UK carrier policy: dumb or dumberer

[CountDeMoney]

The ironic thing, of course, is that the F-18 carries its ordnance externally, mostly if not entirely negating its stealth features when on a strike mission.

Brilliant.  While we're at it, let's bring back gun pods.

[Admiral Yi]

Last time I start a thread about boats.

I only wanted to laugh at the Tories.

Thi thread raises the semi-serious question, what happens if a single post exceeds the default page length?

[11B4V]

Last time I start a thread about boats.

I only wanted to laugh at the Tories.

Thi thread raises the semi-serious question, what happens if a single post exceeds the default page length?

then quote it in it's entirety. Your head would explode.

[Kolytsin]

The Americans didn't know of plans to cut the program until November, either.

False.  McNamara was considering that the program's difficulties warranted a cut of the program, but wanted to wait until November to decide.  None of this was communicated to the British.

Neustatd, Richard.  Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective.  Page 6.

"Among all those I interviewed, there was but one who sought to read my report after the President's death.  That was Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, who deviled a copy out of JFK's executor, Robert Kennedy.  McNamara read it and we subsequently discussed it.  He had but one point of difference with it.  I had written that in August of 1962 he concluded Skybolt should go, but the time of the announcement was not yet.  No, McNamara told me, rather his August thought would have been, if, by November, circumstances remained unchanged from August, then he would gladly conclude that it should go.

I would need evidence that
(1) "The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program."
(2)  "it was cut without informing the British"
(3)  "When McNamara went to London to inform the British...[he was], unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent."

I have not seen a single basis or source for your arguments.  Neustedt doesn't support any of these assertions.

You may also see Nigel Ashton's Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence, Chapter 8, page 152.

The single quotation that I pulled for you was not intended for these other assertions, which are too broad to supported by mere cherry-picking of a paragraph.  I would modify the first one, however, to say that they did know the difficulties, but did not know that these difficulties represented a threat to the program.  The rest of the books, and my other citation of the House of Commons deliberation, which I did not place in front of your nose, do support these arguments.  I refuse to hand deliver material to you for review.  At this point, without you providing any sources for your baseless claims, I must regard your arguments as mere naysaying and there is nothing more to discuss.  No matter how much information I may place in front of you, I now believe that your stance will not change.

And the point I am making is that the actual choice was between a higher (overall) cost Hornet program that was less capable, and a lower (overall) cost Tomcat program that was more capable.  that's what the analysis at the time, before the decision was made, told us, and this decision was accepted by the highest level of Navy decision-makers of which I am aware.  None of the post-hoc rationalizations have convinced me that the decision was made based on actual cost-versus-performance data, since there was no follow-on effectiveness study done by the Pentagon.

Then this discussion ends with whether one will believe the numbers contained in your unpublished, internal Navy study, known only to you, or an Navy-independent, publicly-available, concomitant Congressional study.  You have sourced and based none of your claims throughout this entire discussion with independent evidence or studies and your arguments reduce to mere attacks on the validity or interpretation of my sources. 

Edit: You state that your group evaluated the F-14D Quickstrike and it was not adequately considered.  I rebut this with the following excerpt from the congressional report:

While those intent on killing the F/A-18E/F program have suggested otherwise, the F-14D Quickstrike was considered in detail. A side-by-side comparison showed that the F-14D was more expensive, less reliable and less survivable than the F/A-18E/F. In fact, the Quickstrike was shown to be even less capable than the current F/A-18C/D, which the F/A-18E/F will replace. Other reasonable options also were considered and eventually rejected, including other derivatives of the F-14. Although one derivative--the STC-21--was found to offer equivalent performance to the F/A-1E/F, the studies concluded it was simply too expensive and significantly more risky.

In a head-to-head comparison of the F/A-18E/F with the F-14D Quickstrike, the Navy found that the F-14D was not as survivable in the Strike role, was more expensive to procure, and was more expensive to operate and support; and less capable than the F/A-18C/D in the strike role.

The italics are my own.

You are, of course, free to believe anything you wish.

And I will choose to believe the published conclusions of respected political scientists and an independent congressional study over the unsupported claims of an anonymous internet personality. 

My contact with the NAWC office has not resulted in a report, but if I ever manage to get ahold of this phantom publication I will post my conclusions, while respecting the classification of the report.

[CountDeMoney]

Last time I start a thread about boats.

I only wanted to laugh at the Tories.

I like this Kolystin guy.  He's produced more in 15 posts than Raz has posted in, I don't know, how many years have we had Raz?

He is a worth opponent for grumbler-san.

[Ed Anger]

I stand by my man Grumbler, who was there when Pulcher threw the chickens into the sea.

[CountDeMoney]

I stand by my man Grumbler, who was there when Pulcher threw the chickens into the sea.

Yes, but he's been lacking decent sparring partners.  I like this Kolystin Mr T type coming out of nowhere to keep the g man fresh.

[Ed Anger]

I'm suspicious of n00bs.

[11B4V]

Could be Grumbler argueing with himself....

[PDH]

I'm suspicious of n00bs.

Indeed. They smell funny and they talk strange.

[Kolytsin]

I have finally received an independent evaluation of the report you participated in.  The pages are, unfortunately, apparently classified, but the executive summary is thankfully posted.  It is available here:

http://gao.justia.com/department-of-defense/1993/9/naval-aviation-nsiad-93-287r/NSIAD-93-287R-full-report.pdf

This report is highly critical of the F/A-18 and supports several of your assertions on its shortcomings.  However the report concludes that the F-14D Quickstrike was an inferior platform compared to the F-18 E/F (page 13).  Also, the numbers that I posted earlier were challenged.  Instead of $7.4 Billion more, the GAO argues that the QS apparently would have cost $3.6 Billion more.   I still maintain my original position, based on this report's conclusion, that the F-14D (QS) was a higher cost, underperforming alternative.


Your assertion that the Navy performed an inadequate review of the F-14 Quickstrike is not correct.  However, they did not adequately compare the platform with all alternatives.  From the same source, the summary is below:

Except for the F-14 QUICKSTRIKE, the Board's deliberations appeared to be based on individuals' knowledge and judgment or on
information derived from prior analyses that were only minimally documented in the materials submitted to the Board, rather than on studies performed specifically to compare the F/A-18E/F with other alternatives.

This is further substantiated here: http://www.gao.gov/assets/160/155498.pdf   

There is an odd blip, however.  There is some unsourced noise that suggests that the Navy tried to go with the F-14 variant in 1991 but was denied by the DoD, specifically Mr. Cheney.  Their position changed in 1992 to the F-18 variant.  Also, unverifiably, the maintenance costs in the 1992 estimate were based off of F-14A data.  The true maintenance costs of the F-14D when it reached the fleet were half that. 

Based on my research on your report, my position remains in opposition to your F-14D (QS).  I have become more open to the completely reengineered F-14 Strike Tomcat.  This platform appears superior in all respects to the SH, except cost per platform.  However, it would have maintained the strike capability of the A-6 while incorporating all significant upgrades to the SH, for an increase in cost.  The disadvantages held by the F-14D(QS) would have been engineered out of this platform.  The Navy should have performed further follow-on studies and the decision on the F/A-18 E/F was definitely premature, but not necessarily wrong.

[grumbler]

False.  McNamara was considering that the program's difficulties warranted a cut of the program, but wanted to wait until November to decide.  None of this was communicated to the British.

Untrue:

As we will see when we come to discuss the Nassau meeting, the British government could hardly claim to be unaware of the possibility of the failure of Skybolt or unfamiliar with the likely US negotiating position in the event of such a failure

Nigel Ashton's Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence p. 156

The British were quite aware of the issues with the program.

You may also see Nigel Ashton's Kennedy, Macmillan, and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence, Chapter 8, page 152.

Did that.  He agrees with me, and not with you.

The single quotation that I pulled for you was not intended for these other assertions, which are too broad to supported by mere cherry-picking of a paragraph.  I would modify the first one, however, to say that they did know the difficulties, but did not know that these difficulties represented a threat to the program.

Ashton disagrees with this, as I have shown.

Then this discussion ends with whether one will believe the numbers contained in your unpublished, internal Navy study, known only to you, or an Navy-independent, publicly-available, concomitant Congressional study.

It began with my observations about how bureaucracies, for reasons of their own, twist the objective facts until they support the bureaucratic, as opposed to the logical, conclusions.  My observations were based on personal experience.  Your support of the bureaucratic solution is based on the post-hoc justifications put out by the bureaucracy in question.  I don't really care about what you believe.  My observation stands, and if you think I am lying, that's fine with me.

There really isn't anything more to say.

[CountDeMoney]

There really isn't anything more to say.

Yes there is:  whether or not Kolytsin's or your premises remain valid in Battleship.

[grumbler]

There really isn't anything more to say.

Yes there is:  whether or not Kolytsin's or your premises remain valid in Battleship.

My premises would have held true in The Final Countdown.

* Screaming Eagle one-zero-three, splash the Zeroes! *

* No can do, Nimitz. Bingo state. Heading for the barn. *

The movie would have lasted five minutes.



Edit: changed the scenario to Seedy's favorite line.

[CountDeMoney]