Which fourth-generation dreadnought do you think looks best?

[Agelastus]

I don't think that much of the armour plate would be usable, given how much thicker the KGV armour plate would be next to the Magnificent.

Only if we were demanding a 33 knot ship on 54000 tonnes. That is one aspect of the hypothetical design as listed that I am emphatically not arguing in favour of. If such a ship was built, she'd be designed for the same speed as the KGV class.

[Neil]

I don't think that much of the armour plate would be usable, given how much thicker the KGV armour plate would be next to the Magnificent.

Only if we were demanding a 33 knot ship on 54000 tonnes. That is one aspect of the hypothetical design as listed that I am emphatically not arguing in favour of. If such a ship was built, she'd be designed for the same speed as the KGV class.

One wonders if they could even make 29 knots with such a ridiculously large citadel and KGV armour, at least on 54,000 tons.

[Agelastus]

KGV was a 28 knot ship on trials. That was the speed I was suggesting.

And I am trying to learn SpringSharp to see if it can even be roughly simulated (and no, unlike some users of SpringSharp, I am well aware that a theoretical program like this is no substitute for the practical experience of the RN's DNC of the time.)

[Agelastus]

It seems I have made a booboo. The general stop of heavy warship construction was in 1942, not 1940. Anson and Howe just slipped under the wire.

http://warships1discussionboards.yuku.com/topic/6960/t/FFO-RN-Responses-Pt-1.html

The post that links to is well worth a read, even if one is not aware of the FFO alt-history situation.

However, it is interesting to note that the plan for Vanguard was for her to be commissioned 36 months after keel laying, which does add weight to the argument that the "Magnificent", if laid down as proposed in my posts, could have been ready in early to mid 1943, rather than the 1946 of Vanguard of our time line. One must add the six months of the "warship stop" to that, but that would still leave her entering service by around January 1944 at the latest.

[grumbler]

However, it is interesting to note that the plan for Vanguard was for her to be commissioned 36 months after keel laying, which does add weight to the argument that the "Magnificent", if laid down as proposed in my posts, could have been ready in early to mid 1943, rather than the 1946 of Vanguard of our time line. One must add the six months of the "warship stop" to that, but that would still leave her entering service by around January 1944 at the latest.

I don't doubt that your numbers are logical.  What I doubt is that the RN would ever give up two battleships delivered in 1942 in favor of a single, albeit larger, battleship delivered two years later.  Offensively and defensively, two KGV's would be considerably stronger than a single Magnificent, and when you add the fact that the two battleships would provide invaluable service during two critical war years while the one BB would spend those years sitting on the stocks or fitted-out, the decision to build the two seems to me to be a slam-dunk.

[Agelastus]

Hmmm...Grumbler's effectively issued a challenge. This is going to be rough, 'cause I am writing this down partly as I think it out.

For "Magnificent" to be built I need two PODs and one assumption that I cannot find confirmed or denied on the web (which is bad alternate history, but I cannot help it.)

POD (1) Problems (probable best choice being the breakdown of two tugs) prevent the RMS Queen Elizabeth from leaving John Brown, blocking the fitting out dock required for Anson until the next suitable Spring Tide. (The internet is conspicuously absent in the critical datum of whether the tide used was the first or second suitable tide of the year.)

POD (2) Incomplete information on the Yamato is obtained by the Royal Navy in May 1940; in particular, the deception regarding the '16" special' is not rumbled (reasonable assumption given the security of this aspect of the project.)

ASSUMPTION: The fitting out of HMS Anson & Howe had not proceeded to the stage of fitting turret mountings by June 1940 (a safe assumption if building methods are akin to those described for the original Dreadnought in Massie's book.)

Key dates:

17.09.1939: Sinking of HMS Courageous

08.06.1940: Sinking of HMS Glorious

14.06.1940: Fall of Paris (at which point, even the densest observer has probably realised France is done for.)

Key Data:
Aircraft capacity (as per original design):
1937 class = 33/36 (Illustrious, Victorious, Formidable)
1938 class = 45 (Indomitable)
1939 class = 54 (Implacable, Indefatigable)
1940 class = 78 (Proposed, eventually evolved into the truncated Eagle class)

The above shows that regardless of any doctinal lag in contemporary documentation, the Royal Navy was rapidly evolving away from the model that an aircraft carrier relied on guns and armour to protect itself from aerial attack and was very eager to put aircraft to sea. Later in the war in OTL serious suggestions were made to convert Vanguard to a carrier prior to completion.

So, let's hold an emergency meeting of the DNC and the Sea Lords etc. somewhere in the week following the Fall of Paris. They will be discussing several major issues

(1) Air cover for the Royal Navy in the absence of French support, particularly in regard to the Mediterranean.

(2) The provision of modern capital ships to oppose known and expected German and Italian strength.

(3) "Yamato" and its' implications for the British battleline.

(4) "Main Fleet East" in the event of a two-front war in Europe and Japan.

With regard to (1) there is general gloom. Although HMS Illustrious has just commissioned, the remaining three vessels of this class are still some time from commissioning (November 1940, May 1941 and October 1941 in OTL.) Moreover, instead of these being pure additions to the strength, two fleet carriers have already been lost in the war, and due to the low aircraft capacity of the first three vessels of the "pure" Illustrious class, in terms of aircraft at sea the Royal Navy will not see an improvement over the pre-War situation until the Indomitable commissions in late 1941. The assembled Admirals, considering the location of Italian airbases across the Empire's Mediterranean lifeline, are not very happy with this, but there is nothing that can be done in the short term.

With regards to (2) the Royal Navy has a fairly accurate idea of Western European opposition. Germany has the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, with the Bismarck and Tirpitz under construction. Italy has four old battleships, plus the modern Littorio and Vittorio Veneto (both newly commissioned) with two more vessels under construction (neither of which is expected to be complete prior to 1942.) The British currently have five vessels under construction, with in-service dates expected to be late 1940 through to the end of 1941 (wartime delays in OTL resulted in Anson and Howe not commissioning until 1942.)

Consideration of the economic resources of Germany and Italy has been undertaken by the intelligence department of the Admiralty, and has concluded that both countries lack the steel manufacturing capacity to both continue the construction of big ships and adequately equip their armies, but this cannot be taken for granted.

[Note: this is a reasonable conclusion to reach with the benefit of hindsight. Given the evidence of what WWI did to the building programs of all continental combatants, it should be a reasonable conclusion for the period as well. The only thing is that I am not aware of any such conclusions being reached at the time in OTL!]

It is pointed out that the old Italian battleships, and even the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, are adequately covered for by the four remaining Revenge class battleships, Malaya, Barham, the two Renown class vessels and Hood, assuming appropriate deployments are made. This leaves the three modified QEs and the Nelsons to cover the more modern ships until the KGVs are commissioned. This is not seen by anyone present to be ideal, in fact, several people present consider this a case of wishful thinking. Inescapably, the conclusion is that the new British battleships are not ready when they needed to be; at this point the Mediterranean Fleet's pre-war plans for "Copenhagening" the Italian fleet is raised (it is at this meeting that "Judgement" is authorised.)

The matter of the French fleet is shelved pending political direction from the War Cabinet. It is pointed out that Richelieu would be a very valuable addition to the Royal Navy despite the logistical problems that would be involved in keeping her in service.

At this point, (3) is discussed. The Admiralty have a fairly accurate idea of the tonnage of the new ship, but cannot reconcile this with the 16" weaponry believed to be used. In the absence of an accurate look at the turret layout, and based on known Japanese preferences for turret layouts for current cruiser and preceding battleship designs (Mogami and Kaga being particularly important) the Admiralty's preliminary conclusion is that the Yamato will be a five turret vessel carrying 15 x 16" rifles. It is also known that the Japanese have two such vessels under construction. Even if the assumption that a war with Japan will be fought alongside the USA is proved correct, these behemoths cannot be ignored. Consideration is given to the various options -

( A ) Restart the first two Lions - given the lack of progress on these vessels at this point, the Admiralty sees no hope of these entering service before 1945. Moreover, four ships would be required to adequately counter the two Japanese vessels in their lordships opinion.

( B ) Put the discussed Vanguard type vessel into construction using stored 15" weaponry and construct at least one additional vessel However, while these could be ready for service in 1944 in their lordships' opinion, they share the problem of the Lions in being too few in number, and also suffer from an inferior main battery.

]Note: By my calculations the monitors and the Furious reserve set that was built in case the 18" guns were a failure should yield sufficient turrets for a second ship.]

( C ) Design and build a suitable counter to the Yamatos fitted with at least four triple 16" turrets. When the additional design time over the Lions is considered, their lordships do not see these vessels entering service before 1946.

( D ) Rely on the Americans. This option is discounted because it would mark the acceptance by the British Empire and the Royal Navy that it was no longer able to meet its' commitments. Some response must be made to the Yamatos, for the Empire's prestige if nothing else.

( E ) Some other option to be considered.

Their lordships move on to point (4) "Main Fleet East". It is pointed out that by January 1942 Japan will have six modern carriers in commission, to add to a formidable battleline of at least 10 and possibly 12 units (the Admiralty does not know when exactly the Yamatos are due for commissioning. The Royal Navy will also have six fleet carriers and an equivalent or superior number of battleships. However, assuming no major fleet losses on either side and allowing for refit cycles, the Admiralty comes to the conclusion that "Main Fleet East", at this point in time, could consist of no more than three battleships and one carrier. This is deemed by all present to be insufficient to meet both the obligations of Britain to the Dominions, and also to be insufficient to act as a deterrent to the Japanese. In conjunction with expected American deployments, the Admiralty believes that at least three carriers and an unspecified but larger number of battleships are required to adequately fulfil this strategy.

It is at this point that the DNC, aware of the delay in sending Anson to the fitting out dock, and bearing in mind the apparent success of the Japanese conversion of Kaga, suggests that the hulls of Anson and Howe could be converted to sixty plane carriers in approximately 14 months. They will carry much less armour than the carriers currently under construction, but this would be acceptable if they were for Far East and not Mediterranean service.

[Note: the above estimate is based on the 18 months the Japanese estimated they needed to do a full conversion of their old 14" battleships to full aircraft carriers with a 54 plane complement. The British don't have to strip as much down. Sir Stanley Goodall, the DNC, was emphatically not a member of the "gun club" and would have abandoned Vanguard if he had been allowed to in favour of using the materials for aircraft carriers. It does not seem to much of a stretch to have him advocate a different use for Anson and Howe's hulls if the situation arose.]

Their lordships are not totally enthused by this suggestion, as this will cut the Royal Navy's number of modern battleships by two units. It is suggested that the decision be put off until the results of Operation Judgement are known. After it is pointed out that Judgement would take months to carry out due to all the preparations and training involved, the DNC comes up with a brainwave, a plan which serves as both an (e) option to the problem of Yamato, and a compromise for the "gun club" of the Royal Navy. Take the quad turrets and armour plate already prepared for Anson and Howe and use them in a single larger ship for service in the Far East. The DNC believes that due to the materials already produced, he can have this ship ready for commissioning thirty to thirty-three months after keel laying. While one "super battleship" is an inadequate response to two units in enemy hands, it is better than nothing, and has the virtue of being available in 1943 rather than 1946.

[Note: If Vanguard was scheduled to take 36 months, an estimate which included the production of armour plate and the rebuilding of her turret assemblies, then 30/33 months for a ship where all of this has been produced already seems reasonable, and the DNC is considering round-the-clock shifts here. In fact, if I ever wrote this as a timeline, I'd have her taking 40 months to complete, plus a little design time (for the hull, the rest could be designed while being built), entering service in January 1944. As an aside, I'd also have the conversions of Anson and Howe take 20 months instead of the 14 month estimate. They'd still enter service early enough in 1942 to be of great value.]

The Admiralty accept the DNC's plans for the moment, and take a budget request to the War Cabinet. Within the next few months, the "gun club" will revisit this decision to cut a modern battleship from the Royal Navy's strength and get authorisation for two Vanguards instead of one, to be laid down in 1941. One of these, "Vanguard" herself, is completed in 1946 and misses the war. The other, "Bulwark" is launched but never completed and sold for scrap post-war.



Well, how's that? I may even take some time and think up a war record for the Anson, Howe and Magnificent...

[Neil]

What I don't get is why the sinking of the carriers would be particularily motivating in your alternate timeline, when it was not so in reality.  Moreover, your plan contradicts itself.  You state that the RN is concerned about air cover in the Med, and then assign Anson and Howe to the doldrums of the Far East.

Also, I don't understand why the construction of Yamato and Musashi would spur the British to make a single inferior battleship in the place of two.  If Bismarck and Tirpitz couldn't drive the RN into a panic, I find it hard to believe that the Japanese ships would do so.

[PDH]

Needs maps.

[grumbler]

What I don't get is why the sinking of the carriers would be particularily motivating in your alternate timeline, when it was not so in reality.  Moreover, your plan contradicts itself.  You state that the RN is concerned about air cover in the Med, and then assign Anson and Howe to the doldrums of the Far East.

Also, I don't understand why the construction of Yamato and Musashi would spur the British to make a single inferior battleship in the place of two.  If Bismarck and Tirpitz couldn't drive the RN into a panic, I find it hard to believe that the Japanese ships would do so.

I also don't understand why the Admiralty would possibly think in June 1940 that CVs were a better investment than BBs.  What was the largest ship sunk to that date by carrier aircraft?  A destroyer?  I have never heard anything about a proposal to convert Anson and Howe to carriers.  I agree with Agelastus that it is highly unlikely that these ships could be redesigned and then built in 36 months. 

It is pretty clear to me that the British response, in the event that it was decided that "some response must be made to the Yamatos, for the Empire's prestige if nothing else," would be to resume construction of the Lions, while completing the Anson and Howe as battleships in order to maintain the necessary margin of superiority over the Germans in Europe.

Aggie, as an aside, the concept of "Main Fleet East" was totally dead by 1940, so wouldn't be considered by the Admiralty as in point (4). It was a 1920s concept that didn't survive the revival of German naval power.

[Neil]

I also don't understand why the Admiralty would possibly think in June 1940 that CVs were a better investment than BBs.  What was the largest ship sunk to that date by carrier aircraft?  A destroyer?

While I agree with you, I believe that he was posulating that the Admiralty would want the carriers not as offensive weapons, but to provide the fleet with air cover, especially in the Med.

[Agelastus]

Aggie, as an aside, the concept of "Main Fleet East" was totally dead by 1940, so wouldn't be considered by the Admiralty as in point (4). It was a 1920s concept that didn't survive the revival of German naval power.

Grumbler, I have to disagree with you here.

Main Fleet East, as far as the Royal Navy, Australia, New Zealand and Churchill were concerned was official strategy right up until 1940/1.

The expansion of Singapore Naval Base was only completed in 1939, which is rather strange for a strategy that was abandoned in the 1920s (most of the work postdates 1931.) The governments of Australia and New Zealand were assured throughout the 1930s and into the war years that "Main Fleet East" continued to be policy, although the number of days relief that had to be awaited was increased (and Singapore's supply stockpile was increased from 90 days to 180 days in this period as well, although this exceeds any length of time it appears the Dominions were told they would have to hold out.)

There are records of Admiralty meetings, and meetings with Churchill from 1940/1 where they discuss potential fleet deployments by 1942 which have up to seven battleships and two carriers (IIRC) deployed to Singapore. This is, of course, both under "ideal circumstances" and pre-several wartime losses.*

The sending or Prince of Wales, Repulse and (proposed) Indomitable to the Far East was a belated (and stupid) attempt to implement a part of "Main Fleet East", exactly as the Dominions (who had committed troops to Europe on this basis) had been promised all along.

Directly from another website -

"Building for victory", makes it clear that planning for a far eastern fleet dominated thinking behind the heavy unit programme throughout 1939, with capital additions to the armour plate plants and gun pits being considered in terms of the number of far east battleships that would result in 1943 or 1944.

See (according to others):

"Main Fleet East" - Russell Grenfell, 1951**
"Struggle For The Middle Sea - The Great Navies at War in the Mediterranean Theatrer, 1940-1945" - O'Hara, V.P. (2009).
"The Sommerville Papers: Selections from the Private and Official Correspondence of Admiral of the Fleet Sir James Sommerville, G.C.B., D.S.O." - Simpson, Michael, ed.  1996.




*And I've just spent the last hour trying to find the bulleting board post where that was quoted, as it listed the source and date of the meeting. Sometimes I hate the internet...

**I must confess I was surprised by the age of this source when I looked it up

[grumbler]

Grumbler, I have to disagree with you here.

Main Fleet East, as far as the Royal Navy, Australia, New Zealand and Churchill were concerned was official strategy right up until 1940/1. 

I believe that you will find that there was no "official strategy" for the Royal Navy, Australia, New Zealand, nor Churchill.  The largest force Churchill mentions planning to send east in his History of the Second World War is seven battleships (4 of them R class, Nelson and Rodney, and Repulse) plus one carrier.  Clearly, this was not the bulk of the fleet (including no modern battleships).

Maybe you have a source that claims the British were still planning in June 1940 to send their modern fleet to Singapore, and counter the German fleet with the R class, Rodney, Nelson, and Repulse?

The expansion of Singapore Naval Base was only completed in 1939, which is rather strange for a strategy that was abandoned in the 1920s

What strategy was abandoned in the 1920s?

The governments of Australia and New Zealand were assured throughout the 1930s and into the war years that "Main Fleet East" continued to be policy, although the number of days relief that had to be awaited was increased (and Singapore's supply stockpile was increased from 90 days to 180 days in this period as well, although this exceeds any length of time it appears the Dominions were told they would have to hold out.)

Could you cite me these assurances?  I am especially interested in the specifics of the time the Dominions were told they would have to "hold out," and the corresponding british military plans for the forces that would relieve the Dominions.  I am willing to bet that, by 1936, there are no such plans, because by 1936 it was clear the main fleet would be needed in home waters to counter the German navy. 

There are records of Admiralty meetings, and meetings with Churchill from 1940/1 where they discuss potential fleet deployments by 1942 which have up to seven battleships and two carriers (IIRC) deployed to Singapore. This is, of course, both under "ideal circumstances" and pre-several wartime losses.*

This is not, obviously, "Main Fleet East."  If it had been, then of course wartiome losses would have had to have been absorbed by the auxiliary fleet back home, not the main fleet.

The sending or Prince of Wales, Repulse and (proposed) Indomitable to the Far East was a belated (and stupid) attempt to implement a part of "Main Fleet East", exactly as the Dominions (who had committed troops to Europe on this basis) had been promised all along.

No, the PoW and Repulse were sent because "Main Fleet East" had long go been given up as impossible.  Force Z was the fig leaf to cover Britain's nakedness in the east.  At no point was it planned to send the main fleet to singapore while the German navy remained intact, which was, of course, the heart of "Main Fleet East."

Directly from another website -

  C'mon, "another website" isn't a source.  Even if you found the site, though, that isn't at all saying "Main Fleet East" but rather that the Eastern Fleet would get whatever the Home Fleet didn't need - which is the exact opposite of "Main Fleet East."

[Agelastus]

What I don't get is why the sinking of the carriers would be particularily motivating in your alternate timeline, when it was not so in reality.  Moreover, your plan contradicts itself.  You state that the RN is concerned about air cover in the Med, and then assign Anson and Howe to the doldrums of the Far East.

I actually state that the Royal Navy resigns itself to not being able to do anything about the Mediterranean situation in the short term (I had to include a discussion of this as part of the meeting due to the logic of the fact that they would be discussing the whole situation.) The idea of converting Anson and Howe comes from the examination of what could be made available for the Far East as of January 1942. At that point the Royal Navy should have six carriers, giving a deployment of 2 x Home Fleet (inc. Furious, on her last legs), 1 x Western Med, 1 x Eastern Med and 1 x Far East. The sixth carrier will probably be in for a refit or other repairs. The figure of three for the Far East is based on the Americans deploying 3-5 carriers of their own in the Pacific in January 1942. The seems to be a reasonable assumption for the Royal Navy to make given the situation in 1940 and traditional American deployments.

Stanley Goodall is on record as opposing Vanguard's construction while he was DNC; he wanted to build more carriers. Since he was DNC from 1936 he's also supervised a fleet expansion plan which has provided approximately equal numbers of carriers to battleships, despite the influence of the "gun club". Given that, it's not unreasonable to assume that he might come up with such a suggestion for Anson and Howe had a meeting as I have described actually taken place. In real life, of course, no such meeting took place to the best of my knowledge. In OTL I am also unaware of any proposal to finish Anson and Howe as carriers.

Also, I don't understand why the construction of Yamato and Musashi would spur the British to make a single inferior battleship in the place of two.  If Bismarck and Tirpitz couldn't drive the RN into a panic, I find it hard to believe that the Japanese ships would do so.

The simple rationale is the equation that afflicted the Royal Navy throughout the 1930s, cost over capability (consider the "L" and "M" classes followed by the cut-price "O" class.) Once you decide that KGV is not going to cut it against the Yamato, you have to consider what you can get. Ideally, two ships carrying 12x16" would be ordered. But they would take too much time, cost too much and take too much labour and materials.

Bismarck and Tirpitz are a pair of fairly standard 15" battleships, allegedly 35000 tonnes, with no appreciable existing battleline to back them up. They have the potential to annoy, not to panic; using them as a comparison point to the potential effect of a knowledge of Yamato/Musashi's size is rather unfair to those two ships.

In the case of Yamato, I admit I've stacked the deck a little by having this TL's Royal Navy make erroneous assumptions regarding Yamato's armament (although I think I explained them quite logically.) The sheer size of the ships must also make the Royal Navy consider how much more damage they would be able to take than a smaller ship, theoretically. So you have these two ships extraordinarily tough ships leading a battleline against a Royal Navy force led by, what? King George V? Nelson? Warspite? Rather brings a shiver to my spine...

Given how little progress had been made on the Lions by June 1940, I honestly do not see them as a valid response to Yamato if the Royal Navy is to make one. Yamato and Musashi will commission in 1942, Lion would be commissioning in 1945.

Stripping Nelson and Rodney is attractive, but anyone suggesting they be taken out of service in 1940 would be shot. Besides, Nelson's 16" triples do not have a particularly good reputation even compared to the 14" quads.

For a rapid response one has to use available guns and available armour plate; the only such material available is that prepared for Anson and Howe. But I had to come up with a rationale for using Anson's and Howe's hulls for something else. Hence, "Main Fleet East", which was nowhere near as dead as Grumbler asserts.

[Agelastus]

I believe that you will find that there was no "official strategy" for the Royal Navy, Australia, New Zealand, nor Churchill.  The largest force Churchill mentions planning to send east in his History of the Second World War is seven battleships (4 of them R class, Nelson and Rodney, and Repulse) plus one carrier.  Clearly, this was not the bulk of the fleet (including no modern battleships).

Maybe you have a source that claims the British were still planning in June 1940 to send their modern fleet to Singapore, and counter the German fleet with the R class, Rodney, Nelson, and Repulse?

No, that is only roughly half of the Royal Navy's battleships after all, not a major force at all.

As for the modern fleet, the KGVs were "North Sea ships", from everything I've read, which influenced such things as the design of their bows. The ships that would form the backbone of "Main Fleet East" had the war been delayed long enough were the Lions and Vanguard, and any of their successors.

What strategy was abandoned in the 1920s?

According to your post, "Main Fleet East". Since the Singapore Graving dock in particular was expected to support the "Main Fleet East" strategy I was using this to point out that it made no strength spending £60 million on a base whose role was to support a strategy you believe was abandoned in the 1920s.

Could you cite me these assurances?  I am especially interested in the specifics of the time the Dominions were told they would have to "hold out," and the corresponding british military plans for the forces that would relieve the Dominions.  I am willing to bet that, by 1936, there are no such plans, because by 1936 it was clear the main fleet would be needed in home waters to counter the German navy.

The specifics seem to be 48-72 days.

The rest I will get back to you on; at the least I somehow need to lay my hands on a copy of "Cowman, Ian. 'Main fleet to Singapore? Churchill, the admiralty and force Z'. Journal of Strategic Studies, 17:2 (1994), 79-93. Publisher: Cass; Taylor and Francis; Routledge. ISSN 01402390. ISSN (electronic) 1743-937X." and I cannot afford to buy it at the moment.

"Ends of British imperialism: the scramble for empire, Suez and ... By William Roger Louis" on Google Books make very interesting reading, as it unequivocally states that the plan to send the fleet East was Imperial policy in 1937, and also unequivocally states that the man who changed this was Churchill - who could not possibly have done this before 1940 when he was prime-minister. And yet it was the same Churchill who demanded Force Z be sent in a belated reprise of the strategy.

There also seem to be some very interesting documents referring to the "Fleet to Singapore"/"Main Fleet East" strategy at the National Archives (http://nationalarchives.gov.uk)...as long as they are free.

No, the PoW and Repulse were sent because "Main Fleet East" had long go been given up as impossible.  Force Z was the fig leaf to cover Britain's nakedness in the east.  At no point was it planned to send the main fleet to singapore while the German navy remained intact, which was, of course, the heart of "Main Fleet East."

A fig leaf to reassure the Dominions that they had not been lied to about "Main Fleet East" for twenty years; which, of course, they hadn't been

  C'mon, "another website" isn't a source.  Even if you found the site, though, that isn't at all saying "Main Fleet East" but rather that the Eastern Fleet would get whatever the Home Fleet didn't need - which is the exact opposite of "Main Fleet East."

Listed solely for the book involved, one that I have a feeling I remember you mentioning as having in your library or as having read from a previous discussion.

[Agelastus]

There also seem to be some very interesting documents referring to the "Fleet to Singapore"/"Main Fleet East" strategy at the National Archives (http://nationalarchives.gov.uk)...as long as they are free.

Since the first of the selected documents I downloaded was 141 pages long, "I may be some time".