UK carrier policy: dumb or dumberer

[grumbler]

With the increased precision strike capability, was here any substantive degradation in the Super Tomcat's dog fighting capaabilities, or its ability to continue serving in a long range supersonic fleet interceptor platform?

No, the Strike Tomcat was as good as the base Tomcat in the air superiority role.

One pilot is cheaper to train and maintain than a pilot and a crewman.

Without a doubt.  The delta in operating costs was dwarfed by the delta in development costs, though.

I would've liked to have seen that.

The A-6F was the first platform eliminated, despite its superior strike range.  The problem it had was utilizing that range in a world where, if the F-14 wasn't retained as a strike fighter, there was no aircraft that could escort the A-6F to the ranges where its superior load was an advantage.

The Strike Tomcat was essentially equal to the A-6F at ranges of 700 miles and less. Given the target packages selected by the Navy as mission-representative, that was good enough.

[MadBurgerMaker]

The F-18 E/F was selected, I think, because it was a single-seat aircraft and the airdale admirals had long wanted to get rid of the backseat guys.  It had nothing to do with spare parts (which would be available for either aircraft).

The airdale admirals didn't seem to want to get rid of the NFOs all that much, since the F/A-18F is actually a two seater and it isn't just used as a trainer.   A whole bunch of those F-14 squadrons went to the F.

Excessively easy example (VFA-103):

[Neil]

Do you think it might have been wise to consider the possible advantages of dreadnought battleship construction?  All that firepower on target...

[Kolytsin]

The F-18 E/F was selected, I think, because it was a single-seat aircraft and the airdale admirals had long wanted to get rid of the backseat guys. 

If that is your core argument, you might want to re-look at the seating specifications of the F-18-F.  As MBM pointed out, most F-14 squadrons converted to the two-seater F-18-F.  I do not believe that there was any reduction at all in the NFO community related to this decision.

While only the admirals who made the decision know for certain, my opinion remains that the F-14D was scrapped due to 1. Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber, 2.  Increased obsolescence of its aviation electronics relative to the FLIR and AMRAAM capabilities of the F-18, and 3. High maintenance and labor costs relative to the F-18.  According to the Navy, at least, the F-18 takes 75% less labor time per flight hour and costs 40% less per flight hour relative to the F-14. 

Most arguments essentially boil down to that the Hornet and SH can not carry A-6 payloads A-6 distances. They also lack the range and super-long-range BVR capability of the F-14 which thus, so far as the Tomcat crowd is concerned, automatically makes the Hornet and Superhornet inferior.  But why? Are these factors really that important?  I would say not.  The Navy has shifted its stated emphasis to combat and strike in the littoral regions where the threat becomes several small attack aircraft armed with Exocet missiles.   This theater plays up to the capabilities of the Superhornet vice the Tomcat.  The days of massive Soviet bomber fleets armed with Anti-ship missiles with a 500 mile range are over.

While adding a few modifications may have made the F-14's paper capabilities better than that of the Superhornet, you are still left with the F-14's hydraulic control system, 1970's supply chain, and 1970's radar systems.  Considering the delays of the F-35 program, I feel the navy made the right decision to use an upgraded F-18 as a bridging fighter until the F-35 comes online while still maintaining the technical edge of the force.


With regards to the Skybolt side-comment.  The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program.  While hindsight makes it easy to lambast the Air-launched Ballistic Missile program, these facts were not known yet in the 1960's.  It was mismanagement of the political side of the program that created such a controversy.  The British were not informed of the significant difficulties of the program and it was cut without informing the British.  When McNamara went to London to inform the British and offer Poseidon missiles as a trade, he tied the Poseidon missile offer to NATO, unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent.  Hence the flare-up in Anglo-American relations.  While it was the correct decision to cancel the Skybolt program, the Kennedy administration should have had far more communication with the British on the issue.


Edit:  Also confused on your statistics.  An F-18 E/F (including program costs) costs about $90 Million in 2012 dollars ($65 Million flyaway).  An original F-14B would cost (just flyaway costs) $45 million in 2012 dollars.  Add about 10 million for upgrades and I would expect the total flyaway cost to be around 55 million each for an upgraded version.  The total procurement costs to date of the F-18 E/F program have been $40 billion.  Not sure where these $80 billion and $20 billion statistics are coming from. . . .

[CountDeMoney]

The A-6F was the first platform eliminated, despite its superior strike range.  The problem it had was utilizing that range in a world where, if the F-14 wasn't retained as a strike fighter, there was no aircraft that could escort the A-6F to the ranges where its superior load was an advantage.

I want the Navy to go back to 1986. 

[mongers]

The F-18 E/F was selected, I think, because it was a single-seat aircraft and the airdale admirals had long wanted to get rid of the backseat guys. 

If that is your core argument, you might want to re-look at the seating specifications of the F-18-F.  As MBM pointed out, most F-14 squadrons converted to the two-seater F-18-F.  I do not believe that there was any reduction at all in the NFO community related to this decision.

While only the admirals who made the decision know for certain, my opinion remains that the F-14D was scrapped due to 1. Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber, 2.  Increased obsolescence of its aviation electronics relative to the FLIR and AMRAAM capabilities of the F-18, and 3. High maintenance and labor costs relative to the F-18.  According to the Navy, at least, the F-18 takes 75% less labor time per flight hour and costs 40% less per flight hour relative to the F-14. 

Most arguments essentially boil down to that the Hornet and SH can not carry A-6 payloads A-6 distances. They also lack the range and super-long-range BVR capability of the F-14 which thus, so far as the Tomcat crowd is concerned, automatically makes the Hornet and Superhornet inferior.  But why? Are these factors really that important?  I would say not.  The Navy has shifted its stated emphasis to combat and strike in the littoral regions where the threat becomes several small attack aircraft armed with Exocet missiles.   This theater plays up to the capabilities of the Superhornet vice the Tomcat.  The days of massive Soviet bomber fleets armed with Anti-ship missiles with a 500 mile range are over.

While adding a few modifications may have made the F-14's paper capabilities better than that of the Superhornet, you are still left with the F-14's hydraulic control system, 1970's supply chain, and 1970's radar systems.  Considering the delays of the F-35 program, I feel the navy made the right decision to use an upgraded F-18 as a bridging fighter until the F-35 comes online while still maintaining the technical edge of the force.


With regards to the Skybolt side-comment.  The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program.  While hindsight makes it easy to lambast the Air-launched Ballistic Missile program, these facts were not known yet in the 1960's.  It was mismanagement of the political side of the program that created such a controversy.  The British were not informed of the significant difficulties of the program and it was cut without informing the British.  When McNamara went to London to inform the British and offer Poseidon missiles as a trade, he tied the Poseidon missile offer to NATO, unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent.  Hence the flare-up in Anglo-American relations.  While it was the correct decision to cancel the Skybolt program, the Kennedy administration should have had far more communication with the British on the issue.


Edit:  Also confused on your statistics.  An F-18 E/F (including program costs) costs about $90 Million in 2012 dollars ($65 Million flyaway).  An original F-14B would cost (just flyaway costs) $45 million in 2012 dollars.  Add about 10 million for upgrades and I would expect the total flyaway cost to be around 55 million each for an upgraded version.  The total procurement costs to date of the F-18 E/F program have been $40 billion.  Not sure where these $80 billion and $20 billion statistics are coming from. . . .

Topcat ?

[The Brain]

The F-18 E/F was selected, I think, because it was a single-seat aircraft and the airdale admirals had long wanted to get rid of the backseat guys. 

If that is your core argument, you might want to re-look at the seating specifications of the F-18-F.  As MBM pointed out, most F-14 squadrons converted to the two-seater F-18-F.  I do not believe that there was any reduction at all in the NFO community related to this decision.

While only the admirals who made the decision know for certain, my opinion remains that the F-14D was scrapped due to 1. Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber, 2.  Increased obsolescence of its aviation electronics relative to the FLIR and AMRAAM capabilities of the F-18, and 3. High maintenance and labor costs relative to the F-18.  According to the Navy, at least, the F-18 takes 75% less labor time per flight hour and costs 40% less per flight hour relative to the F-14. 

Most arguments essentially boil down to that the Hornet and SH can not carry A-6 payloads A-6 distances. They also lack the range and super-long-range BVR capability of the F-14 which thus, so far as the Tomcat crowd is concerned, automatically makes the Hornet and Superhornet inferior.  But why? Are these factors really that important?  I would say not.  The Navy has shifted its stated emphasis to combat and strike in the littoral regions where the threat becomes several small attack aircraft armed with Exocet missiles.   This theater plays up to the capabilities of the Superhornet vice the Tomcat.  The days of massive Soviet bomber fleets armed with Anti-ship missiles with a 500 mile range are over.

While adding a few modifications may have made the F-14's paper capabilities better than that of the Superhornet, you are still left with the F-14's hydraulic control system, 1970's supply chain, and 1970's radar systems.  Considering the delays of the F-35 program, I feel the navy made the right decision to use an upgraded F-18 as a bridging fighter until the F-35 comes online while still maintaining the technical edge of the force.


With regards to the Skybolt side-comment.  The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program.  While hindsight makes it easy to lambast the Air-launched Ballistic Missile program, these facts were not known yet in the 1960's.  It was mismanagement of the political side of the program that created such a controversy.  The British were not informed of the significant difficulties of the program and it was cut without informing the British.  When McNamara went to London to inform the British and offer Poseidon missiles as a trade, he tied the Poseidon missile offer to NATO, unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent.  Hence the flare-up in Anglo-American relations.  While it was the correct decision to cancel the Skybolt program, the Kennedy administration should have had far more communication with the British on the issue.


Edit:  Also confused on your statistics.  An F-18 E/F (including program costs) costs about $90 Million in 2012 dollars ($65 Million flyaway).  An original F-14B would cost (just flyaway costs) $45 million in 2012 dollars.  Add about 10 million for upgrades and I would expect the total flyaway cost to be around 55 million each for an upgraded version.  The total procurement costs to date of the F-18 E/F program have been $40 billion.  Not sure where these $80 billion and $20 billion statistics are coming from. . . .

Topcat ?

Tommmmm.

[Tonitrus]

Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber,

Which hasn't disappeared.  Though we may not care anyway. 

[dps]

The A-6F was the first platform eliminated, despite its superior strike range.  The problem it had was utilizing that range in a world where, if the F-14 wasn't retained as a strike fighter, there was no aircraft that could escort the A-6F to the ranges where its superior load was an advantage.

I want the Navy to go back to 1986. 

Let's go back farther and bring back A-1 Skyraiders. 

[grumbler]

If that is your core argument, you might want to re-look at the seating specifications of the F-18-F.

It's not a "core argument," it is an observation.  At the time of the study (and the decision), there were only going to be 8 F models per carrier (2 per squadron), to serve as strike leads.  Those planes would have two pilots each and no NFOs.

While only the admirals who made the decision know for certain, my opinion remains that the F-14D was scrapped due to 1. Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber, 2.  Increased obsolescence of its aviation electronics relative to the FLIR and AMRAAM capabilities of the F-18, and 3. High maintenance and labor costs relative to the F-18.  According to the Navy, at least, the F-18 takes 75% less labor time per flight hour and costs 40% less per flight hour relative to the F-14.

The F-14D and the F-14E (which was, as noted, just new-production F-14D with some added software) was as fully-capable in terms of avionics as the F-18 E and F. It cannot be compared to the F-14A, which, as you note, was a maintenance hog, particularly compared to the much simpler and less capable contemporary F-18 A and B.

Most arguments essentially boil down to that the Hornet and SH can not carry A-6 payloads A-6 distances. They also lack the range and super-long-range BVR capability of the F-14 which thus, so far as the Tomcat crowd is concerned, automatically makes the Hornet and Superhornet inferior.  But why? Are these factors really that important?  I would say not.  The Navy has shifted its stated emphasis to combat and strike in the littoral regions where the threat becomes several small attack aircraft armed with Exocet missiles.   This theater plays up to the capabilities of the Superhornet vice the Tomcat.  The days of massive Soviet bomber fleets armed with Anti-ship missiles with a 500 mile range are over.

This is Cold War type thinking.  No one, when the study was done, was thinking in terms of Backfire bombers and As-4s.  The entire study was built around littoral operations.  And, in littoral operations, the F-14E outperformed the F-18 E and F significantly.  The difference between being able to strike targets 700iles away and being able to strike targets 350 miles away is significant, not only in terms of being able to reach further inland, but also in terms of being able to strike from further out, and thus increasing force security.

While adding a few modifications may have made the F-14's paper capabilities better than that of the Superhornet, you are still left with the F-14's hydraulic control system, 1970's supply chain, and 1970's radar systems.

I don't think anyone considered retaining F-14As (which had the hydraulic systems and older radar, as well as some significant shortcomings you don't mention, like massive fuel consumption upon launch).  The choice my group examined was between new-build F-14Es and new-build F-18Es.  I have no idea what a "1970s supply chain" is, or why you think it relevant to the late 1990s, when the aircraft we examined would have been put into service. 

Considering the delays of the F-35 program, I feel the navy made the right decision to use an upgraded F-18 as a bridging fighter until the F-35 comes online while still maintaining the technical edge of the force.

I think the reverse is true; the delays in the F-35 make the decision to opt for the Super Hornet even more obviously a mistake.

With regards to the Skybolt side-comment.  The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program.  While hindsight makes it easy to lambast the Air-launched Ballistic Missile program, these facts were not known yet in the 1960's.  It was mismanagement of the political side of the program that created such a controversy.  The British were not informed of the significant difficulties of the program and it was cut without informing the British.  When McNamara went to London to inform the British and offer Poseidon missiles as a trade, he tied the Poseidon missile offer to NATO, unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent.  Hence the flare-up in Anglo-American relations.  While it was the correct decision to cancel the Skybolt program, the Kennedy administration should have had far more communication with the British on the issue.

The British knew perfectly well what was happening with the Skybolt development program, and were aware of the US considerations for dropping the program.  And, of course, they were aware that it had been cut.  To believe otherwise is to believe that the British didn't even read the newspapers! 

The problem was caused by the fact that the British had decided to stake their entire deterrent program on the Skybolt, which was the sort of penny-wise and pound-foolish thing we are seeing with their carriers today (though entirely in keeping with both British and US defense procurement "strategies").  When Skybolt was cancelled, for good and sufficient reasons, they were stuck.  The claim that Macnamara was "unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent" is laughable; of course he knew what stock they placed in an independent deterrent; he just wanted to scotch the independence of that deterrent because he (and Kennedy) didn't want the Soviets to be tempted into an attack only on the British deterrent, as part of some independent British venture (something like the Suez fiasco) taken under the umbrella of that deterrent.  Of course, the very arguments Macnamara was using were undermined by the fact that Polaris wouldn't be subject to such a Soviet attack, and so, in the end, the british got Polaris and the independent deterrent, in what was a real steal price-wise.  There is no question that Polaris, though obviously more expensive than the el cheapo Skybolt route, was a much more credible deterrent, and that the Brits would have had to buy into Polaris or Poseidon at some point anyway, but without the leverage to get the deal they actually got.

Edit:  Also confused on your statistics.  An F-18 E/F (including program costs) costs about $90 Million in 2012 dollars ($65 Million flyaway).  An original F-14B would cost (just flyaway costs) $45 million in 2012 dollars.  Add about 10 million for upgrades and I would expect the total flyaway cost to be around 55 million each for an upgraded version.  The total procurement costs to date of the F-18 E/F program have been $40 billion.  Not sure where these $80 billion and $20 billion statistics are coming from. . . .

There were no development costs for the F-14E.  There were significant development costs for the F-18 E/F.  Remember, we are talking about decisions being made in 1991.  The E/F was just a concept (Hornet 2000) at that point.

[Sheilbh]

FORCE DE FRAPPE!

[Neil]

Wouldn't it have made more sense to use nuclear 15-inch shells, fired from the Vanguard?

[dps]

Wouldn't it have made more sense to use nuclear 15-inch shells, fired from the Vanguard?

I don't think the Vanguard was available in 1991.

[Neil]

Wouldn't it have made more sense to use nuclear 15-inch shells, fired from the Vanguard?

I don't think the Vanguard was available in 1991.

I'm talking about Skybolt.  The air thing isn't really an issue.  The F-14 was obviously superior because it was in Top Gun and Macross and it had range and armament and Grumman is the premiere maker of naval aircraft.

[Kolytsin]

It's not a "core argument," it is an observation.  At the time of the study (and the decision), there were only going to be 8 F models per carrier (2 per squadron), to serve as strike leads.  Those planes would have two pilots each and no NFOs.

Perhaps.  I do not know exactly what they had planned with respect for wing make-up at that time.

The F-14D and the F-14E (which was, as noted, just new-production F-14D with some added software) was as fully-capable in terms of avionics as the F-18 E and F. It cannot be compared to the F-14A, which, as you note, was a maintenance hog, particularly compared to the much simpler and less capable contemporary F-18 A and B.

Not true.  The proposed upgrades for the F-14 were incompatible with many of the precision-guided munitions that were being developed for the day.  To completely upgrade the F-14 would have cost substantially more money.  Please reference the GAO report at http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao9512.htm or the 1992 Congressional Cost of Operational Effectiveness Analysis report at www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/920630-cr.htm

This is Cold War type thinking.  No one, when the study was done, was thinking in terms of Backfire bombers and As-4s.  The entire study was built around littoral operations.  And, in littoral operations, the F-14E outperformed the F-18 E and F significantly.  The difference between being able to strike targets 700iles away and being able to strike targets 350 miles away is significant, not only in terms of being able to reach further inland, but also in terms of being able to strike from further out, and thus increasing force security.

Congressional reports at the time mark only marginal improvement over the capabilities of the F-18.  It was likely more capable individually, but more F-18's could be carried by a carrier than F-14's.  Any strike capability over 700 miles could be dealt with either by tomahawks or by the United States Air Force.  From the 1994 GAO report:

Upgraded F-14s generally have greater range than the F/A-18C and could possibly reach targets beyond the Hornet's range.  However, this capability may not be needed with the Navy's shift to a littoral warfare strategy.  In the Navy's revised strategy, "From The Sea," dated September 1992, it announced a need to concentrate on capabilities required to operate near the world's coastlines.  The Navy recognized that this direction represented a fundamental shift away from open-ocean war fighting and toward joint service operations conducted from the sea.  In defining this change of emphasis, the Secretary of the Navy said 85 percent of the Navy's potential targets are within 200 miles of the coast.  This is within the F/A-18C's range.  If greater range is needed, the Navy's Tomahawk cruise missile can attack targets up to a range of about 700 miles, and Air Force bombers have even greater range.  Both supplement and complement carrier aviation in striking deep within enemy territory.

I don't think anyone considered retaining F-14As (which had the hydraulic systems and older radar, as well as some significant shortcomings you don't mention, like massive fuel consumption upon launch).  The choice my group examined was between new-build F-14Es and new-build F-18Es.  I have no idea what a "1970s supply chain" is, or why you think it relevant to the late 1990s, when the aircraft we examined would have been put into service. 

F-14 upgrades considered at the time were directed towards avionics and armaments capabilities.  No upgrades were considered toward basic airframe capabilities (too costly and impossible to install without ripping apart the aircraft).  Basic flight systems such as hydraulic control would have been retained.  Your statement is incorrect.  Again, please see the GAO report at http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao9512.htm.   "1970's supply chain" refers to the large Northrop-Grumman military-industrial complex which supported the F-14.  The F-14 program supported estimates of 80,000 jobs, many of which were redundant from other platforms.  Why pay for one F-14 technical assistant and one F-18 technical assistant when you can consolidate and only need one F-18 technical assistant?  Additionally, many subcontractors build components for the Navy, and these contractors disappear or bankrupt or consolidate over time.  If a part breaks, it must be specially ordered and manufactured if the company no longer exists.  A terrible waste of government money.  I have seen simple rotary telephones on Navy ships cost nearly $10,000 to replace.  Maintaining older supply chains of contractors and subcontractors costs more in long-term maintenance costs.  This was reflected in the operational estimates of the time.

I think the reverse is true; the delays in the F-35 make the decision to opt for the Super Hornet even more obviously a mistake.

Each man has his own opinion.  However, the decision to use the F-18 left us with a platform that could fully deploy the wide range of precision guided munitions, vice the limited PGM's supported by the F-14 upgrade.  Unquestionably, this was the most necessary ordnance in the tactical situations of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.  No "Top-gun" high-performance fighter was required in those conflicts.  What was needed was a platform that could deliver precision munitons on very narrow targets while minimizing civilian casualties. 

The British knew perfectly well what was happening with the Skybolt development program, and were aware of the US considerations for dropping the program.  And, of course, they were aware that it had been cut.  To believe otherwise is to believe that the British didn't even read the newspapers! 

l. o. l.  I am laughing out loud at your ignorance of this issue.  The British were aware of developmental problems but were not aware of the impending cuts until McNamara told them in November.  Please see this link to read the floor statements in the House of Commons between the Defense Minister Thorneycraft and the opposition Conservatives.  http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1962/dec/17/skybolt-missile-talks

From the British defense minister himself:

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft)

With permission, I should like to make a statement on my recent talks with Mr. McNamara in London on 11th December.

The principal subject discussed was, as the House knows, the future of the Skybolt missile. We have, of course, known from the outset of our association with the United States Government on 894 this weapon that it constituted a formidable development problem. We knew of various difficulties that had arisen, and of the steps that were being taken to surmount them. Such difficulties, of course, were not unexpected, nor are they unusual even in simpler missiles.

However, when I visited the United States in September of this year, the situation was that while the increase in costs was causing concern, I was assured that American plans assumed delivery of Skybolt. It was not until the beginning of November that Mr. McNamara, while assuring me that no decision would be taken without the fullest consultation, informed me that the future of the weapon was under review. This consultation was carried a further stage last week, and will be continued between the Prime Minister and the President in the Bahamas.

The problem was caused by the fact that the British had decided to stake their entire deterrent program on the Skybolt, which was the sort of penny-wise and pound-foolish thing we are seeing with their carriers today (though entirely in keeping with both British and US defense procurement "strategies").  When Skybolt was cancelled, for good and sufficient reasons, they were stuck.

Yes.  I agree fully.  As an aside, this debate reinforces our mutual agreement that British defense procurement policy has been schizophrenic at best and over-reliant on American defense procurement.

The claim that Macnamara was "unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent" is laughable; of course he knew what stock they placed in an independent deterrent; he just wanted to scotch the independence of that deterrent because he (and Kennedy) didn't want the Soviets to be tempted into an attack only on the British deterrent, as part of some independent British venture (something like the Suez fiasco) taken under the umbrella of that deterrent.

You are mistaken, or you are a interpreting source documents vastly different from contemporary historians.  Please see Chapter 3 of Richard E. Neustadt's Alliance Politics [1970]  for a discussion on this issue.  Better yet, read his updated Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective [1999] which unquestionably reveals McNamara's (and Kennedy's) ignorance of Eisenhower's promise of an independent nuclear deterrent to the British in 1958.

" Of course, the very arguments Macnamara was using were undermined by the fact that Polaris wouldn't be subject to such a Soviet attack, and so, in the end, the british got Polaris and the independent deterrent, in what was a real steal price-wise.  There is no question that Polaris, though obviously more expensive than the el cheapo Skybolt route, was a much more credible deterrent, and that the Brits would have had to buy into Polaris or Poseidon at some point anyway, but without the leverage to get the deal they actually got.

Yes, the British got a better system.  We agree.  However, the costs were, in my estimation, too great.  The system itself cost much more money, and the Skybolt issue was used by DeGaulle as an excuse veto Britain's desired entry into the European Common market.  (See page 50-55 of Alliance Politics)  Given the state of the euro today, perhaps that was a good thing after all.  This statement is in line with our original hypothesis that British defense spending is historically conducted without proper analysis of the costs involved and the feasibility of those programs.  This results in a backtrack further down the road and a subsequent dramatic increase in defense spending.  I believe that this point is supported by this analogy.

There were no development costs for the F-14E.  There were significant development costs for the F-18 E/F.  Remember, we are talking about decisions being made in 1991.  The E/F was just a concept (Hornet 2000) at that point.

Source documents from that period refer to a F-18 E/F platform.  I do not believe your statement that it was still Hornet 2000 at the decision point.  Earlier you had stated yourself that they planned on a 2-seater F-model with two pilots attached to each air wing.  Your statements are contradictory and confusing.  Please provide references.  There were significant costs relative to converting the F-14.  These were judged to be too much by the Navy and the Armed Services Committee.  Please see the 1992 Congressional Report at:

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/920630-cr.htm

And I quote from it:

Figure 7: CVW Cost Comparisons

[Billions of FY90$; 20 years; 13 CVWs; Basis for Estimates: F/A-18E/F Is Budget Quality; F-14D(QS) & STC-21 are Rough Order of Magnitude]

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                    CVW A                       CVW B                                      CVW D
                                40 F/A-18E/F    20 F/A-18E/F 20 F-14D(QS)             40 F-14D(QS)                                   

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

E&MD                            $4.88                 $4.88        $0.33                          $0.33         

Total procurement         43.48                 24.96        29.10                         47.15           

Operations and support 23.54                11.77        15.92                         31.84           

Total                               71.90                41.61        45.35                         79.32     

or you can look at the [1994] GAO report at:

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-1994-06-22/html/CREC-1994-06-22-pt1-PgS26.htm

Incidentally, this conflicts with your earlier cost estimate of $80 billion versus $20 billion.  I believe you pulled this number out of thin air or this number applies only to a limited selected upgrade of aircraft and not to a new production run of F-14's.  Please provide some sort of qualification or reference to your statistic.


My original statement was that I believed the reasons for cutting the F-14 to be: 1. Loss of mission relevance with the end of the cold war and the disappearance of the Tu-22M bomber, 2.  Increased obsolescence of its aviation electronics relative to the FLIR and AMRAAM capabilities of the F-18, and 3. High maintenance and labor costs relative to the F-18.

Your original statement, was that you believe it was due to "airdale" admirals wanting to remove the two-seater airplane, backed up by an implied statement that because you were involved in the creation of the performance comparison report you had insider knowledge of the personalities making such a decision.  We have established that the transition to the F-18's did not significantly affect the Naval Flight Officer community.  You countered with a statement that the original plan was for single-seaters with "pilot-only" two seaters.  However, to take your argument, if the original secret intention of the admirals was to perform a clandestine reduction in NFO personnel costs, this begs the question: Why would they have changed their mind and shifted back to a two-seater plan in the end?  With the F-18 versus F-14 battle won, the battle to keep single-seaters would have been a mere skirmish compared to the first.  It makes no sense that they would suddenly change tack if their original intention was to establish a single-seater air fleet.  The only plausible explanation is that there was a change in brass at the top, but there is no reference or data to support this.  You have proved nothing and made a wild accusation with no facts.  I believe that there is an emotional factor to this associated with the fact that your personal recommendation was not heeded.  Rather, I should say, it was heeded, noted, and considered to be insufficient to support continued deployment of the F-14.  I challenge your statement and I demand references, facts, and personalities involved.  I am willing to listen and change my views, provided I receive facts.

To support my arguments, I quote from the 1992 report, which is roughly concurrent with the decision timeframe:

7. SUMMARY

Over the course of the last five years several major reviews and analyses have produced the data which substantiates the Navy's F/A-18E/F decision. The need to replace large quantities of retiring fighter and attack aircraft in the late 1990s within a constrained fiscal environment is the basis for the Navy's requirement. Less substantial modification to the F/A-18C/D was rigorously evaluated, but all postulated solutions incurred additional costs without improvements in carrier suitability, combat performance, survivability, and growth potential. New start aircraft were considered as prohibitively expensive. The A-6 AI was eliminated as not adequately survivable in the projected threat environment. All F-14 derivatives, while offering equivalent or slightly better fighter capability compared to the F/A-18E/F, proved to be too expensive compared to expected future funding for naval aviation. The data as summarized in Figure 8 confirm the Navy's F/A-18E/F decision.

FIGURE 8. SUMMARY

F-14D(QS): not as survivable in strike role, more expensive to procure, more expensive to operate and support, less capable than F/A-18C/D in strike role.

F-14 derivatives (ATC-21/STC-21): require more squadron manpower, more expensive to operate, high development cost risk (ROM estimates), not acceptable for Marine Corps, not suitable for foreign military sales.

F/A-18E/F configuration based upon 5 years COEA trade studies.

F/A-18E/F cost effective solution to meet inventory requirements.

END

I feel that this conclusively supports my characterization of the mindset that caused the cancellation of the F-14 program.