UK carrier policy: dumb or dumberer

[CountDeMoney]

Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

In Gulf War 1 too. Sweet 16" action.

A former Ranger I used to work with--who had to wait over ten years for his combat jump wings after their action on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border--got to watch a fire support mission from the Iowa walk its shells right into a shitload of mobilized student reservists into the tree line on the far side of an open field.  Said it was like watching cockroaches scatter, except in little bitty pieces.   

[Ed Anger]

Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

In Gulf War 1 too. Sweet 16" action.

A former Ranger I used to work with--who had to wait over ten years for his combat jump wings after their action on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border--got to watch a fire support mission from the Iowa walk its shells right into a shitload of mobilized student reservists into the tree line on the far side of an open field.  Said it was like watching cockroaches scatter, except in little bitty pieces.   

Whoops, I just creamed my pants. BRB.

[Neil]

Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

New Jersey was, but by itself it wasn't enough.  More dreadnoughts would have been required.

[CountDeMoney]

Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

New Jersey was, but by itself it wasn't enough.  More dreadnoughts would have been required.

I still have hopes that one day, particularly with the "littoral" emphasis on the current and future operational capabilities, that NGFS will once again see the last two wagons come back in some sort of capacity.
It can be done.

[CountDeMoney]

Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

In Gulf War 1 too. Sweet 16" action.

A former Ranger I used to work with--who had to wait over ten years for his combat jump wings after their action on the Honduran-Nicaraguan border--got to watch a fire support mission from the Iowa walk its shells right into a shitload of mobilized student reservists into the tree line on the far side of an open field.  Said it was like watching cockroaches scatter, except in little bitty pieces.   

Whoops, I just creamed my pants. BRB.

I knew you would. 

[grumbler]

Not true.  The proposed upgrades for the F-14 were incompatible with many of the precision-guided munitions that were being developed for the day.  To completely upgrade the F-14 would have cost substantially more money.  Please reference the GAO report at http://www.fas.org/man/gao/gao9512.htm or the 1992 Congressional Cost of Operational Effectiveness Analysis report at www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ac/docs/920630-cr.htm

You are confusing upgraded old F-14s with new-build F-14s.  Neither of your reports refer to new-build F-14s.  Both were written about a different issue, long after the decision at stake was made.

Congressional reports at the time mark only marginal improvement over the capabilities of the F-18.  It was likely more capable individually, but more F-18's could be carried by a carrier than F-14's.  Any strike capability over 700 miles could be dealt with either by tomahawks or by the United States Air Force.  From the 1994 GAO report:

Upgraded F-14s generally have greater range than the F/A-18C.. (snip)

Again, you are misunderstanding the issue.  The issue wasn't "should the Navy spend money to upgrade F-14s," but, rather, "should the navy use the F-14 or the F-18 as the basis for the next-generation strike fighter."

As for the shift to "From the Sea," that document was written in light of the decision to abandon the Naval strike mission and adopt the F-18.  The argument that "the Secretary of the Navy said 85 percent of the Navy's potential targets are within 200 miles of the coast" is merely a reinforcement of the bureaucratic reasoning behind the decision to adopt the short-range F-18 E and F: the Navy's "potential targets" are overwhelmingly located close tot he sea because the Navy cannot hit targets more than a stone's throw away.

F-14 upgrades considered at the time were directed towards avionics and armaments capabilities... (snip)

Since the issue I was discussion doesn't concern F-14 upgrades at all, this is moot.

Each man has his own opinion.  However, the decision to use the F-18 left us with a platform that could fully deploy the wide range of precision guided munitions, vice the limited PGM's supported by the F-14 upgrade.  Unquestionably, this was the most necessary ordnance in the tactical situations of the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.  No "Top-gun" high-performance fighter was required in those conflicts.  What was needed was a platform that could deliver precision munitons on very narrow targets while minimizing civilian casualties. 

While each man may have his own opinion, an informed opinion like mine is probably going to be more persuasive than an uninformed opinion like yours.  The decision to opt for the F-18 follow-on rather than the F-14 follow-on saved a bit in training costs (no need for NFOs) and a fair chunk in operating costs (more fuel-efficient engines due to much lighter aircraft), but left the Navy with a fraction of its strike capability and an enormous R&D bill.

l. o. l.  I am laughing out loud at your ignorance of this issue.

As I am at yours.

The British were aware of developmental problems but were not aware of the impending cuts until McNamara told them in November. 

Not sure what you are arguing here.  There were no impending cuts until November. 

Please see this link to read the floor statements in the House of Commons between the Defense Minister Thorneycraft and the opposition Conservatives.  http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1962/dec/17/skybolt-missile-talks

From the British defense minister himself:

The Minister of Defence (Mr. Peter Thorneycroft)

With permission, I should like to make a statement on my recent talks with Mr. McNamara in London on 11th December.

The principal subject discussed was, as the House knows, the future of the Skybolt missile. We have, of course, known from the outset of our association with the United States Government on 894 this weapon that it constituted a formidable development problem. We knew of various difficulties that had arisen, and of the steps that were being taken to surmount them. Such difficulties, of course, were not unexpected, nor are they unusual even in simpler missiles.

However, when I visited the United States in September of this year, the situation was that while the increase in costs was causing concern, I was assured that American plans assumed delivery of Skybolt. It was not until the beginning of November that Mr. McNamara, while assuring me that no decision would be taken without the fullest consultation, informed me that the future of the weapon was under review. This consultation was carried a further stage last week, and will be continued between the Prime Minister and the President in the Bahamas.

Yes, this is correct, and in accordance with what I have said; the November notification of the possibility of cancellation was no surprise to the Brits, though it was unwelcome.

You are mistaken, or you are a interpreting source documents vastly different from contemporary historians.  Please see Chapter 3 of Richard E. Neustadt's Alliance Politics [1970]  for a discussion on this issue.  Better yet, read his updated Report to JFK: The Skybolt Crisis in Perspective [1999] which unquestionably reveals McNamara's (and Kennedy's) ignorance of Eisenhower's promise of an independent nuclear deterrent to the British in 1958.

I disagree.  Contemporary, and subsequent, historians are pretty much agree that McNamara and Kennedy fully understood that the British wanted an independent nuclear deterrent, and that Skybolt was going to give them that.  If you think that some historian says otherwise, you need some citations, not vague 'read this book" stuff.    McNamara and Kennedy wanted to convert the Brits to a "duel key" system that would allow the US to have a veto over British nuclear responses, under the argument that this would reduce the chances of a thermonuclear exchange.

Now, the tussle with he Brits came not alone because Skybolt was cancelled, but because McNamara and Kennedy wanted to use the subsequent forced British move to the Polaris program as leverage to get them to accept the duel key.  The Brits successfully counter-leveraged the fact that they had the capability to go it alone and got the Polaris not only without the duel key, but at a bargain price.

Yes, the British got a better system.  We agree.  However, the costs were, in my estimation, too great.  The system itself cost much more money, and the Skybolt issue was used by DeGaulle as an excuse veto Britain's desired entry into the European Common market.

The SSBN system cost more money because the aircraft and their bases were already built - but the Vulcans were obsolescent even by the 1960s (and in particular proved unable to maintain a standing airborne force even though over 100 aircraft had been built), and would have to have been replaced by the early 70s had a Skybolt program been adopted.  That cost would have dwarfed that of the  the SSBN force.

Source documents from that period refer to a F-18 E/F platform.  I do not believe your statement that it was still Hornet 2000 at the decision point.

I don't believe you have a clue as to when the decision was made.

Earlier you had stated yourself that they planned on a 2-seater F-model with two pilots attached to each air wing.  Your statements are contradictory and confusing.  Please provide references.

What level of clearance do you possess?  If it is high enough, you can probably get a copy of the report (which would be something like "Naval Strike warfare Options") from 1991 via the OPNAV N88 office.

There were significant costs relative to converting the F-14.  These were judged to be too much by the Navy and the Armed Services Committee.

Irrelevant.  The report I am referring to didn't consider any F-14 conversions.

Incidentally, this conflicts with your earlier cost estimate of $80 billion versus $20 billion.  I believe you pulled this number out of thin air or this number applies only to a limited selected upgrade of aircraft and not to a new production run of F-14's. 

I don't care what you believe. 

Please provide some sort of qualification or reference to your statistic.

I already referenced this; my recollections of the 1991 study I ran.  I see a typo in my statement, though; it should say the F-14D would have been $20 billion less to build in equivalent numbers, not less than $20 billion.

Your original statement, was that you believe it was due to "airdale" admirals wanting to remove the two-seater airplane, backed up by an implied statement that because you were involved in the creation of the performance comparison report you had insider knowledge of the personalities making such a decision.

Nope.  I brought up the difference between the outcome of the study (which was to build upon the F-14 airframe rather than the F-18, for cost, effectiveness, and obviously cost-effectiveness reasons) and the policy ultimately adopted a year or so later as an example of how bureaucracies function: the decision that makes the most objective sense often loses to a solution that has subjective benefits within the bureaucracy (like getting rid of the back-seaters).  I never said anything about the personalities - whoever they were - who got the decision reversed.

That the Navy, after making the decision in favor of the F-18, should find reasons why the F-18 decision was the correct one is to be expected.  That it was cheaper to fly is certainly true.  Whether it was a smart decision to forgo the strike mission to save those operating expenses (at a high anticipated development cost, I might add, though the cost numbers may have changed in the meantime, as nothing is more volatile than projected development costs!) is the question.  I still think the Navy got it wrong.  If you don't, that's perfectly fine with me.

In 1991, the Hornet option was the more expensive and less capable of the two options available.  All of the analysis demonstrated that.  The DSB accepted the analysis and recommended accordingly.  Without analysis, the DSB recommendation was rejected, and the Navy bought the option that its own study had shown to be the inferior one.  Those are facts.  This is how bureaucracies operate, though; bureaucratic priorities are not always rational to outsiders.

[CountDeMoney]

Earlier you had stated yourself that they planned on a 2-seater F-model with two pilots attached to each air wing.  Your statements are contradictory and confusing.  Please provide references.

What level of clearance do you possess?  If it is high enough, you can probably get a copy of the report (which would be something like "Naval Strike warfare Options") from 1991 via the OPNAV N88 office.

[Kolytsin]

You are confusing upgraded old F-14s with new-build F-14s.  Neither of your reports refer to new-build F-14s.  Both were written about a different issue, long after the decision at stake was made.

I was unsure about the exact nature of your study.  I targeted both variations, new build and upgrades to existing aircraft.  I am proceeding based on the belief that you are referring to either new builds of the the F-14D(QS) or new builds of the proposed F-14 ATC/STC-21.  If we limit the debate to those two platforms, the 1992 congressional study remains relevant.  According to the numbers published therein, estimates at the time of a 40-platform F-14D(QS) showed the cost to total $79.32 Billion, compared with $88.31 Billion for a new production run of F-14 ATC/STC-21 platforms.  An equivalent F-18 wing cost estimate was $71.90 Billion.   The referenced figure even states that this number was based on new builds.  Please read the report and revise your statement or explain exactly what it was that you were studying for the F-14.  The ATC/STC-21 estimates I believe refers to your particular study.  To quote further from the report:

After several years of comprehensive analysis including the results of MAR-I and MAR-II, the Navy concluded that ATA and NATF were beyond the limits of affordability and judged the A-6 AI as lacking sufficient survivability to justify further consideration. This narrowed the candidate field to only the F/A-18E/F and the ATC-21/STC-21 as viable alternatives to fulfill carrier aviation's force structure, low end strike fighter requirements. The MAR studies concluded that the STC/ATC-21 were capable of achieving survivability and vulnerability comparable to the F/A-18 derivative. Fighter performance is somewhat better for the F-14 derivatives. Because of the increased gross weights, carrier suitability measures are degraded for the F-14 derivatives compared to the F/A-18 derivative. With the development of an upgraded AEGIS system for the outer air battle and reduction of the long range Soviet bomber threat the F-14 was designed to counter, the Navy concluded it is reasonable to trade better high end fighter performance for reduced cost and comparable performance for other measures.

This supports my argument that the Navy acknowledged the superior performance of the F-14 derivatives, but decided against the platform due to 1.  Lower cost of the F-18.  and 2.  Decreased carrier suitability of a modified F-14.

Again, you are misunderstanding the issue.  The issue wasn't "should the Navy spend money to upgrade F-14s," but, rather, "should the navy use the F-14 or the F-18 as the basis for the next-generation strike fighter."

The issue, as I see it, is "Is a longer range strike fighter necessary in today's threat environment?"  The Navy sought to deal with this via upgrades or new-builds.  The arguments for "not necessary" are the same no matter how you try to hold this capability.

As for the shift to "From the Sea," that document was written in light of the decision to abandon the Naval strike mission and adopt the F-18.  The argument that "the Secretary of the Navy said 85 percent of the Navy's potential targets are within 200 miles of the coast" is merely a reinforcement of the bureaucratic reasoning behind the decision to adopt the short-range F-18 E and F: the Navy's "potential targets" are overwhelmingly located close tot he sea because the Navy cannot hit targets more than a stone's throw away.

I dislike the way you are interpreting the statement.  I feel it is a logical fallacy.  You are trying to portray the Secretary as meaning "The targets that can be handled by the Navy component are within 200 miles of the coast."  Rather, he is saying that "The targets that would need to be handled by the Navy strike component are within 200 miles of the coast."  This is not a reinforcement of bureaucratic reasoning.

Not sure what you are arguing here.  There were no impending cuts until November.   

I am arguing that the British did not know the American plan to cut the program until notified in November.  Perhaps they could have had a premonition, but the Defense minister even stated that he was assured of delivery as late as September.

I disagree.  Contemporary, and subsequent, historians are pretty much agree that McNamara and Kennedy fully understood that the British wanted an independent nuclear deterrent, and that Skybolt was going to give them that.  If you think that some historian says otherwise, you need some citations, not vague 'read this book" stuff.    McNamara and Kennedy wanted to convert the Brits to a "duel key" system that would allow the US to have a veto over British nuclear responses, under the argument that this would reduce the chances of a thermonuclear exchange.

What more is a citation than "Read this book."?  You have provided no books, articles, or backup for your statements and are using the classic argumentative fallacy of "Historians pretty much agree".  Give me names of these "Historians".  In fact, you have provided no references at all for any of your points, except "Based on a 20-year-old personal memory"  I have given you my names.  I will even copy the applicable paragraph out of a book for you.

Neustatd, Richard.  May, Ernest.  Thinking in Time.  Page 108.

For instance, in a famous case at the end of 1962, Anglo-American relations reached a low point because Robert McNamara, Kennedy's Defense Secretary, did not know that two years earlier, when Eisenhower had pledged Britain a crude air-to-surface missile in development (the Skybolt) to extend the Royal Air Force's nuclear capability, the President had not required British bombers to be under NATO.

What more evidence do you need?  What possible quotes, beyond a personal recorded message from Robert McNamara to you, would cause you to give up your untenable position?  Keep in mind that Mr. Neustadt was a close associate of Mr. McNamara and Mr. McNamara even reviewed his comments on the situation and found no issues with his characterization (see page 23 of his 1999 book)

I have not seen a single basis or source for your arguments. 

Now, the tussle with he Brits came not alone because Skybolt was cancelled, but because McNamara and Kennedy wanted to use the subsequent forced British move to the Polaris program as leverage to get them to accept the duel key. 

Provide a source.  My referenced sources disagree with that statement.

The Brits successfully counter-leveraged the fact that they had the capability to go it alone and got the Polaris not only without the duel key, but at a bargain price.

The SSBN system cost more money because the aircraft and their bases were already built - but the Vulcans were obsolescent even by the 1960s (and in particular proved unable to maintain a standing airborne force even though over 100 aircraft had been built), and would have to have been replaced by the early 70s had a Skybolt program been adopted.  That cost would have dwarfed that of the  the SSBN force.

I disagree that a standing airborne force would have been less costly compared to ballistic nuclear submarines, but since you do not provide sources for your statements and since I don't want to move further into the weeds, I will let this statement drop, with my registered disagreement.

I don't believe you have a clue as to when the decision was made.

As per your statements, sometime in 1991.

What level of clearance do you possess?  If it is high enough, you can probably get a copy of the report (which would be something like "Naval Strike warfare Options") from 1991 via the OPNAV N88 office.

It is not available (or, rather, easily findable) on searches of such networks that handle those things.

Irrelevant.  The report I am referring to didn't consider any F-14 conversions.

Converting a F-14 base from a fighter platform to a strike platform does not count as a conversion?

I already referenced this; my recollections of the 1991 study I ran.  I see a typo in my statement, though; it should say the F-14D would have been $20 billion less to build in equivalent numbers, not less than $20 billion.

To solidify your statement.  You are basing your arguments solely off of a 20-year-old recollection of an internal report.

Nope.  I brought up the difference between the outcome of the study (which was to build upon the F-14 airframe rather than the F-18, for cost, effectiveness, and obviously cost-effectiveness reasons) and the policy ultimately adopted a year or so later as an example of how bureaucracies function: the decision that makes the most objective sense often loses to a solution that has subjective benefits within the bureaucracy (like getting rid of the back-seaters).  I never said anything about the personalities - whoever they were - who got the decision reversed.

Reducing personnel costs is hardly subjective in a cost-versus-benefit debate. 

That the Navy, after making the decision in favor of the F-18, should find reasons why the F-18 decision was the correct one is to be expected.  That it was cheaper to fly is certainly true.  Whether it was a smart decision to forgo the strike mission to save those operating expenses (at a high anticipated development cost, I might add, though the cost numbers may have changed in the meantime, as nothing is more volatile than projected development costs!) is the question.  I still think the Navy got it wrong.  If you don't, that's perfectly fine with me.

Projected cost numbers based on my resources indicate that the F-14 had a higher projected cost at the time.  I do not see how you can argue that there is no developmental cost associated with redesigning a F-14 airframe for a strike mission.  Also, I don't see how you can make the conclusion that these arguments were only created after the fact and were not considered at the time of decision unless you were personally in the debating room.  All you know is that you submitted a report that was endorsed by a subsidiary bureaucratic element.  You don't know what other information the deciding forces were referencing at the time.  I highly doubt that this report was the sole source of information. 

In 1991, the Hornet option was the more expensive and less capable of the two options available.  All of the analysis demonstrated that.  The DSB accepted the analysis and recommended accordingly.  Without analysis, the DSB recommendation was rejected, and the Navy bought the option that its own study had shown to be the inferior one.  Those are facts.  This is how bureaucracies operate, though; bureaucratic priorities are not always rational to outsiders.

How do you know it was rejected without analysis?  I have already addressed and challenged the assertion that the Hornet was the more expensive option.  At this point we are arguing about a report that only you have seen and whether the cost assertions made inside that report were true.  Other sources point to the fact that the F-18 was cheaper and that the Navy chose the cheaper option over the marginal improvement in strike capability.  A point which is borne out by history.  I would hardly say that the Navy "sacrificed the strike mission" considering the heavy use of carrier strike capabilities in the recent wars.

The point that I am trying to get to is that the decision was between a lower-cost Hornet, and a equivalent or possibly marginally more capable F-14.  Not between a higher-cost underperforming Hornet and a lower-cost, superior F-14.  Whether the final decision was right or not is somewhat irrelevant, but I feel that using this issue to support an argument of bureaucratic stupidity in defense procurement is misleading and false.

[Ideologue]

Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

Lol.  Yes.

Now I'm imagining B-52s over Dresden. TAKE THAT BILLY PILGRIM.

[Neil]

Weren't some of the Iowas used in Vietnam?

Lol.  Yes.

Now I'm imagining B-52s over Dresden. TAKE THAT BILLY PILGRIM.

In WWIII, they would have been.

[11B4V]

[grumbler]

I was unsure about the exact nature of your study.  .... According to the numbers published therein, estimates at the time of a 40-platform F-14D(QS) showed the cost to total $79.32 Billion, compared with $88.31 Billion for a new production run of F-14 ATC/STC-21 platforms.  An equivalent F-18 wing cost estimate was $71.90 Billion.

The study examined options for the future navy air wing in terms of strike performance in a variety of scenarios.  The F-14 model we ended with as the final recommendation was what the congressional study refers to as the F-14D(QS), though it wasn't known as that in our study.  The cost numbers don't reflect all the R&D costs, just the 6.5 R&D, procurement and operating costs.  Given that the F-18 E/F didn't exist at the time of the study, and the F-14D did, this represents a significant cost advantage for the F-14 option, one that makes their higher unit costs moot in terms of overall costs.  Just looking at the Congressional numbers alone (ignoring the R&D), one would think that paying $7B and change over the life of the wings would be worth it to get the more capable aircraft.

This supports my argument that the Navy acknowledged the superior performance of the F-14 derivatives, but decided against the platform due to 1.  Lower cost of the F-18.  and 2.  Decreased carrier suitability of a modified F-14.

The F-14 had a higher carrier suitability (i.e. ability to land with ordinance still aboard) than does the F-18 E/F.  I seriously doubt that unit cost was the driver, and even if it was, that was a shortsighted approach.  There were cheaper options yet than the E/F, if cost was the driver.

The issue, as I see it, is "Is a longer range strike fighter necessary in today's threat environment?"  The Navy sought to deal with this via upgrades or new-builds.  The arguments for "not necessary" are the same no matter how you try to hold this capability.

You are the only one asking that question, though, and it cannot be answered by anyone save the military planners.  In fact, it cannot possibly be quantified because "longer' and "today's threat environment" are non-quantifiable terms.

I dislike the way you are interpreting the statement.  I feel it is a logical fallacy.  You are trying to portray the Secretary as meaning "The targets that can be handled by the Navy component are within 200 miles of the coast."  Rather, he is saying that "The targets that would need to be handled by the Navy strike component are within 200 miles of the coast."  This is not a reinforcement of bureaucratic reasoning.

it is pure bureaucratic reasoning.  The Navy doesn't need to handle any targets at all.  You are engaged in a logical fallacy; first, by assuming that the navy's targets belong to it and no other service, and second by changing the secretary's statement from the acknowledgement that 15% are further from the cost than the planes can hit to all within strike range.  The target distribution in From the Sea is meaningless bureaucratic mumbo-jumbo.

I am arguing that the British did not know the American plan to cut the program until notified in November.  Perhaps they could have had a premonition, but the Defense minister even stated that he was assured of delivery as late as September.

The Americans didn't know of plans to cut the program until November, either.

Neustatd, Richard.  May, Ernest.  Thinking in Time.  Page 108.

For instance, in a famous case at the end of 1962, Anglo-American relations reached a low point because Robert McNamara, Kennedy's Defense Secretary, did not know that two years earlier, when Eisenhower had pledged Britain a crude air-to-surface missile in development (the Skybolt) to extend the Royal Air Force's nuclear capability, the President had not required British bombers to be under NATO.

What more evidence do you need?  What possible quotes, beyond a personal recorded message from Robert McNamara to you, would cause you to give up your untenable position?  Keep in mind that Mr. Neustadt was a close associate of Mr. McNamara and Mr. McNamara even reviewed his comments on the situation and found no issues with his characterization (see page 23 of his 1999 book)

I would need evidence that
(1) "The British didn't know and were not informed of the significant difficulties encountered by the Skybolt development program."
(2)  "it was cut without informing the British"
(3)  "When McNamara went to London to inform the British...[he was], unaware of the political stock the British placed in having their own independent deterrent."

I have not seen a single basis or source for your arguments.  Neustedt doesn't support any of these assertions.

Provide a source.  My referenced sources disagree with that statement.

You can accept or not.  Your source doesn't disagree with that statement at all.

The rest of your arguments seem to me to be simply naysaying.  I have no response to that kind of argument.

The point that I am trying to get to is that the decision was between a lower-cost Hornet, and a equivalent or possibly marginally more capable F-14.

And the point I am making is that the actual choice was between a higher (overall) cost Hornet program that was less capable, and a lower (overall) cost Tomcat program that was more capable.  that's what the analysis at the time, before the decision was made, told us, and this decision was accepted by the highest level of Navy decision-makers of which I am aware.  None of the post-hoc rationalizations have convinced me that the decision was made based on actual cost-versus-performance data, since there was no follow-on effectiveness study done by the Pentagon.

You are, of course, free to believe anything you wish.

[Gups]

Last time I start a thread about boats.

I only wanted to laugh at the Tories.

[The Minsky Moment]

Actually surprised to see the difference is cost between the F-18 and F-14 was so small.  I always thought he F-18 was a lot cheaper, like 30% or more.

[grumbler]

Actually surprised to see the difference is cost between the F-18 and F-14 was so small.  I always thought he F-18 was a lot cheaper, like 30% or more.

The F-18 E/F had a lot of stealth features the F-14 lacked.  That drove up costs more than the cheaper engines drove costs down.

The ironic thing, of course, is that the F-18 carries its ordnance externally, mostly if not entirely negating its stealth features when on a strike mission.