Grumbler and Berkut, to me...
In preparation for WITE, I've finished reading David Glantz' When Titans Clashed during my vacation camping trip, and I had a nasty leftover in my mouth as it focuses on the war on the Eastern Front, by using combat reports, casualties report, and production data sheets that were produced... under the Stalin regime and that he took from the Soviet archives.
Knowing what I know about how throughout "Oceanian" the Soviet Union under Stalin was, how they would falsify and produce phony production data to please Stalin and make sure that they'd be kept alive, how Stalin would execute anyone who would tell him bad news (like Pavel Rychakov, shot in Spring 1941 for whistleblowing to Big Daddy J that the testing aircrafts blowing up not because of sabotage, but faulty design and quality control), I have an gnawling feeling that the vast numbers and data produced by Glantz are, let's say, very subject to contestation.
As the book was out only in 1993, it's arguable whether Glantz had the time to thoroughly vet these data. But what I witness, is that Glantz is tossed around as one of THE best sources on the Eastern Front because he focuses on the Soviet side, and that the data is taken at face value without scrutiny. So am I being overly skeptical about the validity of this data here? Have historian researchers attempted to consistantly confirm or infirm these data by using German or other sources?
Ide says the data is A-OK.
Quote from: The Brain on August 21, 2011, 02:06:51 PM
Ide says the data is A-OK.
actually, that would be raz and guller :P
Glantz is probably the best guy there is on the Soviet Union in WWII. Admittedly it is difficult know if all Soviet sources are accurate, but then again, the same is true for the German sources as well. The Germans officers that survived the war had very good reasons to lie, and did frequently. Unfortunately the German view point has essentially become Western one.
What numbers are bothering you?
I'd say that you are right to view the book with a pinch of salt, because the data/accounts used were subject to political considerations even as they was gathered. It is the best we have in book form, though, as far as I know.
Glantz's later works were more focused, and had better research. I recommend Stumbling Colossus and Zhukov's Greatest Defeat. I haven't gotten around to Colossus Reborn or To the Gates of Stalingrad yet.
Oh, and Glantz is pro-Soviet, and his willingness to claim that he knows what commanders were thinking hurts him as a historian, but all his biases are in the open, I think.
I'll give an example that Mosier gives in "Hitler vs. Stalin : The Eastern Front 1941-1945". While anecdotal, and Mosier reads a bit like a revisionist sometimes, it still puzzle me off and fuels my reticence to accept Soviet data at face value, so wild are the discrepancies.
Mosier mentions that when Von Manstein attacked and took the Kerch bridgehead in 1942, he reported annihilating two Soviet Armies, over 160,000 prisoners and over 350 tanks captured or destroyed.
The official Soviet data for the Kerch defense, as quoted by Glantz in his appendix in When Titans Clashed, which I have checked personally, was that on 249,000 Soviet soldiers there, 162,282 where killed OR missing (I remind you, von Manstein reported over 160,000 Soviet PoWs), 14,284 wounded, and zero tanks nor vehicle claimed destroyed or captured.
I can accept that Von Manstein would write his Lost Victories with his reputation and bashing Hitler in mind, but nonetheless I can't believe he would magically make up destroyed Soviet tanks in the Kerch offensive just to say "oh yeah, we've ashed tanks too", which can be confirmed or infirmed by other witnesses there, and the Russians really defended the Kerch bridgehead with zero tanks. The only reason I can see is that these losses were glossed over in the report for accounting reasons and hide the fact that precious tanks had been abandoned there to the Germans.
Quote from: Drakken on August 21, 2011, 03:21:33 PM
I'll give an example that Mosier gives in "Hitler vs. Stalin : The Eastern Front 1941-1945". While anecdotal, and Mosier reads a bit like a revisionist sometimes, it still puzzle me off and fuels my reticence to accept Soviet data at face value, so wild are the discrepancies.
Mosier mentions that when Von Manstein attacked and took the Kerch bridgehead in 1942, he reported annihilating two Soviet Armies, over 160,000 prisoners and over 350 tanks captured or destroyed.
The official Soviet data for the Kerch defense, as quoted by Glantz in his appendix in When Titans Clashed, which I have checked personally, was that on 249,000 Soviet soldiers there, 162,282 where killed OR missing (I remind you, von Manstein reported over 160,000 Soviet PoWs), 14,284 wounded, and zero tanks nor vehicle claimed destroyed or captured.
I can accept that Von Manstein would write his Lost Victories with his reputation and bashing Hitler in mind, but nonetheless I can't believe he would magically make up destroyed Soviet tanks in the Kerch offensive just to say "oh yeah, we've ashed tanks too", which can be confirmed or infirmed by other witnesses there, and the Russians really defended the Kerch bridgehead with zero tanks. The only reason I can see is that these losses were glossed over in the report for accounting reasons and hide the fact that precious tanks had been abandoned there to the Germans.
I am not sure what you are asking. Does Glantz say no tanks were lost, or simply not have any data (my copy is at school)? The former would be suspicious, for sure. The latter would simply underscore the chaotic state of Soviet records. The other numbers seem to be in accord with what von Mastein reported, would it not?
I fall asleep when I read Glantz.
Quote from: grumbler on August 21, 2011, 04:33:14 PM
I am not sure what you are asking. Does Glantz say no tanks were lost, or simply not have any data (my copy is at school)? The former would be suspicious, for sure. The latter would simply underscore the chaotic state of Soviet records. The other numbers seem to be in accord with what von Mastein reported, would it not?
It's in his appendix, table B, page 295, under Kerch Defense :
Strength : 249,800
Killing or Missing : 162,282
Wounded : 14,284
Total : 176,566
Tanks/SP Guns : Empty
Artillery : Empty
Aircraft : Empty
Nowhere in the main text of the book does he mention the loss of tanks, only infantry :
QuoteIn May, von Manstein's 11th Army struck at the inept Soviet defenders and, in a nine-day operation [...] drove Soviet 44st [sic], 47th, and 51st Armies from the Kerch Peninsula into the sea. (page 116)
The only mention I can see is in the notes, citing Nevzorov, which matches the numbers given by von Manstein :
QuoteAccording to Nevzorov, [...] during the May catastrophe, more than 150,000 men, 4646 guns and mortars, 496 tanks, and 417 aircraft were lost.
But then in the same note he immediately cites Krivosheev, whose numbers are
uncannily similar identical to those presented in the appendix, making obvious which interpretation he finds valid, with no mention whatsoever of any loss of tanks or military material :
QuoteKrivosheev [...] places Soviet losses in May at 176,566 out of a total force of 249,800, 162,282 of which were irrevocably lost.
So I wonder, why did he leave the parts about material loss empty, when he could have just take Nevzorov's data as far as vehicles were concerned with a simple note.
Quote from: Ed Anger on August 21, 2011, 04:37:49 PM
I fall asleep when I read Glantz.
By 1944 I agree, it's just a list of phantom Soviet Armies and fronts thrown onto the Germans again and again and again, so much it was an eyesore.
The book needs more operational maps at each three pages.
Did he write about what happened in the battles or was he writing about what the sources claim?
Quote from: The Brain on August 21, 2011, 05:07:11 PM
Did he write about what happened in the battles or was he writing about what the sources claim?
Other what I have said in the main text and a small part about how Lev Mehklis was sacked and never given another important position again after the Kerch disaster, nothing more.
The main text is a narrative of the Eastern Front from an operational standpoint, with notes for sources.
Quote from: Drakken on August 21, 2011, 05:09:54 PM
Quote from: The Brain on August 21, 2011, 05:07:11 PM
Did he write about what happened in the battles or was he writing about what the sources claim?
Other what I have said in the main text and a small part about how Lev Mehklis was sacked and never given another important position again, nothing more.
The main text is a narrative of the Eastern Front from an operational standpoint, with notes for sources.
I was asking because information without uncertainties is almost useless.
Quote from: grumbler on August 21, 2011, 03:19:18 PM
Oh, and Glantz is pro-Soviet, and his willingness to claim that he knows what commanders were thinking hurts him as a historian, but all his biases are in the open, I think.
Would you prefer pro-Nazi? :angry:
Anyway, I like his Kursk book.
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2011, 06:49:40 PM
Would you prefer pro-Nazi? :angry:
Might as well. HEIL HITLER.
You're bad at imitating Slarg. :yucky:
You lack the Nazi zeal, a "je-ne-sais-quoi" that evil blondies from the 5th SS Panzer Division had.
Quote from: Drakken on August 21, 2011, 07:08:00 PM
You're bad at imitating Slarg. :yucky:
You lack the Nazi zeal, a "je-ne-sais-quoi" that evil blondies from the 5th SS Panzer Division had.
The cat avatar just doesn't give off the reich feel.
Damn you for stealing the thunder from my "Reich Stuff" line.
I'm always late to the pun party. So when I seem the reich opening, I'm going through.
Reich through, I hope you mean.
I like where this is goering...
Quote from: grumbler on August 21, 2011, 03:11:11 PM
Glantz's later works were more focused, and had better research.
+1
Quote
I recommend Stumbling Colossus and Zhukov's Greatest Defeat. I haven't gotten around to Colossus Reborn or To the Gates of Stalingrad yet.
Your in for a treat.
Pt. I The red army at war, 1941-1943
1 The first period of the war, 22 June 1941 to 18 November 1942 3
2 The second period of the war, 1943 37
3 Soviet military art 63
Pt. II The force
4 Strength and major components 135
5 The shadow army : NKVD forces 157
6 Rifle and airborne forces 179
7 Tank, mechanized, and cavalry forces 218
8 Artillery and air forces 285
9 Engineer, signal, chemical, railroad, auto-transport and road, and construction forces 333
Pt. III The leaders and the led
10 Strategic leadership and control organs 369
11 Central military administration 403
12 The officer corps and command cadre 466
13 The red army soldier 536
14 Conclusions 609
;)
Quote from: Ed Anger on August 21, 2011, 04:37:49 PM
I fall asleep when I read Glantz.
I prefer his style.
Quote from: Ideologue on August 21, 2011, 06:49:40 PM
Would you prefer pro-Nazi? :angry:
Anyway, I like his Kursk book.
His Kursk book is very good, but needs to be balanced with Newtons and Zetterling. Throw in Nipe's, Decision in the Ukraine.
When Nipe comes out with his 2SS Panzer Corps account that can be thrown in there too. Another guy (Zamlin???) has come out with another Soviet account.
Quote from: Drakken on August 21, 2011, 02:01:53 PM
Grumbler and Berkut, to me...
In preparation for WITE, I've finished reading David Glantz' When Titans Clashed during my vacation camping trip, and I had a nasty leftover in my mouth as it focuses on the war on the Eastern Front, by using combat reports, casualties report, and production data sheets that were produced... under the Stalin regime and that he took from the Soviet archives.
Knowing what I know about how throughout "Oceanian" the Soviet Union under Stalin was, how they would falsify and produce phony production data to please Stalin and make sure that they'd be kept alive, how Stalin would execute anyone who would tell him bad news (like Pavel Rychakov, shot in Spring 1941 for whistleblowing to Big Daddy J that the testing aircrafts blowing up not because of sabotage, but faulty design and quality control), I have an gnawling feeling that the vast numbers and data produced by Glantz are, let's say, very subject to contestation.
As the book was out only in 1993, it's arguable whether Glantz had the time to thoroughly vet these data. But what I witness, is that Glantz is tossed around as one of THE best sources on the Eastern Front because he focuses on the Soviet side, and that the data is taken at face value without scrutiny. So am I being overly skeptical about the validity of this data here? Have historian researchers attempted to consistantly confirm or infirm these data by using German or other sources?
A couple things, in no particular order:
Glantz is not all that "pro-soviet". He does tell the story from the Soviet side, which hasn't been done much in Western histories, so I think he comes across as being pro-Soviet, but he is hyper-critical of the Soviets in many, many cases. So much so that the Russians don't even seem to much like him anymore.
He acknowledges that his access to Soviet records, while giving a pretty good insight, is in fact flawed from the standpoint of their completeness and reliability. He seems to be pretty careful to back check as much as possible, and even compare the German and Soviet views of the same battle (which is often rather illuminating, especially when the Soviets report a huge counter-attack on the Germans that is barely defeated, and the German reports mention some local skirmish they stopped easily). I don't think it is accurate to say that he accepts Soviet sources uncritically, at all.
The idea that "well, the Germans are biased too!" when talking about Soviet records is kind of bullshit. Not because the Germans are not biased, of course they are, but because the advantage of the German records goes far beyond and issue of bias. The Germans kept incredible records for the most part. They had a effficient and relatively thorough staff system that was pretty damn good at record keeping at the bureaucratic level, which is generally much more transparent. THe commanders can say what they like about given battles, but there is likely to be reams of mid-level record keeping that is going to refute or support them. Not so with the Soviet records. The Soviets did not have anywhere near the same level of mid-level organizational management that was good at record keeping, nor did they have (IMO) the same level of cultural demand for good record keeping. I do not at all agree with the oft-refrained "well, the German records are biased too, so why should we trust them anymore than the Soviets?". We should trust them more because they are simply more complete, more consistent, and more honest.
I don't think Glantz is a great source for a complete history of the Eastern Front in WW2, but he is far and away the best source for the complete Soviet history of the Eastern Front in WW2. His writing is not great in that it is often very dry and hard to get through, and dear lord where are the maps???, but there isn't anything else out there that is even close, IMO.
Berkut, Pro-Nazi. I have no idea how he knows the German records are more then accurate Soviet ones. There is simply more access to German records and memoirs then Soviet ones. German officers have a bad habit of dishonestly. In fact, one of the contributing factors of the rise of Adolf Hilter can be attributed to German officers blame shifting and lying. The Dolchstosslegende. I think heavy reliance on German officer memoirs and the like has somewhat clouded western thinking on the German-Soviet war. For instance in the popular mind Stalingrad hold a much more important place then Kursk. After the Stalingrad debacle Hitler gave a much freer hand to his army in planning the operation. This made a it harder to blame Hitler for the failure so they would rather focus on Stalingrad where blaming Hitler's stubbornness was much easier despite Kursk being more strategically meaningful.
When it comes to the accuracy of German sources, I think it's important to make a distinction as to which "German sources" you mean. As Berkut points out, official records are quite extensive and generally accurate (though not completely exhaustive nor 100% accurate). But if you're talking about the reams of documents generated by the Allied debriefing of captured German officers, you can't take stuff there at face value. The captured officers had major incentives to blame both German battlefield reverses and atrocities commited by German forces solely on Hitler and the Nazis as much as possible. And of course memoirs that were written by them suffer from the same problems.
Is there reason to believe that internal Soviet ones are less so?
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 11:36:54 AM
Is there reason to believe that internal Soviet ones are less so?
Yes.
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 10:30:26 AM
Glantz is not all that "pro-soviet". He does tell the story from the Soviet side, which hasn't been done much in Western histories, so I think he comes across as being pro-Soviet, but he is hyper-critical of the Soviets in many, many cases.
Very true, Berkut
Raz has a point, although a narrow one. The general scholarly view with respect to Soviet economic planning (including defense) is that the bureaucracy did a reasonably good job of at least attempting to record information accurately. This was of obvious importance to a planned system, and as it turns out the Soviets didn't keep "double book" -- if it was desired to keep certain information confidential, it simply was censored from all but the most confidential circulations (this might explain the absence of the tank info). There were problems with lower level functionaries trying to fiddle with figures to hide deficiencies and make themselves look good, although the central control commissions made real efforts to clamp down on that. Perhaps a bigger problem was a shortage of qualified functionaries to keep up with the work. That and the chaos engendered by the rapid German advance is probably a bigger contributor to problems in Soviet records than outright efforts at falsification.
On the flip side, I can't think of any good reason to place serious doubt on the accuracy of contemporaneous German military record-keeping, at least until late into 1944. the German military had efficient and diligent bureaucrats and the German penchant for record-keeping is a national stereotype.
Quote from: dps on August 22, 2011, 11:32:33 AM
When it comes to the accuracy of German sources, I think it's important to make a distinction as to which "German sources" you mean. As Berkut points out, official records are quite extensive and generally accurate (though not completely exhaustive nor 100% accurate). But if you're talking about the reams of documents generated by the Allied debriefing of captured German officers, you can't take stuff there at face value. The captured officers had major incentives to blame both German battlefield reverses and atrocities commited by German forces solely on Hitler and the Nazis as much as possible. And of course memoirs that were written by them suffer from the same problems.
Indeed. I thought I made that clear, but perhaps not.
If Nazi General vonLiesAlot says he did X, Y, and Z on dates A, B, and C, you can go check the copies of the actual orders issued to his command and subordinates on those dates, because the effing Germans probably filled them all out in triplicate and filed them in 3 different places.
The Soviets were not nearly as meticulous in their record keeping. Hell, I don't know that anyone was, except maybe for the Americans.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2011, 12:10:56 PM
On the flip side, I can't think of any good reason to place serious doubt on the accuracy of contemporaneous German military record-keeping, at least until late into 1944. the German military had efficient and diligent bureaucrats and the German penchant for record-keeping is a national stereotype.
Indeed. My point is a generalization, of course, and hence must be taken as such. There are certainly going to be particular exceptions to that generalization.
The Soviets simply did not have the sophisticated "middle-management" staff system that the Germans did, especially in the early and mid war periods. Early war was chaos, and mid war the best staff officers were being shoved into command slots as fast as possible. By the late war, the Soviet operational command structure had solidified greatly, of course, and late war records keeping improved immensely, as the Soviets adopted and perfected their own operational staff structure.
Glantz really does a great job of going over some of this in Colossus Reborn, actually. I don't think people really appreciate just how thoroughly the Germans destroyed the Soviet command structure at the outbreak of the war, and then did it again later that summer.
Which is really what is so incredibly impressive about the way the Soviets ended up winning that war. They basically had to start over from nearly from scratch, not just in actual forces and equipment, but in their operational command structure as well, since what they had failed so spectacularly. Just figuring out how to put units together in a workable manner was a monumental task, even in peacetime, much less doing so in war.
Hell, a simple example is just looking at the evolution of Soviet mechanized divisions/corps throughout the first two years of war.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2011, 12:10:56 PM
On the flip side, I can't think of any good reason to place serious doubt on the accuracy of contemporaneous German military record-keeping, at least until late into 1944. the German military had efficient and diligent bureaucrats and the German penchant for record-keeping is a national stereotype.
The Germans had a reputation for record keeping, but the Nazis were notoriously slap dash in administration. Besides, they lost the war and lots of documents were likely lost or destroyed in the chaos.
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 12:35:19 PM
Glantz really does a great job of going over some of this in Colossus Reborn, actually. I don't think people really appreciate just how thoroughly the Germans destroyed the Soviet command structure at the outbreak of the war, and then did it again later that summer.
Which is really what is so incredibly impressive about the way the Soviets ended up winning that war. They basically had to start over from nearly from scratch, not just in actual forces and equipment, but in their operational command structure as well, since what they had failed so spectacularly. Just figuring out how to put units together in a workable manner was a monumental task, even in peacetime, much less doing so in war.
Hell, a simple example is just looking at the evolution of Soviet mechanized divisions/corps throughout the first two years of war.
I actually get the opposite impression. I find it strange the Germans got as far as they did. Germany was badly, badly run. It didn't even gear up to full war production until '43. It's economy was a house of cards. German victories were often the result of high risk, high return gambits. I find it amazing that these knotheads were able to conquer most of Europe.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 12:51:03 PM
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 12:35:19 PM
Glantz really does a great job of going over some of this in Colossus Reborn, actually. I don't think people really appreciate just how thoroughly the Germans destroyed the Soviet command structure at the outbreak of the war, and then did it again later that summer.
Which is really what is so incredibly impressive about the way the Soviets ended up winning that war. They basically had to start over from nearly from scratch, not just in actual forces and equipment, but in their operational command structure as well, since what they had failed so spectacularly. Just figuring out how to put units together in a workable manner was a monumental task, even in peacetime, much less doing so in war.
Hell, a simple example is just looking at the evolution of Soviet mechanized divisions/corps throughout the first two years of war.
I actually get the opposite impression. I find it strange the Germans got as far as they did. Germany was badly, badly run. It didn't even gear up to full war production until '43. It's economy was a house of cards. German victories were often the result of high risk, high return gambits. I find it amazing that these knotheads were able to conquer most of Europe.
German victories were not at all the result of high risk, high return gambles - they had too many of them for such a facile explanation.
I imagine if I could not understand why the German military machine worked in the manner it did despite the often poor strategic leadership, I would find their success "amazing" as well.
There is nothing mysterious about how the Germans got as far as they did. It is a ridiculously thoroughly studied historical occurrence. Do a little reading, and you won't be so bewildered anymore.
I would characterize the invasion of France and Norway as high risk, high return operations. Barbarossa certainly was. The Polish operation was risky since it relied on France not doing anything and the Czech Crisis was big gamble.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 01:04:45 PM
I would characterize the invasion of France and Norway as high risk, high return operations. Barbarossa certainly was. The Polish operation was risky since it relied on France not doing anything and the Czech Crisis was big gamble.
Those are all strategic decisions, not operational. And even at the strategic level, your point is facile. Explaining German military success as "Gosh, they just got lucky with high risk operations that happened to work out in most cases!" just illustrates how little you understand why and how the Germans did what they did, and why they failed in the end.
Uh, huh. Whatever, German fanboy.
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 01:10:47 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 01:04:45 PM
I would characterize the invasion of France and Norway as high risk, high return operations. Barbarossa certainly was. The Polish operation was risky since it relied on France not doing anything and the Czech Crisis was big gamble.
Those are all strategic decisions, not operational. And even at the strategic level, your point is facile. Explaining German military success as "Gosh, they just got lucky with high risk operations that happened to work out in most cases!" just illustrates how little you understand why and how the Germans did what they did, and why they failed in the end.
I'm not a history major, but it does seem that Germans got especially lucky with the incompetence of their enemies early in the war. Attacking Poland and hoping that France wouldn't attack at the same time in the west is something I might try in EU3 against AI, and reload if it doesn't work out.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 01:16:29 PM
Uh, huh. Whatever, German fanboy.
You are, if nothing else, consistent.
As am I - I consistently forget why I don't respond to you, and then you consistently remind me.
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 01:23:04 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 01:16:29 PM
Uh, huh. Whatever, German fanboy.
You are, if nothing else, consistent.
As am I - I consistently forget why I don't respond to you, and then you consistently remind me.
I do respond rudely when I talked to insultingly. I am consistent in this, that is true. Maybe if you weren't such a goddamn ass, I wouldn't call you names.
Quote from: DGuller on August 22, 2011, 01:22:28 PM
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 01:10:47 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 01:04:45 PM
I would characterize the invasion of France and Norway as high risk, high return operations. Barbarossa certainly was. The Polish operation was risky since it relied on France not doing anything and the Czech Crisis was big gamble.
Those are all strategic decisions, not operational. And even at the strategic level, your point is facile. Explaining German military success as "Gosh, they just got lucky with high risk operations that happened to work out in most cases!" just illustrates how little you understand why and how the Germans did what they did, and why they failed in the end.
I'm not a history major, but it does seem that Germans got especially lucky with the incompetence of their enemies early in the war. Attacking Poland and hoping that France wouldn't attack at the same time in the west is something I might try in EU3 against AI, and reload if it doesn't work out.
I don't think the Germans were counting on the French not attacking, they were counting on the French not being able to succeed even if they did attack.
And it's not like it took Nostradamus to figure out that France was not going to attack in any kind of force. The French government at the time had no incentive to go smashing into Germany, and their military was in no condition to do so either, and everyone knew it. AFter Munich, I think the German High Command was confident that they could hold the Siegfried line against any reasonably expected French attack.
Was it a risk? I suppose. But it wasn't some kind of crazy gamble. Germany knew they would smash Poland with Soviet help, and worst case scenario they have interior lines to return their army back to the West very quickly. With the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the "risk" associated with the Poland operation was almost completely removed.
The Siegfried line wasn't even finished. And even when it was, it wasn't very useful. How many soldiers did Germany have on the Western Front? How many tanks, artillery and planes were there? How many French? The French did attack there in 1914. I'm not sure if it's a safe bet that they wouldn't do so again.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 01:33:21 PM
The Siegfried line wasn't even finished. And even when it was, it wasn't very useful. How many soldiers did Germany have on the Western Front? How many tanks, artillery and planes were there? How many French? The French did attack there in 1914. I'm not sure if it's a safe bet that they wouldn't do so again.
France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no
Union Nationale government and civil society was bitterly divided between left and right, and from rabid anti-fascism to defeatism, and even welcoming the enemy in. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.
And France did not attack in 1914, they got attacked. You know, the Schlieffen plan through Belgium?
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 01:37:03 PM
France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and society was bitterly divided between left and right, and anti-fascism and defeatism. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.
Well, they certainly got what they wished, didn't they?
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 01:38:13 PM
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 01:37:03 PM
France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and society was bitterly divided between left and right, and anti-fascism and defeatism. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.
Well, they certainly got what they wished, didn't they?
Hence why these collaborated so thoroughly and willfully in Vichy France, and in part why France, when Petain arrived in power, was the only country invaded by Germany who actually officially gave up the fight.
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 01:39:25 PM
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 01:38:13 PM
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 01:37:03 PM
France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and society was bitterly divided between left and right, and anti-fascism and defeatism. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.
Well, they certainly got what they wished, didn't they?
Hence why these collaborated so thoroughly and willfully in Vichy France, and in part why France, when Petain arrived in power, was the only country invaded by Germany who actually officially gave up the fight.
Interesting. I will admit I don't know much of the particulars of the French lack of interest in fighting WW2, just kind of know that they didn't have the cultural or political will/unity necessary. And more importantly, the Germans knew it as well.
I think the real shock for Hitler and the Germans was not that France was not willing to fight, but that England WAS willing to fight, even after Poland, the Low Countries, Norway, and France had all been beaten. I still say that is one of the "great moments" in cultural history, when the Brits basically said "Fuck you, we aren't quitting even if it does seem completely insane to keep fighting! Lets see you get across the Channel!".
Of course, I am just a German fanboy, so what do I know?
I'm Adolf Hitler reborn. According to web quizzes.
I generally agree with Berkut on this. People tend to rate Hitler and the Nazi leadership rather poorly as strategic thinkers, given how successful they were.* It's strange.
Not that there weren't major, major mistakes. Raz identified one (the failure to fully mobilize the economy for war), and there are others (the racism, particularly in the treatment of Ukrainians, the desire for a surface fleet, the belief that the Luftwaffe was equipped for terror bombing, the insane insistence that everything should dive bomb). But even Alexander and Napoleon made major strategic mistakes, and no one calls them buffoons. The desire to villify and denigrate the Nazis (especially on the part of, ahem, Wehrmacht generals both concerned for their own glory and in many cases complicit in their crimes--hi Guderian), while understandable, is something I'm not sure holds up to scrutiny.
*Well, in the short-term. It's also important to remember that Germany was facing three nations each stronger than itself. And it was very close to destroying one of them, and arguably came close to knocking another one out of the war. I suppose one can argue that a smart person would have been contented with the massive concessions made and never gone to war in the first place.
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 01:37:03 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 01:33:21 PM
The Siegfried line wasn't even finished. And even when it was, it wasn't very useful. How many soldiers did Germany have on the Western Front? How many tanks, artillery and planes were there? How many French? The French did attack there in 1914. I'm not sure if it's a safe bet that they wouldn't do so again.
France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and civil society was bitterly divided between left and right, and from rabid anti-fascism to defeatism, and even welcoming the enemy in. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.
And France did not attack in 1914, they got attacked. You know, the Schlieffen plan through Belgium?
They did launch an offensive in 1914. It was a terrible failure. They also launched a minor offensive in 1939, but gave up pretty quickly. A bold strike could have captured the vital Saar region, which would have hurt German industry, and forced any German operation against the French to force them out first.
I just don't understand the desire to dismiss what Germany did as facilely as "they got lucky". I mean...that is just plain boring. Why would anyone want history to be so insipid?
Germany conquered most of Europe because they kept rolling the 6/1 split on the CRT on low odds attacks? Seriously, THAT is your explanation?
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 01:37:03 PM
France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and civil society was bitterly divided between left and right, and from rabid anti-fascism to defeatism, and even welcoming the enemy in. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.
Well it was compounded by the fact that, incredibly, the Comintern in France was pro-German because of the Nazi-Soviet pact. Then mysteriously the Commies in France decided the war against Germany was ok sometime in 1941.
While there were certainly right wing nutcases in France I think they only came up with the idea of using the defeat the reform the country along Franco-fascist lines once the war was lost. At first there was alot of enthusiasm for the project but over time the fascist French got disillusioned when it became clear the Germans had no interest in a strong French Fascist state. I am not sure they were actively trying to undermine the war effort before then though.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 01:50:33 PM
They did launch an offensive in 1914. It was a terrible failure. They also launched a minor offensive in 1939, but gave up pretty quickly. A bold strike could have captured the vital Saar region, which would have hurt German industry, and forced any German operation against the French to force them out first.
Gamelin never wanted to attack at all. He thought that time was on the Allies side and a British Blockade and resources from the empires would allow them to win. So he pretended to attack but only because Reynaud was putting pressure on him to.
But really capturing the Saar wouldn't have done much besides create an indefensible salient for the outnumbered French to defend. The strike would have needed to be a bit more bold than that.
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 01:50:44 PM
I just don't understand the desire to dismiss what Germany did as facilely as "they got lucky". I mean...that is just plain boring. Why would anyone want history to be so insipid?
Germany conquered most of Europe because they kept rolling the 6/1 split on the CRT on low odds attacks? Seriously, THAT is your explanation?
See, I don't look at through the lens of a wargame. Perhaps that's why we differ
Quote from: Ideologue on August 22, 2011, 01:47:09 PM
I generally agree with Berkut on this. People tend to rate Hitler and the Nazi leadership rather poorly as strategic thinkers, given how successful they were.* It's strange.
Not that there weren't major, major mistakes. Raz identified one (the failure to fully mobilize the economy for war), and there are others (the racism, particularly in the treatment of Ukrainians, the desire for a surface fleet, the belief that the Luftwaffe was equipped for terror bombing, the insane insistence that everything should dive bomb). But even Alexander and Napoleon made major strategic mistakes, and no one calls them buffoons. The desire to villify and denigrate the Nazis (especially on the part of, ahem, Wehrmacht generals both concerned for their own glory and in many cases complicit in their crimes--hi Guderian), while understandable, is something I'm not sure holds up to scrutiny.
*Well, in the short-term. It's also important to remember that Germany was facing three nations each stronger than itself. And it was very close to destroying one of them, and arguably came close to knocking another one out of the war. I suppose one can argue that a smart person would have been contented with the massive concessions made and never gone to war in the first place.
They were horrible strategic thinkers in that they lost all sense of having reasonable, limited goals as the war progressed, in a classic case of supreme hubris. The longer the war went on, the worse the quality of decision-making.
Declaring war on the Soviets was barely justifiable as an extreme gamble, considering that the Nazis had at least some reason to believe that the Soviet system was tottering to a fall. In contrast, declaring war on the US made no freaking sense at all.
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 01:44:32 PM
Interesting. I will admit I don't know much of the particulars of the French lack of interest in fighting WW2, just kind of know that they didn't have the cultural or political will/unity necessary. And more importantly, the Germans knew it as well.
I'll be clear, not everyone welcomed the Germans with open arms, but some did, like the people affiliated or sympathisers to the Action Française, or to the Croix-de-Feu, who were full blown right-wing fascist-leaning groups with quite a few eminent intellectual like Maurras and Brasillach. They had their newspapers with big tirages (over a million) and their networks of supporters. Contrarily to what Valmy says, they weren't a fringe group. During the IIIrd Republic they were a sizeable force to be reckoned with.
The vast majority of people were aghast, it's not by accident that the streets of Paris was nigh-on empty when they paraded. Those who wanted to fight them fought them hard (not all French units gave up the fight like cowards, numbers in the lower rank soldiers were rather left-leaning and sympathetic to the Socialist cause, and quite a few fought fanatically to stop the Germans), and then either fled to fight from the colonies or went into the maquis. But until the Germans attacked the main idea about this war is that it'll be resolved politically and there was no reason to bleed white again for some god-forsaken "ally" in the East.
The "human resource" problem was the divided ranks in the officer corps and the political leadership. For each Paul Reynaud, who wanted to keep fighting until the end, there was a Maréchal Pétain who prefered fighting the Communists rather than Hitler. For them, the enemy was Russia and its Internationale, and fighting Hitler was in fact doing Stalin's bidding.
Even within the Vichy Regime, not everyone was rabidly pro-Nazi. Some were full-blown collaborators and Nazi sycophants, either politically or intellectually, like Joseph Darnand or Robert Brasillach. Others, like Pierre Laval or Henri Giraud, genuinely believed (or wanted to be believed) that the Vichy Regime was the legitimate continuation of France and that France was playing to preserve its independence toward Hitler.
Quote from: Ideologue on August 22, 2011, 01:47:09 PM
I generally agree with Berkut on this. People tend to rate Hitler and the Nazi leadership rather poorly as strategic thinkers, given how successful they were.* It's strange.
Not that there weren't major, major mistakes. Raz identified one (the failure to fully mobilize the economy for war), and there are others (the racism, particularly in the treatment of Ukrainians, the desire for a surface fleet, the belief that the Luftwaffe was equipped for terror bombing, the insane insistence that everything should dive bomb). But even Alexander and Napoleon made major strategic mistakes, and no one calls them buffoons. The desire to villify and denigrate the Nazis (especially on the part of, ahem, Wehrmacht generals both concerned for their own glory and in many cases complicit in their crimes--hi Guderian), while understandable, is something I'm not sure holds up to scrutiny.
*Well, in the short-term. It's also important to remember that Germany was facing three nations each stronger than itself. And it was very close to destroying one of them, and arguably came close to knocking another one out of the war. I suppose one can argue that a smart person would have been contented with the massive concessions made and never gone to war in the first place.
I think Hitler gets a bit under-rated As a strategist (especially for someone with no formal training). His strategic oversight in the beginning of the War worked fairly well, but still, like Napoleon they were often major gambles. They often succeed his because enemies didn't think anyone would be crazy enough to try them.
The industrial side is the primary reason why I think the Germans got further then they should have. The Russian built more T-34s then all the German tanks combined. This is surprising considering the Soviets were not know for efficiency and only a generation ago Russian barely had the capability to even make a car.
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 02:03:28 PM
Contrarily to what Valmy says, they weren't a fringe group.
Um I well aware they were not a fringe group. Where did I say they were a fringe group? They were a very powerful group. I just doubted they were trying to undermine the war effort before it was clear the Germans had won. They were, after all, French nationalists. I know they chanted 'better Hitler than Blume' and all that, but the Socialists were not in charge in 1939 and 1940. The Radicals were and while the Radicals had at one point been a left wing party they were not by that point.
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 01:44:32 PM
Interesting. I will admit I don't know much of the particulars of the French lack of interest in fighting WW2, just kind of know that they didn't have the cultural or political will/unity necessary. And more importantly, the Germans knew it as well.
I think the real shock for Hitler and the Germans was not that France was not willing to fight, but that England WAS willing to fight, even after Poland, the Low Countries, Norway, and France had all been beaten. I still say that is one of the "great moments" in cultural history, when the Brits basically said "Fuck you, we aren't quitting even if it does seem completely insane to keep fighting! Lets see you get across the Channel!".
Of course, I am just a German fanboy, so what do I know?
You can say that Churchill pulled an Alci. :unsure:
Quote from: Valmy on August 22, 2011, 02:06:04 PM
Um I well aware they were not a fringe group. Where did I say they were a fringe group? They were a very powerful group. I just doubted they were trying to undermine the war effort before it was clear the Germans had won. They were, after all, French nationalists. I know they chanted 'better Hitler than Blume' and all that, but the Socialists were not in charge in 1939 and 1940. The Radicals were and while the Radicals had at one point been a left wing party they were not by that point.
Many of them were French nationalists, yes, but the other camp was Hitler-fanboism. They loved seeing how Germany was run efficiently and put back on track under Hitler compared to the bitter political and social divide in France, that Stalin was a far bigger threat than Hitler witnessing the former's intervention in the Spanish Civil War just south of their frontiers. These, to quote Henri Guillemin who was a contemporary witness of the events of the times, working as a diplomat, went as far as to say that "they wouldn't be unhappy to see France lose the war with Hitler."
If your French is good enough, I can link you to Guillemin's TV series from the 70s on Pétain and his Vichy Regime.
Sure I read quite a bit on this subject as you can imagine but I was not aware they tried to do anything to undermine the war effort, unlike the freaking Comintern. I do know they were not exactly devastated when the Nazis did win. But like all French political groups there were big divisions even between political allies.
Go ahead and provide the linkage.
There you go, all of them are there.
http://archives.tsr.ch/dossier-histoirepetain
Merci :frog:
But really the Fall of France is not because of the Comintern and backstabbing Franco-Nazis but mostly because Maurice Gamelin was a terrible general with terrible ideas on everything from strategy to tactics to logistics to command and control.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 12:41:49 PM
The Germans had a reputation for record keeping, but the Nazis were notoriously slap dash in administration.
That might lead me to question certain SS or Gestapo records, but at least until late in the war not the Wehrmacht generally.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 12:51:03 PM
I actually get the opposite impression. I find it strange the Germans got as far as they did. Germany was badly, badly run.
Everything is relative. The German economy was backward in many respects, but there was a strong industrial core spread out among web of proto-Mittelstand type business, a well educated and disciplined work force, and considerable scientific innovation (despite Nazi own goals). It still had its central location, the second largest population in Europe, and managed to recruit and surround itself with allies and satellites. Plus, it had a first mover advantage in rearmament.
Compare all that to France with its population bust, squabbling politicians and inconsistent policy; the UK - desperately trying to manage its overstretched global empire on reduced material resources; the USSR - a paranoid regime ravaged by self-inflicted purges desperately trying to mobilize and control improverished and still semi-literate masses; USA - a country mired in a second Depression, increasingly embroiled in controversies in the Pacific and China, and where isolationism was a dominant political ideology.
The real question is how - after Hitler secured a de facto (if cool) alliance with the Soviet Union in 1939 - those that would resist him would have any chance at all.
Quote from: Valmy on August 22, 2011, 02:23:02 PM
Merci :frog:
But really the Fall of France is not because of the Comintern and backstabbing Franco-Nazis but mostly because Maurice Gamelin was a terrible general with terrible ideas on everything from strategy to tactics to logistics to command and control.
Of course on the operational level, but morale, unity (here lack thereof) and the will to fight played a role. Even the best of plans will fail if a good chunk of your officers feel this war shouldn't be fought at all and will fight only half-heartedly to defend the territory, so imagine when the plan's faulty from the start.
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 02:44:42 PM
Of course on the operational level, but morale, unity (here lack thereof) and the will to fight played a role. Even the best of plans will fail if a good chunk of your officers feel this war shouldn't be fought at all and will fight only half-heartedly to defend the territory.
Yeah but to what extent was their lack of morale and will to fight contributed by the way the Army was led? The fact his plan resulted in the French Army sitting around doing nothing for months let the doubts begin to build and nerves to give out. I see no reason why similar leadership in the First World War would not have had similar results.
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 01:50:33 PM
They also launched a minor offensive in 1939, but gave up pretty quickly. A bold strike could have captured the vital Saar region, which would have hurt German industry, and forced any German operation against the French to force them out first.
A bold, organized, well-planned strike with soldiers/officers of sufficient training & morale could certainly have captured the Saar. Unfortunately for the French they lacked pretty much all those ingredients.
Them Char B1 bis tanks were funky & cool lookin', though.
What does "bis" mean anyway?
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 12:41:49 PM
The Germans had a reputation for record keeping, but the Nazis were notoriously slap dash in administration. Besides, they lost the war and lots of documents were likely lost or destroyed in the chaos.
The kinds of documents that describe losses and orders of battle would have been German, not Nazi, so your point seems moot.
Quote from: Valmy on August 22, 2011, 02:56:49 PM
Yeah but to what extent was their lack of morale and will to fight contributed by the way the Army was led? The fact his plan resulted in the French Army sitting around doing nothing for months let the doubts begin to build and nerves to give out. I see no reason why similar leadership in the First World War would not have had similar results.
Gamelin and his officers expected a repeat of the First World War, which is why they were so reluctant to attack until they had created a large superiority in force. They didn't know how weak the Germans opposite them were.
I know in HoI3 those baguette-eating bastards aren't afraid to march into the Saar.
Wochenschau = gospel. Period.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2011, 02:23:19 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 12:41:49 PM
The Germans had a reputation for record keeping, but the Nazis were notoriously slap dash in administration.
That might lead me to question certain SS or Gestapo records, but at least until late in the war not the Wehrmacht generally.
Would you expect the same from Red Army records?
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 06:17:04 PM
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 22, 2011, 02:23:19 PM
Quote from: Razgovory on August 22, 2011, 12:41:49 PM
The Germans had a reputation for record keeping, but the Nazis were notoriously slap dash in administration.
That might lead me to question certain SS or Gestapo records, but at least until late in the war not the Wehrmacht generally.
Would you expect the same from Red Army records?
From the same guys who brought you the Kursk Myth, That Operation Mars was just a side show, We didnt execute any Polish military,............ Naw they must be spot on.
But, I'll thumb through my copy of the Soviet General Staff Study on Kursk along with others and get back to you. It "was" classified, so it should be spot on...right.
Quote from: 11B4V on August 23, 2011, 04:32:28 AM
From the same guys who brought you the Kursk Myth, That Operation Mars was just a side show, We didnt execute any Polish military,............ Naw they must be spot on.
But, I'll thumb through my copy of the Soviet General Staff Study on Kursk along with others and get back to you. It "was" classified, so it should be spot on...right.
There is a difference between records and histories. But, I would agree that even Red Army records from the early should be viewed suspiciously, because they were not kept continuously due to the turmoil at the front (and may have been "reconstructed" later in some cases), and because of the strong political controls placed on Red Army commanders in that time period. The German Army never had anything like the commissar system, and the commissars would see all Red Army reports before they were submitted.
Quote from: grumbler on August 23, 2011, 06:25:38 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on August 23, 2011, 04:32:28 AM
From the same guys who brought you the Kursk Myth, That Operation Mars was just a side show, We didnt execute any Polish military,............ Naw they must be spot on.
But, I'll thumb through my copy of the Soviet General Staff Study on Kursk along with others and get back to you. It "was" classified, so it should be spot on...right.
There is a difference between records and histories. But, I would agree that even Red Army records from the early should be viewed suspiciously, because they were not kept continuously due to the turmoil at the front (and may have been "reconstructed" later in some cases), and because of the strong political controls placed on Red Army commanders in that time period. The German Army never had anything like the commissar system, and the commissars would see all Red Army reports before they were submitted.
Nazi fanboy alert! Nazi fanboy alert!
One of the points that Glantz makes that I think is applicable is the lack of education in the Soviet military (expecially after the purges eviscerated the middle managment of the Red Army and Air Force). He cites a specific example - very few lower level officers could use a slide rule, hence could not do the calculations necessary to employ indirect fire artillery. So the artillery was cited to fire direct, which resulted in about a million pieces of Soviet artillery in German hands as they overran the positions.
I don't doubt that that same level of poor education impacted on the Red Army record keeping as well.
Did Soviets never realize that you could just hit a Shift key?
Quote from: DGuller on August 23, 2011, 10:40:29 AM
Did Soviets never realize that you could just hit a Shift key?
:lol:
Germany and Japan always made the best slide rules.
The big brown truck just brought Valeriy Zamulin's book before I left for work today. From what I've gathered this 600 page tome deals with Vatutins AO and particularly the Prokhorovka area. Thumbing through it I have to say what a qaulity book. Gloss pages, good maps, lots of B&W photots, color terrain photos, etc.
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 01:39:25 PM
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 01:38:13 PM
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 01:37:03 PM
France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and society was bitterly divided between left and right, and anti-fascism and defeatism. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.
Well, they certainly got what they wished, didn't they?
Hence why these collaborated so thoroughly and willfully in Vichy France, and in part why France, when Petain arrived in power, was the only country invaded by Germany who actually officially gave up the fight.
France never gave up the fight. Petain and his quarteron de generaux en retraite might have.
France was in London.
Quote from: Zoupa on August 24, 2011, 10:10:41 PM
France never gave up the fight. Petain and his quarteron de generaux en retraite might have.
France was in London.
Still if Reynauld had not lost his nerve and Darlan had not been such a contemptible douche France might have continued the fight with the backing of its Empire.
Quote from: Zoupa on August 24, 2011, 10:10:41 PM
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 01:39:25 PM
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 01:38:13 PM
Quote from: Drakken on August 22, 2011, 01:37:03 PM
France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and society was bitterly divided between left and right, and anti-fascism and defeatism. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.
Well, they certainly got what they wished, didn't they?
Hence why these collaborated so thoroughly and willfully in Vichy France, and in part why France, when Petain arrived in power, was the only country invaded by Germany who actually officially gave up the fight.
France never gave up the fight. Petain and his quarteron de generaux en retraite might have.
France was in London.
:frog: :worthy:
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on August 23, 2011, 12:17:26 PM
Germany and Japan always made the best slide rules.
"You vill not even get on der laddah until das child in front of you is on the way down!"and
"No child, prease, to use slide unless at least one meter tall."Agree, those were the best rules.
Quote from: Berkut on August 22, 2011, 01:44:32 PM
Interesting. I will admit I don't know much of the particulars of the French lack of interest in fighting WW2, just kind of know that they didn't have the cultural or political will/unity necessary. And more importantly, the Germans knew it as well.
Well the Germans presumed that about everybody. Even the Russians.
I guess I think the French soldiers would have fought reasonably well if they had confidence in their commanders. They showed themselves well at times in the Battle of France but they were so decisively and quickly beaten strategically it was hard to have very high morale.
Let's necro this thread. :cthulu:
I purchased Glantz's Operation Barbarossa for under 10 bucks on kobostore, straight to my e-reader.
Also, now that I've found a job that I like and in which I have possibilites for the future I've finally decided to complete my dissertation to obtain my master's degree in International Relations - Strategic Studies, which is long, long, long overdue (like 10 years overdue). I can work on it part-time during the weekend, it's "only" between 50 and 100 pages long.
My tentative subject would be a comparative survey on the current state debate among academics/military specialists on whether the failure of Operation Barbarossa was unavoidable for the Germans. Was Germany's only good move not to play or, despite its huge logistical and operational limitations, could the Wehrmacht pull a favourable position, even a win?
On the former I know David Stahel is a firm author who argues that Germany lost the war as soon as the first German soldier put his foot on Soviet soil on June 22nd, 1941, so he is on my reading list. But what about the latter category? Do you guys have authors who argue that Germany's defeat was avoidable?
They could have taken Lenningrad if a few more things went there way, but more than that? Nope, don't think so. So yeah, without an earlier change they were doomed as soon as they crossed the border.
Now, if Britain threw in the towell after France, then maybe they could have pulled it off.
IIRC this was originally published as Before Stalingrad, that's the one I have.
IMO in order for the Germans to have done anything resembling a victory, you would have to change too much in their favor. Was it doomed from the start... yes. However, they did make a good go of it.
Bad planning, logistical system, and intellegence. They didn't have a grasp of the breadth, depth, and the undeveloped transportation network of the Russia theater. Benefit of hind sight
Also, had they have went for Moscow instead of encircling Kirponos (Kiev Pocket), it would have ended in a bigger disaster. They had to clear the right flank of AG Center before attempting Moscow.
Stahl's books are worth a read, but he does make some claims, not backed up, about the German high command dynamic.
However Glantz and Stahl seem to run parallel that Barbarossa was lost at Smolensk.
Other recommendations
The Viaz'ma Catastrophe, 1941: The Red Army's Disastrous Stand against Operation Typhoon
by Lev Lopuk
Defense of Moscow 1941, The: The Northern Flank January 1, 2014
by Jack Radey
Quote from: Drakken on January 08, 2016, 01:02:34 AM
Let's necro this thread. :cthulu:
I purchased Glantz's Operation Barbarossa for under 10 bucks on kobostore, straight to my e-reader.
Also, now that I've found a job that I like and in which I have possibilites for the future I've finally decided to complete my dissertation to obtain my master's degree in International Relations - Strategic Studies, which is long, long, long overdue (like 10 years overdue). I can work on it part-time during the weekend, it's "only" between 50 and 100 pages long.
My tentative subject would be a comparative survey on the current state debate among academics/military specialists on whether the failure of Operation Barbarossa was unavoidable for the Germans. Was Germany's only good move not to play or, despite its huge logistical and operational limitations, could the Wehrmacht pull a favourable position, even a win?
On the former I know David Stahel is a firm author who argues that Germany lost the war as soon as the first German soldier put his foot on Soviet soil on June 22nd, 1941, so he is on my reading list. But what about the latter category? Do you guys have authors who argue that Germany's defeat was avoidable?
It seems weird to me to claim that Germany had no chance against Russia in WW2 when they beat Russia in WW1.
Quote from: The Brain on January 08, 2016, 02:34:16 AM
Quote from: Drakken on January 08, 2016, 01:02:34 AM
Let's necro this thread. :cthulu:
I purchased Glantz's Operation Barbarossa for under 10 bucks on kobostore, straight to my e-reader.
Also, now that I've found a job that I like and in which I have possibilites for the future I've finally decided to complete my dissertation to obtain my master's degree in International Relations - Strategic Studies, which is long, long, long overdue (like 10 years overdue). I can work on it part-time during the weekend, it's "only" between 50 and 100 pages long.
My tentative subject would be a comparative survey on the current state debate among academics/military specialists on whether the failure of Operation Barbarossa was unavoidable for the Germans. Was Germany's only good move not to play or, despite its huge logistical and operational limitations, could the Wehrmacht pull a favourable position, even a win?
On the former I know David Stahel is a firm author who argues that Germany lost the war as soon as the first German soldier put his foot on Soviet soil on June 22nd, 1941, so he is on my reading list. But what about the latter category? Do you guys have authors who argue that Germany's defeat was avoidable?
It seems weird to me to claim that Germany had no chance against Russia in WW2 when they beat Russia in WW1.
Hell, a runner with no legs has a chance at winning a foot race. Doesn't mean he's going to, though.
they might have a better chance at it had they gone in as liberators from soviet yoke rather than Einsatztruppen-wielding exterminators. Might have helped with the partisans (i.e. less of them) But for that to happen pigs would have had to magically grow wings and jetpacks.
Quote from: Drakken on January 08, 2016, 01:02:34 AM
Do you guys have authors who argue that Germany's defeat was avoidable?
Paul Carell. :D
:bleeding:
(My dad read him a fair bit, but then again he was an avid reader of Der Landser (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Der_Landser))
I think it depends on how you define "winning".
Also, the discussion seems to leave out the Soviets - as if Germanies chances were only dependent on what Germany did, or did not do. The Germans could have executed better, and the Soviets could have executed worse.
I don't think it was within a reasonable set of outcomes for Germany to conuer the USSR. I do think it is possible that the outcome could have been much more nuanced than it was (utter defeat for Germany).
All these references to EU3 multiplayer games become quickly dated. :(
Quote from: grumbler on January 08, 2016, 07:27:26 AM
Paul Carell. :D
By authors/academics, I meant
credible authors/academics.
If no authors argue whether Barbarossa was doomed from the start, I'm fully willing to adapt my subject to perhaps make a survey/analysis or why ultimately the planning and execution of Barbarossa failed on the political, operational, and logistical level. In other words, a comparative study on how the Germans and the Soviets, each on their side, tried to cope and adapt to an urgency crisis situation - and the latter succeeded while the former didn't.
It's a master's dissertation - I only have to show I can make a proper research and write a paper on the subject.
Quote from: Berkut on January 08, 2016, 09:39:57 AM
I think it depends on how you define "winning".
Also, the discussion seems to leave out the Soviets - as if Germanies chances were only dependent on what Germany did, or did not do. The Germans could have executed better, and the Soviets could have executed worse.
I don't think it was within a reasonable set of outcomes for Germany to conuer the USSR. I do think it is possible that the outcome could have been much more nuanced than it was (utter defeat for Germany).
It's a good question : What, short of taking Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov/Kharkov/Don Basin, would constitute "winning" for Germany in 1941? What could a "reasonable" Hitler ask for a peace treaty he if sued for it in early 1942?
I'd say that in real life, Germany had a minor advantage`by early 1942. It was able to bite and hold the ground despite Soviet winter counterattacks in the Center, avoiding a complete collapse of the front. Leningrad was besieged, the Axis still held the initiative, but there was so much reserve left for one local major offensive. The Red Army was simply not ready to launch a coordinated offensive without marching itself on its own feet, and Moscow was still techically under threat. However Germany's economy was woefully left unprepared for war and no strategic reserve was left for a second push - it would have taken a major reorganization as soon as later 1941 to put Germany's production to a war footing for late 1942 at best.
Germany's best chance of a favourable peace would be inside this window - Winter to Summer 1942. But then, do what next? Had alt-Hitler not had this fixated idea of no retreat and allowed his commanders to do what they were trained to do - initiative and defensive flexibility - the war could have drawn out a lot longer.
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 02:10:35 AM
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.
It saved Germany army from complete collapse in the winter of 41-42, yes. Their equipment was frozen and badly in need of winter maintenance. However, it was that same success that convinced Hitler that he knew instinctively better than his own generals. From then, standing fast regardless of the situation and preventing his subordinates to exercise operational flexibility when on the defensive proved disastrous. Hence, my comment.
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 02:10:35 AM
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army.
I've never really understood this argument from a theoretical level.
If the Soviet army was tactically and operationally inept, how does a stand fast order "save" the German Army?
After all, absent such an order, it's not like the German operational commanders could not choose to hold in place if that was the appropriate stance to take in some particular location.
What could possibly be the benefit of a straight out, no flexibility, purely political order that ties the hands of the field commanders to react with nuance to this tactically and operationally inept opponent?
Quote from: Drakken on January 09, 2016, 02:16:12 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 02:10:35 AM
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.
It saved Germany army from complete collapse in the winter of 41-42, yes.
I don't buy the claim that the German Army was in any real danger of "collapse" in the winter of 41-42.
This thinking is, again, a symptom of the common East Front thinking that portrays the Soviet Army capapbilities as irrelevant to the discussion - like the fate of the German army during the winter is completely a matter of what Germany chose to do.
Quite simply, the Red Army during that winter lacked the ability to cause a collapse of the German army, standfast order or not.
I still refuse to accept the claim that any kind of "one size fits all" political direction from high command could possibly be better than leaving it up to the field commanders to react appropriately (which of course might include a hold in place order in some cases, and hence include any possible local benefit the "standfast" order could actually have).
Quote from: Drakken on January 09, 2016, 01:51:47 AM
Quote from: Berkut on January 08, 2016, 09:39:57 AM
I think it depends on how you define "winning".
Also, the discussion seems to leave out the Soviets - as if Germanies chances were only dependent on what Germany did, or did not do. The Germans could have executed better, and the Soviets could have executed worse.
I don't think it was within a reasonable set of outcomes for Germany to conuer the USSR. I do think it is possible that the outcome could have been much more nuanced than it was (utter defeat for Germany).
It's a good question : What, short of taking Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov/Kharkov/Don Basin, would constitute "winning" for Germany in 1941? What could a "reasonable" Hitler ask for a peace treaty he if sued for it in early 1942?
I'd say that in real life, Germany had a minor advantage`by early 1942. It was able to bite and hold the ground despite Soviet winter counterattacks in the Center, avoiding a complete collapse of the front. Leningrad was besieged, the Axis still held the initiative, but there was so much reserve left for one local major offensive. The Red Army was simply not ready to launch a coordinated offensive without marching itself on its own feet, and Moscow was still techically under threat. However Germany's economy was woefully left unprepared for war and no strategic reserve was left for a second push - it would have taken a major reorganization as soon as later 1941 to put Germany's production to a war footing for late 1942 at best.
Germany's best chance of a favourable peace would be inside this window - Winter to Summer 1942. But then, do what next? Had alt-Hitler not had this fixated idea of no retreat and allowed his commanders to do what they were trained to do - initiative and defensive flexibility - the war could have drawn out a lot longer.
One of the reasons I don't buy the "Germany was doomed" argument is that the idea of the war being drawn out longer is almost a non-started as far as the Soviets are concerned.
Hisotrically, by 1945 they were bled white. Of course, historically the Germans were even worse.
So if we posit a war that has (from 1941 on) some lower level of Germany losses, and higher level of Soviet losses, we reach a point where the Soviets simply run out of men to put into uniform. Historically, this happened - but of course the Germans ran out of men even earlier.
So to my thinking, it is not hard to imagine a situation with moderately different loss ratios that sees the Soviets running out of bodies a bit earlier, Germany being able to hold on a bit longer, and both sides becoming so exhausted that offensive action becomes impossible, even late in the war.
Now, this likely just results in the Western allies doing more while the Soviets do less, but it is really hard to specualte with any great accuracy what the follow on effects of this counter-factual might be. Does Italy hold out longer with a little more German help? Are the Western Allies a bit more hesitant to invade, given moderately less Soviet success, and hence moderately greater German ability to defend Western Europe?
I don't pretend to know - maybe none of it would matter. Maybe it all just means that the Germans get to enjoy watching their cities disappear in mushroom clouds in late 1945.
But I think the "Germany was doomed" argument is just the typical history "easy answer" that tends to argue that what DID happen is what HAD to happen. Sometimes that is the case (I am very content arguing for example that there was no probably set of circumstances that would see a Southern win in the USCW or any way for Japan to defeat the US), but often the set of possible outcomes is based on a huge number of variables which people tend to assume afterwards were more like constants.
For example, how close was the Soviet political structure to collapse? It did NOT collapse, so most historians assume it wasn't close. But how can we be sure?
Quote from: Drakken on January 09, 2016, 02:16:12 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 02:10:35 AM
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.
It saved Germany army from complete collapse in the winter of 41-42, yes. Their equipment was frozen and badly in need of winter maintenance. However, it was that same success that convinced Hitler that he knew instinctively better than his own generals. From then, standing fast regardless of the situation and preventing his subordinates to exercise operational flexibility when on the defensive proved disastrous. Hence, my comment.
Bottom line is, the German army was never capable large scale mobile defense in Russia. Even though they had the maneuver space for it. Even if the generals had complete operational flexibility and initiative.
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 03:02:09 AM
Quote from: Drakken on January 09, 2016, 02:16:12 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 02:10:35 AM
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.
It saved Germany army from complete collapse in the winter of 41-42, yes. Their equipment was frozen and badly in need of winter maintenance. However, it was that same success that convinced Hitler that he knew instinctively better than his own generals. From then, standing fast regardless of the situation and preventing his subordinates to exercise operational flexibility when on the defensive proved disastrous. Hence, my comment.
Bottom line is, the German army was never capable large scale mobile defense in Russia. Even though they had the maneuver space for it. Even if the generals had complete operational flexibility and initiative.
If you mean they lacked the transport capability, I can certainly agree with that. Their mobile formations were potent, but always a small fraction of their combat power.
Of course, for most of the war the Soviet Army lacked and large scale capability for mobile offensive warfare as well, so this wasn't THAT large of a problem.
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 02:19:30 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 02:10:35 AM
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army.
I've never really understood this argument from a theoretical level.
If the Soviet army was tactically and operationally inept, how does a stand fast order "save" the German Army?
After all, absent such an order, it's not like the German operational commanders could not choose to hold in place if that was the appropriate stance to take in some particular location.
What could possibly be the benefit of a straight out, no flexibility, purely political order that ties the hands of the field commanders to react with nuance to this tactically and operationally inept opponent?
Not theoretical at all.
In short the German army wanted to retreat/withdraw. Problem is they didn't have the maneuvering capability. They were past the end of their limits. So with the standfast order the German operational commanders used a strong point type defense or hedgehog. Which allowed the Russian offensive to eventually peter out and lose momentum. The Russians were tactically and operationally inept and at that point in the campaign could not manuever/coordinate units effectively. They could use sledgehammer tactics and hammer away at great cost which they could sustain in the long run.. Do you know why the Russians abolished the tank/mech divisions and corps in late 1941?
The Russians knew what they wanted to do strategically, but could not really effectively do it. Had the 1941 Russian army been the mid to late 1943 army, the Germans would have genuinely had a defeat on their hands. It seems you don't have very good grasp of the plight the German army was in the winter of 41-42.
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 03:04:06 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 03:02:09 AM
Quote from: Drakken on January 09, 2016, 02:16:12 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 02:10:35 AM
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.
It saved Germany army from complete collapse in the winter of 41-42, yes. Their equipment was frozen and badly in need of winter maintenance. However, it was that same success that convinced Hitler that he knew instinctively better than his own generals. From then, standing fast regardless of the situation and preventing his subordinates to exercise operational flexibility when on the defensive proved disastrous. Hence, my comment.
Bottom line is, the German army was never capable large scale mobile defense in Russia. Even though they had the maneuver space for it. Even if the generals had complete operational flexibility and initiative.
If you mean they lacked the transport capability, I can certainly agree with that. Their mobile formations were potent, but always a small fraction of their combat power.
Of course, for most of the war the Soviet Army lacked and large scale capability for mobile offensive warfare as well, so this wasn't THAT large of a problem.
Oh the German panzer corps were potent until early 45 to be sure.
A very good read is a memoir by a German officer named Hermann Balck just recently translated. He was assigned as General of Mobile Forces at OKH during Barbarossa. He gives a good description of the Germans lack of transportation, supply problems, and lack of comanality of transportation assets.
The Russians from mid 1943 onward, could pick the time and place for major operations and the Germans had to
react and the Russians could do it at several places at once. It was a HUGHE problem.
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 02:19:30 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 02:10:35 AM
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army.
What could possibly be the benefit of a straight out, no flexibility, purely political order that ties the hands of the field commanders to react with nuance to this tactically and operationally inept opponent?
The German army survived intact in the winter of 41-42 did it not. Bruised to be sure, and could not conduct a theater wide offensive in 42. The sustained damage showed at the launch of Operation Blue. As did the damage from Stalingrad showed in the German 1943 summer offensive. The German strategic offensives in 41, 42, and 43 were scaled down each of those years. This showed dwindling strategic initiative for the germans and the opposite for the Russians.
Here's a quote from a memoir and any level headed assessment will be the same.
Quote
On 30 December I was back in Rastenburg and the following day I briefed Hitler. It took more than two hours, during which time Hitler hardly spoke. He only occasionally asked a question. I pleaded with Hitler not to withdraw under any circumstances. Operations were completely impossible in the snow that was two meters deep, and in the -58 degree Fahrenheit weather, river crossings and the building of positions were impossible anywhere. This was a crisis that could not be solved operationally. Front lines were being held wherever we could manage to get just one tank and twenty men to one decisive point after days and days of trying. The demand to hold under such conditions might sound brutal, but in reality it was the greatest clemency.
That is from one of the best (arguably "the best") panzer division/corps commanders the Germans had. Keep thinking the Germans could have conducted an orderly withdrawal, mobile defense, or mobile whatever in the winter of 41-42.I will respectfully disagree with such a fantasy. It wasnt possible or feasible.
Anywho, Drakken I can't remember if it's the book you got or When Titans Clashed that has one of two favorite glantz quotes "the Russian and German armies of Dec41 were that of two "punch-drunk boxers, staying precariously on their feet ..."
The other being, "What Rotmistrov failed to remember was the bulk of the burning tanks on the Prokhorovka battlefield were Russian."
Quote from: The Brain on January 08, 2016, 02:34:16 AM
It seems weird to me to claim that Germany had no chance against Russia in WW2 when they beat Russia in WW1.
How is it weird, Russia was much stronger and Germany much weaker at this point in time.
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 02:32:50 AM
But I think the "Germany was doomed" argument is just the typical history "easy answer" that tends to argue that what DID happen is what HAD to happen. Sometimes that is the case (I am very content arguing for example that there was no probably set of circumstances that would see a Southern win in the USCW or any way for Japan to defeat the US), but often the set of possible outcomes is based on a huge number of variables which people tend to assume afterwards were more like constants.
For example, how close was the Soviet political structure to collapse? It did NOT collapse, so most historians assume it wasn't close. But how can we be sure?
You think there was no way that Britain or France could have gotten involved?
Quote from: jimmy olsen on January 09, 2016, 07:07:03 AM
Quote from: The Brain on January 08, 2016, 02:34:16 AM
It seems weird to me to claim that Germany had no chance against Russia in WW2 when they beat Russia in WW1.
How is it weird, Russia was much stronger and Germany much weaker at this point in time.
I don't see a reason to believe that the chance had moved all the way to zero.
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 02:19:30 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 02:10:35 AM
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army.
I've never really understood this argument from a theoretical level.
If the Soviet army was tactically and operationally inept, how does a stand fast order "save" the German Army?
After all, absent such an order, it's not like the German operational commanders could not choose to hold in place if that was the appropriate stance to take in some particular location.
What could possibly be the benefit of a straight out, no flexibility, purely political order that ties the hands of the field commanders to react with nuance to this tactically and operationally inept opponent?
Actually, in the absence of the stand fast order the German commanders would have attempted to retreat (as, indeed, they did before the stand fast order) and would have been cut to pieces in the attempt (as, indeed, they were when they attempted retreat before the stand fast order). The stand fast order essentially ordered German units to sacrifice themselves in place rather than attempting to execute a doctrine that was hopelessly inadequate to the circumstances. The field commanders didn't understand how out of their league they were, because they had never encountered the conditions they faced in the Winter of '41-'42.
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 03:49:31 AM
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 02:19:30 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 02:10:35 AM
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army.
What could possibly be the benefit of a straight out, no flexibility, purely political order that ties the hands of the field commanders to react with nuance to this tactically and operationally inept opponent?
The German army survived intact in the winter of 41-42 did it not. Bruised to be sure, and could not conduct a theater wide offensive in 42. The sustained damage showed at the launch of Operation Blue. As did the damage from Stalingrad showed in the German 1943 summer offensive. The German strategic offensives in 41, 42, and 43 were scaled down each of those years. This showed dwindling strategic initiative for the germans and the opposite for the Russians.
Here's a quote from a memoir and any level headed assessment will be the same.
Quote
On 30 December I was back in Rastenburg and the following day I briefed Hitler. It took more than two hours, during which time Hitler hardly spoke. He only occasionally asked a question. I pleaded with Hitler not to withdraw under any circumstances. Operations were completely impossible in the snow that was two meters deep, and in the -58 degree Fahrenheit weather, river crossings and the building of positions were impossible anywhere. This was a crisis that could not be solved operationally. Front lines were being held wherever we could manage to get just one tank and twenty men to one decisive point after days and days of trying. The demand to hold under such conditions might sound brutal, but in reality it was the greatest clemency.
That is from one of the best (arguably "the best") panzer division/corps commanders the Germans had. Keep thinking the Germans could have conducted an orderly withdrawal, mobile defense, or mobile whatever in the winter of 41-42.I will respectfully disagree with such a fantasy. It wasnt possible or feasible.
I am not at all arguing that they should have retreated - what I am arguing is the claim that "the army wanted to retreat". Well, apparently that isn't the case since it appears that there were some who understood that they needed to hold (in those places where that was appropriate) - indeed, you cite an example here.
Nor am I arguing that a large scale retreat would have been a good idea. What I am arguing is that the "No retreat, no where" order is not a good idea. Or at least, the inflexibility of it is a bad idea. After all, certainly you would not argue that a voluntary adjustment of lines is WORSE than an involuntary one, right? And we know that in the case of AGC, there were examples where despite the stand fast order, they were not able to hold their positions anyway, and were forced to retreat.
And grumbler, there are examples of retreats conducted in defiance of or before the stand fast order that were made under controlled circumstances without substantial losses. Third Panzer Army was grossly over-exposed, and had no choice but to retreat, and did so in order in December, IIRC.
In any case, I also think it is important to note that again, the Soviets lacked the capability in the Winter of 41/42 to exploit German weakness and lack of mobility - they had little themselves in more than a low level operational sense. B4 is right - they could not even manage moderate to large sized mobile formations when they did have them, and by the winter had mostly disbanded those that were left.
I think the "standfast saved the Wehrmacht" story is kind of received wisdom that really doesn't stand up to much scrutiny. Yes, if the alternative is a Napoleon-esque "retreat from Moscow" debacle, then sure that would be terrible, but I don't buy the idea that absent a standfast the entire German army would just crumble and flee. They didn't do that on any number of incredibly dire circumstances later in the war, I don't believe they would have done so in the Winter of '41 either.
Rather I think had Hitler simply ordered his generals to hold as best they can, while leaving them with the operational flexibility to adjust their lines as needed, the result, at worse, would have been much the same. I don't think the German High Command was on the verge of a mental breakdown resulting in some kind of total breakdown such that absent such a stringent demand they army would have fallen apart fleeing anywhere and everywhere.
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 05:17:53 AM
Anywho, Drakken I can't remember if it's the book you got or When Titans Clashed that has one of two favorite glantz quotes "the Russian and German armies of Dec41 were that of two "punch-drunk boxers, staying precariously on their feet ..."
Indeed - and that is in large part where I started having my doubts about the CW in regards to the order. I don't think the Soviets were capable of delivering the knock out blow regardless, and I don't think the Wehrmacht, despite being battered, was the kind of army to simply have a collective failure of morale resulting in them falling apart absent such a blow being delivered.
Quote
The other being, "What Rotmistrov failed to remember was the bulk of the burning tanks on the Prokhorovka battlefield were Russian."
It was quotes like that that resulted in Glantz's "unprecedented access to Soviet archives" not being so accessible anymore. :)
Quote from: jimmy olsen on January 09, 2016, 07:07:03 AM
Quote from: The Brain on January 08, 2016, 02:34:16 AM
It seems weird to me to claim that Germany had no chance against Russia in WW2 when they beat Russia in WW1.
How is it weird, Russia was much stronger and Germany much weaker at this point in time.
This actually speaks to my point to some extent (and argues against it as well, depending on how you look at it).
WW2 in the East was of a different nature than WW1 in the East. In WW1, Germany and Russia fought because they were both backing up allies. They both had ideas about expanding territory and such, but the Germans never had any illusions about conquering Russia, nor did they try.
Their WW1 "win" was, at the end of the day, a win based not on outright conquest, but breaking the will of the Russians to continue. They delivered enough blows that at some point, the Russia will to continue was simply gone. It is not unreasonable to think that this could have happened in WW2 as well, it just didn't. And part of the reason it did not, is that Germany engaged in a war of conquest. The *point* of WW2 was (for Germany) to take over huge chunks of Russia - not just win a war, force a negotiated peace, and grab some border regions.
When I say I think Germany could have "won" WW2, I don't mean I think they could have taken Moscow, Leningrad, and Stalingrad, forcing a dissolution of the Soviet government and outright effective conquest of European Russia/USSR. I do think they could have realised at some point that those goals were not obtainable any longer, and been willing to pull back from those goals, and forced a defensive war of attrition and maneuver resulting in a negotiated peace that left vast parts of Soviet Europe under their control.
There are problems with this theory of course, and it is by no means certain that it would have worked. And there are even better arguments that it was simply not possible from a ideological standpoint of Nazism.
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 02:27:00 PM
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 03:49:31 AM
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 02:19:30 AM
Quote from: 11B4V on January 09, 2016, 02:10:35 AM
I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army.
What could possibly be the benefit of a straight out, no flexibility, purely political order that ties the hands of the field commanders to react with nuance to this tactically and operationally inept opponent?
The German army survived intact in the winter of 41-42 did it not. Bruised to be sure, and could not conduct a theater wide offensive in 42. The sustained damage showed at the launch of Operation Blue. As did the damage from Stalingrad showed in the German 1943 summer offensive. The German strategic offensives in 41, 42, and 43 were scaled down each of those years. This showed dwindling strategic initiative for the germans and the opposite for the Russians.
Here's a quote from a memoir and any level headed assessment will be the same.
Quote
On 30 December I was back in Rastenburg and the following day I briefed Hitler. It took more than two hours, during which time Hitler hardly spoke. He only occasionally asked a question. I pleaded with Hitler not to withdraw under any circumstances. Operations were completely impossible in the snow that was two meters deep, and in the -58 degree Fahrenheit weather, river crossings and the building of positions were impossible anywhere. This was a crisis that could not be solved operationally. Front lines were being held wherever we could manage to get just one tank and twenty men to one decisive point after days and days of trying. The demand to hold under such conditions might sound brutal, but in reality it was the greatest clemency.
That is from one of the best (arguably "the best") panzer division/corps commanders the Germans had. Keep thinking the Germans could have conducted an orderly withdrawal, mobile defense, or mobile whatever in the winter of 41-42.I will respectfully disagree with such a fantasy. It wasnt possible or feasible.
I am not at all arguing that they should have retreated - what I am arguing is the claim that "the army wanted to retreat". Well, apparently that isn't the case since it appears that there were some who understood that they needed to hold (in those places where that was appropriate) - indeed, you cite an example here.
Nor am I arguing that a large scale retreat would have been a good idea. What I am arguing is that the "No retreat, no where" order is not a good idea. Or at least, the inflexibility of it is a bad idea. After all, certainly you would not argue that a voluntary adjustment of lines is WORSE than an involuntary one, right? And we know that in the case of AGC, there were examples where despite the stand fast order, they were not able to hold their positions anyway, and were forced to retreat.
And grumbler, there are examples of retreats conducted in defiance of or before the stand fast order that were made under controlled circumstances without substantial losses. Third Panzer Army was grossly over-exposed, and had no choice but to retreat, and did so in order in December, IIRC.
In any case, I also think it is important to note that again, the Soviets lacked the capability in the Winter of 41/42 to exploit German weakness and lack of mobility - they had little themselves in more than a low level operational sense. B4 is right - they could not even manage moderate to large sized mobile formations when they did have them, and by the winter had mostly disbanded those that were left.
I think the "standfast saved the Wehrmacht" story is kind of received wisdom that really doesn't stand up to much scrutiny. Yes, if the alternative is a Napoleon-esque "retreat from Moscow" debacle, then sure that would be terrible, but I don't buy the idea that absent a standfast the entire German army would just crumble and flee. They didn't do that on any number of incredibly dire circumstances later in the war, I don't believe they would have done so in the Winter of '41 either.
Rather I think had Hitler simply ordered his generals to hold as best they can, while leaving them with the operational flexibility to adjust their lines as needed, the result, at worse, would have been much the same. I don't think the German High Command was on the verge of a mental breakdown resulting in some kind of total breakdown such that absent such a stringent demand they army would have fallen apart fleeing anywhere and everywhere.
:cheers:
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 02:27:00 PM
I am not at all arguing that they should have retreated - what I am arguing is the claim that "the army wanted to retreat". Well, apparently that isn't the case since it appears that there were some who understood that they needed to hold (in those places where that was appropriate) - indeed, you cite an example here.
I'm not sure what you are arguing here. "The army" didn't want to retreat - it HAD to retreat. And its defensive tactics were not serving it at all well. When Guderian withdrew (the remnants of) his 2nd Panzer Army, he forced 2nd Army to retreat as well. Using German withdrawal tactics, Busch lost three divisions encircled and annihilated.
QuoteNor am I arguing that a large scale retreat would have been a good idea. What I am arguing is that the "No retreat, no where" order is not a good idea. Or at least, the inflexibility of it is a bad idea. After all, certainly you would not argue that a voluntary adjustment of lines is WORSE than an involuntary one, right? And we know that in the case of AGC, there were examples where despite the stand fast order, they were not able to hold their positions anyway, and were forced to retreat.
It isn't a matter of choosing between voluntary and involuntary withdrawals. It is a matter of choosing between the risk that the front will be crushed if it tries to stand and the risk that it will be crushed after it abandons much of its heavy weapons and artillery and retreats to some... line... somewhere. There are examples of retreat causing disaster, and standing fast causing disaster.
QuoteAnd grumbler, there are examples of retreats conducted in defiance of or before the stand fast order that were made under controlled circumstances without substantial losses. Third Panzer Army was grossly over-exposed, and had no choice but to retreat, and did so in order in December, IIRC.
And, again, there are examples of retreats ending with disaster. It isn't so black-and-white. And the army generals were not much better-prepared to deal with the situation than Hitler (though the forced retirement of von Rundstedt wasn't a result of this). The commander-in-chief of the army stated in a meeting (days before he was relieved) that he could see no plan that would save AGC.
QuoteIn any case, I also think it is important to note that again, the Soviets lacked the capability in the Winter of 41/42 to exploit German weakness and lack of mobility - they had little themselves in more than a low level operational sense. B4 is right - they could not even manage moderate to large sized mobile formations when they did have them, and by the winter had mostly disbanded those that were left.
I think it is important to note that the Soviets
did exploit German weakness and lack of mobility in the Winter of '41-'42. In fact, we are debating the best German response to that exploitation!
QuoteI think the "standfast saved the Wehrmacht" story is kind of received wisdom that really doesn't stand up to much scrutiny. Yes, if the alternative is a Napoleon-esque "retreat from Moscow" debacle, then sure that would be terrible, but I don't buy the idea that absent a standfast the entire German army would just crumble and flee. They didn't do that on any number of incredibly dire circumstances later in the war, I don't believe they would have done so in the Winter of '41 either.
Your strawman characterization of the debate ("absent a standfast the entire German army would just crumble and flee") isn't very useful to the debate. I believe that the Germans lacked the capacity to conduct a flexible defense and that the decision to stand and hold hedgehog positions was the correct one.
QuoteRather I think had Hitler simply ordered his generals to hold as best they can, while leaving them with the operational flexibility to adjust their lines as needed, the result, at worse, would have been much the same. I don't think the German High Command was on the verge of a mental breakdown resulting in some kind of total breakdown such that absent such a stringent demand they army would have fallen apart fleeing anywhere and everywhere.
Of course, the strawman part of this statement is just that, but the larger question of whether the German staff had an alternative plan that had an real chance of success is by no means as settled as you assume. The alternative to defending in place was to abandon all of the non-operational equipment and all of the equipment for which transport was limited or non-existent (since better than half the horses and trucks the Germans started with were no longer available).
And, of course, the question arises "retreat to
where?" AGS had a definite defensive line to retreat to, so a flexible withdrawal to that line made sense. AGN was fairly secure in its hold fast positions. AGC had nothing to retreat to - once they started to retreat, they would have to go back as far as the Russians could advance. That's what Guderian was effectively arguing for.
Now, I am not arguing that Hitler was right and Guderian was wrong. I am arguing, though, that it is by no means a clear-cut case that the hold fast order was inferior to "wing it as best you can." The Germans had been unsuccessful when they tried to defend using their existing doctrine. Hitler's improvised doctrine was costly, but, I believe, less costly than the likely alternative. Just in frostbite casualties alone the stand fast order may have been the better option: the Germans lost the services of over 200,000 men due to frostbite when operating under the cover of villages and prepared positions; imagine what the frostbite losses would have been had the men been sleeping in the open.
It was Hitler's fault that the German Army had no good options in December '41 and January '42, but that fact is independent of the stand fast decision.
For those who are interested, Downloadable PDFs of translations of Franz Halder's Private War Journal can be found online. Volume VI and VII concerns the war in the Balkans and Eastern Front. :thumbsup:
Just change the last number if you are interested in a particular volume.
http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng6.pdf
http://militera.lib.ru/db/0/pdf/halder_eng7.pdf
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 02:32:50 AM
One of the reasons I don't buy the "Germany was doomed" argument is that the idea of the war being drawn out longer is almost a non-started as far as the Soviets are concerned.. . .
Now, this likely just results in the Western allies doing more while the Soviets do less, but it is really hard to specualte with any great accuracy what the follow on effects of this counter-factual might be. Does Italy hold out longer with a little more German help? Are the Western Allies a bit more hesitant to invade, given moderately less Soviet success, and hence moderately greater German ability to defend Western Europe?
The inevitability thesis is based on the huge disparity of resources - human, material, and technological - between the Allies as a whole on the one hand and Germany on the other hand. So just increasing Soviet casualty rates counterfactually might slow the allied advances in the east and lead to the various effects you suggest, but at best is just buys more time. Eventually the resource disparity would tell. It would take a much more extensive set of counterfactual assumptions to alter the end result.
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on January 12, 2016, 11:46:56 AM
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 02:32:50 AM
One of the reasons I don't buy the "Germany was doomed" argument is that the idea of the war being drawn out longer is almost a non-started as far as the Soviets are concerned.. . .
Now, this likely just results in the Western allies doing more while the Soviets do less, but it is really hard to specualte with any great accuracy what the follow on effects of this counter-factual might be. Does Italy hold out longer with a little more German help? Are the Western Allies a bit more hesitant to invade, given moderately less Soviet success, and hence moderately greater German ability to defend Western Europe?
The inevitability thesis is based on the huge disparity of resources - human, material, and technological - between the Allies as a whole on the one hand and Germany on the other hand. So just increasing Soviet casualty rates counterfactually might slow the allied advances in the east and lead to the various effects you suggest, but at best is just buys more time. Eventually the resource disparity would tell. It would take a much more extensive set of counterfactual assumptions to alter the end result.
Way I've seen it expressed is that Germany could have won
earlier in a counterfactual, but could never have won
later. ;) In that, the only hope Germany had of winning was if Hitler's 'kick the door in and the whole rotten edifice collapses' theory actually proved true - when it didn't, drawing Germany into a long war, they were indeed screwed, sooner or later. Decisions made by the Germans may have drawn the whole thing out longer and caused even more suffering, of course, but there was no reasonably similar universe in which they win.
Quote from: Malthus on January 12, 2016, 12:32:25 PM
Quote from: The Minsky Moment on January 12, 2016, 11:46:56 AM
Quote from: Berkut on January 09, 2016, 02:32:50 AM
One of the reasons I don't buy the "Germany was doomed" argument is that the idea of the war being drawn out longer is almost a non-started as far as the Soviets are concerned.. . .
Now, this likely just results in the Western allies doing more while the Soviets do less, but it is really hard to specualte with any great accuracy what the follow on effects of this counter-factual might be. Does Italy hold out longer with a little more German help? Are the Western Allies a bit more hesitant to invade, given moderately less Soviet success, and hence moderately greater German ability to defend Western Europe?
The inevitability thesis is based on the huge disparity of resources - human, material, and technological - between the Allies as a whole on the one hand and Germany on the other hand. So just increasing Soviet casualty rates counterfactually might slow the allied advances in the east and lead to the various effects you suggest, but at best is just buys more time. Eventually the resource disparity would tell. It would take a much more extensive set of counterfactual assumptions to alter the end result.
Way I've seen it expressed is that Germany could have won earlier in a counterfactual, but could never have won later. ;) In that, the only hope Germany had of winning was if Hitler's 'kick the door in and the whole rotten edifice collapses' theory actually proved true - when it didn't, drawing Germany into a long war, they were indeed screwed, sooner or later. Decisions made by the Germans may have drawn the whole thing out longer and caused even more suffering, of course, but there was no reasonably similar universe in which they win.
I don't disagree with this, as long we hypothesize that there was no way the West was going to alter their approach regardless of Soviet participation.
However, I don't think a counter-factual involving some kind of separate peace or armistice with the USSR is out of the question, assuming moderately greater than historical German success.
That raises another question oft debated:
Was historical German success, overall, vastly greater than what could reasonably be expected, about what could reasonable be expected, or considerably less than what could reasonably be expected?
From a gaming standpoint, if Turn 1 of our game is the first year of the war, did they roll well on the CRT overall, or poorly, or average? Most people seem to think that their results were pretty incredible, and expecting relatively more is not reasonable - which suggests that my counter-factual is less likely, of course.