Any way for the Germans to win the Eastern front?

[grumbler]

I remembered that H.P. Wilmott (probably my favorite author on WW2) had a book on the precise topic of the coming of war to the Pacific, and that I'd always meant to get it.  So I did.  But I ended up getting a couple of his other books I had always meant to get, and ended up spending $200 at Amazon and AbeBooks. 

I'll let Wilmott have the final word on whether Japan would have attacked the US without a guarantee the Germans would DoW, and let you know what he says.

[Ideologue]

Of course, it's also more a boot to the ass that I need to read Toland's book, which has been languishing on my shelf for the past year. 

I'll add my recommendation to grumbler's.  It was a while ago that I read it, but I really liked it.  (I think the only thing I didn't like was that in like 1000 pages it only managed to find about 40 to deal with China.  But the Sino-Japanese War doesn't exactly move units, I guess.)

[CountDeMoney]

But the Sino-Japanese War doesn't exactly move units, I guess.)

Not in English anyway.

[jimmy olsen]

But the Sino-Japanese War doesn't exactly move units, I guess.)

Not in English anyway.

It moves your unit I'm sure.

[CountDeMoney]

But the Sino-Japanese War doesn't exactly move units, I guess.)

Not in English anyway.

It moves your unit I'm sure.

SCWHING!

[Ideologue]

But the Sino-Japanese War doesn't exactly move units, I guess.)

Not in English anyway.

And I think half of those probably were probably about how Joe Stilwell was tired of being used as a sexual prop by the Chiangs.

[grumbler]

I'll let Wilmott have the final word on whether Japan would have attacked the US without a guarantee the Germans would DoW, and let you know what he says.

Finally finished my HP Wilmott marathon (I re-read all the books by him I had, as well as reading his stuff I hadn't had) so can return to this topic.

The most relevant book on the topic is Wilmott's collaboration with Japanese author Hauruo Tohmatsu, A Gathering Darkness.  The authors make it clear that Japan had decided to go to war with the US by the end of July, 1941, and that their timing for the attack on pearl Harbor was based on 3 primary considerations:
(1) the end of monsoon season in November
(2) the completion of preparations for the participation of the Shokaku and Zuikaku (commissioned at the beginning of August 1941 and the end of September, 1941, respectively) for participation in the attack It was felt essential that they participate), and
(3) the completion of modifications to the Japanese oilers and warships to allow them to refuel at sea (this took longer than anticipated, and the attack was delayed into December because of this; the IJN's first-ever underway replenishment came during the transit to Pearl Harbor - there wasn't even time to rehearse the operation).

Germany's attitude was not considered.  In fact, Japanese war plans had always been made under the assumption she would have no allies.  I think Weinberg is dead wrong on this.

Weinberg is right that Pearl Harbor was a disaster for the Japanese, but not for the reasons he stated.  Had the US carriers been there, and destroyed, the attack would have been equally disastrous.  I think Wilmott's argument is persuasive;  Japan's decision to go to war was a decision to lose the war, because Japan's leaders failed to understand that the alternative to her victory in a limited war was not her defeat in a limited war, but her defeat in an unlimited war.  He notes that japan had never fought a war in which the terms were not dictated by her.  Thus, her leaders didn't consider what might happen if the terms were dictated by Japan's enemies.  The disaster that PH represented was the disaster of not considering rationally what the potential consequences were, and instead allowing wishful thinking to be the bedrock of policy analysis.

[derspiess]

Weinberg is right that Pearl Harbor was a disaster for the Japanese, but not for the reasons he stated.  Had the US carriers been there, and destroyed, the attack would have been equally disastrous.  I think Wilmott's argument is persuasive;  Japan's decision to go to war was a decision to lose the war, because Japan's leaders failed to understand that the alternative to her victory in a limited war was not her defeat in a limited war, but her defeat in an unlimited war.  He notes that japan had never fought a war in which the terms were not dictated by her.  Thus, her leaders didn't consider what might happen if the terms were dictated by Japan's enemies.  The disaster that PH represented was the disaster of not considering rationally what the potential consequences were, and instead allowing wishful thinking to be the bedrock of policy analysis.

I'm not a naval expert by any means, but I never fully understood the argument that the outcome of the war would have been significantly different had the carriers been at Pearl Harbor during the attack.  Like we couldn't have built more while fighting delaying actions against the Japs?

[Lettow77]

 Trusting Weinberg is a fool's game. His "Visions of Victory" was painful to read, particularly with regards to Japan and Germany.

[CountDeMoney]

(3) the completion of modifications to the Japanese oilers and warships to allow them to refuel at sea (this took longer than anticipated, and the attack was delayed into December because of this; the IJN's first-ever underway replenishment came during the transit to Pearl Harbor - there wasn't even time to rehearse the operation).

Which reminds me: who was the Eurodouchebag on EUOT that used to argue endlessly that the IJN was prepared to remain on station and starve out the Hawaiian islands immediately after Pearl, anyway?

[grumbler]

I'm not a naval expert by any means, but I never fully understood the argument that the outcome of the war would have been significantly different had the carriers been at Pearl Harbor during the attack.  Like we couldn't have built more while fighting delaying actions against the Japs?

Yes.  Plus, the carriers would have been much easier to raise and return to service than the battleships.

Wilmott also demonstrates pretty convincingly that the whole "third strike wave controversy" at PH is based on myths perpetrated by Fuchida.  There was no possibility of the third strike being launched without requiring an after-dark recovery, which the IJN had never attempted on any scale.  Given that the ships and aircraft had pressing missions waiting for them after this mission and that a third strike would have been hard-pressed to inflict meaningful damage, no one considered the issue until Fuchida wrote his self-serving history after the war.  Wikipedia notwithstanding, the issue was always moot.

[Ed Anger]

(3) the completion of modifications to the Japanese oilers and warships to allow them to refuel at sea (this took longer than anticipated, and the attack was delayed into December because of this; the IJN's first-ever underway replenishment came during the transit to Pearl Harbor - there wasn't even time to rehearse the operation).

Which reminds me: who was the Eurodouchebag on EUOT that used to argue endlessly that the IJN was prepared to remain on station and starve out the Hawaiian islands immediately after Pearl, anyway?

[The Brain]

The disaster that PH represented was the disaster of not considering rationally what the potential consequences were, and instead allowing wishful thinking to be the bedrock of policy analysis.

Let's hope America never makes that mistake.

[DGuller]

The disaster that PH represented was the disaster of not considering rationally what the potential consequences were, and instead allowing wishful thinking to be the bedrock of policy analysis.

Let's hope America never makes that mistake.

[DGuller]

How did a thread about the Eastern front get hijacked into a thread about Pearl Harbor?