko, who published a photo on Telegram of what he said was the dead officer.

Mityaev, 46, commanded the 150th motorized rifle division and had fought in Syria, Gerashchenko said.

Four lost so far. That is a lot of Generals to lose in so short a time. I wonder how it's happening? Doesn't seem tit would be normal combat losses, such as to artillery, and even if they're near the front it seems unusual to lose so many in a short time.

[viper37]

The German tank museum has a few videos with their director having a few thoughts about the war in Ukraine. He covered briefly the history of the T-64 => T-90 evolution, and that the design philosophy behind them was different than with Western tanks - Abrams, Chieftain, Leo etc. were designed around sustainability, i.e. keeping each tank and crew in combat as long as possible and allowing for easy repairs (e.g. how you can replace a Leo-2 engine in minutes).

The Soviet models were based on ensuring the formation can achieve its objective, and treating tanks (and crews) as expendable material. The idea being that 1:1 a T-72 wouldn't measure up to an Abrams, but massed formations would overwhelm them, creating gaps in the defenses that could be exploited. That led to smaller, mass produced tanks built for smaller (physically) crews. If there's technical problems or damage - often best bet is to just abandon it, because recovery/repair might be very unlikely or impossible - explaining why we see all those images of abandoned equipment.

That reminds me of Glantz's analysis of WW2 tank design and doctrine comparison between Germany and the USSR.

The Germans considered each armored vehicle to be an asset, kind of like how the Navy looks at a ship. Sure, you are going to lose some, but they should be preserved, repaired, and put back into service. And they should be designed to stand up in combat with a service life measured in months, if not years.

The Soviets realized that the average tank lasted hours in combat - not days, not weeks, and certainly not months. For them, armor is ammunition - something that is expended in order to achieve a result. Sure, you might repair them if and when you can, but mostly you just use them up and get more. No reason to make the transmission in a T-34 reliable enough to last a thousand hours when the AFV is almost certainly going to be destroyed in less then 10 hours.

Of course, they won the war and the Germans lost....

German Panzer tanks were difficult to repair, had engine problems and very low fuel efficiency.  I guess not much as evolved since then for German car manufacturers...

I don't think there was much to be done for fuel efficiency, 70-80 miles for a Panzer IV before refueling, since they were big machines.  But I remember that the slightest engine tuning required to take out the entire engine block, difficult to do in the field.

I do wonder if they'd have performed that much better vs the Soviets with easier to repair tanks, all  other things being equal.  Low mobility kinda gets there with lots of armor.  But I don't know how different could Germany could have done things preparing for a war in the East with a very populous country and needing to keep troops in occupied Western Europe.  The Russians did not put much effort in their navy for WWII, while the Germans still had to divert some manpower for theirs.  Ultimately, they could not afford to sustain as much losses as Russia, so they kinda needed to have bigger, more armored tanks.