Glantz, or the reliability of Stalin-era Soviet reports on the Eastern Front

[11B4V]

I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.

[Drakken]

I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.

It saved Germany army from complete collapse in the winter of 41-42, yes. Their equipment was frozen and badly in need of winter maintenance. However, it was that same success that convinced Hitler that he knew instinctively better than his own generals. From then, standing fast regardless of the situation and preventing his subordinates to exercise operational flexibility when on the defensive proved disastrous. Hence, my comment.

[Berkut]

I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army.

I've never really understood this argument from a theoretical level.

If the Soviet army was tactically and operationally inept, how does a stand fast order "save" the German Army?

After all, absent such an order, it's not like the German operational commanders could not choose to hold in place if that was the appropriate stance to take in some particular location.

What could possibly be the benefit of a straight out, no flexibility, purely political order that ties the hands of the field commanders to react with nuance to this tactically and operationally inept opponent?

[Berkut]

I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.

It saved Germany army from complete collapse in the winter of 41-42, yes.

I don't buy the claim that the German Army was in any real danger of "collapse" in the winter of 41-42.

This thinking is, again, a symptom of the common East Front thinking that portrays the Soviet Army capapbilities as irrelevant to the discussion - like the fate of the German army during the winter is completely a matter of what Germany chose to do.

Quite simply, the Red Army during that winter lacked the ability to cause a collapse of the German army, standfast order or not.

I still refuse to accept the claim that any kind of "one size fits all" political direction from high command could possibly be better than leaving it up to the field commanders to react appropriately (which of course might include a hold in place order in some cases, and hence include any possible local benefit the "standfast" order could actually have).

[Berkut]

I think it depends on how you define "winning".

Also, the discussion seems to leave out the Soviets - as if Germanies chances were only dependent on what Germany did, or did not do. The Germans could have executed better, and the Soviets could have executed worse.

I don't think it was within a reasonable set of outcomes for Germany to conuer the USSR. I do think it is possible that the outcome could have been much more nuanced than it was (utter defeat for Germany).

It's a good question : What, short of taking Leningrad, Moscow, and Rostov/Kharkov/Don Basin, would constitute "winning" for Germany in 1941? What could a "reasonable" Hitler ask for a peace treaty he if sued for it in early 1942?

I'd say that in real life, Germany had a minor advantage`by early 1942. It was able to bite and hold the ground despite Soviet winter counterattacks in the Center, avoiding a complete collapse of the front. Leningrad was besieged, the Axis still held the initiative, but there was so much reserve left for one local major offensive. The Red Army was simply not ready to launch a coordinated offensive without marching itself on its own feet, and Moscow was still techically under threat. However Germany's economy was  woefully left unprepared for war and no strategic reserve was left for a second push - it would have taken a major reorganization as soon as later 1941 to put Germany's production to a war footing for late 1942 at best.

Germany's best chance of a favourable peace would be inside this window - Winter to Summer 1942. But then, do what next? Had alt-Hitler not had this fixated idea of no retreat and allowed his commanders to do what they were trained to do - initiative and defensive flexibility - the war could have drawn out a lot longer.

One of the reasons I don't buy the "Germany was doomed" argument is that the idea of the war being drawn out longer is almost a non-started as far as the Soviets are concerned.

Hisotrically, by 1945 they were bled white. Of course, historically the Germans were even worse.

So if we posit a war that has (from 1941 on) some lower level of Germany losses, and higher level of Soviet losses, we reach a point where the Soviets simply run out of men to put into uniform. Historically, this happened - but of course the Germans ran out of men even earlier.

So to my thinking, it is not hard to imagine a situation with moderately different loss ratios that sees the Soviets running out of bodies a bit earlier, Germany being able to hold on a bit longer, and both sides becoming so exhausted that offensive action becomes impossible, even late in the war.

Now, this likely just results in the Western allies doing more while the Soviets do less, but it is really hard to specualte with any great accuracy what the follow on effects of this counter-factual might be. Does Italy hold out longer with a little more German help? Are the Western Allies a bit more hesitant to invade, given moderately less Soviet success, and hence moderately greater German ability to defend Western Europe?

I don't pretend to know - maybe none of it would matter. Maybe it all just means that the Germans get to enjoy watching their cities disappear in mushroom clouds in late 1945.

But I think the "Germany was doomed" argument is just the typical history "easy answer" that tends to argue that what DID happen is what HAD to happen. Sometimes that is the case (I am very content arguing for example that there was no probably set of circumstances that would see a Southern win in the USCW or any way for Japan to defeat the US), but often the set of possible outcomes is based on a huge number of variables which people tend to assume afterwards were more like constants.

For example, how close was the Soviet political structure to collapse? It did NOT collapse, so most historians assume it wasn't close. But how can we be sure?

[11B4V]

I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.

It saved Germany army from complete collapse in the winter of 41-42, yes. Their equipment was frozen and badly in need of winter maintenance. However, it was that same success that convinced Hitler that he knew instinctively better than his own generals. From then, standing fast regardless of the situation and preventing his subordinates to exercise operational flexibility when on the defensive proved disastrous. Hence, my comment.

Bottom line is, the German army was never capable large scale mobile defense in Russia. Even though they had the maneuver space for it. Even if the generals had complete operational flexibility and initiative.

[Berkut]

I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.

It saved Germany army from complete collapse in the winter of 41-42, yes. Their equipment was frozen and badly in need of winter maintenance. However, it was that same success that convinced Hitler that he knew instinctively better than his own generals. From then, standing fast regardless of the situation and preventing his subordinates to exercise operational flexibility when on the defensive proved disastrous. Hence, my comment.

Bottom line is, the German army was never capable large scale mobile defense in Russia. Even though they had the maneuver space for it. Even if the generals had complete operational flexibility and initiative.

If you mean they lacked the transport capability, I can certainly agree with that. Their mobile formations were potent, but always a small fraction of their combat power.

Of course, for most of the war the Soviet Army lacked and large scale capability for mobile offensive warfare as well, so this wasn't THAT large of a problem.

[11B4V]

I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army.

I've never really understood this argument from a theoretical level.

If the Soviet army was tactically and operationally inept, how does a stand fast order "save" the German Army?

After all, absent such an order, it's not like the German operational commanders could not choose to hold in place if that was the appropriate stance to take in some particular location.

What could possibly be the benefit of a straight out, no flexibility, purely political order that ties the hands of the field commanders to react with nuance to this tactically and operationally inept opponent?

Not theoretical at all.

In short the German army wanted to retreat/withdraw. Problem is they didn't have the maneuvering capability. They were past the end of their limits. So with the standfast order the German operational commanders used a strong point type defense or hedgehog. Which allowed the Russian offensive to eventually peter out and lose momentum. The Russians were tactically and operationally inept and at that point in the campaign could not manuever/coordinate units effectively. They could use sledgehammer tactics and hammer away at great cost which they could sustain in the long run.. Do you know why the Russians abolished the tank/mech divisions and corps in late 1941?

The Russians knew what they wanted to do strategically, but could not really effectively do it. Had the 1941 Russian army been the mid to late 1943 army, the Germans would have genuinely had a defeat on their hands. It seems you don't have very good grasp of the plight the German army was in the winter of 41-42.

[11B4V]

I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army. It's a common falsehood to think the German army was capable of a large scale mobile defensive warfare. Their army didn't have the capability equipment wise, a know fact.

It saved Germany army from complete collapse in the winter of 41-42, yes. Their equipment was frozen and badly in need of winter maintenance. However, it was that same success that convinced Hitler that he knew instinctively better than his own generals. From then, standing fast regardless of the situation and preventing his subordinates to exercise operational flexibility when on the defensive proved disastrous. Hence, my comment.

Bottom line is, the German army was never capable large scale mobile defense in Russia. Even though they had the maneuver space for it. Even if the generals had complete operational flexibility and initiative.

If you mean they lacked the transport capability, I can certainly agree with that. Their mobile formations were potent, but always a small fraction of their combat power.

Of course, for most of the war the Soviet Army lacked and large scale capability for mobile offensive warfare as well, so this wasn't THAT large of a problem.

Oh the German panzer corps were potent until early 45 to be sure.

A very good read is a memoir by a German officer named Hermann Balck just recently translated. He was assigned as General of Mobile Forces at OKH during Barbarossa. He gives a good description of the Germans lack of transportation, supply problems, and lack of comanality of transportation assets.

The Russians from mid 1943 onward, could pick the time and place for major operations and the Germans had to
react and the Russians could do it at several places at once. It was a HUGHE problem.

[11B4V]

I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army.

What could possibly be the benefit of a straight out, no flexibility, purely political order that ties the hands of the field commanders to react with nuance to this tactically and operationally inept opponent?

The German army survived intact in the winter of 41-42 did it not. Bruised to be sure, and could not conduct a theater wide offensive in 42. The sustained damage showed at the launch of Operation Blue. As did the damage from Stalingrad showed in the German 1943 summer offensive. The German strategic offensives in 41, 42, and 43 were scaled down each of those years. This showed dwindling strategic initiative for the germans and the opposite for the Russians.

Here's a quote from a memoir and any level headed assessment will be the same.

On 30 December I was back in Rastenburg and the following day I briefed Hitler. It took more than two hours, during which time Hitler hardly spoke. He only occasionally asked a question. I pleaded with Hitler not to withdraw under any circumstances. Operations were completely impossible in the snow that was two meters deep, and in the -58 degree Fahrenheit weather, river crossings and the building of positions were impossible anywhere. This was a crisis that could not be solved operationally. Front lines were being held wherever we could manage to get just one tank and twenty men to one decisive point after days and days of trying. The demand to hold under such conditions might sound brutal, but in reality it was the greatest clemency.

That is from one of the best (arguably "the best") panzer division/corps commanders the Germans had. Keep thinking the Germans could have conducted an orderly withdrawal, mobile defense, or mobile whatever in the winter of 41-42.I will respectfully disagree with such a fantasy. It wasnt possible or feasible.

[11B4V]

Anywho, Drakken I can't remember if it's the book you got or When Titans Clashed that has one of two favorite glantz quotes "the Russian and German armies of Dec41 were that of two "punch-drunk boxers, staying precariously on their feet ..."

The other being, "What Rotmistrov failed to remember was the bulk of the burning tanks on the Prokhorovka battlefield were Russian."

[jimmy olsen]

It seems weird to me to claim that Germany had no chance against Russia in WW2 when they beat Russia in WW1.

How is it weird, Russia was much stronger and Germany much weaker at this point in time.

[jimmy olsen]

But I think the "Germany was doomed" argument is just the typical history "easy answer" that tends to argue that what DID happen is what HAD to happen. Sometimes that is the case (I am very content arguing for example that there was no probably set of circumstances that would see a Southern win in the USCW or any way for Japan to defeat the US), but often the set of possible outcomes is based on a huge number of variables which people tend to assume afterwards were more like constants.

For example, how close was the Soviet political structure to collapse? It did NOT collapse, so most historians assume it wasn't close. But how can we be sure?

You think there was no way that Britain or France could have gotten involved?

[The Brain]

It seems weird to me to claim that Germany had no chance against Russia in WW2 when they beat Russia in WW1.

How is it weird, Russia was much stronger and Germany much weaker at this point in time.

I don't see a reason to believe that the chance had moved all the way to zero.

[grumbler]

I would disagree with your last paragraph. The standfast in the winter of 41-42, actually saved the German army from disaster against a tactically and operationally inept red army.

I've never really understood this argument from a theoretical level.

If the Soviet army was tactically and operationally inept, how does a stand fast order "save" the German Army?

After all, absent such an order, it's not like the German operational commanders could not choose to hold in place if that was the appropriate stance to take in some particular location.

What could possibly be the benefit of a straight out, no flexibility, purely political order that ties the hands of the field commanders to react with nuance to this tactically and operationally inept opponent?

Actually, in the absence of the stand fast order the German commanders would have attempted to retreat (as, indeed, they did before the stand fast order) and would have been cut to pieces in the attempt (as, indeed, they were when they attempted retreat before the stand fast order).  The stand fast order essentially ordered German units to sacrifice themselves in place rather than attempting to execute a doctrine that was hopelessly inadequate to the circumstances.  The field commanders didn't understand how out of their league they were, because they had never encountered the conditions they faced in the Winter of '41-'42.