Glantz, or the reliability of Stalin-era Soviet reports on the Eastern Front

[Berkut]

I would characterize the invasion of France and Norway as high risk, high return operations.  Barbarossa certainly was.  The Polish operation was risky since it relied on France not doing anything and the Czech Crisis was big gamble.

Those are all strategic decisions, not operational. And even at the strategic level, your point is facile. Explaining German military success as "Gosh, they just got lucky with high risk operations that happened to work out in most cases!" just illustrates how little you understand why and how the Germans did what they did, and why they failed in the end.

I'm not a history major, but it does seem that Germans got especially lucky with the incompetence of their enemies early in the war.  Attacking Poland and hoping that France wouldn't attack at the same time in the west is something I might try in EU3 against AI, and reload if it doesn't work out.

I don't think the Germans were counting on the French not attacking, they were counting on the French not being able to succeed even if they did attack.

And it's not like it took Nostradamus to figure out that France was not going to attack in any kind of force. The French government at the time had no incentive to go smashing into Germany, and their military was in no condition to do so either, and everyone knew it. AFter Munich, I think the German High Command was confident that they could hold the Siegfried line against any reasonably expected French attack.

Was it a risk? I suppose. But it wasn't some kind of crazy gamble. Germany knew they would smash Poland with Soviet help, and worst case scenario they have interior lines to return their army back to the West very quickly. With the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the "risk" associated with the Poland operation was almost completely removed.

[Razgovory]

The Siegfried line wasn't even finished.  And even when it was, it wasn't very useful.  How many soldiers did Germany have on the Western Front?  How many tanks, artillery and planes were there?  How many French?  The French did attack there in 1914.  I'm not sure if it's a safe bet that they wouldn't do so again.

[Drakken]

The Siegfried line wasn't even finished.  And even when it was, it wasn't very useful.  How many soldiers did Germany have on the Western Front?  How many tanks, artillery and planes were there?  How many French?  The French did attack there in 1914.  I'm not sure if it's a safe bet that they wouldn't do so again.

France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and civil society was bitterly divided between left and right, and from rabid anti-fascism to defeatism, and even welcoming the enemy in. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.

And France did not attack in 1914, they got attacked. You know, the Schlieffen plan through Belgium?

[Berkut]

France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and society was bitterly divided between left and right, and anti-fascism and defeatism. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.

Well, they certainly got what they wished, didn't they?

[Drakken]

France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and society was bitterly divided between left and right, and anti-fascism and defeatism. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.

Well, they certainly got what they wished, didn't they?

Hence why these collaborated so thoroughly and willfully in Vichy France, and in part why France, when Petain arrived in power, was the only country invaded by Germany who actually officially gave up the fight.

[Berkut]

France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and society was bitterly divided between left and right, and anti-fascism and defeatism. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.

Well, they certainly got what they wished, didn't they?

Hence why these collaborated so thoroughly and willfully in Vichy France, and in part why France, when Petain arrived in power, was the only country invaded by Germany who actually officially gave up the fight.

Interesting. I will admit I don't know much of the particulars of the French lack of interest in fighting WW2, just kind of know that they didn't have the cultural or political will/unity necessary. And more importantly, the Germans knew it as well.

I think the real shock for Hitler and the Germans was not that France was not willing to fight, but that England WAS willing to fight, even after Poland, the Low Countries, Norway, and France had all been beaten. I still say that is one of the "great moments" in cultural history, when the Brits basically said "Fuck you, we aren't quitting even if it does seem completely insane to keep fighting! Lets see you get across the Channel!".

Of course, I am just a German fanboy, so what do I know?

[Ed Anger]

I'm Adolf Hitler reborn. According to web quizzes.

[Ideologue]

I generally agree with Berkut on this.  People tend to rate Hitler and the Nazi leadership rather poorly as strategic thinkers, given how successful they were.*  It's strange.

Not that there weren't major, major mistakes.  Raz identified one (the failure to fully mobilize the economy for war), and there are others (the racism, particularly in the treatment of Ukrainians, the desire for a surface fleet, the belief that the Luftwaffe was equipped for terror bombing, the insane insistence that everything should dive bomb).  But even Alexander and Napoleon made major strategic mistakes, and no one calls them buffoons.  The desire to villify and denigrate the Nazis (especially on the part of, ahem, Wehrmacht generals both concerned for their own glory and in many cases complicit in their crimes--hi Guderian), while understandable, is something I'm not sure holds up to scrutiny.

*Well, in the short-term.  It's also important to remember that Germany was facing three nations each stronger than itself.  And it was very close to destroying one of them, and arguably came close to knocking another one out of the war.  I suppose one can argue that a smart person would have been contented with the massive concessions made and never gone to war in the first place.

[Razgovory]

The Siegfried line wasn't even finished.  And even when it was, it wasn't very useful.  How many soldiers did Germany have on the Western Front?  How many tanks, artillery and planes were there?  How many French?  The French did attack there in 1914.  I'm not sure if it's a safe bet that they wouldn't do so again.

France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and civil society was bitterly divided between left and right, and from rabid anti-fascism to defeatism, and even welcoming the enemy in. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.

And France did not attack in 1914, they got attacked. You know, the Schlieffen plan through Belgium?

They did launch an offensive in 1914.  It was a terrible failure.  They also launched a minor offensive in 1939, but gave up pretty quickly.  A bold strike could have captured the vital Saar region, which would have hurt German industry, and forced any German operation against the French to force them out first.

[Berkut]

I just don't understand the desire to dismiss what Germany did as facilely as "they got lucky". I mean...that is just plain boring. Why would anyone want history to be so insipid?

Germany conquered most of Europe because they kept rolling the 6/1 split on the CRT on low odds attacks? Seriously, THAT is your explanation?

[Valmy]

France in 1940 wasn't France of 1914. For one, there was no Union Nationale government and civil society was bitterly divided between left and right, and from rabid anti-fascism to defeatism, and even welcoming the enemy in. Quite a few high-placed people both in civilian and military not only didn't want France to fight Germany, but to wish for a disaster to give an excuse to kick the Socialists out.

Well it was compounded by the fact that, incredibly, the Comintern in France was pro-German because of the Nazi-Soviet pact.  Then mysteriously the Commies in France decided the war against Germany was ok sometime in 1941.

While there were certainly right wing nutcases in France I think they only came up with the idea of using the defeat the reform the country along Franco-fascist lines once the war was lost.  At first there was alot of enthusiasm for the project but over time the fascist French got disillusioned when it became clear the Germans had no interest in a strong French Fascist state.  I am not sure they were actively trying to undermine the war effort before then though.

[Valmy]

They did launch an offensive in 1914.  It was a terrible failure.  They also launched a minor offensive in 1939, but gave up pretty quickly.  A bold strike could have captured the vital Saar region, which would have hurt German industry, and forced any German operation against the French to force them out first.

Gamelin never wanted to attack at all.  He thought that time was on the Allies side and a British Blockade and resources from the empires would allow them to win.  So he pretended to attack but only because Reynaud was putting pressure on him to.

But really capturing the Saar wouldn't have done much besides create an indefensible salient for the outnumbered French to defend.  The strike would have needed to be a bit more bold than that.

[Razgovory]

I just don't understand the desire to dismiss what Germany did as facilely as "they got lucky". I mean...that is just plain boring. Why would anyone want history to be so insipid?

Germany conquered most of Europe because they kept rolling the 6/1 split on the CRT on low odds attacks? Seriously, THAT is your explanation?

See, I don't look at through the lens of a wargame.  Perhaps that's why we differ

[Malthus]

I generally agree with Berkut on this.  People tend to rate Hitler and the Nazi leadership rather poorly as strategic thinkers, given how successful they were.*  It's strange.

Not that there weren't major, major mistakes.  Raz identified one (the failure to fully mobilize the economy for war), and there are others (the racism, particularly in the treatment of Ukrainians, the desire for a surface fleet, the belief that the Luftwaffe was equipped for terror bombing, the insane insistence that everything should dive bomb).  But even Alexander and Napoleon made major strategic mistakes, and no one calls them buffoons.  The desire to villify and denigrate the Nazis (especially on the part of, ahem, Wehrmacht generals both concerned for their own glory and in many cases complicit in their crimes--hi Guderian), while understandable, is something I'm not sure holds up to scrutiny.

*Well, in the short-term.  It's also important to remember that Germany was facing three nations each stronger than itself.  And it was very close to destroying one of them, and arguably came close to knocking another one out of the war.  I suppose one can argue that a smart person would have been contented with the massive concessions made and never gone to war in the first place.

They were horrible strategic thinkers in that they lost all sense of having reasonable, limited goals as the war progressed, in a classic case of supreme hubris. The longer the war went on, the worse the quality of decision-making.

Declaring war on the Soviets was barely justifiable as an extreme gamble, considering that the Nazis had at least some reason to believe that the Soviet system was tottering to a fall. In contrast, declaring war on the US made no freaking sense at all.

[Drakken]

Interesting. I will admit I don't know much of the particulars of the French lack of interest in fighting WW2, just kind of know that they didn't have the cultural or political will/unity necessary. And more importantly, the Germans knew it as well.

I'll be clear, not everyone welcomed the Germans with open arms, but some did, like the people affiliated or sympathisers to the Action Française, or to the Croix-de-Feu, who were full blown right-wing fascist-leaning groups with quite a few eminent intellectual like Maurras and Brasillach. They had their newspapers with big tirages (over a million) and their networks of supporters. Contrarily to what Valmy says, they weren't a fringe group. During the IIIrd Republic they were a sizeable force to be reckoned with.

The vast majority of people were aghast, it's not by accident that the streets of Paris was nigh-on empty when they paraded. Those who wanted to fight them fought them hard (not all French units gave up the fight like cowards, numbers in the lower rank soldiers were rather left-leaning and sympathetic to the Socialist cause, and quite a few fought fanatically to stop the Germans), and then either fled to fight from the colonies or went into the maquis. But until the Germans attacked the main idea about this war is that it'll be resolved politically and there was no reason to bleed white again for some god-forsaken "ally" in the East.

The "human resource" problem was the divided ranks in the officer corps and the political leadership. For each Paul Reynaud, who wanted to keep fighting until the end, there was a Maréchal Pétain who prefered fighting the Communists rather than Hitler. For them, the enemy was Russia and its Internationale, and fighting Hitler was in fact doing Stalin's bidding.

Even within the Vichy Regime, not everyone was rabidly pro-Nazi. Some were full-blown collaborators and Nazi sycophants, either politically or intellectually, like Joseph Darnand or Robert Brasillach. Others, like Pierre Laval or Henri Giraud, genuinely believed (or wanted to be believed) that the Vichy Regime was the legitimate continuation of France and that France was playing to preserve its independence toward Hitler.