Glantz, or the reliability of Stalin-era Soviet reports on the Eastern Front

[Razgovory]

Is there reason to believe that internal Soviet ones are less so?

Yes.

What reason?

[11B4V]

Glantz is not all that "pro-soviet". He does tell the story from the Soviet side, which hasn't been done much in Western histories, so I think he comes across as being pro-Soviet, but he is hyper-critical of the Soviets in many, many cases.

Very true, Berkut

[The Minsky Moment]

Raz has a point, although a narrow one.  The general scholarly view with respect to Soviet economic planning (including defense) is that the bureaucracy did a reasonably good job of at least attempting to record information accurately.  This was of obvious importance to a planned system, and as it turns out the Soviets didn't keep "double book" -- if it was desired to keep certain information confidential, it simply was censored from all but the most confidential circulations (this might explain the absence of the tank info).  There were problems with lower level functionaries trying to fiddle with figures to hide deficiencies and make themselves look good, although the central control commissions made real efforts to clamp down on that.  Perhaps a bigger problem was a shortage of qualified functionaries to keep up with the work.  That and the chaos engendered by the rapid German advance is probably a bigger contributor to problems in Soviet records than outright efforts at falsification.

On the flip side, I can't think of any good reason to place serious doubt on the accuracy of contemporaneous German military record-keeping, at least until late into 1944.  the German military had efficient and diligent bureaucrats and the German penchant for record-keeping is a national stereotype.

[Berkut]

When it comes to the accuracy of German sources, I think it's important to make a distinction as to which "German sources" you mean.  As Berkut points out, official records are quite extensive and generally accurate (though not completely exhaustive nor 100% accurate).  But if you're talking about the reams of documents generated by the Allied debriefing of captured German officers, you can't take stuff there at face value.  The captured officers had major incentives to blame both German battlefield reverses and atrocities commited by German forces solely on Hitler and the Nazis as much as possible.  And of course memoirs that were written by them suffer from the same problems.

Indeed. I thought I made that clear, but perhaps not.

If Nazi General vonLiesAlot says he did X, Y, and Z on dates A, B, and C, you can go check the copies of the actual orders issued to his command and subordinates on those dates, because the effing Germans probably filled them all out in triplicate and filed them in 3 different places.

The Soviets were not nearly as meticulous in their record keeping. Hell, I don't know that anyone was, except maybe for the Americans.

[Berkut]

On the flip side, I can't think of any good reason to place serious doubt on the accuracy of contemporaneous German military record-keeping, at least until late into 1944.  the German military had efficient and diligent bureaucrats and the German penchant for record-keeping is a national stereotype.

Indeed. My point is a generalization, of course, and hence must be taken as such. There are certainly going to be particular exceptions to that generalization.

The Soviets simply did not have the sophisticated "middle-management" staff system that the Germans did, especially in the early and mid war periods. Early war was chaos, and mid war the best staff officers were being shoved into command slots as fast as possible. By the late war, the Soviet operational command structure had solidified greatly, of course, and late war records keeping improved immensely, as the Soviets adopted and perfected their own operational staff structure.

[Berkut]

Glantz really does a great job of going over some of this in Colossus Reborn, actually. I don't think people really appreciate just how thoroughly the Germans destroyed the Soviet command structure at the outbreak of the war, and then did it again later that summer.

Which is really what is so incredibly impressive about the way the Soviets ended up winning that war. They basically had to start over from  nearly from scratch, not just in actual forces and equipment, but in their operational command structure as well, since what they had failed so spectacularly. Just figuring out how to put units together in a workable manner was a monumental task, even in peacetime, much less doing so in war.

Hell, a simple example is just looking at the evolution of Soviet mechanized divisions/corps throughout the first two years of war.

[Razgovory]

On the flip side, I can't think of any good reason to place serious doubt on the accuracy of contemporaneous German military record-keeping, at least until late into 1944.  the German military had efficient and diligent bureaucrats and the German penchant for record-keeping is a national stereotype.

The Germans had a reputation for record keeping, but the Nazis were notoriously slap dash in administration.  Besides, they lost the war and lots of documents were likely lost or destroyed in the chaos.

[Razgovory]

Glantz really does a great job of going over some of this in Colossus Reborn, actually. I don't think people really appreciate just how thoroughly the Germans destroyed the Soviet command structure at the outbreak of the war, and then did it again later that summer.

Which is really what is so incredibly impressive about the way the Soviets ended up winning that war. They basically had to start over from  nearly from scratch, not just in actual forces and equipment, but in their operational command structure as well, since what they had failed so spectacularly. Just figuring out how to put units together in a workable manner was a monumental task, even in peacetime, much less doing so in war.

Hell, a simple example is just looking at the evolution of Soviet mechanized divisions/corps throughout the first two years of war.

I actually get the opposite impression.  I find it strange the Germans got as far as they did.  Germany was badly, badly run.  It didn't even gear up to full war production until '43.  It's economy was a house of cards.  German victories were often the result of high risk, high return gambits.  I find it amazing that these knotheads were able to conquer most of Europe.

[Berkut]

Glantz really does a great job of going over some of this in Colossus Reborn, actually. I don't think people really appreciate just how thoroughly the Germans destroyed the Soviet command structure at the outbreak of the war, and then did it again later that summer.

Which is really what is so incredibly impressive about the way the Soviets ended up winning that war. They basically had to start over from  nearly from scratch, not just in actual forces and equipment, but in their operational command structure as well, since what they had failed so spectacularly. Just figuring out how to put units together in a workable manner was a monumental task, even in peacetime, much less doing so in war.

Hell, a simple example is just looking at the evolution of Soviet mechanized divisions/corps throughout the first two years of war.

I actually get the opposite impression.  I find it strange the Germans got as far as they did.  Germany was badly, badly run.  It didn't even gear up to full war production until '43.  It's economy was a house of cards.  German victories were often the result of high risk, high return gambits.  I find it amazing that these knotheads were able to conquer most of Europe.

German victories were not at all the result of high risk, high return gambles - they had too many of them for such a facile explanation.

I imagine if I could not understand why the German military machine worked in the manner it did despite the often poor strategic leadership, I would find their success "amazing" as well.

There is nothing mysterious about how the Germans got as far as they did. It is a ridiculously thoroughly studied historical occurrence. Do a little reading, and you won't be so bewildered anymore.

[Razgovory]

I would characterize the invasion of France and Norway as high risk, high return operations.  Barbarossa certainly was.  The Polish operation was risky since it relied on France not doing anything and the Czech Crisis was big gamble.

[Berkut]

I would characterize the invasion of France and Norway as high risk, high return operations.  Barbarossa certainly was.  The Polish operation was risky since it relied on France not doing anything and the Czech Crisis was big gamble.

Those are all strategic decisions, not operational. And even at the strategic level, your point is facile. Explaining German military success as "Gosh, they just got lucky with high risk operations that happened to work out in most cases!" just illustrates how little you understand why and how the Germans did what they did, and why they failed in the end.

[Razgovory]

Uh, huh.  Whatever, German fanboy.

[DGuller]

I would characterize the invasion of France and Norway as high risk, high return operations.  Barbarossa certainly was.  The Polish operation was risky since it relied on France not doing anything and the Czech Crisis was big gamble.

Those are all strategic decisions, not operational. And even at the strategic level, your point is facile. Explaining German military success as "Gosh, they just got lucky with high risk operations that happened to work out in most cases!" just illustrates how little you understand why and how the Germans did what they did, and why they failed in the end.

I'm not a history major, but it does seem that Germans got especially lucky with the incompetence of their enemies early in the war.  Attacking Poland and hoping that France wouldn't attack at the same time in the west is something I might try in EU3 against AI, and reload if it doesn't work out.

[Berkut]

Uh, huh.  Whatever, German fanboy.

You are, if nothing else, consistent.

As am I - I consistently forget why I don't respond to you, and then you consistently remind me.

[Razgovory]

Uh, huh.  Whatever, German fanboy.

You are, if nothing else, consistent.

As am I - I consistently forget why I don't respond to you, and then you consistently remind me.

I do respond rudely when I talked to insultingly.  I am consistent in this, that is true.  Maybe if you weren't such a goddamn ass, I wouldn't call you names.