Which fourth-generation dreadnought do you think looks best?

[Agelastus]

Dominion or decline: Anglo-American naval relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 By Ian Cowman on Google books has a fascinating section on "Main Fleet East" planning of the 1930s.

[grumbler]

No, that is only roughly half of the Royal Navy's battleships after all, not a major force at all.

No, it is a major force (that's seven battleships, with over 14,000 priceless crewmen) but obviously not the Main Fleet.  "Main Fleet East" was the doctrine of sending the Main Fleet (the modern stuff) to the East (that's Singapore, in geographic terms).  There was only one "main fleet" and four "coffin-ships," two obsolescent ships, and a relic battlecruiser would not be it.

As for the modern fleet, the KGVs were "North Sea ships", from everything I've read, which influenced such things as the design of their bows. The ships that would form the backbone of "Main Fleet East" had the war been delayed long enough were the Lions and Vanguard, and any of their successors.

Lion and Temeraire, and any successor ships, would never have sailed for Singapore leaving 5 KGVs to face 2 Bismarcks and 2+ H class.  No way.  Vanguard, yes.  But Vanguard would not by herself have formed the main fleet of the RN.

According to your post, "Main Fleet East".

Please argue from what I said ("didn't survive the revival of German naval power") rather than strawmen of your own creation. 

Since the Singapore Graving dock in particular was expected to support the "Main Fleet East" strategy I was using this to point out that it made no strength spending £60 million on a base whose role was to support a strategy you believe was abandoned in the 1920s.

No, the Singapore docks were designed to support a secondary fleet.  Not even the much smaller force the British ended up stationing in the Far East in 1941 could be supported there; most had to base themselves out of Ceylon.

The specifics seem to be 48-72 days.

I think the specifics were 88.3-110.78 days

The rest I will get back to you on; at the least I somehow need to lay my hands on a copy of "Cowman, Ian. 'Main fleet to Singapore? Churchill, the admiralty and force Z'. Journal of Strategic Studies, 17:2 (1994), 79-93. Publisher: Cass; Taylor and Francis; Routledge. ISSN 01402390. ISSN (electronic) 1743-937X." and I cannot afford to buy it at the moment.

I doubt that this will help you much, as Churchill had nothing to do with Main Fleet East.

"Ends of British imperialism: the scramble for empire, Suez and ... By William Roger Louis" on Google Books make very interesting reading, as it unequivocally states that the plan to send the fleet East was Imperial policy in 1937, and also unequivocally states that the man who changed this was Churchill - who could not possibly have done this before 1940 when he was prime-minister. And yet it was the same Churchill who demanded Force Z be sent in a belated reprise of the strategy.[/quote] Alas, The strategic illusion: the Singapore strategy and the defence of Australia
by Ian Hamill makes the exact opposite argument (page 274):
"In April, 1931, the First Lord informed the Cabinet that 'the number of our capital ships is now so reduced that [should we] move our fleet to the east, insufficient vessels of this type would be left in Home Waters...'"

and notes that, in 1932, the language of the 1925 Main Fleet East declaration was modified to make this a "Fleet sufficient to provide 'cover' against a Japanese fleet."

and that in 1935, the standard became "a fleet in the Far East fully adequate to stand on the defensive and serve as a deterrent... while maintaining in Home Waters a force able to meet the requirements of a war with Germany."

Clearly, by 1935, Main Fleet East was dead.

A fig leaf to reassure the Dominions that they had not been lied to about "Main Fleet East" for twenty years; which, of course, they hadn't been

They hadn't been lied to about Main Fleet East for some time, as it hadn't existed for some time.  By 1937 they had been briefed on the decision to adopt a purely defensive stance in Asia until a European war was over or definitively averted.

Listed solely for the book involved, one that I have a feeling I remember you mentioning as having in your library or as having read from a previous discussion.

I have Summerville's autobiography, and Struggle for the Middle Sea, but not the other one.

[Agelastus]

No, it is a major force (that's seven battleships, with over 14,000 priceless crewmen) but obviously not the Main Fleet.  "Main Fleet East" was the doctrine of sending the Main Fleet (the modern stuff) to the East (that's Singapore, in geographic terms).  There was only one "main fleet" and four "coffin-ships," two obsolescent ships, and a relic battlecruiser would not be it.

From further reading, it is clear that this would fall under the "emergency measures" that the Royal Navy felt would have to be undertaken in the case of a war before 1942.

[As an aside, I find it very amusing that the war came three years too early for Royal Navy planners, and five years too early for Kriegsmarine navy planners! ]

Lion and Temeraire, and any successor ships, would never have sailed for Singapore leaving 5 KGVs to face 2 Bismarcks and 2+ H class.  No way.  Vanguard, yes.  But Vanguard would not by herself have formed the main fleet of the RN.

What is becoming clear from my reading is that the Royal Navy was consistently underestimating German and Japanese construction capacities (or, perhaps, intentions.) The fact is that the Lions were planned with Far East Service in mind, whereas the KGVs were not. I shall continue hunting down the appropriate references for you.

Please argue from what I said ("didn't survive the revival of German naval power") rather than strawmen of your own creation. 

Which is a total strawman on your part as Royal Navy planning for "Main Fleet East" continues right up until 1939 even in the face of a two front war. The revival of German naval power dates back to the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935. In fact, it was official Imperial policy at the Imperial conference of 1937.

See Dominion or decline: Anglo-American naval relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 By Ian Cowman

I did misremember you exact wording though, I admit.

No, the Singapore docks were designed to support a secondary fleet.  Not even the much smaller force the British ended up stationing in the Far East in 1941 could be supported there; most had to base themselves out of Ceylon.

That's a bit of a strawman of your own, Grumbler! The ships at Ceylon were the "R"s that by this stage of the war had seen such heavy service that they were considered fit only for convoy duty. In 1939 they had been considered suitable for use in the "Main Fleet East" strategy despite their low speed.

What I find truly fascinating about all this was that the Royal Navy was actually planning to fight a naval war with Japan based on Hong Kong, with Singapore as the main fleet base only if the funds and time was not available to develop Hong Kong!

See Dominion or decline: Anglo-American naval relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 By Ian Cowman

I think the specifics were 88.3-110.78 days

On a serious note, the 48-72 days was quoted on another board by an Australian poster who over the last five years that I have been lurking on the appropriate boards has been consistently well informed and when backchecked capable of providing certifiable sources. I still have to go through those cabinet papers I have downloaded to see what I can find, anyway.

The information from Cowmans book is "70 days to relieve Singapore, 90 days to relieve Hong Kong."

Alas, The strategic illusion: the Singapore strategy and the defence of Australia
by Ian Hamill makes the exact opposite argument (page 274):
"In April, 1931, the First Lord informed the Cabinet that 'the number of our capital ships is now so reduced that [should we] move our fleet to the east, insufficient vessels of this type would be left in Home Waters...'"

and notes that, in 1932, the language of the 1925 Main Fleet East declaration was modified to make this a "Fleet sufficient to provide 'cover' against a Japanese fleet."

and that in 1935, the standard became "a fleet in the Far East fully adequate to stand on the defensive and serve as a deterrent... while maintaining in Home Waters a force able to meet the requirements of a war with Germany."

Clearly, by 1935, Main Fleet East was dead.

"Cover" is a term of dubious semantics - if to "cover" nine (officially) Japanese battleships in 1932 with one uses eight of your own, that's still half your fleet. And as for the 1935 declaration, since "Main Fleet East" was still official Imperial policy in 1937, and the Royal Navy was still planning offensive operations in 1939 as part of this strategy, I suspect that this quote from 1935 does not mean exactly what you believe it to.

One obvious point is that the term "deterrent" has very little meaning once the shooting has started. One attempts to deter your enemy to avoid a war. If I remember my reading correctly, 1935 is one point where Australia was pushing particularly hard for a permanent Far East capital ship presence.

The interesting thing is that the Royal Navy's construction plans based on their assessment of enemy capabilities shows clearly that they were building a fleet to fight a two front war.

Shame, as one of the authors I have read today points out, that they completely ignored Italy!

They hadn't been lied to about Main Fleet East for some time, as it hadn't existed for some time.  By 1937 they had been briefed on the decision to adopt a purely defensive stance in Asia until a European war was over or definitively averted.

Since we are both producing books that support our respective contentions regarding the Main Fleet East policy, I suspect we are never going to agree. However, I will try and trawl through those Cabinet papers by tomorrow afternoon.

[PDH]

Can't we all just agree to mock Tim?

[Agelastus]

Can't we all just agree to mock Tim?

I've been posting about "Magnificent" for so long that I've forgotten if Tim did anything worrh mocking in this thread.

[PDH]

Can't we all just agree to mock Tim?

I've been posting about "Magnificent" for so long that I've forgotten if Tim did anything worrh mocking in this thread.

Oh, any thread can start Old Groany and you singing Kumbaya around the campfire.

[Agelastus]

God, that brought back memories! I haven't sung "Kumbaya" since I was six years old in infants school.

[Neil]

Ultimately, I think it comes down to a matter of priority.  Should Britain build against a potential threat in Japan, or two immediate threats in Germany and Italy?

[Berkut]

Did Britain's plans in all this include the US, or were they based on the assumption that they would be taking on all comers alone?

[Agelastus]

Ultimately, I think it comes down to a matter of priority.  Should Britain build against a potential threat in Japan, or two immediate threats in Germany and Italy?

I have to quibble here as it seems pretty clear from all I know of the design process for Vanguard that she was built primarily with Japan in mind, and she was authorised before war broke out with Japan. So in OTL Britain was building with reference to a potential threat as well as the immediate threats of Germany and Italy, so there is no reason she would not do the same in an alternate timeline.

[Agelastus]

Did Britain's plans in all this include the US, or were they based on the assumption that they would be taking on all comers alone?

British planning from at least 1937 (and probably earlier) considered it to be extremely likely that any war with Japan would also involve the United States, due to the strategic interests of the Americans in the Phillippines and China.

The only problem was, even with extensive contacts between the naval forces in the Far East, and staff talks at various levels, the British could not be 100% sure of this until December 7th 1941.

Prior to 1940 this uncertainty meant that the Main Fleet East concept had to be retained (although Grumbler would disagree.) After the outbreak of the Mediterranean campaign against Italy and the fall of France, this still meant Britain had to consider the possibility that she would have to hold Malay barrier on her own until such time as sufficient forces could be diverted from Europe.

Let me rephrase that - in the forlorn hope that adequate forces could be diverted from Europe absent American intervention.

The fall of France blew a lot of plans out of the water, including Main Fleet East.

[Warspite]

The first half of the war didnt go too well for us, did it?

[Agelastus]

The first half of the war didnt go too well for us, did it?

No. 

Actually, that's probably why this period of history attracts so many British Alt. Historians on the various fora.

For example, I would not lose Courageous and Glorious to the utter stupidities that claimed them...

[grumbler]

From further reading, it is clear that this would fall under the "emergency measures" that the Royal Navy felt would have to be undertaken in the case of a war before 1942.

You have lost me.  What is "this?"  What document says what the RN considered "emergency measures," and what is the magic about the year 1942?  And when was that magic year cited?

[As an aside, I find it very amusing that the war came three years too early for Royal Navy planners, and five years too early for Kriegsmarine navy planners! ]

Planners never get it right.  It is an occupational hazard.  I have been there, and the USn of today is not anything like the "USN of the future" I postulated for 2009 in 1989.

What is becoming clear from my reading is that the Royal Navy was consistently underestimating German and Japanese construction capacities (or, perhaps, intentions.) The fact is that the Lions were planned with Far East Service in mind, whereas the KGVs were not. I shall continue hunting down the appropriate references for you.

I think maybe your Alt-Hist web site has made you think too linearly.  The RN didn't plan so rigidly as "these ships were never going east, these ships always were."  The Lions, for instance, were not strictly a response to japanese developments, nor the KGVs to German.

Which is a total strawman on your part as Royal Navy planning for "Main Fleet East" continues right up until 1939 even in the face of a two front war. The revival of German naval power dates back to the Anglo-German naval agreement of 1935. In fact, it was official Imperial policy at the Imperial conference of 1937.

Inncorrect on both accounts, as my cite demonstrated.  It was not official policy at the 1937 conference.  A defensive fleet was.

See Dominion or decline: Anglo-American naval relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 By Ian Cowman

Page number? Quote?  You just cannot throw a reference out there and expect me to accept your interpretation of it, especially in the face of a contradictory cite and quote.

That's a bit of a strawman of your own, Grumbler! The ships at Ceylon were the "R"s that by this stage of the war had seen such heavy service that they were considered fit only for convoy duty. In 1939 they had been considered suitable for use in the "Main Fleet East" strategy despite their low speed.

But you are arguing that they were part of a "Main Fleet East" strategy, and I am arguing (using this same evaluation of them) to argue the contrary! 

Make up your mind:  if "Main Fleet East" meant the deployment of the R class as the main British fleet in the world, then you have a shred of evidence.  If they were the dregs deployed to the east because they were needed nowhere else, then I have a shred of evidence that Main Fleet East was not even attempted.

BTW, learn what a strawman is.  It is annoying to see you employ it, get called on it, and then accuse others of it repeatedly when it isn't employed.

What I find truly fascinating about all this was that the Royal Navy was actually planning to fight a naval war with Japan based on Hong Kong, with Singapore as the main fleet base only if the funds and time was not available to develop Hong Kong!

All of my sources indicate that the British in the 1920s abandoned the idea of holding Hong Kong except as an advanced outpost that had to be taken before Singapore could be attacked, so i would need a cite on this.

See Dominion or decline: Anglo-American naval relations on the Pacific, 1937-1941 By Ian Cowman

Page number?  Quote?

On a serious note, the 48-72 days was quoted on another board by an Australian poster who over the last five years that I have been lurking on the appropriate boards has been consistently well informed and when backchecked capable of providing certifiable sources. I still have to go through those cabinet papers I have downloaded to see what I can find, anyway.

Sorry, but some anonymous Australian poster isn't authoritative.

The information from Cowmans book is "70 days to relieve Singapore, 90 days to relieve Hong Kong."

Page number?  Quote?  This seems wildly improbable for the post-1935 RN planning of which I have read.

"Cover" is a term of dubious semantics - if to "cover" nine (officially) Japanese battleships in 1932 with one uses eight of your own, that's still half your fleet. And as for the 1935 declaration, since "Main Fleet East" was still official Imperial policy in 1937, and the Royal Navy was still planning offensive operations in 1939 as part of this strategy, I suspect that this quote from 1935 does not mean exactly what you believe it to.

"Main Fleet East" had been explicitly abandoned by the 1937 Imperial Defense Conference.  Every source I have (including the ones cited and quoted) agree on that.  What made the Anzacs nervous in 1937 was precisely that Britain had abandoned the concept of sending the main fleet east, and was instead talking about defense and deterrence.  That is what led the Anzacs to seek American guaratees rather than British ones.

I cannot access Cwoman's book online, but I can access the Table of contents at https://bookweb.kinokuniya.co.jp/htmy/1859731112.html, and that seems to support my contention of the radical change after the 1937 conference, rather than your status quo one (my bold)

Part II:  The Anglo-American Naval Scene           115(165)
1937-1941
  3  A `Special Relationship': Naval Relations     115(50)
  1937-1939
    Background                                     115(4)
    The Air Routes and the Naval Base Question     119(9)
    The 1938 Ingersoll Meetings                    128(11)
    British Defence Conundrums in 1939             139(6)
    The 1939 Hampton Meetings                      145(8)
    Conclusions                                    153(12)
  4  Britain Cedes the Initiative: The Road to     165(42)
  ABC-1
    Outbreak of the War in Europe                  165(2)
    Far Eastern Strategy Transformed               167(3)
    The Prospects for Anglo-American Staff Talks   170(1)
    American Foreign Policy and the Far East       171(5)
    The American Mission to London                 176(1)
    American War Planning and the Far East         177(5)
    The Plan Dog Memorandum                        182(3)
    Misreading the Signals                         185(7)
    Heavy Weather at ABC-1                         192(4)

One obvious point is that the term "deterrent" has very little meaning once the shooting has started. One attempts to deter your enemy to avoid a war. If I remember my reading correctly, 1935 is one point where Australia was pushing particularly hard for a permanent Far East capital ship presence.

In fact, in 1937, Australia had pushed for the transfer of a British capital ship to RAn manning.  If they still believed in "Main Fleet East" as you assert, they would not have done this. 

The interesting thing is that the Royal Navy's construction plans based on their assessment of enemy capabilities shows clearly that they were building a fleet to fight a two front war.

That is one interpretation, but it is also clear that, by 1935 (and certainly no later than 1937) they were committed to "Main Fleet Home" and thus "Main Fleet East" was not discussesd in 1940  - which is my sole point.

Shame, as one of the authors I have read today points out, that they completely ignored Italy!

Not ignored, but rather assumed away on the basis that france would neutralize Italy.  See Churchill's History of the Second World War (which I consulted at work today, so it is there and so I cannot give you a page number, but which talks about this). It was not an unreasonable concept - the Italians believed it themselves!

Since we are both producing books that support our respective contentions regarding the Main Fleet East policy, I suspect we are never going to agree. However, I will try and trawl through those Cabinet papers by tomorrow afternoon.

Okay.  I would be delighted to be proved wrong.  That would mean more data for the grist mill.

[Agelastus]

Grumbler, you are a nightmare for quoting! It's 3 AM in the morning where I am and you give me this complex a post! 

You have lost me.  What is "this?"  What document says what the RN considered "emergency measures," and what is the magic about the year 1942?  And when was that magic year cited?

It's in Cowman, p. 38, although I admit he uses "stopgap" rather than "emergency" measures. Unfortunately the notes for this page are on a page not visible on Google!

I think maybe your Alt-Hist web site has made you think too linearly.  The RN didn't plan so rigidly as "these ships were never going east, these ships always were."  The Lions, for instance, were not strictly a response to japanese developments, nor the KGVs to German.

I do realise it is not as rigid as this, and if necessary they could indeed have gone east, but the fact is the KGVs were designed more for North Sea than Pacific conditions (the need for the forward quad turret to be able to fire over the bow, for example, that resulted in impaired seakeeping.) The Lions, and the Vanguard, were designed to be more suitable for non-North Sea situations. In the end, the Royal Navy did not have the choice of what to deploy where as the Lions were never built and Vanguard was too late.

The reason for this was because the KGVs were to replace the Rs, which (despite the fact that in 1939 they were considered as suitable for eastern deployment, Cowan again) were last on the list for assignment to South East Asia. Thus the optimisation for North Sea/short range conditions. The design is pre-radar, which explains the aircraft facilities and the decision in regard to the bow design.

Incorrect on both accounts, as my cite demonstrated.  It was not official policy at the 1937 conference.  A defensive fleet was..

See Cowan p.31. The 70 day and 90 day figures date to March 1937, In April 1937 agreement was reached for joint Anglo-Chinese development on Hainan to allow it to act as a forward anchorage for the relief of Hong Kong. The exact site is at Gaalong bay. This is a long way from a defensive strategy.

See Cowan p.37 for the confirmation of Main Fleet East at the 1937 Imperial conference.

As for your source's interpretation of the "defensive fleet" see pages 315-317 of "Ends of British Imperialism, the scramble for Empire, Suez and decolonisation byWm. Roger Louis". This account of Hoare's words (sentiments apparently shared with Chatfield and Hankey) do not square with your source's view.

Incidentally, the source for the "48-72" days appears to originate, or be repeated, on p. 315 of this work.

But you are arguing that they were part of a "Main Fleet East" strategy, and I am arguing (using this same evaluation of them) to argue the contrary! 

Actually, there is a world of difference between the elderly but well maintained Rs of 1939 and the hard driven units of 1941. They had spent most of the previous two years on assignment in Home Waters, and had suffered from reduced maintenance cycles accordingly. It is listed in several works that ships assigned to the Mediterranean Fleet were kept in better order than Home Fleet units because of their access to the floating dock at Alexandria, whereas Home Fleet units had to compete with urgent repair work for merchants and escorts, which often got shoved ahead of routine maintenance.

Use of the Rs as part of the Main Fleet East is specifically discussed on p31-32 of Cowan.

All of my sources indicate that the British in the 1920s abandoned the idea of holding Hong Kong except as an advanced outpost that had to be taken before Singapore could be attacked, so i would need a cite on this.

Much of Cowan's first section specifically discusses the use of Hong Kong. In particular see p.17-18 for the original Admiralty rationale, but there is a wealth of supporting evidence on later pages.

Sorry, but some anonymous Australian poster isn't authoritative.

I think you might not think this if you frequented those boards, but the point is moot as I have listed an alternative source for the figure above.

Page number?  Quote?  This seems wildly improbable for the post-1935 RN planning of which I have read.

Cowan, p.31, listed above. I've seen the figure as 90 days increased to 180 days in other works, these figures being specific to Singapore. I suspect this latter figure may be from 1940 planning, but I haven't come across it in my current research for this discussion.

"Main Fleet East" had been explicitly abandoned by the 1937 Imperial Defense Conference.  Every source I have (including the ones cited and quoted) agree on that.  What made the Anzacs nervous in 1937 was precisely that Britain had abandoned the concept of sending the main fleet east, and was instead talking about defense and deterrence.  That is what led the Anzacs to seek American guarantees rather than British ones.

See Cowan p.38-39 for Australia's response to the 1937 Imperial conference vis-a-vis Britain.

Could you direct me to the source for Australian-American contacts pre-1942 (when I know such guarantees were sought?) Louis p.320 lists the British as making contacts regarding mutual defence in the Far East.

He also on p.318-19 gives some interesting information of the CID's deliberations in June and July which are completely contrary to the minimal fleet approach your source states.

   4  Britain Cedes the Initiative: The Road to     165(42)
  ABC-1
    Outbreak of the War in Europe                  165(2)
    Far Eastern Strategy Transformed               167(3)
    The Prospects for Anglo-American Staff Talks   170(1)
    American Foreign Policy and the Far East       171(5)
    The American Mission to London                 176(1)
    American War Planning and the Far East         177(5)
    The Plan Dog Memorandum                        182(3)
    Misreading the Signals                         185(7)
    Heavy Weather at ABC-1                         192(4)

Actually, this supports me - if you look at the first section in the "road to ABC1" you'll note it discusses the outbreak of the war in Europe. Chronologically, therefore, this section is no earlier than September 1939.

In fact, this section is mainly concerned with the post 1940 Fall of France situation, when American support would have been needed to get "Main Fleet East" to work. Of course, we both know how successful that was, with the Americans at Pearl and the British at Singapore!

In fact, in 1937, Australia had pushed for the transfer of a British capital ship to RAn manning.  If they still believed in "Main Fleet East" as you assert, they would not have done this.

Actually, this still relates to "Main Fleet East". See Cowan p.38-39; it was supposed to augment "Main Fleet East" and was a result of the attempts at the 1937 conference to involve the Dominions more in Imperial defence. The original suggestion was the construction of, not the transfer of, a capital ship.

That is one interpretation, but it is also clear that, by 1935 (and certainly no later than 1937) they were committed to "Main Fleet Home" and thus "Main Fleet East" was not discussesd in 1940  - which is my sole point.

And effectively, my sole point is that this is incorrect, with supporting authors supplied. God, I'm tired (it is now 3.56am...) This is getting circular. I don't understand why you cannot get access to the relevant section of Cowan - is it due to copyright issues with Google books?

Not ignored, but rather assumed away on the basis that france would neutralize Italy.  See Churchill's History of the Second World War (which I consulted at work today, so it is there and so I cannot give you a page number, but which talks about this). It was not an unreasonable concept - the Italians believed it themselves!

True, and I was being a bit unfair to the Royal Navy there. One of the sources I have read today stated that the two navies only began talks on wartime co-operation in 1938 (can't remember which one) and it probably got me a little riled. I know the British and the French were supposed to be Allies, but relying on something (the French neutralising the Italians) without actually discussing it seemed a bit reckless!

And now, at 3.59am I bid you goodnight...:collapses: