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Richelieu:
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fupload.wikimedia.org%2Fwikipedia%2Fcommons%2Fb%2Fbc%2FRichelieu-1.jpg&hash=0b0a415d25ba8b610a9d3acfb163d2f28bf69937)

Bismarck:
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.secondworldwarhistory.com%2Fimgs%2Fkms_bismarck.jpg&hash=8c5abd2a8c4b74343a389896f4d17124d93c1c1c)

Littorio:
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.regiamarina.net%2Farsenals%2Fships_it%2Fbattleships%2Fdrawings%2Flittorio_class.jpg&hash=7cbd0858bb36eb223bc350665026903ce3224bee)

Yamato:
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fcombinedfleet.com%2Fyampic01.jpg&hash=460691f3bcd188c4c62a93128fc8254871fca99a)

Vanguard:
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.chuckhawks.com%2Fvanguard.jpg&hash=c0eb761558a7d154535cc4233b1423a80f2acb51)

Iowa:
(https://languish.org/forums/proxy.php?request=http%3A%2F%2Faboutfacts.net%2FWeapons%26amp%3BWar%2FWeapons50%2Fia-1957inrIowa.jpg&hash=48581690d664de2fb46db606642aa3412444a37e)

Musashi?

Vanguard has by far the best-looking hull, but its turrets are so small compared to her size that she doesn't quite "work."

Yamato's wavy hull ruins her look.

Iowa's bow is too long - makes her look lopsided.  She has the best superstructure, though.

VV's after turrets is one deck too high - it makes it look like something is missing on the quarterdeck.

Richelieu is simply unattractive in general.

Bismarck isn't the best at anything, but is balanced and lacks serious flaws, and thus the most attractive.

Uhmmm... I happen to like wavy hulls if the effect is not excessive.

For me the best looking is Yamato, closely followed by Bismarck and Iowa almost tied. If forced to choose, Bismarck 2nd, Iowa 3rd.

I agree with Grumbler, Vittorio Veneto's stern is plain ugly.

And both Vanguard and Richelieu could have used better concept art, specially Richelieu doesn't seem French (come on, guys, you are supposed to be the best at design and fashion!)

Actually, I think I prefer the Yamato's overall superstructure to the Iowa's, although I really like the window bank on the bridge of the Iowa.    Yamato looks very sleek, even moreso than most Japanese ships.  I also agree that Vanguard would look a lot better with triple or quad turrets.  Richelieu has all those empty spaces on her, an unusual armament layout and a weird, ugly quarterdeck.  As for the Littorios, I always wondered why they put the after turret up so high.  Seems to me it would have made more sense to move the aft seconaries forward a bit.  Bismarck looks fast and mean, although less so than Yamato in my opinion.

I must disagree - Vanguard has by far the most aesthetically pleasing superstructure. I liked the look of this style on the rebuilds of the Queen Elizabeths' as well.

I can't disagree about the armament though, even if I am a fan of the 15"/42 in general.

(1) Vanguard.
(2) Bismarck
(3) Yamato
(4) Iowa
(5) Littorio
(6) Richelieu

I've never liked the block superstructure look, preferring the stepped-up look.  If one is to have a block look, I agree that Vanguard's is superior to Yamato's and (especially!) Littorio's. 

1. Bismarck.


Fugliest: Iowa

WHat was the logic of Richileau's armament layout?

Not sure who to vote for, I kinda like the look of the Bismark. And I do like the long bow of the Iowa.

Quote from: Warspite on September 15, 2009, 12:37:40 PM
WHat was the logic of Richileau's armament layout?

Grouping the turrets/magazines like that meant you had to cover less area with the armor belt.

Having all big guns pointing towards the bow was a very aggressive design (true, Nelson class was similar in that aspect but Great Britain had 15 dreadnoughts while France had only 6!). Perhaps the French expected their main mission to be hunting German commerce raiders?   

Ameurika, fuck yea!

Quite fond of the Iowa.

Quote from: grumbler on September 15, 2009, 01:14:35 PM

Quote from: Warspite on September 15, 2009, 12:37:40 PM
WHat was the logic of Richileau's armament layout?

Grouping the turrets/magazines like that meant you had to cover less area with the armor belt.

Although the rear-mounted secondary might lessen that somewhat.

Also, you notice that the turrets in Richelieu and Dunkerque are much farther apart than in Rodney, reducing the chance of a lucky hit taking out your entire main battery.

Came down to Bismark and Iowa for me.  Iowa has generally maintained her beauty, while Bismark is a rusting hulk on the bottom of the ocean.   :P  Voted Iowa.

Quote from: Alatriste on September 15, 2009, 01:50:22 PM
Having all big guns pointing towards the bow was a very aggressive design (true, Nelson class was similar in that aspect but Great Britain had 15 dreadnoughts while France had only 6!). Perhaps the French expected their main mission to be hunting German commerce raiders?

I think it had more to do with weight saving and maintaining a 30 knot top speed, since they had accepted 15" instead of 16" rifles. Don't forget that Richelieu was designed to adhere to the 35000 tonne Washington Treaty limit.

i have a 15'' rifle

I've always been rather partial to the KGVs. I guess Vanguard will do, though I find its lack of quads disturbing.
Yamato gets the honourable mention.

Quote from: Maladict on September 15, 2009, 04:07:48 PM
I've always been rather partial to the KGVs. I guess Vanguard will do, though I find its lack of quads disturbing.

I've always had a sneaking admiration for this particular "Never-Were". It's almost a shame the idea didn't occur to people seventy years ago.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/furashita/magnif_f.htm (http://www.combinedfleet.com/furashita/magnif_f.htm)

Quote from: Agelastus on September 15, 2009, 03:29:29 PM
Don't forget that Richelieu was designed to adhere to the 35000 tonne Washington Treaty limit.

Originally, although the treaty got abandoned somewhere along the way.  Like Littorio and King George V, Richelieu was a third-generation battleship at its heart that got modified and boosted up along the way.

Quote from: Neil on September 15, 2009, 04:42:05 PM
Originally, although the treaty got abandoned somewhere along the way.  Like Littorio and King George V, Richelieu was a third-generation battleship at its heart that got modified and boosted up along the way.

That doesn't change the fact that the fundamental design decisions, such as turret placement, were made at a time when the 35000 tonne limit was being adhered to - yes, she bloated later, but then so did the KGVs and South Dakotas.

Littorio's more like a Bismarck, in my opinion - you know "Designer, here is the treaty tonnage - how much more do you need and think we can get away with?"

Quote from: Agelastus on September 15, 2009, 04:21:38 PM
I've always had a sneaking admiration for this particular "Never-Were". It's almost a shame the idea didn't occur to people seventy years ago.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/furashita/magnif_f.htm (http://www.combinedfleet.com/furashita/magnif_f.htm)

The 14" guns were not nearly good enough to warrant wasting this much effort to get more of them to sea.  The Brits would have been better off cannibalizing Rodney and/or Nelson for 16" turrets.

Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2009, 08:08:22 AM
The 14" guns were not nearly good enough to warrant wasting this much effort to get more of them to sea.  The Brits would have been better off cannibalizing Rodney and/or Nelson for 16" turrets.

That's an interesting question - would one 54000 tonne battleship be cheaper than the two 38000 tonne battleships it replaced in this alternate timeline, or would have replaced had it been thought of in OTL? [The guns were going to sea anyway, of course, in OTL.]

That's why I like it - the guns were going to sea anyway, and I'm a fan of "bigger is better". It's also a heck of a lot more reasonable than some of the other ships on that site!

Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2009, 08:08:22 AM

Quote from: Agelastus on September 15, 2009, 04:21:38 PM
I've always had a sneaking admiration for this particular "Never-Were". It's almost a shame the idea didn't occur to people seventy years ago.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/furashita/magnif_f.htm (http://www.combinedfleet.com/furashita/magnif_f.htm)

The 14" guns were not nearly good enough to warrant wasting this much effort to get more of them to sea.  The Brits would have been better off cannibalizing Rodney and/or Nelson for 16" turrets.

On the other hand, they proved to be adequate for what little was asked of them.

Gotta say I'm actually not a fan of the aesthetics of the Yamato or the Bismarck. Both seem like jumbled piles of guns at weird oblique angles that would look more appropriate in a modern cartoon. Littorio's just downright gawky. Vanguard and Iowa run neck-and-neck in my book, so I think I'll give it to Iowa based on familiarity: http://www.battleshipnewjersey.org/

Quote from: Neil on September 16, 2009, 08:27:03 AM
On the other hand, they proved to be adequate for what little was asked of them.

Excluding the two times they were asked to do what they had been designed to do (attack a ship of similar size and capacity to their own) they failed miserably.  The first time, their buddy-ship died unavenged; the second, their buddy-ship carried the burden of putting down Bismarck pretty much unassisted.

In no action of which I am aware did a single 14" rifle successfully respond to every call for salvo.  Maybe there was a shore bombardment where that happened.

Grumbler: were those two incidents down to the gun itself, or the systems of equipment and drill in which they were integrated?

Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2009, 09:51:31 AM

Quote from: Neil on September 16, 2009, 08:27:03 AM
On the other hand, they proved to be adequate for what little was asked of them.

Excluding the two times they were asked to do what they had been designed to do (attack a ship of similar size and capacity to their own) they failed miserably.  The first time, their buddy-ship died unavenged; the second, their buddy-ship carried the burden of putting down Bismarck pretty much unassisted.

You forgot about the third time, when the Duke of York destroyed the Scharnhorst.  Prince of Wales and KGV participated in their engagements, insofar as it was tactically sound to do so.

QuoteIn no action of which I am aware did a single 14" rifle successfully respond to every call for salvo.  Maybe there was a shore bombardment where that happened.

Wasn't Prince of Wales' B turret the reliable one?  I thought that one operated well during the Denmark Strait engagement.

But yeah, the 14" gun did have some major flaws, although being a 14" gun wasn't one of them.  And the quad mounting exacerbated it.

Quote from: Neil on September 16, 2009, 02:31:29 PM
You forgot about the third time, when the Duke of York destroyed the Scharnhorst. 

Perhaps grumbler does not consider that of "similar size and capacity."

Quote from: The Minsky Moment on September 16, 2009, 03:20:34 PM

Quote from: Neil on September 16, 2009, 02:31:29 PM
You forgot about the third time, when the Duke of York destroyed the Scharnhorst. 

Perhaps grumbler does not consider that of "similar size and capacity."

If he were to say that, then I would say that he can't have it both ways.  If 39,000-ton Scharnhorst was inferior to the 44,000-ton KGVs, then 51,000-ton Bismarck was superior to them, in which case the actions of the KGVs and the Bismarck are no longer a contest between equals.  Scharnhorst was armoured on a similar scale to Duke of York, and her 11" guns were extremely powerful for their size.

Quote from: Neil on September 16, 2009, 03:55:42 PM
If he were to say that, then I would say that he can't have it both ways.  If 39,000-ton Scharnhorst was inferior to the 44,000-ton KGVs, then 51,000-ton Bismarck was superior to them, in which case the actions of the KGVs and the Bismarck are no longer a contest between equals.  Scharnhorst was armoured on a similar scale to Duke of York, and her 11" guns were extremely powerful for their size.

Is there a particular reason you prefer full load to standard displacement?

Not that it makes any difference for your point, of course.

Yamato looks the scariest. 

Quote from: Agelastus on September 16, 2009, 08:16:58 AM

Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2009, 08:08:22 AM
The 14" guns were not nearly good enough to warrant wasting this much effort to get more of them to sea.  The Brits would have been better off cannibalizing Rodney and/or Nelson for 16" turrets.

That's an interesting question - would one 54000 tonne battleship be cheaper than the two 38000 tonne battleships it replaced in this alternate timeline, or would have replaced had it been thought of in OTL? [The guns were going to sea anyway, of course, in OTL.]

That's why I like it - the guns were going to sea anyway, and I'm a fan of "bigger is better". It's also a heck of a lot more reasonable than some of the other ships on that site!

My guess is, the 54,000 tons ship would have been more expensive that two 38,000, because building only one ship of a class is inherently more expensive, and due to the need to modify dry docks and other shore facilities.

Quote from: Agelastus on September 16, 2009, 03:57:54 PM

Quote from: Neil on September 16, 2009, 03:55:42 PM
If he were to say that, then I would say that he can't have it both ways.  If 39,000-ton Scharnhorst was inferior to the 44,000-ton KGVs, then 51,000-ton Bismarck was superior to them, in which case the actions of the KGVs and the Bismarck are no longer a contest between equals.  Scharnhorst was armoured on a similar scale to Duke of York, and her 11" guns were extremely powerful for their size.

Is there a particular reason you prefer full load to standard displacement?

Not that it makes any difference for your point, of course.

Full load is more reliable I find.  I remember hearing about all the things that would be done to get the 'standard' displacement as low as possible, in order to meet the treaty.

That, and I like larger numbers.

True.

I know that N3 and G3 were limited because of the size of Britain's infrastructure to around 49000 tonnes. The trouble is the guy who invented this never-were does not seem to have specified any dimensions, or better yet, simmed it with SpringSharp.

As much as I dearly love the Iowa, and the aesthetics of the Bismarck are pleasing, nothing says Battleship Baddassedness like the Yamato.

Quote from: Warspite on September 16, 2009, 10:03:39 AM
Grumbler: were those two incidents down to the gun itself, or the systems of equipment and drill in which they were integrated?

The combination of gun, mounting, loading system, and turret.  All o0f these would have been present had the "extra" 14" turrets been used on some super-ship designed to cary four of them.been used to

Quote from: Neil on September 16, 2009, 02:31:29 PM
You forgot about the third time, when the Duke of York destroyed the Scharnhorst.  Prince of Wales and KGV participated in their engagements, insofar as it was tactically sound to do so.

I didn't "forget" about the third time, i excluded it through wording.  Bothy ships only particiapted insofar as it was "tactically sound" to do so (which is to say when there was an effective capital ship to occupy the enemy's fire).

QuoteWasn't Prince of Wales' B turret the reliable one?  I thought that one operated well during the Denmark Strait engagement.

But yeah, the 14" gun did have some major flaws, although being a 14" gun wasn't one of them.  And the quad mounting exacerbated it.

Twin 14" turrets were more reliable than quad turrets, though not reliable per se.  Every one of PoW's guns failed at least once in her engagement, as did every one of KGVs in hers, and every one of Duke of York's in hers.  It was a newly-designed gun with a newly-designed mounting in newly-designed turret, and none of those designs were produced by anyone as capable as the designers of the 16" gun, mounting, and turret on the Rodsons.

Yamato for a mistress, Iowa for a wife.

Quote from: Neil on September 16, 2009, 03:55:42 PM
If he were to say that, then I would say that he can't have it both ways.  If 39,000-ton Scharnhorst was inferior to the 44,000-ton KGVs, then 51,000-ton Bismarck was superior to them, in which case the actions of the KGVs and the Bismarck are no longer a contest between equals.  Scharnhorst was armoured on a similar scale to Duke of York, and her 11" guns were extremely powerful for their size.

Note that I said "size and capability."  Had I said "full-load tonnage" you would be correct.

Salvo weights for the three ships make the point clear:
Scharnhorst: 2970 kg
Bismarck: 6400 kg
KGV 7210 kg

"One of these things is not like the other things."

Armor penetration was along similar lines except at close ranges (where the Scharnhorst guns could punch above weight class).

So, you cannot have it both ways.  If ships' capabilities is only to be measured by tonnage, then your mention of armor is irrelevant.  If their capabilities are a mix of offensive and defensive measures, then Scharnhorst is nowhere near the equivalent of the King George V class, though the Bismarck is.

Quote from: Alatriste on September 16, 2009, 04:03:23 PM
My guess is, the 54,000 tons ship would have been more expensive that two 38,000, because building only one ship of a class is inherently more expensive, and due to the need to modify dry docks and other shore facilities.

But the fuel and crew requirements for the two ships are much more than the one.

But the point is that the two ships were built, but aging, and replacing them would not have been in the cards before the late 1930s (still too new) nor during/after the late 1930s (war scare makes every existing ship valuable).  If, hwever, the British felt they needed a fast supership for the Far East, the last thing they would want is one armed with the 14" turrets from a KGV class, so either the 15" twin or 16" triples would have been the only options, with the latter clearly superior.

Duke of York might be a more versatile combatant, but Scharnhorst was still designed to fight dreadnought battleships (albeit French ones) at those relatively close ranges, and it was at around those ranges that North Atlantic battles would frequently be fought.  Scharnhorst was less powerful than Duke of York, but the power of her guns and quality of her armour made the difference less than you might think from just looking at throw weights.  Similarily, Bismarck's powerful guns and heavy armour make it a more powerful ship than the KGV, despite the KGVs superior throw weight.

Grumbler, why do you keep harping on about "extra" turrets - the turrets on that hypothetical ship are from Anson and Howe. In other words, they are not a brilliant choice, but they are already there, and replacing two small ships with one larger ship really does not make a lot of difference given when Anson and Howe were completed historically.

Still, it is only a hypothetical, and I am well aware that such a concept did not cross the Admiralty's mind; doesn't change the fact that it would be an interesting ship for a naval combat simulation.

Yamato... though they all seem pretty similar to me.

Yamato.  There is even a spaceship version of it :contract:

Richelieu class.  :wub: Tres sex-a.

Quote from: Agelastus on September 16, 2009, 09:22:30 PM
Grumbler, why do you keep harping on about "extra" turrets - the turrets on that hypothetical ship are from Anson and Howe.

Why do you keep harping on the fact that i specifically note that these turrets are used because they are deemed surplus to requirments?  You do not actually believe that the British would build such a ship in preference to one with four triple `6" turrets, do you?

QuoteIn other words, they are not a brilliant choice, but they are already there, and replacing two small ships with one larger ship really does not make a lot of difference given when Anson and Howe were completed historically.

And because they are "already there" is why I "harp on" the fact that they are already there.  The new ship could not be designed, bid out, laid down, constructed, and finished anywhere nearly as quickly as Anson and Howe could be just finished, especially because the Anson and Howe's construction was benefiting from lessons learned from building the previous three ships of the class.

QuoteStill, it is only a hypothetical, and I am well aware that such a concept did not cross the Admiralty's mind; doesn't change the fact that it would be an interesting ship for a naval combat simulation.

It is, frankly, a rather silly concept.  While a single larger ship would be cheaper to operate than a pair of smaller ones, it couldn't possibly be designed and built in time to see action in the war (as the Vanguard already showed).  If it was going to be ordered sufficiently far in advance of the war to be finished during the war, then it would be better-built with 16" guns (but then you are just duplicating the Lions on a larger scale, and a better design than this one existed for that already).

Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2009, 11:38:49 PM
Why do you keep harping on the fact that i specifically note that these turrets are used because they are deemed surplus to requirments?  You do not actually believe that the British would build such a ship in preference to one with four triple "16" turrets, do you?

As I've made clear elsewhere, no. However, it is more likely to be built than a ship with triple 16" guns. Incidentally, you are the one who blocked that possibility by debunking the idea of scrapping Nelson and Rodney. :P

Quote from: grumbler on September 16, 2009, 11:38:49 PMAnd because they are "already there" is why I "harp on" the fact that they are already there.  The new ship could not be designed, bid out, laid down, constructed, and finished anywhere nearly as quickly as Anson and Howe could be just finished, especially because the Anson and Howe's construction was benefiting from lessons learned from building the previous three ships of the class.

You are ignoring the real life examples of Renown and Repulse here, are you not? I repeat, the long lead time items for this ship come from a cancelled Anson and Howe. Now, the idea would only occur to the Admiralty if somehow preliminary information regarding Yamato had leaked (and not been fully understood) which is unlikely, but if it was constructed it would be ready considerably quicker than Vanguard. As I said, Anson and Howe did not enter service until 1942, a good couple of years too late anyway. The author of this particular "alt history" has the ship entering service in 1944; however, given in reality the decision to construct such a ship could not be made later than 1939 (early 1940 at the absolute latest), I can easily see an in service date of 1943 for this vessel.

Quote from: Agelastus on September 17, 2009, 05:35:11 AM
As I've made clear elsewhere, no. However, it is more likely to be built than a ship with triple 16" guns.

Why is it more likely to be built than an effective ship with superior weapons?  I would think the opposite is true.

QuoteIncidentally, you are the one who blocked that possibility by debunking the idea of scrapping Nelson and Rodney. :P

Scrapping the Rodson is a likelier outcome than building a ship like this one.

QuoteYou are ignoring the real life examples of Renown and Repulse here, are you not? I repeat, the long lead time items for this ship come from a cancelled Anson and Howe.

I think you are confused here.  Renown and Repulse commissioned in August and September 1916, and Anson and Howe were not even ordered until April of that year.

QuoteNow, the idea would only occur to the Admiralty if somehow preliminary information regarding Yamato had leaked (and not been fully understood) which is unlikely, but if it was constructed it would be ready considerably quicker than Vanguard.

I am not sure why this would be true.  In what year are you postulating this ship being ordered?

QuoteAs I said, Anson and Howe did not enter service until 1942, a good couple of years too late anyway. 

I am not sure what "too late" means in this context.  The Royal navy was were delighted to have Anson and Howe in 1942, and their arrival relieved a great deal of strain in maintaining the watch over Germany's "Fleet in Being." 

QuoteThe author of this particular "alt history" has the ship entering service in 1944; however, given in reality the decision to construct such a ship could not be made later than 1939 (early 1940 at the absolute latest), I can easily see an in service date of 1943 for this vessel.

I don't think the British shipyards were capable of delivering a ship in less than five years from the time of its ordering (particularly a lead ship). 

The real question is how they are going to get 33 knots out of a 55,000-ton, 900+-foot long hull in an affordable manner.  The British wouldn't have the advantage of American powerplant designs, nor could they afford to construct her out of similar materials to the Iowa.

Moreover, because of the additional length in the middle and the additional turret, the added length over th KGV is almost all in the armour belt, which means it would disproportionately add to the displacement.  The Iowas managed because their citadel was relatively short for such a long ship.  Unless this was armoured with on the scale of a Great War battlecruiser, it would be hard to see this working out.

Grumbler, I give up trying to reply point by point with quotes...I just can't do it with the problem I have with the reply box scrolling down for long posts...  :mad:

I'll have to do it, "by the numbers" - sorry.

(1) It's more likely to be built than a ship with 16" guns for two reasons, firstly that the Admiralty will not scrap Nelson and Rodney, and the second is the time required to construct new 16" turrets, the absolute longest lead time item of this sort of warship. I can't even borrow the turrets from the first two Lions given how little progress was made on them by September 1939.

(2) Skipped.

(3) Renown and Repulse were built using materials (ie. guns and armour) already on order for three R class battleships. This allowed them to be completed in less than two years from being laid down to commissioning. When you add the design time, you still don't get much more than two years for these ships. Allowing for wartime delays and the greater size of the hull, assuming the ship is laid down in late 1939/early 1940 I can easily see a completion date of 1943. If you eliminate Anson and Howe and consider the threat the British felt the Japanese represented by 1941, she should avoid some of the delays Vanguard suffered.

(4) The time frame for ordering this ship cannot be later than April 1940 (I do not know when the turrets were actually fitted to Anson and Howe, but given the hulls were launched in February and April 1940 I cannot delay too long.) If information on Yamato is leaked prior to September 1939 then it is quite likely that the Lion's would be redesigned and the plan be to use 16" guns. So I figure I have the period between roughly September 1939 to April 1940 for this sort of ship to be laid down.

(5) By 1942 you have the Bismarck sunk, and the Italian battleline crippled. You have Japan showing the world that the future was carrier aviation, and you have the USN in the war with roughly half its' battleline intact and some very good battleships in service, working up or under construction. If WWII had a "battleship period" it was between June 1940 and December 1941, and Anson and Howe both missed this period (I am not forgetting the Guadalcanal campaign here, but it is a very unlikely permutation that has British battleships involved here.)

(6) See above for the "Renown" contention of the argument. King George V took four years to complete, which if I recall correctly includes a six month period when all work on major warships was stopped because of a crisis in the repair of merchant shipping. If new turrets had to be built (or old turrets modernised, as with Vanguard) I would agree with you, but in this case the ship postulated is using guns and armour originally ordered in 1937.

I got tired of trying to edit the above post. :mad:

Two other thoughts.

(1) Given the original plan was for the 16" triple and the 14" quad to fit the same barbette, an alternative possibility could be that the ship was ordered in place of one of the Lions, but ended up armed with Anson and Howe's quads as a wartime emergency measure.

(2) Could Anson and Howe's hulls have seemed useful to the Admiralty as carriers given the Japanese example of the Kaga and the loss of both the Courageous and Glorious early in the war?

Quote from: Neil on September 17, 2009, 08:32:10 AM
The real question is how they are going to get 33 knots out of a 55,000-ton, 900+-foot long hull in an affordable manner.  The British wouldn't have the advantage of American powerplant designs, nor could they afford to construct her out of similar materials to the Iowa.

I'll be honest, I havent simmed it but I do not see how such a ship would make 33 knots. Apart from the factors you list, it would be contrary to British practise of the time. I suspect if it was simmed the best you could manage would be in the 28-29 knot range.

Quote from: Agelastus on September 17, 2009, 11:36:52 AM
(2) Could Anson and Howe's hulls have seemed useful to the Admiralty as carriers given the Japanese example of the Kaga and the loss of both the Courageous and Glorious early in the war?

Unlikely, given the low priority of fleet carrier aviation in the Atlantic war.  It's more likely that they would scratchbuild the Magnificent as a large carrier.

Quote from: Agelastus on September 17, 2009, 11:33:17 AM
Grumbler, I give up trying to reply point by point with quotes...I just can't do it with the problem I have with the reply box scrolling down for long posts...  :mad:

I had that issue until I just learned to yank the bottom of the window down until the message appeared in a single window.

Quote(1) It's more likely to be built than a ship with 16" guns for two reasons, firstly that the Admiralty will not scrap Nelson and Rodney, and the second is the time required to construct new 16" turrets, the absolute longest lead time item of this sort of warship. I can't even borrow the turrets from the first two Lions given how little progress was made on them by September 1939.

I don't think that the turrets are necessarily that long-lead an item, if you are just duplicating existing designs. As noted below, the turrets for the Renown class were produced very quickly.

Quote(3) Renown and Repulse were built using materials (ie. guns and armour) already on order for three R class battleships. This allowed them to be completed in less than two years from being laid down to commissioning.

They also had an absolute priority on materials, per Fischer.  The guns and turntables for the "R" class Renown and Repulse were, indeed, used, but new turrets were fabricated (since these had not been ordered - the guns and turntables had been ordered as spares in July 1914 when the Renown and Repulse were canceled, and the guns and turntables for Resistance were never ordered). 

QuoteWhen you add the design time, you still don't get much more than two years for these ships.

there was no "design time" for Renown and Repulse.  They were literally designed as they were built.   Even considering that, though, the speed of their construction was remarkable, though in no book I have attributed to the availability of the guns.

QuoteAllowing for wartime delays and the greater size of the hull, assuming the ship is laid down in late 1939/early 1940 I can easily see a completion date of 1943. If you eliminate Anson and Howe and consider the threat the British felt the Japanese represented by 1941, she should avoid some of the delays Vanguard suffered.

I don't see how this applies.  What would this ship have that Vanguard did not?  In nay case, I see absolutely no reason why the British would eliminate two under-construction battleships in favor of an untested design that would further delay getting guns to sea.  I cannot see any rationale for the British to deliberately risk a battleship disaster when Bismarck and Tirpitz finished and the British had so little that could face them.

Quote(4) The time frame for ordering this ship cannot be later than April 1940 (I do not know when the turrets were actually fitted to Anson and Howe, but given the hulls were launched in February and April 1940 I cannot delay too long.) If information on Yamato is leaked prior to September 1939 then it is quite likely that the Lion's would be redesigned and the plan be to use 16" guns. So I figure I have the period between roughly September 1939 to April 1940 for this sort of ship to be laid down.

I understand the desire to postulate behemoths, but if the British really want tubes at sea because of Yamato, they would simply resume full-scale and full-priority production on the Anson and Howe (making them available in 1941) rather than stopping construction on them to start a whole new ship that would be delivered two years later.  The Lion and Temeraire, if built at normal wartime speed, would have been available before your ship.

Quote(5) By 1942 you have the Bismarck sunk, and the Italian battleline crippled. You have Japan showing the world that the future was carrier aviation, and you have the USN in the war with roughly half its' battleline intact and some very good battleships in service, working up or under construction. If WWII had a "battleship period" it was between June 1940 and December 1941, and Anson and Howe both missed this period (I am not forgetting the Guadalcanal campaign here, but it is a very unlikely permutation that has British battleships involved here.)

The British repeatedly slowed construction on Anson and Howe to carry out other work.  Your proposed "emergency" would presumably not have seen this, or else your proposed battleship would have suffered precisely the delays that Vanguard did.

Quote(6) See above for the "Renown" contention of the argument. King George V took four years to complete, which if I recall correctly includes a six month period when all work on major warships was stopped because of a crisis in the repair of merchant shipping. If new turrets had to be built (or old turrets modernised, as with Vanguard) I would agree with you, but in this case the ship postulated is using guns and armour originally ordered in 1937.

The problem with your concept, as I see it, is that the British would have had to decide that they faced an emergency, and then decided to respond with a weaker force (a single ship rather than two) that would be delivered two years later than the stronger force.  I just cannot see that being a good decision.

And, yes, there was a five-month delay in all battleship construction while workers were moved to a "crash" project, but that project was the arming of the almost-useless AMCs!  That is one of those decisions that, in retrospect, seems mad.

Grumbler, thanks for the advice regarding long posts. :)
:grumbles:  Why couldn't we just stick to the old software. :grumbles:

I think its' quite amusing that I am now trying to justify the possibility of a ship being constructed that I myself have said would never have been built. :lmfao: at myself.

Anyway, as for naval rifles and turret assemblies being "long lead time" items, remember that the Naval Scare of 1909 was partly based on the fear that Krupp was starting production of these items a year before the hulls they were for were due to be laid down. The theory that the Germans would have 21 dreadnoughts in service to the Royal Navy's 16 in 1913 can be attributed largely due to this fear, as it would allow the Germans to have a "hull laying to service time" of a year less than the Royal Navy relied on for its' predictions of German strength. I have not read anywhere that this fundamental relationship (gun time to hull time) had changed in the 1930s compared to the 1910s.

I do know, but am damned if I can find a convenient reference to hand, that among the first items ordered for any battleship, even ahead of hull materials, are the guns and the armour plate.

As for build time, if the British were responding to partial information on Yamato, then the ship would have priority. If they were not aware of Yamato, then the ship would not have been laid down as they already had a "Far East battleship" in Vanguard. The lack of delays is inherent in the reasons for the ship being laid down.

Of course, they also have the armour plate and guns ready as these items were ordered in 1937 for Anson and Howe, unlike materials for Vanguard which were not ordered until 1940 IIRC.

As for responding with one ship rather than two - well, "Magnificent" is a stopgap, built since the materials are there. That is, after all, the nature of an emergency measure. If I was DNC, I'd have a much better unit in mind for when it became possible to divert funds for new 16" turrets etc. Of course, by the time this became possible I'd be screaming "carriers, carriers, carriers"!!!

I am aware of a six month delay in all major warship construction due to the neccessity to clear a backlog of merchant ships needing repair in 1940. Since the AMCs were requisitioned in Autumn 1939, I don't think this is the same delay you are talking about, although I have not come across this one myself. If they are separate instances, then the four year construction time for KGV should be cut to a three year construction time for a ship without delays. We are, after all, talking about 11 months of stoppage there!

Quote from: Agelastus on September 17, 2009, 05:20:55 PM
I think its' quite amusing that I am now trying to justify the possibility of a ship being constructed that I myself have said would never have been built. :lmfao: at myself. 

It is entertaining, sometimes, to debate a topic you don't actually care a lot about, just for the info that you have to pick up to make your points.

QuoteAnyway, as for naval rifles and turret assemblies being "long lead time" items, remember that the Naval Scare of 1909 was partly based on the fear that Krupp was starting production of these items a year before the hulls they were for were due to be laid down. The theory that the Germans would have 21 dreadnoughts in service to the Royal Navy's 16 in 1913 can be attributed largely due to this fear, as it would allow the Germans to have a "hull laying to service time" of a year less than the Royal Navy relied on for its' predictions of German strength. I have not read anywhere that this fundamental relationship (gun time to hull time) had changed in the 1930s compared to the 1910s.

I ran across an interesting tidbit looking for info on this topic:  the Erebus class monitors were ordered on a crash basis in 1915, and to complete them ASAP they took two turrets from Royal Oak and assigned them to this project, and ordered two more turrets built for Royal Oak.  Royal Oak commissioned 28 months after being laid down, exactly the same amount of time as Royal Sovereign, which had been laid down the same day but had not had any turrets diverted.  I think guns can be the log pole in the tent, especially for a new class with new guns (pretty much every source I have agrees that this is true for at least some ships), but clearly they aren't always such (especially, perhaps, when they are repeats of a well-known design).

QuoteAs for build time, if the British were responding to partial information on Yamato, then the ship would have priority. If they were not aware of Yamato, then the ship would not have been laid down as they already had a "Far East battleship" in Vanguard. The lack of delays is inherent in the reasons for the ship being laid down.

I am just not convinced that the British would have abandoned two under-construction battleships for one hypothetical one, which would be delivered two years later than the battleships it displaced.  I agree with the rest of your reasoning.

QuoteOf course, they also have the armour plate and guns ready as these items were ordered in 1937 for Anson and Howe, unlike materials for Vanguard which were not ordered until 1940 IIRC.

As for responding with one ship rather than two - well, "Magnificent" is a stopgap, built since the materials are there. That is, after all, the nature of an emergency measure. If I was DNC, I'd have a much better unit in mind for when it became possible to divert funds for new 16" turrets etc. Of course, by the time this became possible I'd be screaming "carriers, carriers, carriers"!!! 

I am not sure how much use the Anson and Howe's plate would be for a new ship.

QuoteI am aware of a six month delay in all major warship construction due to the neccessity to clear a backlog of merchant ships needing repair in 1940. Since the AMCs were requisitioned in Autumn 1939, I don't think this is the same delay you are talking about, although I have not come across this one myself. If they are separate instances, then the four year construction time for KGV should be cut to a three year construction time for a ship without delays. We are, after all, talking about 11 months of stoppage there!

The AMCs were requisitioned at the start of the war, and the construction holiday occurred that fall and into early 1940 (but didn't apply to escorts).  I am not aware of a six month holiday of all major construction in 1940, but that is just due to lack of information.

I don't think that much of the armour plate would be usable, given how much thicker the KGV armour plate would be next to the Magnificent.

Quote from: grumbler on September 17, 2009, 06:37:48 PM
I ran across an interesting tidbit looking for info on this topic:  the Erebus class monitors were ordered on a crash basis in 1915, and to complete them ASAP they took two turrets from Royal Oak and assigned them to this project, and ordered two more turrets built for Royal Oak.  Royal Oak commissioned 28 months after being laid down, exactly the same amount of time as Royal Sovereign, which had been laid down the same day but had not had any turrets diverted.  I think guns can be the log pole in the tent, especially for a new class with new guns (pretty much every source I have agrees that this is true for at least some ships), but clearly they aren't always such (especially, perhaps, when they are repeats of a well-known design).

There is a good chance that these two turrets would be the remaining pair of the eight ordered for the original Renown and Repulse (the battlecruisers only requiring six, but I doubt that the relevant information is on the net.) I'll have to believe you when you say Resistance' turrets were never ordered.

If the problem of the guns lengthening build time was specific to Krupp and Germany not being able to produce guns as quickly as British manufacturers, this may be due to technique, as the German 15" of WWI was an all-steel, rather than wire-wound type. Which is interesting as the British moved to a very similar technique, as I understand it, for the 14" rifles of the 1930s. So something that may not have been a problem for the British in WWI became one in WWII!

Quote from: grumbler on September 17, 2009, 06:37:48 PMThe AMCs were requisitioned at the start of the war, and the construction holiday occurred that fall and into early 1940 (but didn't apply to escorts).  I am not aware of a six month holiday of all major construction in 1940, but that is just due to lack of information.

My knowledge of the "general stop" comes from reading the detailed discussions from the FFO alternate history, where they use the continued presence of France in the war (with its' merchant ships) as a justification for the "general stop" not happening in their alternate history. I shall try an hunt down the posts for the references they sited.

Unfortunately, the most comprehensive site of their postings is in French, not a particularly strong suit of mine.

Quote from: Neil on September 17, 2009, 06:43:44 PM
I don't think that much of the armour plate would be usable, given how much thicker the KGV armour plate would be next to the Magnificent.

Only if we were demanding a 33 knot ship on 54000 tonnes. That is one aspect of the hypothetical design as listed that I am emphatically not arguing in favour of. If such a ship was built, she'd be designed for the same speed as the KGV class.

Quote from: Agelastus on September 17, 2009, 07:14:59 PM

Quote from: Neil on September 17, 2009, 06:43:44 PM
I don't think that much of the armour plate would be usable, given how much thicker the KGV armour plate would be next to the Magnificent.

Only if we were demanding a 33 knot ship on 54000 tonnes. That is one aspect of the hypothetical design as listed that I am emphatically not arguing in favour of. If such a ship was built, she'd be designed for the same speed as the KGV class.

One wonders if they could even make 29 knots with such a ridiculously large citadel and KGV armour, at least on 54,000 tons.

KGV was a 28 knot ship on trials. That was the speed I was suggesting.

And I am trying to learn SpringSharp to see if it can even be roughly simulated (and no, unlike some users of SpringSharp, I am well aware that a theoretical program like this is no substitute for the practical experience of the RN's DNC of the time.)

It seems I have made a booboo. The general stop of heavy warship construction was in 1942, not 1940. Anson and Howe just slipped under the wire.

http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/6960/t/FFO-RN-Responses-Pt-1.html (http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/6960/t/FFO-RN-Responses-Pt-1.html)

The post that links to is well worth a read, even if one is not aware of the FFO alt-history situation.

However, it is interesting to note that the plan for Vanguard was for her to be commissioned 36 months after keel laying, which does add weight to the argument that the "Magnificent", if laid down as proposed in my posts, could have been ready in early to mid 1943, rather than the 1946 of Vanguard of our time line. One must add the six months of the "warship stop" to that, but that would still leave her entering service by around January 1944 at the latest.

Quote from: Agelastus on September 17, 2009, 07:36:36 PM
However, it is interesting to note that the plan for Vanguard was for her to be commissioned 36 months after keel laying, which does add weight to the argument that the "Magnificent", if laid down as proposed in my posts, could have been ready in early to mid 1943, rather than the 1946 of Vanguard of our time line. One must add the six months of the "warship stop" to that, but that would still leave her entering service by around January 1944 at the latest.

I don't doubt that your numbers are logical.  What I doubt is that the RN would ever give up two battleships delivered in 1942 in favor of a single, albeit larger, battleship delivered two years later.  Offensively and defensively, two KGV's would be considerably stronger than a single Magnificent, and when you add the fact that the two battleships would provide invaluable service during two critical war years while the one BB would spend those years sitting on the stocks or fitted-out, the decision to build the two seems to me to be a slam-dunk.

Hmmm...Grumbler's effectively issued a challenge. This is going to be rough, 'cause I am writing this down partly as I think it out.

For "Magnificent" to be built I need two PODs and one assumption that I cannot find confirmed or denied on the web (which is bad alternate history, but I cannot help it.)

POD (1) Problems (probable best choice being the breakdown of two tugs) prevent the RMS Queen Elizabeth from leaving John Brown, blocking the fitting out dock required for Anson until the next suitable Spring Tide. (The internet is conspicuously absent in the critical datum of whether the tide used was the first or second suitable tide of the year.)

POD (2) Incomplete information on the Yamato is obtained by the Royal Navy in May 1940; in particular, the deception regarding the '16" special' is not rumbled (reasonable assumption given the security of this aspect of the project.)

ASSUMPTION: The fitting out of HMS Anson & Howe had not proceeded to the stage of fitting turret mountings by June 1940 (a safe assumption if building methods are akin to those described for the original Dreadnought in Massie's book.)

Key dates:

17.09.1939: Sinking of HMS Courageous

08.06.1940: Sinking of HMS Glorious

14.06.1940: Fall of Paris (at which point, even the densest observer has probably realised France is done for.)

Key Data:
Aircraft capacity (as per original design):
1937 class = 33/36 (Illustrious, Victorious, Formidable)
1938 class = 45 (Indomitable)
1939 class = 54 (Implacable, Indefatigable)
1940 class = 78 (Proposed, eventually evolved into the truncated Eagle class)

The above shows that regardless of any doctinal lag in contemporary documentation, the Royal Navy was rapidly evolving away from the model that an aircraft carrier relied on guns and armour to protect itself from aerial attack and was very eager to put aircraft to sea. Later in the war in OTL serious suggestions were made to convert Vanguard to a carrier prior to completion.

So, let's hold an emergency meeting of the DNC and the Sea Lords etc. somewhere in the week following the Fall of Paris. They will be discussing several major issues

(1) Air cover for the Royal Navy in the absence of French support, particularly in regard to the Mediterranean.

(2) The provision of modern capital ships to oppose known and expected German and Italian strength.

(3) "Yamato" and its' implications for the British battleline.

(4) "Main Fleet East" in the event of a two-front war in Europe and Japan.

With regard to (1) there is general gloom. Although HMS Illustrious has just commissioned, the remaining three vessels of this class are still some time from commissioning (November 1940, May 1941 and October 1941 in OTL.) Moreover, instead of these being pure additions to the strength, two fleet carriers have already been lost in the war, and due to the low aircraft capacity of the first three vessels of the "pure" Illustrious class, in terms of aircraft at sea the Royal Navy will not see an improvement over the pre-War situation until the Indomitable commissions in late 1941. The assembled Admirals, considering the location of Italian airbases across the Empire's Mediterranean lifeline, are not very happy with this, but there is nothing that can be done in the short term.

With regards to (2) the Royal Navy has a fairly accurate idea of Western European opposition. Germany has the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with the Bismarck and Tirpitz under construction. Italy has four old battleships, plus the modern Littorio and Vittorio Veneto (both newly commissioned) with two more vessels under construction (neither of which is expected to be complete prior to 1942.) The British currently have five vessels under construction, with in-service dates expected to be late 1940 through to the end of 1941 (wartime delays in OTL resulted in Anson and Howe not commissioning until 1942.)

Consideration of the economic resources of Germany and Italy has been undertaken by the intelligence department of the Admiralty, and has concluded that both countries lack the steel manufacturing capacity to both continue the construction of big ships and adequately equip their armies, but this cannot be taken for granted.

[Note: this is a reasonable conclusion to reach with the benefit of hindsight. Given the evidence of what WWI did to the building programs of all continental combatants, it should be a reasonable conclusion for the period as well. The only thing is that I am not aware of any such conclusions being reached at the time in OTL!]

It is pointed out that the old Italian battleships, and even the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, are adequately covered for by the four remaining Revenge class battleships, Malaya, Barham, the two Renown class vessels and Hood, assuming appropriate deployments are made. This leaves the three modified QEs and the Nelsons to cover the more modern ships until the KGVs are commissioned. This is not seen by anyone present to be ideal, in fact, several people present consider this a case of wishful thinking. Inescapably, the conclusion is that the new British battleships are not ready when they needed to be; at this point the Mediterranean Fleet's pre-war plans for "Copenhagening" the Italian fleet is raised (it is at this meeting that "Judgement" is authorised.)

The matter of the French fleet is shelved pending political direction from the War Cabinet. It is pointed out that Richelieu would be a very valuable addition to the Royal Navy despite the logistical problems that would be involved in keeping her in service.

At this point, (3) is discussed. The Admiralty have a fairly accurate idea of the tonnage of the new ship, but cannot reconcile this with the 16" weaponry believed to be used. In the absence of an accurate look at the turret layout, and based on known Japanese preferences for turret layouts for current cruiser and preceding battleship designs (Mogami and Kaga being particularly important) the Admiralty's preliminary conclusion is that the Yamato will be a five turret vessel carrying 15 x 16" rifles. It is also known that the Japanese have two such vessels under construction. Even if the assumption that a war with Japan will be fought alongside the USA is proved correct, these behemoths cannot be ignored. Consideration is given to the various options -

( A ) Restart the first two Lions - given the lack of progress on these vessels at this point, the Admiralty sees no hope of these entering service before 1945. Moreover, four ships would be required to adequately counter the two Japanese vessels in their lordships opinion.

( B ) Put the discussed Vanguard type vessel into construction using stored 15" weaponry and construct at least one additional vessel However, while these could be ready for service in 1944 in their lordships' opinion, they share the problem of the Lions in being too few in number, and also suffer from an inferior main battery.

]Note: By my calculations the monitors and the Furious reserve set that was built in case the 18" guns were a failure should yield sufficient turrets for a second ship.]

( C ) Design and build a suitable counter to the Yamatos fitted with at least four triple 16" turrets. When the additional design time over the Lions is considered, their lordships do not see these vessels entering service before 1946.

( D ) Rely on the Americans. This option is discounted because it would mark the acceptance by the British Empire and the Royal Navy that it was no longer able to meet its' commitments. Some response must be made to the Yamatos, for the Empire's prestige if nothing else.

( E ) Some other option to be considered.

Their lordships move on to point (4) "Main Fleet East". It is pointed out that by January 1942 Japan will have six modern carriers in commission, to add to a formidable battleline of at least 10 and possibly 12 units (the Admiralty does not know when exactly the Yamatos are due for commissioning. The Royal Navy will also have six fleet carriers and an equivalent or superior number of battleships. However, assuming no major fleet losses on either side and allowing for refit cycles, the Admiralty comes to the conclusion that "Main Fleet East", at this point in time, could consist of no more than three battleships and one carrier. This is deemed by all present to be insufficient to meet both the obligations of Britain to the Dominions, and also to be insufficient to act as a deterrent to the Japanese. In conjunction with expected American deployments, the Admiralty believes that at least three carriers and an unspecified but larger number of battleships are required to adequately fulfil this strategy.

It is at this point that the DNC, aware of the delay in sending Anson to the fitting out dock, and bearing in mind the apparent success of the Japanese conversion of Kaga, suggests that the hulls of Anson and Howe could be converted to sixty plane carriers in approximately 14 months. They will carry much less armour than the carriers currently under construction, but this would be acceptable if they were for Far East and not Mediterranean service.

[Note: the above estimate is based on the 18 months the Japanese estimated they needed to do a full conversion of their old 14" battleships to full aircraft carriers with a 54 plane complement. The British don't have to strip as much down. Sir Stanley Goodall, the DNC, was emphatically not a member of the "gun club" and would have abandoned Vanguard if he had been allowed to in favour of using the materials for aircraft carriers. It does not seem to much of a stretch to have him advocate a different use for Anson and Howe's hulls if the situation arose.]

Their lordships are not totally enthused by this suggestion, as this will cut the Royal Navy's number of modern battleships by two units. It is suggested that the decision be put off until the results of Operation Judgement are known. After it is pointed out that Judgement would take months to carry out due to all the preparations and training involved, the DNC comes up with a brainwave, a plan which serves as both an (e) option to the problem of Yamato, and a compromise for the "gun club" of the Royal Navy. Take the quad turrets and armour plate already prepared for Anson and Howe and use them in a single larger ship for service in the Far East. The DNC believes that due to the materials already produced, he can have this ship ready for commissioning thirty to thirty-three months after keel laying. While one "super battleship" is an inadequate response to two units in enemy hands, it is better than nothing, and has the virtue of being available in 1943 rather than 1946.

[Note: If Vanguard was scheduled to take 36 months, an estimate which included the production of armour plate and the rebuilding of her turret assemblies, then 30/33 months for a ship where all of this has been produced already seems reasonable, and the DNC is considering round-the-clock shifts here. In fact, if I ever wrote this as a timeline, I'd have her taking 40 months to complete, plus a little design time (for the hull, the rest could be designed while being built), entering service in January 1944. As an aside, I'd also have the conversions of Anson and Howe take 20 months instead of the 14 month estimate. They'd still enter service early enough in 1942 to be of great value.]

The Admiralty accept the DNC's plans for the moment, and take a budget request to the War Cabinet. Within the next few months, the "gun club" will revisit this decision to cut a modern battleship from the Royal Navy's strength and get authorisation for two Vanguards instead of one, to be laid down in 1941. One of these, "Vanguard" herself, is completed in 1946 and misses the war. The other, "Bulwark" is launched but never completed and sold for scrap post-war.



Well, how's that? I may even take some time and think up a war record for the Anson, Howe and Magnificent...

What I don't get is why the sinking of the carriers would be particularily motivating in your alternate timeline, when it was not so in reality.  Moreover, your plan contradicts itself.  You state that the RN is concerned about air cover in the Med, and then assign Anson and Howe to the doldrums of the Far East.

Also, I don't understand why the construction of Yamato and Musashi would spur the British to make a single inferior battleship in the place of two.  If Bismarck and Tirpitz couldn't drive the RN into a panic, I find it hard to believe that the Japanese ships would do so.

Needs maps.

Quote from: Neil on September 18, 2009, 12:46:30 PM
What I don't get is why the sinking of the carriers would be particularily motivating in your alternate timeline, when it was not so in reality.  Moreover, your plan contradicts itself.  You state that the RN is concerned about air cover in the Med, and then assign Anson and Howe to the doldrums of the Far East.

Also, I don't understand why the construction of Yamato and Musashi would spur the British to make a single inferior battleship in the place of two.  If Bismarck and Tirpitz couldn't drive the RN into a panic, I find it hard to believe that the Japanese ships would do so.

I also don't understand why the Admiralty would possibly think in June 1940 that CVs were a better investment than BBs.  What was the largest ship sunk to that date by carrier aircraft?  A destroyer?  I have never heard anything about a proposal to convert Anson and Howe to carriers.  I agree with Agelastus that it is highly unlikely that these ships could be redesigned and then built in 36 months. 

It is pretty clear to me that the British response, in the event that it was decided that "some response must be made to the Yamatos, for the Empire's prestige if nothing else," would be to resume construction of the Lions, while completing the Anson and Howe as battleships in order to maintain the necessary margin of superiority over the Germans in Europe.

Aggie, as an aside, the concept of "Main Fleet East" was totally dead by 1940, so wouldn't be considered by the Admiralty as in point (4). It was a 1920s concept that didn't survive the revival of German naval power.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 01:30:32 PM
I also don't understand why the Admiralty would possibly think in June 1940 that CVs were a better investment than BBs.  What was the largest ship sunk to that date by carrier aircraft?  A destroyer?

While I agree with you, I believe that he was posulating that the Admiralty would want the carriers not as offensive weapons, but to provide the fleet with air cover, especially in the Med.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 01:30:32 PM
Aggie, as an aside, the concept of "Main Fleet East" was totally dead by 1940, so wouldn't be considered by the Admiralty as in point (4). It was a 1920s concept that didn't survive the revival of German naval power.

Grumbler, I have to disagree with you here.

Main Fleet East, as far as the Royal Navy, Australia, New Zealand and Churchill were concerned was official strategy right up until 1940/1.

The expansion of Singapore Naval Base was only completed in 1939, which is rather strange for a strategy that was abandoned in the 1920s (most of the work postdates 1931.) The governments of Australia and New Zealand were assured throughout the 1930s and into the war years that "Main Fleet East" continued to be policy, although the number of days relief that had to be awaited was increased (and Singapore's supply stockpile was increased from 90 days to 180 days in this period as well, although this exceeds any length of time it appears the Dominions were told they would have to hold out.)

There are records of Admiralty meetings, and meetings with Churchill from 1940/1 where they discuss potential fleet deployments by 1942 which have up to seven battleships and two carriers (IIRC) deployed to Singapore. This is, of course, both under "ideal circumstances" and pre-several wartime losses.*

The sending or Prince of Wales, Repulse and (proposed) Indomitable to the Far East was a belated (and stupid) attempt to implement a part of "Main Fleet East", exactly as the Dominions (who had committed troops to Europe on this basis) had been promised all along.

Directly from another website -

Quote"Building for victory", makes it clear that planning for a far eastern fleet dominated thinking behind the heavy unit programme throughout 1939, with capital additions to the armour plate plants and gun pits being considered in terms of the number of far east battleships that would result in 1943 or 1944.

See (according to others):

"Main Fleet East" - Russell Grenfell, 1951**
"Struggle For The Middle Sea - The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theatrer, 1940-1945" - O'Hara, V.P. (2009).
"The Sommerville Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Sommerville, G.C.B., D.S.O." - Simpson, Michael, ed.  1996.




*And I've just spent the last hour trying to find the bulleting board post where that was quoted, as it listed the source and date of the meeting. Sometimes I hate the internet... :(

**I must confess I was surprised by the age of this source when I looked it up

Quote from: Agelastus on September 18, 2009, 02:11:05 PM
Grumbler, I have to disagree with you here.

Main Fleet East, as far as the Royal Navy, Australia, New Zealand and Churchill were concerned was official strategy right up until 1940/1. 

I believe that you will find that there was no "official strategy" for the Royal Navy, Australia, New Zealand, nor Churchill.  The largest force Churchill mentions planning to send east in his History of the Second World War is seven battleships (4 of them R class, Nelson and Rodney, and Repulse) plus one carrier.  Clearly, this was not the bulk of the fleet (including no modern battleships).

Maybe you have a source that claims the British were still planning in June 1940 to send their modern fleet to Singapore, and counter the German fleet with the R class, Rodney, Nelson, and Repulse?

QuoteThe expansion of Singapore Naval Base was only completed in 1939, which is rather strange for a strategy that was abandoned in the 1920s

What strategy was abandoned in the 1920s?

QuoteThe governments of Australia and New Zealand were assured throughout the 1930s and into the war years that "Main Fleet East" continued to be policy, although the number of days relief that had to be awaited was increased (and Singapore's supply stockpile was increased from 90 days to 180 days in this period as well, although this exceeds any length of time it appears the Dominions were told they would have to hold out.)

Could you cite me these assurances?  I am especially interested in the specifics of the time the Dominions were told they would have to "hold out," and the corresponding british military plans for the forces that would relieve the Dominions.  I am willing to bet that, by 1936, there are no such plans, because by 1936 it was clear the main fleet would be needed in home waters to counter the German navy. 

QuoteThere are records of Admiralty meetings, and meetings with Churchill from 1940/1 where they discuss potential fleet deployments by 1942 which have up to seven battleships and two carriers (IIRC) deployed to Singapore. This is, of course, both under "ideal circumstances" and pre-several wartime losses.*

This is not, obviously, "Main Fleet East."  If it had been, then of course wartiome losses would have had to have been absorbed by the auxiliary fleet back home, not the main fleet.

QuoteThe sending or Prince of Wales, Repulse and (proposed) Indomitable to the Far East was a belated (and stupid) attempt to implement a part of "Main Fleet East", exactly as the Dominions (who had committed troops to Europe on this basis) had been promised all along.

No, the PoW and Repulse were sent because "Main Fleet East" had long go been given up as impossible.  Force Z was the fig leaf to cover Britain's nakedness in the east.  At no point was it planned to send the main fleet to singapore while the German navy remained intact, which was, of course, the heart of "Main Fleet East."

QuoteDirectly from another website -

:lmfao:  C'mon, "another website" isn't a source.  Even if you found the site, though, that isn't at all saying "Main Fleet East" but rather that the Eastern Fleet would get whatever the Home Fleet didn't need - which is the exact opposite of "Main Fleet East."

Quote from: Neil on September 18, 2009, 12:46:30 PM
What I don't get is why the sinking of the carriers would be particularily motivating in your alternate timeline, when it was not so in reality.  Moreover, your plan contradicts itself.  You state that the RN is concerned about air cover in the Med, and then assign Anson and Howe to the doldrums of the Far East.

I actually state that the Royal Navy resigns itself to not being able to do anything about the Mediterranean situation in the short term (I had to include a discussion of this as part of the meeting due to the logic of the fact that they would be discussing the whole situation.) The idea of converting Anson and Howe comes from the examination of what could be made available for the Far East as of January 1942. At that point the Royal Navy should have six carriers, giving a deployment of 2 x Home Fleet (inc. Furious, on her last legs), 1 x Western Med, 1 x Eastern Med and 1 x Far East. The sixth carrier will probably be in for a refit or other repairs. The figure of three for the Far East is based on the Americans deploying 3-5 carriers of their own in the Pacific in January 1942. The seems to be a reasonable assumption for the Royal Navy to make given the situation in 1940 and traditional American deployments.

Stanley Goodall is on record as opposing Vanguard's construction while he was DNC; he wanted to build more carriers. Since he was DNC from 1936 he's also supervised a fleet expansion plan which has provided approximately equal numbers of carriers to battleships, despite the influence of the "gun club". Given that, it's not unreasonable to assume that he might come up with such a suggestion for Anson and Howe had a meeting as I have described actually taken place. In real life, of course, no such meeting took place to the best of my knowledge. In OTL I am also unaware of any proposal to finish Anson and Howe as carriers.

Quote from: Neil on September 18, 2009, 12:46:30 PM
Also, I don't understand why the construction of Yamato and Musashi would spur the British to make a single inferior battleship in the place of two.  If Bismarck and Tirpitz couldn't drive the RN into a panic, I find it hard to believe that the Japanese ships would do so.

The simple rationale is the equation that afflicted the Royal Navy throughout the 1930s, cost over capability (consider the "L" and "M" classes followed by the cut-price "O" class.) Once you decide that KGV is not going to cut it against the Yamato, you have to consider what you can get. Ideally, two ships carrying 12x16" would be ordered. But they would take too much time, cost too much and take too much labour and materials.

Bismarck and Tirpitz are a pair of fairly standard 15" battleships, allegedly 35000 tonnes, with no appreciable existing battleline to back them up. They have the potential to annoy, not to panic; using them as a comparison point to the potential effect of a knowledge of Yamato/Musashi's size is rather unfair to those two ships.

In the case of Yamato, I admit I've stacked the deck a little by having this TL's Royal Navy make erroneous assumptions regarding Yamato's armament (although I think I explained them quite logically.) The sheer size of the ships must also make the Royal Navy consider how much more damage they would be able to take than a smaller ship, theoretically. So you have these two ships extraordinarily tough ships leading a battleline against a Royal Navy force led by, what? King George V? Nelson? Warspite? Rather brings a shiver to my spine...

Given how little progress had been made on the Lions by June 1940, I honestly do not see them as a valid response to Yamato if the Royal Navy is to make one. Yamato and Musashi will commission in 1942, Lion would be commissioning in 1945.

Stripping Nelson and Rodney is attractive, but anyone suggesting they be taken out of service in 1940 would be shot. Besides, Nelson's 16" triples do not have a particularly good reputation even compared to the 14" quads.

For a rapid response one has to use available guns and available armour plate; the only such material available is that prepared for Anson and Howe. But I had to come up with a rationale for using Anson's and Howe's hulls for something else. Hence, "Main Fleet East", which was nowhere near as dead as Grumbler asserts.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 02:47:00 PM
I believe that you will find that there was no "official strategy" for the Royal Navy, Australia, New Zealand, nor Churchill.  The largest force Churchill mentions planning to send east in his History of the Second World War is seven battleships (4 of them R class, Nelson and Rodney, and Repulse) plus one carrier.  Clearly, this was not the bulk of the fleet (including no modern battleships).

Maybe you have a source that claims the British were still planning in June 1940 to send their modern fleet to Singapore, and counter the German fleet with the R class, Rodney, Nelson, and Repulse?

No, that is only roughly half of the Royal Navy's battleships after all, not a major force at all. :)

As for the modern fleet, the KGVs were "North Sea ships", from everything I've read, which influenced such things as the design of their bows. The ships that would form the backbone of "Main Fleet East" had the war been delayed long enough were the Lions and Vanguard, and any of their successors.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 02:47:00 PM
What strategy was abandoned in the 1920s?

According to your post, "Main Fleet East". Since the Singapore Graving dock in particular was expected to support the "Main Fleet East" strategy I was using this to point out that it made no strength spending £60 million on a base whose role was to support a strategy you believe was abandoned in the 1920s.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 02:47:00 PM
Could you cite me these assurances?  I am especially interested in the specifics of the time the Dominions were told they would have to "hold out," and the corresponding british military plans for the forces that would relieve the Dominions.  I am willing to bet that, by 1936, there are no such plans, because by 1936 it was clear the main fleet would be needed in home waters to counter the German navy.

The specifics seem to be 48-72 days.

The rest I will get back to you on; at the least I somehow need to lay my hands on a copy of "Cowman, Ian. 'Main fleet to Singapore? Churchill, the admiralty and force Z'. Journal of Strategic Studies, 17:2 (1994), 79-93. Publisher: Cass; Taylor and Francis; Routledge. ISSN 01402390. ISSN (electronic) 1743-937X." and I cannot afford to buy it at the moment.

"Ends of British imperialism: the scramble for empire, Suez and ... By William Roger Louis" on Google Books make very interesting reading, as it unequivocally states that the plan to send the fleet East was Imperial policy in 1937, and also unequivocally states that the man who changed this was Churchill - who could not possibly have done this before 1940 when he was prime-minister. And yet it was the same Churchill who demanded Force Z be sent in a belated reprise of the strategy.

There also seem to be some very interesting documents referring to the "Fleet to Singapore"/"Main Fleet East" strategy at the National Archives (http://nationalarchives.gov.uk)...as long as they are free.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 02:47:00 PM
No, the PoW and Repulse were sent because "Main Fleet East" had long go been given up as impossible.  Force Z was the fig leaf to cover Britain's nakedness in the east.  At no point was it planned to send the main fleet to singapore while the German navy remained intact, which was, of course, the heart of "Main Fleet East."

A fig leaf to reassure the Dominions that they had not been lied to about "Main Fleet East" for twenty years; which, of course, they hadn't been

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 02:47:00 PM:lmfao:  C'mon, "another website" isn't a source.  Even if you found the site, though, that isn't at all saying "Main Fleet East" but rather that the Eastern Fleet would get whatever the Home Fleet didn't need - which is the exact opposite of "Main Fleet East."

Listed solely for the book involved, one that I have a feeling I remember you mentioning as having in your library or as having read from a previous discussion.

QuoteThere also seem to be some very interesting documents referring to the "Fleet to Singapore"/"Main Fleet East" strategy at the National Archives (http://nationalarchives.gov.uk)...as long as they are free.

Since the first of the selected documents I downloaded was 141 pages long, "I may be some time".

Dominion or decline: Anglo-American naval relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 By Ian Cowman on Google books has a fascinating section on "Main Fleet East" planning of the 1930s.

Quote from: Agelastus on September 18, 2009, 03:22:08 PM
No, that is only roughly half of the Royal Navy's battleships after all, not a major force at all. :)

No, it is a major force (that's seven battleships, with over 14,000 priceless crewmen) but obviously not the Main Fleet.  "Main Fleet East" was the doctrine of sending the Main Fleet (the modern stuff) to the East (that's Singapore, in geographic terms).  There was only one "main fleet" and four "coffin-ships," two obsolescent ships, and a relic battlecruiser would not be it.

QuoteAs for the modern fleet, the KGVs were "North Sea ships", from everything I've read, which influenced such things as the design of their bows. The ships that would form the backbone of "Main Fleet East" had the war been delayed long enough were the Lions and Vanguard, and any of their successors.

Lion and Temeraire, and any successor ships, would never have sailed for Singapore leaving 5 KGVs to face 2 Bismarcks and 2+ H class.  No way.  Vanguard, yes.  But Vanguard would not by herself have formed the main fleet of the RN.

QuoteAccording to your post, "Main Fleet East".

Please argue from what I said ("didn't survive the revival of German naval power") rather than strawmen of your own creation.  :)

QuoteSince the Singapore Graving dock in particular was expected to support the "Main Fleet East" strategy I was using this to point out that it made no strength spending £60 million on a base whose role was to support a strategy you believe was abandoned in the 1920s.

No, the Singapore docks were designed to support a secondary fleet.  Not even the much smaller force the British ended up stationing in the Far East in 1941 could be supported there; most had to base themselves out of Ceylon.

QuoteThe specifics seem to be 48-72 days.

I think the specifics were 88.3-110.78 days

QuoteThe rest I will get back to you on; at the least I somehow need to lay my hands on a copy of "Cowman, Ian. 'Main fleet to Singapore? Churchill, the admiralty and force Z'. Journal of Strategic Studies, 17:2 (1994), 79-93. Publisher: Cass; Taylor and Francis; Routledge. ISSN 01402390. ISSN (electronic) 1743-937X." and I cannot afford to buy it at the moment.

I doubt that this will help you much, as Churchill had nothing to do with Main Fleet East.

"Ends of British imperialism: the scramble for empire, Suez and ... By William Roger Louis" on Google Books make very interesting reading, as it unequivocally states that the plan to send the fleet East was Imperial policy in 1937, and also unequivocally states that the man who changed this was Churchill - who could not possibly have done this before 1940 when he was prime-minister. And yet it was the same Churchill who demanded Force Z be sent in a belated reprise of the strategy.[/quote] Alas, The strategic illusion: the Singapore strategy and the defence of Australia
by Ian Hamill makes the exact opposite argument (page 274):
"In April, 1931, the First Lord informed the Cabinet that 'the number of our capital ships is now so reduced that [should we] move our fleet to the east, insufficient vessels of this type would be left in Home Waters...'"

and notes that, in 1932, the language of the 1925 Main Fleet East declaration was modified to make this a "Fleet sufficient to provide 'cover' against a Japanese fleet."

and that in 1935, the standard became "a fleet in the Far East fully adequate to stand on the defensive and serve as a deterrent... while maintaining in Home Waters a force able to meet the requirements of a war with Germany."

Clearly, by 1935, Main Fleet East was dead.

QuoteA fig leaf to reassure the Dominions that they had not been lied to about "Main Fleet East" for twenty years; which, of course, they hadn't been

They hadn't been lied to about Main Fleet East for some time, as it hadn't existed for some time.  By 1937 they had been briefed on the decision to adopt a purely defensive stance in Asia until a European war was over or definitively averted.

QuoteListed solely for the book involved, one that I have a feeling I remember you mentioning as having in your library or as having read from a previous discussion.

I have Summerville's autobiography, and Struggle for the Middle Sea, but not the other one.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 05:13:18 PM
No, it is a major force (that's seven battleships, with over 14,000 priceless crewmen) but obviously not the Main Fleet.  "Main Fleet East" was the doctrine of sending the Main Fleet (the modern stuff) to the East (that's Singapore, in geographic terms).  There was only one "main fleet" and four "coffin-ships," two obsolescent ships, and a relic battlecruiser would not be it.

From further reading, it is clear that this would fall under the "emergency measures" that the Royal Navy felt would have to be undertaken in the case of a war before 1942.

[As an aside, I find it very amusing that the war came three years too early for Royal Navy planners, and five years too early for Kriegsmarine navy planners! :D]

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 05:13:18 PM
Lion and Temeraire, and any successor ships, would never have sailed for Singapore leaving 5 KGVs to face 2 Bismarcks and 2+ H class.  No way.  Vanguard, yes.  But Vanguard would not by herself have formed the main fleet of the RN.

What is becoming clear from my reading is that the Royal Navy was consistently underestimating German and Japanese construction capacities (or, perhaps, intentions.) The fact is that the Lions were planned with Far East Service in mind, whereas the KGVs were not. I shall continue hunting down the appropriate references for you.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 05:13:18 PMPlease argue from what I said ("didn't survive the revival of German naval power") rather than strawmen of your own creation.  :)

Which is a total strawman on your part as Royal Navy planning for "Main Fleet East" continues right up until 1939 even in the face of a two front war. The revival of German naval power dates back to the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935. In fact, it was official Imperial policy at the Imperial conference of 1937.

See Dominion or decline: Anglo-American naval relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 By Ian Cowman

I did misremember you exact wording though, I admit.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 05:13:18 PMNo, the Singapore docks were designed to support a secondary fleet.  Not even the much smaller force the British ended up stationing in the Far East in 1941 could be supported there; most had to base themselves out of Ceylon.

That's a bit of a strawman of your own, Grumbler! The ships at Ceylon were the "R"s that by this stage of the war had seen such heavy service that they were considered fit only for convoy duty. In 1939 they had been considered suitable for use in the "Main Fleet East" strategy despite their low speed.

What I find truly fascinating about all this was that the Royal Navy was actually planning to fight a naval war with Japan based on Hong Kong, with Singapore as the main fleet base only if the funds and time was not available to develop Hong Kong! :huh:

See Dominion or decline: Anglo-American naval relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 By Ian Cowman

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 05:13:18 PM
I think the specifics were 88.3-110.78 days

On a serious note, the 48-72 days was quoted on another board by an Australian poster who over the last five years that I have been lurking on the appropriate boards has been consistently well informed and when backchecked capable of providing certifiable sources. I still have to go through those cabinet papers I have downloaded to see what I can find, anyway.

The information from Cowmans book is "70 days to relieve Singapore, 90 days to relieve Hong Kong."

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 05:13:18 PMAlas, The strategic illusion: the Singapore strategy and the defence of Australia
by Ian Hamill makes the exact opposite argument (page 274):
"In April, 1931, the First Lord informed the Cabinet that 'the number of our capital ships is now so reduced that [should we] move our fleet to the east, insufficient vessels of this type would be left in Home Waters...'"

and notes that, in 1932, the language of the 1925 Main Fleet East declaration was modified to make this a "Fleet sufficient to provide 'cover' against a Japanese fleet."

and that in 1935, the standard became "a fleet in the Far East fully adequate to stand on the defensive and serve as a deterrent... while maintaining in Home Waters a force able to meet the requirements of a war with Germany."

Clearly, by 1935, Main Fleet East was dead.

"Cover" is a term of dubious semantics - if to "cover" nine (officially) Japanese battleships in 1932 with one uses eight of your own, that's still half your fleet. And as for the 1935 declaration, since "Main Fleet East" was still official Imperial policy in 1937, and the Royal Navy was still planning offensive operations in 1939 as part of this strategy, I suspect that this quote from 1935 does not mean exactly what you believe it to.

One obvious point is that the term "deterrent" has very little meaning once the shooting has started. One attempts to deter your enemy to avoid a war. If I remember my reading correctly, 1935 is one point where Australia was pushing particularly hard for a permanent Far East capital ship presence.

The interesting thing is that the Royal Navy's construction plans based on their assessment of enemy capabilities shows clearly that they were building a fleet to fight a two front war.

Shame, as one of the authors I have read today points out, that they completely ignored Italy!

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 05:13:18 PMThey hadn't been lied to about Main Fleet East for some time, as it hadn't existed for some time.  By 1937 they had been briefed on the decision to adopt a purely defensive stance in Asia until a European war was over or definitively averted.

Since we are both producing books that support our respective contentions regarding the Main Fleet East policy, I suspect we are never going to agree. However, I will try and trawl through those Cabinet papers by tomorrow afternoon.

Can't we all just agree to mock Tim?

Quote from: PDH on September 18, 2009, 06:00:06 PM
Can't we all just agree to mock Tim?

I've been posting about "Magnificent" for so long that I've forgotten if Tim did anything worrh mocking in this thread. :Embarrass:

Quote from: Agelastus on September 18, 2009, 06:02:23 PM

Quote from: PDH on September 18, 2009, 06:00:06 PM
Can't we all just agree to mock Tim?

I've been posting about "Magnificent" for so long that I've forgotten if Tim did anything worrh mocking in this thread. :Embarrass:

Oh, any thread can start Old Groany and you singing Kumbaya around the campfire.

God, that brought back memories! I haven't sung "Kumbaya" since I was six years old in infants school. :cry: :)

Ultimately, I think it comes down to a matter of priority.  Should Britain build against a potential threat in Japan, or two immediate threats in Germany and Italy?

Did Britain's plans in all this include the US, or were they based on the assumption that they would be taking on all comers alone?

Quote from: Neil on September 18, 2009, 06:23:32 PM
Ultimately, I think it comes down to a matter of priority.  Should Britain build against a potential threat in Japan, or two immediate threats in Germany and Italy?

I have to quibble here as it seems pretty clear from all I know of the design process for Vanguard that she was built primarily with Japan in mind, and she was authorised before war broke out with Japan. So in OTL Britain was building with reference to a potential threat as well as the immediate threats of Germany and Italy, so there is no reason she would not do the same in an alternate timeline.

Quote from: Berkut on September 18, 2009, 06:32:18 PM
Did Britain's plans in all this include the US, or were they based on the assumption that they would be taking on all comers alone?

British planning from at least 1937 (and probably earlier) considered it to be extremely likely that any war with Japan would also involve the United States, due to the strategic interests of the Americans in the Phillippines and China.

The only problem was, even with extensive contacts between the naval forces in the Far East, and staff talks at various levels, the British could not be 100% sure of this until December 7th 1941.

Prior to 1940 this uncertainty meant that the Main Fleet East concept had to be retained (although Grumbler would disagree.) After the outbreak of the Mediterranean campaign against Italy and the fall of France, this still meant Britain had to consider the possibility that she would have to hold Malay barrier on her own until such time as sufficient forces could be diverted from Europe.

Let me rephrase that - in the forlorn hope that adequate forces could be diverted from Europe absent American intervention.

The fall of France blew a lot of plans out of the water, including Main Fleet East.

The first half of the war didnt go too well for us, did it?

Quote from: Warspite on September 18, 2009, 07:23:30 PM
The first half of the war didnt go too well for us, did it?

No.  :cry:

Actually, that's probably why this period of history attracts so many British Alt. Historians on the various fora.

For example, I would not lose Courageous and Glorious to the utter stupidities that claimed them...

Quote from: Agelastus on September 18, 2009, 05:57:47 PM
From further reading, it is clear that this would fall under the "emergency measures" that the Royal Navy felt would have to be undertaken in the case of a war before 1942.

You have lost me.  What is "this?"  What document says what the RN considered "emergency measures," and what is the magic about the year 1942?  And when was that magic year cited?

Quote[As an aside, I find it very amusing that the war came three years too early for Royal Navy planners, and five years too early for Kriegsmarine navy planners! :D]

Planners never get it right.  It is an occupational hazard.  I have been there, and the USn of today is not anything like the "USN of the future" I postulated for 2009 in 1989.

QuoteWhat is becoming clear from my reading is that the Royal Navy was consistently underestimating German and Japanese construction capacities (or, perhaps, intentions.) The fact is that the Lions were planned with Far East Service in mind, whereas the KGVs were not. I shall continue hunting down the appropriate references for you.

I think maybe your Alt-Hist web site has made you think too linearly.  The RN didn't plan so rigidly as "these ships were never going east, these ships always were."  The Lions, for instance, were not strictly a response to japanese developments, nor the KGVs to German.

QuoteWhich is a total strawman on your part as Royal Navy planning for "Main Fleet East" continues right up until 1939 even in the face of a two front war. The revival of German naval power dates back to the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935. In fact, it was official Imperial policy at the Imperial conference of 1937.

Inncorrect on both accounts, as my cite demonstrated.  It was not official policy at the 1937 conference.  A defensive fleet was.

QuoteSee Dominion or decline: Anglo-American naval relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 By Ian Cowman

Page number? Quote?  You just cannot throw a reference out there and expect me to accept your interpretation of it, especially in the face of a contradictory cite and quote.

QuoteThat's a bit of a strawman of your own, Grumbler! The ships at Ceylon were the "R"s that by this stage of the war had seen such heavy service that they were considered fit only for convoy duty. In 1939 they had been considered suitable for use in the "Main Fleet East" strategy despite their low speed.

But you are arguing that they were part of a "Main Fleet East" strategy, and I am arguing (using this same evaluation of them) to argue the contrary!  :)

Make up your mind:  if "Main Fleet East" meant the deployment of the R class as the main British fleet in the world, then you have a shred of evidence.  If they were the dregs deployed to the east because they were needed nowhere else, then I have a shred of evidence that Main Fleet East was not even attempted.

BTW, learn what a strawman is.  It is annoying to see you employ it, get called on it, and then accuse others of it repeatedly when it isn't employed.

QuoteWhat I find truly fascinating about all this was that the Royal Navy was actually planning to fight a naval war with Japan based on Hong Kong, with Singapore as the main fleet base only if the funds and time was not available to develop Hong Kong! :huh:

All of my sources indicate that the British in the 1920s abandoned the idea of holding Hong Kong except as an advanced outpost that had to be taken before Singapore could be attacked, so i would need a cite on this.

QuoteSee Dominion or decline: Anglo-American naval relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 By Ian Cowman

Page number?  Quote?

QuoteOn a serious note, the 48-72 days was quoted on another board by an Australian poster who over the last five years that I have been lurking on the appropriate boards has been consistently well informed and when backchecked capable of providing certifiable sources. I still have to go through those cabinet papers I have downloaded to see what I can find, anyway.

Sorry, but some anonymous Australian poster isn't authoritative.

QuoteThe information from Cowmans book is "70 days to relieve Singapore, 90 days to relieve Hong Kong."

Page number?  Quote?  This seems wildly improbable for the post-1935 RN planning of which I have read.

Quote"Cover" is a term of dubious semantics - if to "cover" nine (officially) Japanese battleships in 1932 with one uses eight of your own, that's still half your fleet. And as for the 1935 declaration, since "Main Fleet East" was still official Imperial policy in 1937, and the Royal Navy was still planning offensive operations in 1939 as part of this strategy, I suspect that this quote from 1935 does not mean exactly what you believe it to.

"Main Fleet East" had been explicitly abandoned by the 1937 Imperial Defense Conference.  Every source I have (including the ones cited and quoted) agree on that.  What made the Anzacs nervous in 1937 was precisely that Britain had abandoned the concept of sending the main fleet east, and was instead talking about defense and deterrence.  That is what led the Anzacs to seek American guaratees rather than British ones.

I cannot access Cwoman's book online, but I can access the Table of contents at https://bookweb.kinokuniya.co.jp/htmy/1859731112.html, and that seems to support my contention of the radical change after the 1937 conference, rather than your status quo one (my bold)

QuotePart II:  The Anglo-American Naval Scene           115(165)
1937-1941
  3  A `Special Relationship': Naval Relations     115(50)
  1937-1939
    Background                                     115(4)
    The Air Routes and the Naval Base Question     119(9)
    The 1938 Ingersoll Meetings                    128(11)
    British Defence Conundrums in 1939             139(6)
    The 1939 Hampton Meetings                      145(8)
    Conclusions                                    153(12)
  4  Britain Cedes the Initiative: The Road to     165(42)
  ABC-1
    Outbreak of the War in Europe                  165(2)
    Far Eastern Strategy Transformed               167(3)
    The Prospects for Anglo-American Staff Talks   170(1)
    American Foreign Policy and the Far East       171(5)
    The American Mission to London                 176(1)
    American War Planning and the Far East         177(5)
    The Plan Dog Memorandum                        182(3)
    Misreading the Signals                         185(7)
    Heavy Weather at ABC-1                         192(4)

QuoteOne obvious point is that the term "deterrent" has very little meaning once the shooting has started. One attempts to deter your enemy to avoid a war. If I remember my reading correctly, 1935 is one point where Australia was pushing particularly hard for a permanent Far East capital ship presence.

In fact, in 1937, Australia had pushed for the transfer of a British capital ship to RAn manning.  If they still believed in "Main Fleet East" as you assert, they would not have done this. 

QuoteThe interesting thing is that the Royal Navy's construction plans based on their assessment of enemy capabilities shows clearly that they were building a fleet to fight a two front war.

That is one interpretation, but it is also clear that, by 1935 (and certainly no later than 1937) they were committed to "Main Fleet Home" and thus "Main Fleet East" was not discussesd in 1940  - which is my sole point.

QuoteShame, as one of the authors I have read today points out, that they completely ignored Italy!

Not ignored, but rather assumed away on the basis that france would neutralize Italy.  See Churchill's History of the Second World War (which I consulted at work today, so it is there and so I cannot give you a page number, but which talks about this). It was not an unreasonable concept - the Italians believed it themselves!

QuoteSince we are both producing books that support our respective contentions regarding the Main Fleet East policy, I suspect we are never going to agree. However, I will try and trawl through those Cabinet papers by tomorrow afternoon.

Okay.  I would be delighted to be proved wrong.  That would mean more data for the grist mill.

Grumbler, you are a nightmare for quoting! It's 3 AM in the morning where I am and you give me this complex a post!  :D

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PM
You have lost me.  What is "this?"  What document says what the RN considered "emergency measures," and what is the magic about the year 1942?  And when was that magic year cited?

It's in Cowman, p. 38, although I admit he uses "stopgap" rather than "emergency" measures. Unfortunately the notes for this page are on a page not visible on Google! <_<

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PMI think maybe your Alt-Hist web site has made you think too linearly.  The RN didn't plan so rigidly as "these ships were never going east, these ships always were."  The Lions, for instance, were not strictly a response to japanese developments, nor the KGVs to German.

I do realise it is not as rigid as this, and if necessary they could indeed have gone east, but the fact is the KGVs were designed more for North Sea than Pacific conditions (the need for the forward quad turret to be able to fire over the bow, for example, that resulted in impaired seakeeping.) The Lions, and the Vanguard, were designed to be more suitable for non-North Sea situations. In the end, the Royal Navy did not have the choice of what to deploy where as the Lions were never built and Vanguard was too late.

The reason for this was because the KGVs were to replace the Rs, which (despite the fact that in 1939 they were considered as suitable for eastern deployment, Cowan again) were last on the list for assignment to South East Asia. Thus the optimisation for North Sea/short range conditions. The design is pre-radar, which explains the aircraft facilities and the decision in regard to the bow design.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PMIncorrect on both accounts, as my cite demonstrated.  It was not official policy at the 1937 conference.  A defensive fleet was..

See Cowan p.31. The 70 day and 90 day figures date to March 1937, In April 1937 agreement was reached for joint Anglo-Chinese development on Hainan to allow it to act as a forward anchorage for the relief of Hong Kong. The exact site is at Gaalong bay. This is a long way from a defensive strategy.

See Cowan p.37 for the confirmation of Main Fleet East at the 1937 Imperial conference.

As for your source's interpretation of the "defensive fleet" see pages 315-317 of "Ends of British Imperialism, the scramble for Empire, Suez and decolonisation byWm. Roger Louis". This account of Hoare's words (sentiments apparently shared with Chatfield and Hankey) do not square with your source's view.

Incidentally, the source for the "48-72" days appears to originate, or be repeated, on p. 315 of this work.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PMBut you are arguing that they were part of a "Main Fleet East" strategy, and I am arguing (using this same evaluation of them) to argue the contrary!  :)

Actually, there is a world of difference between the elderly but well maintained Rs of 1939 and the hard driven units of 1941. They had spent most of the previous two years on assignment in Home Waters, and had suffered from reduced maintenance cycles accordingly. It is listed in several works that ships assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet were kept in better order than Home Fleet units because of their access to the floating dock at Alexandria, whereas Home Fleet units had to compete with urgent repair work for merchants and escorts, which often got shoved ahead of routine maintenance.

Use of the Rs as part of the Main Fleet East is specifically discussed on p31-32 of Cowan.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PM
All of my sources indicate that the British in the 1920s abandoned the idea of holding Hong Kong except as an advanced outpost that had to be taken before Singapore could be attacked, so i would need a cite on this.

Much of Cowan's first section specifically discusses the use of Hong Kong. In particular see p.17-18 for the original Admiralty rationale, but there is a wealth of supporting evidence on later pages.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PM
Sorry, but some anonymous Australian poster isn't authoritative.

I think you might not think this if you frequented those boards, but the point is moot as I have listed an alternative source for the figure above.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PMPage number?  Quote?  This seems wildly improbable for the post-1935 RN planning of which I have read.

Cowan, p.31, listed above. I've seen the figure as 90 days increased to 180 days in other works, these figures being specific to Singapore. I suspect this latter figure may be from 1940 planning, but I haven't come across it in my current research for this discussion.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PM"Main Fleet East" had been explicitly abandoned by the 1937 Imperial Defense Conference.  Every source I have (including the ones cited and quoted) agree on that.  What made the Anzacs nervous in 1937 was precisely that Britain had abandoned the concept of sending the main fleet east, and was instead talking about defense and deterrence.  That is what led the Anzacs to seek American guarantees rather than British ones.

See Cowan p.38-39 for Australia's response to the 1937 Imperial conference vis-a-vis Britain.

Could you direct me to the source for Australian-American contacts pre-1942 (when I know such guarantees were sought?) Louis p.320 lists the British as making contacts regarding mutual defence in the Far East.

He also on p.318-19 gives some interesting information of the CID's deliberations in June and July which are completely contrary to the minimal fleet approach your source states.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PM
   4  Britain Cedes the Initiative: The Road to     165(42)
  ABC-1
    Outbreak of the War in Europe                  165(2)
    Far Eastern Strategy Transformed               167(3)
    The Prospects for Anglo-American Staff Talks   170(1)
    American Foreign Policy and the Far East       171(5)
    The American Mission to London                 176(1)
    American War Planning and the Far East         177(5)
    The Plan Dog Memorandum                        182(3)
    Misreading the Signals                         185(7)
    Heavy Weather at ABC-1                         192(4)

Actually, this supports me - if you look at the first section in the "road to ABC1" you'll note it discusses the outbreak of the war in Europe. Chronologically, therefore, this section is no earlier than September 1939.

In fact, this section is mainly concerned with the post 1940 Fall of France situation, when American support would have been needed to get "Main Fleet East" to work. Of course, we both know how successful that was, with the Americans at Pearl and the British at Singapore! :)

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PMIn fact, in 1937, Australia had pushed for the transfer of a British capital ship to RAn manning.  If they still believed in "Main Fleet East" as you assert, they would not have done this.

Actually, this still relates to "Main Fleet East". See Cowan p.38-39; it was supposed to augment "Main Fleet East" and was a result of the attempts at the 1937 conference to involve the Dominions more in Imperial defence. The original suggestion was the construction of, not the transfer of, a capital ship.

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PM
That is one interpretation, but it is also clear that, by 1935 (and certainly no later than 1937) they were committed to "Main Fleet Home" and thus "Main Fleet East" was not discussesd in 1940  - which is my sole point.

And effectively, my sole point is that this is incorrect, with supporting authors supplied. God, I'm tired (it is now 3.56am...) This is getting circular. I don't understand why you cannot get access to the relevant section of Cowan - is it due to copyright issues with Google books?

Quote from: grumbler on September 18, 2009, 08:39:57 PMNot ignored, but rather assumed away on the basis that france would neutralize Italy.  See Churchill's History of the Second World War (which I consulted at work today, so it is there and so I cannot give you a page number, but which talks about this). It was not an unreasonable concept - the Italians believed it themselves!

True, and I was being a bit unfair to the Royal Navy there. One of the sources I have read today stated that the two navies only began talks on wartime co-operation in 1938 (can't remember which one) and it probably got me a little riled. I know the British and the French were supposed to be Allies, but relying on something (the French neutralising the Italians) without actually discussing it seemed a bit reckless!

And now, at 3.59am I bid you goodnight...:collapses:

One thing I am getting from these documents is that "official" policy and Admiralty intentions are not always one and the same. The "New Standard" of 1937 is particularly open to debate.

I seem to have made an error in concentrating on 1940 to 41 documents, and need to find more 1937-39 papers.

Cab/66/3/35:
   Australian and New Zealand naval defence, 21.11.39
   Author: Winston Churchill
   
Section 1 and 2 discuss relief of Singapore or Australia – discounts possibility of attack! But in both cases relief is in the form of a significant fleet.

Section 3 discusses abandoning the Mediterranean, by sealing Suez and the straits of Gibraltar, while despatching a fleet east.

Section 4 discusses a "deterrent" fleet, as Grumbler has suggested. This is a wartime document however, and this statement is not entirely in accord with the sentiments of sections 1 and 2 which discuss a "superior fleet" being sent. Again, it states unequivocally that the Mediterranean would be abandoned to support Australia and New Zealand.

Section 5 discusses the likelihood of Japanese aggression against the DEI bringing the USA into the war. Followed by a rather fatuous "trust the admiralty" statement!

Section 6 points out that Britain is at the lowest point of its strength relative Germany and Japan, and that this position will improve as new ships commission.

It is interesting to note that the last line of section 6 tells us exactly who this document is aimed at – "There are no naval grounds, therefore, always assuming that the United States is our friend, which should prevent the despatch of Australian and New Zealand armies to the decisive battlefields, where their name stands so high." :D

CAB/65/24/2
   WM (41) 109th conclusions, Minute 2, confidential annex 05/11/41

Little here referring to Main Fleet East although it is interesting to read some of the units that would be sent east (it refers to Prince of Wales staying on station until Nelson and Rodney are available, and possibly longer – that's three of the five most modern battleships in the Royal Navy at the time.)

The interesting thing is that the prime-minister, WSC, is quoted as saying that if Australia was in need, the Mediterranean would be abandoned. Given this is from 1941, this surprised me a great deal; perhaps it shouldn't have, as other cabinet papers back this up.

CAB/65/22/18
   WM (41) 48th conclusions, Minute 6, Confidential annex 08/05/41

This document is interesting mainly for the apparent belief of the United States that 12 "capital" ships based at Singapore and Hawaii would be sufficient to deter Japan. Although the document's recommended "split" was not followed, it is interesting to note that the US and Britain did have roughly this number of capital ships in the Pacific in December 1941.

The document does use "capital" ships as a synonym for battleships in one section, but in another section points out that "capital" ships does not just mean battleships! :)

CAB/66/18/21 Is a report on Australian parliamentary activity in July 1941 debates; it is interesting solely for a reference by Curtin to ensuring that conditions in the Mediterranean not be allowed to deteriorate to the extent that the Mediterranean Fleet could not be despatched east.

The debate seems to be have triggered by the disastrous Greek campaign.

I do find it interesting that Curtin acts as if the entire Mediterranean Fleet has been promised to come east in the event of war, given the size of that fleet in 1941.

CAB/66/9/2
   25.06.40 report for the War Cabinet, authored by the Chiefs of Staff committee
It is interesting to note that one of the authors is Tom Phillips, who later died on the Prince of Wales.

Section C admits that a Fleet cannot be spared for the Far East "at present." This is quite a significant change from the attitude of WSC in November of the previous year, but is not really surprising given the date.

It does not, unfortunately, make further reference to pre-war planning as it is concerned with current issues.

CAB/68/1/25
   1st monthly report by First Lord of the Admiralty, dated 03.09.39
   
Not germane to "Main Fleet East", but this paragraph supports my contention that "Magnificent" could be built relatively quickly using the turret mountings that existed for "Anson" and "Howe".

QuoteRetardation of Battleships.
(a)   LION and TEMERAIRE – work to be suspended for a year
(b)   Two 1939 program battleships – ordering to be deferred for a year.
Action on gun mountings and any other requirements on which delay is expected will proceed, and it is expected that this retardation will not materially prejudice the ultimate date of completion of the ships.

Also of interest is a note that construction on various projects has been slowed partly due to the fact that "night work is no longer possible due to ARP regulations"! :rolleyes:

CAB/24/273
   "Comparison of the strength of Great Britain with certain other nations as of January 1938".

At first I was very disappointed, as Japan was only mentioned in the context of supporting Germany and Italy if Russia was fighting on the side of Britain and France, despite the listing of her naval strength as part of the comparison tables.

Then I hit paydirt on p.14, section 4, docking.

Quote4. Docking.—The position as regards docking in the event of the fleet
having to operate from Singapore is satisfactory. The Graving Dock at the
Naval Base has been completed, and, although the channel at the entrance has
not yet been fully dredged, any existing ship could now be docked at high water.
The dredging, which will enable ships to be docked at any state of the tide, will
be completed by March 1938.
There are at Singapore a number of commercial docks belonging to the
Singapore Harbour Board capable of docking cruisers, destroyers and submarines.
There is also a small dock at Penang which can dock destroyers and submarines.
Under a skeleton programme which has been prepared to allow for the docking
of the British main fleet under conditions of a Far Eastern War, all destroyers
and submarines and a certain percentage of cruisers are shown as docking in
these commercial docks.

The above does not read at all as the preparations for a defensive or deterrent fleet, and is an official document post-dating 1937.

The document itself is a fascinating read concerning the British perception of relative strengths in 1938, albeit mostly pertaining to Europe.

CAB28/284 is a Far East situation appraisal from March 1939. Unfortunately, it is almost solely concerned with the prospect of applying economic pressure to Japan, rather than listing, as I expected, defensive arrangements and wartime plans.

CAB/66/10/63 is an appreciation of the Far East by the Chiefs of Staff from August 1940. It is concerned for the defence of the Far East in the absence of the Fleet always proposed to be sent there.

It does include the rather plaintive-

QuoteIn view of the foregoing considerations, it has become clear that we
must press on with our future naval construction programmes to the maximum
extent possible; this is a long-term project and no naval building programme
has ever allowed for a war in which we alone would be fighting Germany, Italy
and Japan.

CAB/24/259 is a report on the programs, proposed or otherwise, of the defence services as of March 1936. It includes the following, which on the surface backs up Grumbler's position, I must admit.

I am curious as to exactly what 'cover' means in the 1932 context, since it is such a non-descript word. Given the known capital ship strength of the Japanese, a 'cover' force would surely need to involve half or more of the surface fleet, especially if it was supposed to defend Hong Kong (Hong Kong seems from the various sources I have read in the last few days not to be definitively written off until 1940.)

Quote8. Since 1932 the standard of naval strength has for practical purposes
been based on the following formula :—
" We should be able to send to the Far East a Fleet sufficient to provide
' cover' against the Japanese Fleet; we should have sufficient additional
forces behind this shield for the protection of our territory and mercantile
marine against Japanese attack; at the same time we should be able to
retain in European waters a force sufficient to act as a deterrent and to
prevent the strongest European Naval Power from obtaining control of our
vital Home terminal areas while we can make the necessary redispositions."
(N.C.M. (35) 12.)
The coming increase in German naval power combined with continuing
anxiety for the safety of our possessions in the Far East have properly led the
Defence Requirements Committee to a careful reconsideration of our naval needs,
.and they recommend a netv standard of naval strength defined as follows :—
(i) To enable us to place a Fleet in the Far East fully adequate to act on
the defensive and to serve as a strong deterrent against any threat
to our interests in that part of the globe.
(ii) To maintain in all circumstances in Home Waters a force able to meet
the requirements of a war with Germany at the same time.
Included in (i) and (ii) would be the forces necessary in all parts of the world,
behind the cover of the main fleets, to protect our territories and merchant ships
against sporadic attacks.   

The above would seem to back Grumbler's position...except, the new proposed requirement actually reduces the number of ships required in the European theatre! The previous policy is based on "any European power" which, oddly enough to us in 2009, would have included France in the calculations. The French fleet in 1932 consisted of five dreadnoughts and was the most powerful after Britain's in Europe, whereas the Germans only had old and obsolete pre-dreadnoughts at the time, and were not considered a threat.

Although I cannot state with certainty what the Admiralty requirement to secure Britain would be, the logic of pre-WWI "Germany plus sixty percent" would suggest the retention of eight ships in home waters. Allowing for two vessels to be in refit at any one time, this leaves only five vessels available for the Far East. This is indeed a defensive fleet only.

Just based on the number (15) of capital ships available at the time, this restatement of aiming at Germany significantly increases the firepower available against Japan! As of March 1936, Germany had the three "pocket battleships" of the Deutschland class, and had laid down the two units of the Scharnhorst class (Bismarck is not laid down until later in the year.)

Now, one can argue as to whether or not the Royal Navy considered the Deutschlands as capital ships or not, or whether they could be dealt with by cruisers. Regardless, this 1936 strategy immediately reduces the number of capital ships for European service to 5, based on "Germany plus sixty percent." Allowing again for two in refit, we have eight ships available for use in the Far East, the majority of the Royal Navy's strength.

If the contention is accepted that the Admiralty was willing to fight with equivalent numbers, which seems to be a thread through various books on the subject, we actually have ten ships available for service in the Far East.

It seems clear from Cowan's book that the Admiralty was willing to engage Japan with inferior numbers (although his sources for some of this are listed on pages not available on the web.) Eight ships against nine (or ten, the Admiralty still had a "?" over the status of Hiei in 1938 – it's recorded as such in the tables of the 1938 defence comparison) is certainly a return to the "Main Fleet East" concept in its essence. The known Admiralty Building program, compared to Japanese and German construction, also supports this interpretation.

Year         Britain      Japan      Germany
1936        2                                         
1937        3              1
1938        2*            1   
1939        2                              3
1940        3**          1              3***
               10             3              8 (Admiralty expectation 6)

*Actually laid down in 1937
**2 x Lion, 1 x Vanguard (the proposal to lay down a "Vanguard" concept ship in 1940 predates the war.)
***An assumption based on the laying down dates, actual and proposed, of the first three H class ships. It should be noted that the Admiralty appreciations were that Germany could lay down no more than two large ships a year, and the fact that the Germans had laid down 3 ships in one year could very well have led to a demand for yet more ships by the Admiralty.

The Admiralty's attempt to maintain an equal or superior fleet to Germany and Japan combined is clear from these figures. The "H" class really screw up the Admiralty's estimates, but due to the war we do not know how the Admiralty would have responded.

It's interesting that the Admiralty believes the new standard will require more cruisers than the old one. Presumably, this can be partially attributed to the construction of the "Deutschlands", since they were seen as being used as commerce raiders.

In another section we have a recommendation which is remarkably prescient.

Quote16. We consider it to be a cardinal requirement of our national and imperial
security that our foreign policy should be so conducted as to avoid the possible
development of a situation in which we might be confronted simultaneously with
the hostility, open or veiled, of Japan in the Far East, Germany in the West,
and any Power on the main line of communication between the two. So far as
Japan is concerned, in our previous Report we emphasized strongly the
importance of an ultimate policy of accommodation and neighbourliness with
that country. Recent events accentuate the desirability of that policy, difficult
though it may be to carry out.

Events ran out of the Foreign office's control, of course! :(

The above is a comprehensive listing of the documents I have studied today, even where they were not directly relevant.

I've got more documents to go over, including the above 141 page item to finish, but that's enough for today...I did NOT get enough sleep last night.

http://ir.lib.sfu.ca/bitstream/1892/9839/1/b3155183x.pdf

The above thesis, despite at least two factual errors (or oddities) that I caught, offers a cogent and well documented case for the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 being entered in to in order to maintain the viability of the "Main Fleet to Singapore" strategy in spite of German naval rearmament.

It also provides me with the information (and supporting references) that show that the Royal Navy was willing to accept 1:1 odds as the minimum neccessary for security of the homeland. Meaning that even when France or Italy were being considered as the standard for Europe during the 1920s and early 1930s, allowing for refits, the Admiralty had the capacity and intention to send eight capital ships east in accordance with the 1932 declaration - effective parity with Japan, and more than half of the fleet, which more than qualifies for the Main Fleet East strategy.

Been busy with other stuff over the weekend, but did a little bit of research, with the following results:
(1) disagree that Britain was willing to accept parity with the German fleet as the minimum necessary.  In fact, the RN was willing to fight Japan down one ship to maintain a one-ship edge over Germany.
(2) At the 1937 Imperial Defense Conference, the British formally notified the Dominions that the size of the British fleet to be sent east was no longer to be dependent on the size of the Japanese threat, but rather what was left after British home security was assured (and thus that "Main Fleet East" was no longer the strategy).
(3) Britain wanted to build a fleet big enough to dominate in Europe and Asia, but couldn't afford it.  Nor could they accomplish their aims diplomatically.  They refused to be forced to choose which to do, though, and in the end attempted both with disastrous consequences.